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Abstract 
My thesis analyses and assesses von Balthasar's understanding of the nature-grace 
relationship, initially in his contribution to the mid-twentieth century debate in Catholic 
theology and then focusing on the development of this position in the-Theo-drama. 
Having set out his rejection of extrinsicism, his adoption of the `one supernatural 
end' theory and his use of analogia entis to elucidate the consequent de facto (but not 
necessary) unity between creaturely essence and the gift of grace, I explore his 
christocentric re-formulation of the relationship, going on to give detailed attention to his 
dramatic and intra-trinitarian framing of the question. I focus on his analysis of our 
nature understood as finite freedom and the fulfilment of its relationship with infinite 
freedom through the christological mediation of the human and divine free will in Christ 
(into which we are initiated by the Spirit), leading to the grace of participation in the 
divine processions. Taking account of his use of inter-subjective models, the category of 
gift and his treatment of the image-likeness, idea-prototype relationships, I find this 
perspective yields an understanding of the nature-grace relationship in which there is a 
tension between continuity and distinction. In the concrete treatment of his theological 
anthropology we find the question of nature overtaken by that of personhood and the 
natural-supernatural relationship articulated in terms of the transition from conscious 
subject to person in Christ, which simultaneously emphasises grace as unique identity 
and universalising mission. 
Concluding that despite tendencies to the contrary Balthasar ultimately opts for a 
decidedly dualistic conception of the nature-grace relationship, I close by raising some 
questions about the way he relates our topic to the doctrine of the Trinity: namely what 
significance is left to human freedom within a detailed conception of `our play' within 
the `eternal play' of the Trinity, and what it means to introduce diastasis to the doctrine 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the mid-twentieth century a debate shook Catholic theology. It centred on the 
relationship between nature and grace, between the natural and the supernatural' and 
provoked papal intervention in the encyclical Humani Generis, precipitating the 
withdrawal of the French Jesuit Henri de Lubac's authority to teach, and leaving 
Hans Urs von Balthasar feeling deeply shocked and overwhelmed! Decades later 
the debate seems rather alien: highly technical and abstract. Indeed, even by the time 
of the Second Vatican Council a considerable shift in perspective had already taken 
place. Catholic theology was moving away from the exclusive use of the language of 
neo-scholasticism, from discussion of nature and grace as abstract concepts. A 
concrete, systematically Christ-centred perspective was emerging in which it is in 
Christo that the truths about human nature and its fulfilment find "their source and 
most perfect embodiment", and indeed, "it is only in the mystery of the Word made 
flesh that the mystery of man truly becomes clear. "3 
At the time of the original debate, well before the Council, Balthasar was already 
developing such a christocentric approach to the nature-grace question, taking up his 
'Although there is some evidence of the concept of the supernatural in nuanced form from the 
beginnings of Christian theology, the description of grace as supernatural only becomes typical in 
scholastic theology from the thirteenth century onwards. Arising from the need to distinguish grace 
from God's other gifts (ie between what is already given in nature (datum) and the additional gift of 
grace subsequent to this (donum)), the idea of there being an order of being higher than nature meant 
that some gifts could be attributed to the natural order (such as reason and morally good acts) and 
some to the supernatural (such as faith and meritorious human acts in which grace elevates human 
action to the supernatural plane). (cf Alister McGrath: Iustitia Dei A history of the Christian doctrine 
ofJustiftcation I (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986) 100-102; Henri de Lubac: 
Surnaturel etudes historiques (Paris, Aubier 1946) Part III especially 327,372,398 cited by 
Balthasar: The Theology of Henri de Lubac (HDL) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1991) 65. 
The supernatural character of grace is generally accepted to refer to the fact that grace is not part of 
and transcends the powers of any created nature. (cf "Grace" in Karl Rahner, ed.: Encyclopedia of 
Theology A Concise Sacramentum Mundi (Burns and Oates, London 1975) (CSM) 590 cf also 589; 
R Haight The Experience and Language of Grace (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1979) 63; Stephen J 
Duffy: The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought (Liturgical Press, 
Collegeville 1992) 13). Some definitions specifically include the gratuity of grace (ie freely given 
and beyond any `claim' or requirement of human nature) (eg Duffy: Graced Horizon 13; cf also 
Haight: Experience 63 and Rahner CSM 589) and the ontological superiority of God's being to 
human finite being (Duffy: Graced Horizon 13). 
2 "C'est bouleversant, totalement incomprehensible. " Letter to H de Lubac July 1950 in Elio 
Guerriero: Hans Urs von Balthasar eine Monographie (Johannes Verlag, Einsiedeln 1993) 
3"Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" Gaudium et Spes (7 December 1965) 
paragraph 22 in Austin Flannery, ed.: Vatican Council II The Conciliar and Post Conciliar 
Documents Volume I (Dominican Publications, Dublin 1992) 
mentor Erich Przywara's Catholic-Protestant dialogue with Karl Barth's 
christocentrism and working alongside Catholic colleagues like Romano Guardini and 
Michael Schmaus' who were also interested in an emphatically Christ-centred 
approach to all the questions of philosophy and theology. We shall consider this 
approach in chapters one and two of this thesis. Increasingly Balthasar's grounding 
of his christocentrism in a doctrine of the Trinity becomes more systematic and 
highly developed. By the time he was writing the Theo-drama, the five volume 
middle section of the great trilogy that constitutes the culmination of his work, this 
trinitarian focus is dominant. The main part of our study is concerned with an 
exploration of nature and grace in this latter work. Here it is particularly clear how 
for Balthasar a concrete treatment of the nature-grace relationship is a dramatic one, 
in which there is a genuine interplay between God and man (hence his focus on 
freedom as we shall see), and in which things happen (abrupt reversals and changes; 
`surprise' events with explosive effects on history; ferocious battles against God and 
copiously fruitful and far-reaching co-operation with Him). 
The original mid-century nature-grace debate may now largely have been left 
behind. However the questions it raised were important ones because they are to do 
with the very relationship between God and man, between what we are and what we 
shall be. Perhaps restricted by the highly sensitive theological climate of the day, in 
many ways these questions were never really solved. In exploring Balthasar's 
theology of nature and grace, initially in earlier work but mainly in the Theo-drama, 
we can consider how effective a contribution it makes to the Church's ongoing 
development of an authentic expression of the nature-grace relation. This 
investigation goes beyond what may at first appear to be the relatively narrow 
concerns of one rather complex issue in Roman Catholic theology. It is to do with 
the very nature, purpose and fu filment of human existence, particularly of human 
freedom, that characteristic that so dominates post-enlightenment reflection on the 
nature of human being. And as the thesis unfolds we find it is also to do with our 
4cf Balthasar: The Theology of Karl Barth (KB), tr. Edward T Oakes (Ignatius, San Francisco 1992) 
326-334 and chapter 2 section A below. 
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conception of God, for, as we shall see, for Balthasar it is who God is that decides 
everything else. 
In this thesis I will indicate the opportunities for an authentic understanding of 
the nature-grace relationship opened up by Balthasar's patristic/scholastic retrieval 
and by his intra-trinitarian christocentric perspective. However I will also uncover a 
tension between continuity and distinction in his understanding of the relationship 
that ultimately favours a decidedly dualistic conception. I will also question the way 
he relates our topic to the doctrine of the Trinity, asking what significance is left to 
human freedom within a detailed conception of `our play' within the `eternal play' 
of the Trinity, and what it means to introduce diastasis to the doctrine of God as the 
ground of the God-creature diastasis. 
A Defining terms 
We are aware in what we have already set out that we are presuming an accepted 
understanding of the main terms. So before we go any further we wish to provide a 
preliminary description of what we mean by both 'nature' and `grace'. 
1 Nature 
The word nature has a variety of meanings in modern usage and a rich history, having 
been employed variously down the centuries. ' More specifically, in both 
philosophy and theology it has been used in precise technical senses, such that the 
terms nature and natural "in certain phrases and combinations, bear whole traditions 
of meaning and interpretation within themselves. "6 It is one such influential 
theological `combination' that focuses our attention in this thesis: that of `nature and 
grace' and, in close relation, `natural and supernatural'. 
5 cf RG Collingwood: The Idea of Nature (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1965); Paulos Mar Gregorios: 
The Human Presence An Orthodox View of Nature (Christian Literature Society, Madras 1980); 
Gordon Kaufmann: "A problem for Theology: The Concept of Nature" Havard Theological Review 
65 (1972) 337-366; S O'Flynn Brennan: `Nature in philosophy' (Brennan NCE) and MJ 
Dorenkemper: `Nature in Theology' (Dorenkemper NCE) in New Catholic Encyclopaedia entry 
`Nature' 276-280; `Nature, Philosophical Ideas of (NEP) in New Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 454- 
457: Jörg Splett: `The Philosophical Concept' (Splett SM) and Juan Alfaro: `The Theological 
Concept' and `Nature and Grace' (Alfaro SM) in Rahner, ed.: Sacramentum Mundi entry `Nature" 
171-181. 
6 Kaufmann: "Problem" 339 
13 
This uniquely theological usage is not unrelated to other non-theologically 
specific meanings. One of the oldest and most enduring of these refers to what might 
be called `essence': something's native characteristics, constituting it as that 
particular kind of thing; the inherent behaviour and qualities that make it what it is 
(`whatness'). ' Strictly this meaning refers to the intrinsic/internal source of such 
essential behaviour, "the constant rise of the individual being in its reality (the 
essence as actively realised)", 8 the principle of motion and rest, of becoming! In fact 
Paulos Mar Gregorios, the Syrian Orthodox theologian, makes the interesting 
observation that this meaning underlies all the other meanings of the term. This is 
certainly true of the Christian usage on which our attention is focused, for as we 
shall see, it is the tension between essential characteristics or determinations and 
those that come as a gift from outside that lies at the heart of the nature-grace relation 
and distinction. It is therefore in the sense of these two meanings-the Christian 
`nature and grace', and the philosophical `essence'- that we use the word nature in 
this thesis. 
However we should mention one other meaning. Whilst the use of nature as 
essence is still common today, '° modem usage is dominated by the use of the term to 
refer to `the totality of all that is'. " Although this is not the main application of the 
word in this thesis, theology is not isolated from this shift in meaning and it does 
indeed have relevance for our topic. Whilst the use of `nature' in this sense has little 
It is something's "inherent qualities or characteristics", "its essential qualities or properties", "what 
was native to it", "that which constitutes it or him as that particular (kind of) object or person, 
appearing and behaving as it (he) does, having just those qualities and characteristics" Ibid. 339; "the 
given structure or constitution of a person or thing" referring to both "the given behaviour pattern and 
the expected character of an entity" Gregorios: Human 18; "the laws and principles of structure by 
which the behaviour of things may be explained" NEP 454; "that which determines a being's species 
and proper activity" MJD NCE 279; "human existence under the laws of our particular kind of being; 
the individual as conditioned, limited, finite, determined" Haight: Experience 44 (referring to Karl 
Rahner's understanding of nature); that by which things "severally and collectively are what they are" 
Collingwood: Idea 52. 
8 Splett SM 171 going forth, nasci. 
9 Brennan NCE 276; Collingwood refers to nature as the internal source of a things behaviour (Idea 
45) making it behave as it does (46), and sets out the Aristotelian definition of nature as "the essence 
of things which have a source of movement in themselves. " (81) This is how physis was generally 
used. 
'° cf Ibid. 43ff; Gregorios: Human 18 
" cf Kaufmann: "Problem" 339-340; Gregorios: Human 17-18; Collingwood: Idea 43; NEP 454; 
Dorenkemper NCE 279 
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or no basis in Scripture or patristic writing, " it is being applied to a reality of great 
importance to the Christian tradition: creation. More significantly for us, right from 
the earliest days of Christianity, this `all things' that nature now often designates 
comes up in phrases corresponding to aspects of what has since been expressed as a 
nature-grace relationship: for example the Pauline doctrine of the recapitulation of all 
things in Christ, or the relation of the first and the second creation. We will therefore 
sometimes find nature employed in this sense of totality, particularly because 
Balthasar tends to move from nature-grace to creation-grace terminology. The use of 
nature as totality in this context we shall see also relies upon the meaning of nature 
as essence. For it is what it is in its essence that distinguishes and/or relates nature 
as totality to whatever it is/receives by grace. 
Finally we are considering the nature-grace relationship in the context of the 
human vocation, our existence and fulfilment, so our focus as regards the `essence' 
meaning of nature will be on human nature in particular. 
2 Grace 
The word grace is also rich in meaning and does not succumb instantly to tidy 
definition. Partly because of its varied usage through history, but also because of its 
very centrality to the Christian faith, it is used with reference to different aspects of 
the Christian life. " It is God's action in us forgiving, healing, justifying, liberating, 
sanctifying, and necessary for every salutary act14 (as for example in Augustine's 
conception, highly influential in the West, particularly in Protestant theology). It is 
thus understood as God's love for us, often particularly associated with the Holy 
Spirit. It is God himself relating to and giving himself to us (a perspective 
characteristic of the Eastern tradition15 and dominant in contemporary Catholic 
definitions, which concentrate less on different categories of grace16). It is the 
12 cf eg Gregorios: Human especially 17-27 
13cf Haight: Experience 46; Martin Henry: "Reflections on Grace (1)" Irish Theological Quarterly 66 
2001 197 
14 it is from this that the concept of actual grace, helping every action, derives. 
15The Eastern tradition has no conception of created grace, that is as a gift really distinct from God. 
'6cf Karl Rahner: "Nature and Grace" in Theological Investigations IV 177ff ; CSM 588-595; Duffy: 
Horizon 13,106; R Haight: Experience 46. The basic categories that became typical in Catholic 
theology are sanctifying/habitual grace (a constant supernatural state of being intrinsically 
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relationship human beings have with God when his self-communication is received 
by them (as for example in the understanding of grace as participation in the divine 
life or as the indwelling of the Godhead), and it is on the basis that this `life in God' 
transcends our natural capacities that grace is understood as elevating and 
supernatural". In all cases it is a gift unmerited and gratuitous, freely given by God 
out of his infinite goodness and love. 18 
Without embarking upon a detailed study of the history of the word (which 
would go well beyond what is possible here), we can sum up what we mean by grace 
in this thesis by saying that it is the gift of communio, communion of the human 
person with God and with other persons who are also in communion with Him. It is 
a communion in and through Christ and the Holy Spirit and (especially for 
Balthasar) a communion modelled on and grounded in the eternal communion of the 
persons of the Trinity. To elaborate further on Balthasar's position here would of 
course anticipate the contents of this study, but we can say that this basic 
description embraces a variety of different emphases which incorporate the 
understanding of grace both as God's giving himself and as his acting in us and us in 
Him. We shall find that this exploration of grace is at once a question of theological 
anthropology, of the relationship of finite and infinite freedom; of christology, of 
soteriology, and of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
We should point out from the outset that we are not exploring grace in terms of 
religious experience in the context of spirituality and prayer, nor in terms of vocation 
understood as different states of life, nor have we focused on the specifically 
ecclesiological and sacramental dimensions of the doctrine of grace or on the 
sanctifying and justifying) and actual grace (a temporary divine intervention moving the soul to 
perform a salutary act, including prevenient grace, preceding and affecting an act of the will, and 
subsequent grace, accompanying and supporting the act. ) For more detail on a host of other 
divisions and distinctions cf L Ott: Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma (Mercier Press, Cork 1957) 
220ff; William E Addis and Thomas Arnold, eds.: A Catholic Dictionary (Virtue, London 1952) 
375-379. 
"cf eg Haight: Experience 54-75; McGrath: Justitia I 100-102; Rahner: CSM 588-591; cf also note 1 
above. 
"This is dominant in the original biblical meanings (grace as divine benevolence, unmerited gift or 
favour), although gratuity has remained an essential characteristic of grace in the more substantive 
meanings. 
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eschatological aspect, although we have suggested the direction in which this would 
be developed. 
B Structure of thesis 
Our first chapter discusses Balthasar's approach to the topic in his book Karl Barth 
published in 1951 and in an article published a couple of years later. Chapters two 
and three put forward Balthasar's christocentric perspective at this earlier stage and 
as it is developed later in the Theo-drama. In chapters four and five we focus on the 
theo-dramatic perspective exploring Balthasar's treatment of finite freedom and its 
christo-pneumatological fulfilment in infinite freedom, touching too on his use of the 
image-likeness relationship, the concept of idea and the theme of being `born of 
God'. Following Balthasar's own progression in volume two of the Theo-drama we 
move from the more abstract consideration of finite freedom to the concrete "man", 
Chapter six offering an outline of the theological anthropology contained in the Theo- 
drama and chapter seven setting out Balthasar's understanding of personhood in 
Christ. The concluding chapters draw together from the preceding sections the 
dominant strands of Balthasar's theology of nature and his theology of grace, 
providing a critique of his treatment of both concepts and the relation between them. 
Throughout we will find Balthasar often cautious about explicit treatment and 
categorisation, especially as he moves away from the terminology of the initial 
debate, for the topic 
concerns the most delicate and most mysterious of aspects; our words and concepts are better 
employed in protecting it against misuse rather than in subjecting it to the microscope of 
worldly reason. '9 
C Theo-drama 
The central concerns of the Theo-drama are the concerns of a theology of grace: 
... 
God takes the first step, in surpassing love and utterly free grace, by enabling man to act 
authentically in Christ's acting area and so respond to God's prior action: this constitutes the 
central theme of theo-drama. 2° 
j9Balthasar: Theo-drama II (Th II), tr. Graham Harrison (Ignatius, San Francisco, 1990) 312; cf KB 
290-291; Explorations in Theology I (ET I), tr. AV Littledale with Alexander Dru (Ignatius, San 
Francisco 1989) 61,172 
17 
Each of the three parts of Balthasar's great trilogy corresponds to one of the 
transcendentals. Whilst the theo-aesthetics is concerned with the beautiful and the 
Theo-logic with the true, the Theo-drama is concerned with the good. The question 
of God's manifestation (on the plane of light, image and vision) in the theo-aesthetics 
is a prelude to the central event (on the plane of deed, event, drama), 2' that is, the 
encounter of infinite divine freedom and finite human freedom in creation and 
history'22 the event in which God acts for man and man responds through decision 
and deed. 23 This is the concern of the theo-dramatics. God does not simply want to 
be "contemplated" or "perceived by us, like a solitary actor by the public, but has 
from the beginning provided a play in which we must all share. "24 The Theo-drama 
then is thinking through the bonum "as the historically dramatic mutual orientation 
of the divine-trinitarian freedom and the sinful-redeemed human freedom" to 
eschatology. 25 It is about grace because it is about the self-giving of God, about the 
Being whose `epiphany' is considered in the theo-aesthetics, delivering itself and 
therefore showing itself to be good; 26 and it is about the response, the answer made 
to the splendour that not only reveals, but also surrenders itself. There is bonum, 
there is action and ethics, because there is the donum: lying within the triune self- 
giving of God there is the gift that implies a task, that is, the gift of the free self, its 
liberation for the sake of authentic response to God, and the mission given it which 
can make a genuine contribution to `the play'. 
20Balthasar: Theo-drama III (Th III), tr. Graham Harrison (Ignatius, San Francisco, 1992) 52 
21Balthasar: "In Retrospect" in John Riches, ed.: The Analogy of Beauty. The Theology of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1986) 217 
22Balthasar: "Another Ten Years - 1975" in Ibid. 224 23Balthasar: "Retrospect" 217 
24Balthasar: "Another Ten Years" 225 
25Balthasar: "Theo-logic: On the Work as a Whole" Communio Winter 1993 623-637, here 636 
26Balthasar: My Work in Retrospect (Ignatius, San Francisco 1993) 116 
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PART 





Developing a concept of nature and 
a concept of grace 
A The debate 
In the neo-scholastic theology that dominated Catholic theology for more than half of 
the previous century the order of nature and the order of grace were seen as markedly 
remote from one another and the supernatural distant from human experience. A purely 
natural end for human life was considered (including speculation on the nature of such 
an end had man not been given a supernatural finality), and nature became more and 
more like a coherent, self-enclosed system to which the supernatural was attached like a 
supplementary upperstorey. 
The resourcement in twentieth century Catholic theology, broadly associated with 
the school of thought known as the nouvelle theologie, marked a shift from a dry, 
manual-learnt, decadent neo-scholasticism to the original sources of the Fathers. This 
approach moved away from the harsh extrinsicism in which grace can be viewed as a 
mere addition to a human nature complete in itself. Speculation about a hypothetical 
purely natural world order was replaced by focus on the concrete world order as in fact 
established by God, a world in which communion with God is central to God's intention 
for humanity and thus more attention was given to the link between nature and grace. I 
'On this development and the debate with neo-scholasticism cf Stephen J Duffy: The Graced Horizon 
Nature and Grace in Modern Catholic Thought (Liturgical Press, Minnesota 1992) and The Dynamics of 
Grace: Perspectives in Theological Anthropology (Liturgical Press, Collegville, 1993); R Haight: The 
Experience and Language of Grace (Gill and Macmillan, Dublin 1979) 124f; Martin Henry: "Reflections 
on Grace" Irish Theological Quarterly 66 195-210 here 199,202,208-210; Rahner: `Nature and Grace' in 
Theological Investigations IV 165-188 (Darton, Longman and Todd, London 1966); S Boyle: "The 
Nature of Man and the Call to the Divine", in Faith 26 n6 Nov/Dec 1994; Medard Kehl: "Hans Urs von 
Balthasar A Portrait" Introduction to Medard Kehl and Werner Loser, eds.: The von Balthasar Reader (T 
&T Clark, Edinburgh, 1982) 17ff; John Riches: "Balthasar and the Analysis of Faith" in The Analogy of 
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Henri de Lubac's work was groundbreaking in this regard, with theologians like Karl 
Rahner, H Bouillard and Balthasar himself adopting a similar focus, although the detail 
of their approaches varied. Pope Pius XII's correction of those theologians who denied 
the divine possibility of creating "intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to 
the beatific vision"2 in his encyclical Hu; nani Generis in 1950 was interpreted as a 
condemnation of de Lubac's ideas and put these developments into a state of crisis. 
However his gradual rehabilitation went hand in hand with the general acceptance of the 
main points of his thesis, although the details of his interpretation are still disputed. 
Balthasar makes his main contribution to the debate in his book on Karl Barth's 
theology3 (which he intended as a dialogue between de Lubac and Barth4). Aspects of 
his position on nature can be traced back, however, to articles written in the mid 1940s 
(owing much to his other great mentor, Erich Przywara), 5 and he followed up comments 
and criticisms of the discussion in Karl Barth with an article published in 1953.6 
Beauty 41-44; William V Dych: Karl Rahner (Geoffrey Chapman, 1992) 32-37; John Riches: "Hans Urs 
von Balthasar" and JA DiNoia: "Karl Rahner" in David Ford, ed.: The Modern Theologians (Blackwell, 
Oxford 1989) 193-4,238,242; John O'Donnell: Hans Urs von Balthasar (Chapman, London 1992) 3; 
Balthasar: The Theology of Henri de Lubac (HDL) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1991). 
Contemporaneous works include: Henri de Lubac: Surnaturel, Etudes Historiques (Aubier, Paris 1946) 
(or the new edition Desclee de Brouwer, Paris 1991), later modified in view of criticisms as 
Augustinisme et Theologie Moderne (Aubier, Paris 1965) (Augustinianism and Modern Theology (Herder 
and Herder, New York 1969), and also Le Mystere du Surnaturel (Editions Montaigne, Aubier 1965) 
(The Mystery of the Supernatural (Geoffrey Chapman, London 1967); P Gutwenger: "Der Begriff der 
Natur in der Theologie" in Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 75 (1953) 461-464; Rahner: 
"Concerning the Relationship between Nature and Grace" Theological Investigations I (Darton, Longman 
& Todd, London 1974) 297-317; PJ Donnelly: "Current Theology" Theological Studies VIII (1947) 486- 
488; IX. (1948) 213-249,554-60 and "Current Theology The Gratuity of the Beatific Vision and the 
Possibility of a Natural Destiny" in Theological Studies 11 1950 pp 374-404; Charles Boyer: "Nature 
Pure et Surnaturel dann le "Surnaturel" du Pere de Lubac" in Gregorianum 28 1947 379-95; cf also notes 
3 and 6 below. 
2Pius XII: Encyclical Letter Humani Generis (1950) 26 
3 Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie (1st edition: 1951 Jakob Hegner, Köln; 2nd 
edition: 1962) (KBD) In what follows we refer to the second edition. English translation: The Theology 
of Karl Barth, tr. Edward T Oakes (Ignatius, San Francisco 1992) (KB) 
4 Private letter to de Lubac July 1950 in Elio Guerriero: Han Urs von Balthasar eine Monographie 
(Johannes Verlag, Einsiedeln 1993). 
5 KB 270 note 5 ("Analogie und Dailectik. Zur Klärung der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Karl Barths" 
Divus Thomas 22 (1944) 171-216 and "Analogie und Natur. Zur Klärung der theologischen 
Prinzipienlehre Karl Barths" Divus Thomas 23 (1945) 3-56) 
6 "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie" in Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 75 (1953) (DB), 453- 
461 
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B Balthasar's re-formulation of the nature concept 
Firstly, with de Lubac, Balthasar maintains that in the concrete world created by God 
man has one end: a supernatural one. Nature exists for the sake of grace and is ordered 
to it, and there is a de facto (but not necessary) unity between man's creaturely essence 
and the free gift of grace from his origins.? The creature is always in some relation to 
grace, although the grace of creation is not to be equated with "the actual grace of God's 
supernatural self-disclosure. "8 According to this perspective nature is open and crucially 
(with de Lubac) "man's spirit is a paradoxical creation that straddles the threshold 
between natural and supernatural and belongs to both orders in the concrete creation we 
know. "9 Thus Balthasar argues for a more dialectical understanding of nature, 1° not like 
the extreme ambiguity of a traditional Protestant understanding, ll but a two-sidedness 
(Doppelsinnigkeit; Doppelseitigkeit). 12 What is specifically supernatural is above nature 
as it is beyond nature's own powers to attain, but is also in accordance with nature 
inasmuch as it has been made for it and has therefore been made capable of it. It 
expresses the peculiarity of man's situation, who, having no other goal than the 
supernatural vision of God, has "a nature that cannot be fulfilled through its natural 
possibilities alone"; 13 he can only fulfil himself beyond himself. Balthasar takes up de 
Lubac's thesis that this is the perspective of the Fathers and of Thomas. 14 
KB 267-268 Augustine calls this unity nature. 271 
8 The self bestowal involved in establishing the creature as Other does not approach this opening up and 
giving of self. This would be Pelagian. Ibid. 379 
9 Ibid. 296 (my italics), cf also 343-357; Balthasar: The Theology of Henri de Lubac (HDL) (Ignatius, 
San Francisco 1991) 66-67 
10 KB 267 cf Balthasar: My Work In Retrospect (Ignatius, San Francisco 1993) 63. 
"This can be found in Calvin, for example, where nature includes grace at one moment (original creation; 
sin therefore unnatural) and excludes it at another (fallen man; sin now the expression of his nature). KB 
272 
12 `doublesideness' or `ambiguity' (KBD 282/KB 270; KBD 298/KB 287; KBD 300/KB 289). 
13 KB 268 
14Ibid. 267-270 There is not space here to enter into debate over this interpretation. cf bibliography in 
note 1 above. Baithasar supports the one end interpretation of Thomas with reference to de Lubac's 
argument in Surnaturel (especially 431-480) as well as mentioning various scholars (among them Henri 
Rondet and Michael Schmaus) who accepted his historical analysis (KB 267 note 1; 344 note 62). cf 
also HDL 64f. As regards the paradoxical nature of man Balthasar cites S Th I1/11 q 2, a 3, c (KB 282 
note 27); S Th III q 9, a 2, ad 3 (KB 268), a sentence which "could be replaced with any number of 
others. " cf also discussion KB 269-270. 
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Balthasar still supports the development of the nature concept in the Church's 
formulations after the patristic and high scholastic period. '5 However he rejects the 
way in which some theologians turned the hypothesis of pure nature (initially used to 
defend the gratuity of grace against the juridical bond between nature and grace of Baius 
and Jansen, 16) into a full scale system with "all the seeming power of reality". 17 This 
system then came to dominate modern Catholic theology (at the expense of the patristic 
and scholastic two-sided understanding of nature18). It entailed the futility of discussing 
the nature of man whilst bracketing his real meaning and purpose. 19 Moreover, it is 
extremely difficult to isolate the purely natural. 20 from what is touched by the 
supernatural because of the de facto unity of nature and grace in the concrete. Therefore 
as attempts were made to give the pure nature abstraction some content, talk soon 
trespassed upon the concrete order already "enmeshed in the order of grace" and aspects 
of the concrete concept were subtly subsumed into the abstract one. 21 It was no longer 
the tension between pure nature and the concrete state from which it has been isolated 
that was being described but the old patristic and scholastic tensions between natura 
and gratia; the tension between creation and covenant. Thus, ironically, this artificial 
attempt to make a clear separation of nature and grace (in the wake of Baius' 
understanding of a necessary unity) diminishes appreciation of the full qualitative 
difference between them, because what is explored under the category of pure nature 
inevitably includes the influence of and the relation to the supernatural. Hence, when 
the supernatural is treated per se, it can appear little more than an upperstorey, 
rounding off and perfecting an almost self-sufficient substructure. 
is KB 271-272 
16 Ibid. 269,348 
" Ibid. 348 
18 Ibid. 267 He saw that retrieval of this understanding was of service to ecumenical dialogue. 
19 Ibid. 348 In Balthasar's view theology should not focus on such hypothetical investigations, moving 
rather "within the complex order of this world, which is the only legitimate object of theological 
thought. " Ibid. 284; cf also 285 
20 Ibid. 283-4 
21 Ibid. 289; cf 283 
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Balthasar maintains that both this mistake and that of Baius might have been avoided 
had theologians properly recognised that nature is not a neutral concept shared by 
philosophy and theology that can simply be used univocally in both disciplines. 
Balthasar is not proposing an extreme Protestant dialectic, but an analogy between 
philosophical and theological usage. 
A philosophical concept of nature originating with Aristotle and developed by the 
Stoics and the Scholastics is at once static (as regards essence), and dynamic (in the 
sense of teleological). It is understood from its meaning and effects, that is its finality, 
and it cannot be understood apart from this dynamic meaning. The ways and means of 
achieving its finality are possessed by and inherent to its full logical constitution. 22 It 
would follow logically from this that the dynamic unity of the being of man also 
possesses inherently what is required to achieve the supernatural goal to which he is 
ordained. 23 This univocal application of the philosophical concept was Baius's 
position; the Fathers before him had considered the possibility of such an application. A 
purely philosophical perspective could not identify a problem with such a position. It 
is only from revelation that we know that man's finality is only achieved by the free gift 
of grace and so it is theology alone, based on faith, that can provide the more precise 
delimitation of nature that rules out the Baian `mis-development', on the basis of a new 
theological insight: that our vocation to the beatific vision "can in no way be derived 
from the essence of the creature. "24 
In Balthasar's view the mistake of the pure nature theologians and their false 
extrinsicism originates in the fact that they also univocally adopted this philosophical 
concept of nature. So in their zealous determination to avoid thus bringing grace within 
the remit of nature (as Baius concluded), they had to give man an end that was 
proportionate to his nature, the purely natural end. 
22 Ibid. 274; HDL 66 
23 KB 274 
`4 Ibid. 275 
24 
Without rejecting what is useful and true about philosophical insights, theology 
cannot indiscriminately apply a concept of nature that does not cohere with the 
uniquely Christian understanding of the human being: his end is not simply 
proportionate to his nature, nor therefore is his `natural desire' restricted to what his 
natural capacities can attain of themselves, for God has made him for himself "and our 
hearts are restless till they rest in thee"! 25 
So Balthasar's emphasis on the de facto unity between nature and grace does not 
mean a merging of one order with the other. Indeed he is uneasy that the pure nature 
system's tendency to `steal' from the concrete nature concept (already touched by 
grace) leaves the supernatural without its unique dimensionality. This shows his 
concern for the full qualitative distinction between the two. For the fact that the 
borderline between the two orders is difficult to identify in the concrete by no means 
implies that the distinction between the two is diminished. 
God's real world order is the de facto unity of two materially distinguishable and distinct orders 
that can be differentiated in analysis but are still not separate in reality. 26 
It is precisely this true distinction that Balthasar intends to put forth by recognising 
the limitations of the philosophical definition and approaching the question primarily 
theologically, that is from the perspective of revelation. 
C Defining nature and grace 
This approach means that grace is not best deduced from below as that which is not 
nature. 27 Rather grace is 
revealed in its own inner essence so that its reality, mysteriously transcending all of nature, can be 
realised in its very essence. 
The positive definition of grace can only be given through grace itself God must himself reveal 
what he is within himself. 
Balthasar defines grace as 
that self-disclosure and self-communication of God in which God no longer possesses his own 
divine inner life for himself but now bestows it upon the world and thereby gives the creature a 
share in it. 
28 
25 Augustine: Confessions 
26 KB 280 
27 Ibid. 275ff 
28 Ibid. 364 
25 
It is a participation in God's inner divine life29 that is consciously and ontically real; has 
an event aspect and an ontological aspect, being "a genuine ontological transformation, a 
genuine imparting of divine Being and a genuine sharing of the creature in God's Being 
that affects the creature's own being as well as the creature's awareness of the world of 
divine Being. , 30 This partaking in "what is most unique to God"" can be begun now, 32 
and involves no loss of identity33 or eradication of the God-creature distance. 34 It is "a 
new relationship to Christ and through him to the triune God"35 involving an ontic 
incorporation into Christ as members of his body. 36 Indeed, grace, put more concretely, 
is "Jesus Christ, our Advocate before the Father". 37 God's decision to enter into a 
history with the creature he has endowed with being means encounter and mutual 
exchange - which cannot exclude ontological elements: "real participation and lasting 
ontic effect (qualitas inhaerens)". 38 There is room for differing degrees of closeness and 
distance, "for all real events and phases that make up man's way to God: conversion, 
progress, backsliding, co-operation and obstacles. )39 (The dominant `event quality' of 
this description of grace as (christological) participation is already moving in the 
direction of the dramatic presentation of the later Theo-drama. ) 
Defining grace from its own reality affects how we understand the counterconcept 
too, meaning that the creature cannot delimit itself in relation to grace, seeing as this is 
known by the revelation of God alone. Only the light of revelation can clarify the 
difference between creature and God. 40 So it is primarily working from grace that the 
theological nature concept is defined as "that aggregate of things that is set off from 
29 Ibid. 279,285,286 
30 Ibid. 365 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 366,370 
33 
Ibid. 365 
34 Ibid. 286,287 
3s Ibid. 343 
36 Ibid. 365 
37 Ibid. 373 
38 Ibid. 366 
39 Ibid. 377 
40 Ibid. 279; DB 457-458 
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grace and the supernatural order", 41 "` abstracted' or pulled away from a totality that we 
are given from the start"42 by an a posteriori subtraction. (It is in this sense that it can 
be called a `residual' or `remainder' concept 43) 
Whilst on the one hand God's self-giving in grace cannot be derived from the gift of 
creation (Baius), 44 the fact that we define nature primarily by working from grace does 
not mean that we deduce nature from grace either, as Balthasar concludes Barth does. 45 
Nature is rather `the antechamber', 46 the logical (if not necessarily chronological) 
presupposition of grace, 47 the "minimum that must be present in every possible 
situation where God wants to reveal himself to a creature. "48 Grace is for it and in it, 
being modal, not substantial. 
Nature exists concretely in the transformed exalted "mode" of being graced. But the subject that 
has been so transformed is none other (non alter) than that of nature, even if it has become 
something different (aliter). 49 
It pervades the concrete structure of the world like an abstract formal blueprint does a 
building. 50 Thus an abstract and formal understanding of nature fashioned by some kind 
of subtraction process is not without significance for Balthasar, despite his emphasis on 
the importance of the concrete. 
As presupposed subject the necessity of the nature concept is prior to the facticity 
of revelation, but this is a necessity dependent on the free decision of God and a priority 
relative to the facticity of revelation which supports and circumscribes it. 51 Here we 
identify an abiding pattern in the way Balthasar frames his analysis. The significance of 
nature as a formal and necessary presupposition is upheld, but this ordering is embraced 
by the facticity of revelation issuing from God's one plan for the world which was 
always made for grace. In this way the philosophical necessity of nature grounded in 
4 Ripalda De Ente Supernaturali I, d i, sI and 9, quoted by Balthasar KB 279. 
42 KB 280,282-3 ; DB 453 
43 cf KB 299 
44 Ibid. 275 
4s Ibid. 281 
46 
Ibid. 285 
47 eg Ibid. 281,285 
48 Ibid. 285 
49 
Ibid. 281 
50 Ibid. 283 
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God's decision to create a world is upheld against Barth, whom Balthasar felt had 
sacrificed serious acknowledgement of this aspect of the doctrine of creation for the sake 
of his christocentric 'system'. 52 At the same time this relationship of necessity and 
contingence is embraced within the fact of God's gracious plan upon which the relative 
necessity of nature depends and for which it is designed and in which it stands in its 
concrete state. In distinction from the tendency in Catholic theology that Balthasar 
rejects with de Lubac, this relationship in the reality of the concrete state is the focal 
point for Balthasar; but in distinction from Barth this does not make the relative 
necessity of the prior God-creator relationship unimportant. 
D The analogy of being and the nature concept 
Balthasar's treatment of a formal concept of nature makes distinctive use of the analogy 
of being. 53 
Balthasar's use of the analogy of being is central to his thought. For him analogy is 
far more than a tool of theological expression. Rather, following his decisive encounter 
with Erich Przywara54 during his philosophical training in Pullach near Munich, he takes 
up the Polish thinker's use of the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215)-"For 
all the similarity between God and the creature, there exists an ever-greater 
dissimilarity"-as an "all-embracing law of being"55 governing every aspect of the God- 
creature relationship. 56 `Similarity within ever-greater dissimilarity' is thus the 
inviolable rhythm running throughout the relationship between God and man. It is 
therefore a central principle for all philosophical and theological thought and is clearly 
particularly crucial to our topic. Its importance to von Balthasar is also related to the 
centrality of the `real distinction' in his thought, namely, that created being is always in 
51 Ibid. 285 
52 cf chapter 2 section A below 
53 KB 285ff 
sa "the greatest spirit whom I have been permitted to meet" In Retro 10 
ss Th 111 220 
56 It is not my intention here to assess Przywara's distinctive use of analogy. (An interesting discussion 
can be found in Henry Chavanne: The Analogy between God and the World in St Thomas Aquinas and 
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a state of tension between essence and existence (thus always in `becoming'), in contrast 
to the perfect identity of essence and existence in God from which the former originates 
and to which it is oriented. 57 Whilst each essence, each existence thus bears some kind 
of relationship to God, the dissimilarity of the `real distinction' is always greater than 
any similarity (in tanta similitudine major dissimilitudino). Balthasar attributes the main 
insight here to Thomas's understanding of esse (as "the non-subsistent fullness and 
perfection of all reality and as the supreme `likeness of divine goodness"') which 
distinguishes God from `the being of things', giving a new more radical emphasis to his 
transcendence. 58 
So the nature-grace relationship must be understood according to the analogy of 
being, not because it must submit to some alien philosophical law dreamt up in the 
middle ages, but because the analogy of being is precisely to do with the doctrine of the 
creation, that when God creates there is at once a complete contrast between the 
contingent creatureliness of what he brings into existence and his own uncreated being 
and also some kind of relationship of likeness between the being of the creatures he 
created and his own divine uncreated being. Balthasar therefore agrees with Barth's 
emphasis on the utter dissimilarity between Gottsein and Geschöpfsein but draws 
attention to the relationship at the level of being contained within this very contrast: for 
we are talking about Gottsein and Geschöpfsein. 59 (Later we will see how Balthasar 
finds this relationship illuminated by a specifically trinitarian christocentric 
perspective. 60) When God says "Let us make man in our image", 61 image implies an 
ontological relationship of likeness, a likeness at the level of being, and hence an analogy 
Karl Barth (Vantage Press, New York 1992) who finds Przywara's conception problematic and certainly 
very different from Thomas'. ) 
57 Explorations in Theology I The Word Made Flesh (Ignatius, San Francisco 1989) (ET I) 163f, 173f; 
"Theo-logic: On the Work as a whole" Communio Winter 1993 625 
58 cf Balthasar: The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics (GL) IV (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 
1989) 393ff 
59 KB 286 
60 cf chapter 2 section C below 
61 Genesis 1.26 
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of being, 62 which, precisely because it is a likeness between what is completely different 
(that is between created and uncreated) is described always as a likeness within 
unlikeness (as in the Lateran formula). Both features of the God-man relationship must 
be upheld: that we are fundamentally and inviolably not like God, and that we are like 
him in our constitution as imago dei-not because of any claim we may have, but 
because God made us that way. 
Central to this application of the Lateran definition is the fact that it is continually 
applied to all treatment of the God-man relationship. For Przywara's `likeness within 
unlikeness' embraces the dynamic aspect of the relationship too. The measure of 
distance never decreases as closeness grows. On the contrary: it is ever greater. It is a 
case of `dynamic similarity within ever-increasing dissimilarity'. We will find this 
rhythm beats throughout Balthasar's treatment of grace: the closer we get to God the 
more we realise how much greater and different God is. 63 
Now in Karl Barth Balthasar proposes that the formal concept of nature 
(understood as the `minimum' presupposition of all grace) is createdness 
(Geschöpfsein)64 as such and is to be expressed by the analogia entis precisely because 
this conveys the fact that nature is both like and unlike God its Creator. At the level of 
the formal concept the emphasis is on the aspect of dissimilarity in the analogy of being, 
without amounting to an identification of nature and the aspect of dissimilarity. (This 
would lead back to Baius's position, making grace (as the aspect of similarity) necessary 
for the creature, for dissimilarity alone would be impossible). Likewise grace 
emphasises the aspect of similarity (for it gives a participation in the divine nature) but 
is not identical with the aspect of similarity (in which case the intimacy of grace might 
be understood to involve a `catching up' with God, narrowing the ontological 'gap' ). 65 
Rather, as the analogy of being applies to every aspect of the God-creature relationship 
both similarity and dissimilarity belong with both nature and grace. 
62 cf Balthasar: Theo-drama II, (Th II) tr. Graham Harrison (Ignatius, San Francisco, 1990) 320-321 
63 cf eg KB 373,297 
64 Ibid. 285; 287 (Geschöpflichkeit) 
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Oddly though, in discussing the content of the formal concept Balthasar appears to 
be referring to something which under his own terms is all but impossible to talk about, 
because the nature concept cannot be stripped of its double-sidedness and constrained 
as a pure concept, refined of all elements affected by its de facto ordering to a 
supernatural end. Whilst createdness as such is initially associated with the formal 
concept, 66 further on it is identified with the "conscious free subject" who hears 
revelation and must surely therefore be more than a formal concept. 67 Meanwhile in the 
article "Der Begriff der Natur" he does identify subject, spirit and in some sense 
transcendence with the remainder concept68, despite expressing concern elsewhere about 
the possibility of mistaking Rahner's remainder concept with man's spirit-nature. 69 The 
formal concept of nature remains the "lower limit", the "bare minimum" of an open 
concept that should not be further circumscribed. 70 In fact this preoccupation with the 
formal concept sits rather awkwardly with the line of the main argument where the 
focus is on nature in the concrete with its necessarily dialectical character straddling both 
natural and supernatural orders. 
It seems that it is in the function, rather than the content, of the formal concept that 
its significance lies. It has a conceptual task. It emphasises the distance between 
creature and God. 7' As creatureliness, it ensures "that grace is `only' grace and does not 
turn into nature, meaning a natural participation in God's nature"; 72 it ensures that the 
Gospel of grace appears as religio (law, command, reverence, and fear of the Lord ) as 
well as love (`which is what it is in God"), such that distance is not eliminated when 
nature is given grace; and it tells us "that everything touched by grace retains its natural 
side: grace is always in a nature and for a nature"73 in keeping with his understanding of 
65 Ibid. 286,287 
66 Ibid. 285 
67 Ibid. 291 
68 DB 453 
69 KB 299 
70 Ibid. 291 




nature as the presupposed `subject' and giving this sense to the old axiom that grace 
perfects nature, it does not destroy it. 
E Nature as remainder concept and use of the 
supernatural existential 
Apart from Balthasar's distinctive use of the analogy of being, this distinction between 
the material and formal nature concept, undertaken through a process of abstraction, 
resembles Rahner's distinction between the concepts of concrete nature and of pure 
nature as `residual concept'. Balthasar himself makes the connection between his 
attempt and Rahner's in Karl Barth74 and again makes use of Rahner's suggestions a 
couple of years later in the article "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie"75 (DB) 
which responded to criticisms of his approach in Karl Barth. He is already aware, 
however, that there is a tension between Rahner's scheme and the main presuppositions 
that de Lubac proposes. 76 It is as though he is hesitant about which direction to 
develop de Lubac's insights. Behind the evolving web of relationship and distinction 
vis-a-vis de Lubac and Rahner there also lies the question of how much influence to 
allow the work of Joseph Marechal (1878-1944). Balthasar acknowledges the insights of 
the Jesuit philosopher77 whose ground breaking `transcendental Thomism' was so 
important to Rahner, yet he finds himself setting out as a disciple trained in a different 
school of thought (Przywara, de Lubac). He is aware of a tension between Marechal's 
philosophy and de Lubac's theology, not least because of yet another flawed 
application of the relationship between philosophy and theology. This time the goal of 
human life in God was understood so much as a philosophical a priori that it was 
necessary to retain the weak understanding of natural desire typical of neo-scholasticism 
74 Ibid. 299 
75 cf note 6 above 
76 KB 299 
77 cf Ibid. 219,292,385 
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(that is, as velleity78). This is in contrast to de Lubac's recognition of it as a theological 
a priori, God's one plan for the human creature evident in the intrinsic orientation of 
nature-grace in nature as we know it. 79 
In the article DB, the possibility of opting for Rahner's account is developed more 
explicitly. Here the subtraction from the concrete to arrive at the pure, abstract concept 
is described specifically in terms of deducting the supernatural existential8° (as the 
supernatural modification of nature in the concrete), whilst the abstract concept acquired 
by deducting it is explicitly referred to as the pure counterconcept of the supernatural, 
and as remainder ("Rest"81) (Rahner refers to "Restbegriff'82). The use of this 
terminology uncovers a `triadic' scheme (nature, supernatural existential, grace): there is 
a distinction between nature and the existential that raises/modifies it on the one hand83 
and between the existential and grace on the other, (the existential being `before' grace84). 
78 Ibid. 294 This is similar to Balthasar's criticisms of Rahner's `compromise' over pure nature. Ibid. 
299-300 (cf also de Lubac's critique of an `eternal striving' for God, an "asymptotic approach" to the 
vision of God HDL 70. ) 
79 KB 292-297 De Lubac's insight "was able to throw a powerful spotlight on the hidden theological a 
priori in Marechal's thought: in creation as it actually exists concretely, the "point of identity" on which 
Marechal based his thought is not a purely philosophical one at all. It is actually a theological identity- 
point: namely the one and only goal God has set for human nature, the beatific vision. " 296 
° DB 453,460 ("... wie schwierig die exakte Darstellung des Tatbestandes ist, nämlich dessen, was nach 
Ausklammerung des auf die visio ausrichtenden Existentials im Zentrum der Geisttätigkeit der 
menschlichen Natur übrigbleibt. ") Meanwhile the terminology of the supernatural existential is used 
throughout the article eg "dem `Existential' einer übernatürlichen Bestimmung" 453; "der konkreten, 
existential auf die Gnade ausgerichteten Natur"; "meiner übernatürlichen Ausrichtung (Existential)" 454. 
81 DB 453 
82 Rahner: "Concerning the Relationship between nature and grace" 313 
83 "Die Unterscheidung zwischen Natur und Existential ist aber nicht bloß von einer haarspaltenden 
Begriffsrabulistik gefordert, sondern entspricht dem einfachen religiösen und christlichen Erfahren, das 
genau weiß: auch in aller Unausweichlichkeit meiner übernatürlichen Ausrichtung (Existential) entspricht 
diese Ausrichtung keiner Exigenz meiner Natur. " DB 454; cf also 460, as well as the passages already 
cited where the existential is described as a real modification of nature. 
84 "da die Ausrichtung auf das übernatürliche Ziel noch vorgängig aller Verleihung heiligmachender 
Gnade" DB 455; "... die Setzung einer solchen Kreatur durch Gott schon vorgängig aller Gnaden 
offenbarung eine Bestimmung im innersten Sein des Geschopfes setzt, welche der realen Ausrichtung auf 
das übernatürliche Ziel entspricht. " 453; cf also reference to Rahner's definition: "Am wichtigsten dürfte 
in diesem Zusammenhang die von Karl Rahner (in "Orientierung", 30 Juni 1950) getroffene 
Unterscheidung sein zwischen einer reinen Natur (die nicht auf Übernatur hin geschaffen wäre) und einer 
auf die Übernatur hin von Gott erdachten und verwirklichten Konkreten Natur, die noch `vor' aller 
Begnadung in ihrem Innersten mit dem `Existential' einer übernaturlichen Bestimmung versehen sein 
muß. " 453 and the substantial quotation from Brisbois on the same page. 
P McPartlan interprets de Lubac himself as using a triadic formula proximate to Rahner's. The Eucharist 
Makes the Church. Henri de Lubac and John Zizoulas in Dialogue (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1993) 
35ff; cf also Balthasar's description of de Lubac's "three moments" in HDL 72 note 36, but also 71 
where he is explicit about de Lubac's rejection of Rahner's supernatural existential. 
33 
The paradox of the human condition so central to Balthasar's treatment of our topic in 
Karl Barth is thus interpreted as the supernatural existential'85 a determination touching 
nature at its innermost point, but not constitutive of its natural constitution, 86 "the 
most inner and real" and "ontologically constitutive of a concrete essence" but still not 
proper to its nature (Rahner). 87 
This understanding of the dialectic of our nature as the accidental supernatural 
elevation of our essence is rather distant from the simple understanding dominant in 
Karl Barth that we are creatures made for an end above our natural capacities-although 
even here there is evidence of the same kind of scheme, for example in a distinction 
made between nature as presupposition and a summoning elevation making possible 
communion with God. 88 This kind of approach wants to acknowledge the inmost 
character of the supernatural modality without losing pure nature. This is a tricky 
compromise, driven by the need somehow to keep two completely different ways of 
looking at things on board, rather than a simple expression of the way things are for us 
as established by God. The difficulty for Balthasar in pursuing the path most evident in 
DB is that he may find himself professing a contradiction he has in fact already 
highlighted in Rahner: that is, understanding the meaning of all creation to rest on God's 
free decision to give his grace, and understanding "the deepest essence of man from this 
meaning", yet trying to abstract from this meaning. 89 If the relationship to the 
supernatural, the openness to grace is "man's most intimate and unique feature... the 
85 DB 456 
36 Ibid. 456 ("dieses Existential als eine die Natur im Innersten treffende, obwohl nicht naturhaft- 
konstitutive Bestimmung... ") 
87 Ibid. `das Innerste und Eigentlichste' und ein `ontologisches Konstitutiv seines koncreten Wesens' 
aber doch nicht zu seiner Natur gehorig. " 
88 "But we must not forget that the grace of the Word gone out to all the world not only presupposes 
man as subject but radically raises, deepens and fulfils him in the summons (Anruf) of grace that enables 
us to become partners with God, exalting us as hearers of the Word. " KB 291 Balthasar's italics; cf also 
287-288. A passage of Brisbois's quoted by Balthasar in DB as offering the same distinction as Rahner, 
also speaks in terms of a summons or a call or appeal (Anruf and Berufung) when describing the new 
orientation that modifies human nature. DB 453 The use of this kind of language is particularly 
interesting in the context of Balthasar's later comments about the supernatural existential where the 
language of summoning is sustained. cf chapter 4 section D below 
89 KB 299 
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centre and root of all that he is... How does one go about `abstracting the deepest core of 
things"? 9o 
F Gratuity 
The one thing necessary is also the freest gift of all. 
91 
The pure nature concept was meant to defend the gratuity of grace. As well as having 
the significant reservations regarding the pure nature hypothesis that we have described, 
Balthasar does not think that the gratuity of grace is satisfactorily described by 
distinguishing it as that upon which we have no claim (for we have no claim upon the 
very existence of our nature either). 92 Nature is itself a ftee gift. 93 Instead Balthasar 
picks up from de Lubac the importance of understanding the gratuity of grace primarily 
from above, from its own character, rather than from below, from the fact that nature 
has no claim on it. De Lubac, Balthasar says, "does not judge the worth of heavenly 
realities by their sheer distance to us below but on their own terms. " 94 Thus while both 
creation and grace are considered unowed, creation's elevation to adoption by God 
(grace) is a second and higher work "that should not be explained in terms of the first 
level but from its own intrinsic character", "the personal communication of God's 
trinitarian life and essence, which as such will always seem to every creature-however 
endowed and prepared it might be-to be completely free and undeserved. "95 
This perspective offers a breathtaking coincidence of certainty or `necessity' 
(regarding the fulfilment of our nature in the supernatural-because decreed by God), 
and its utter gratuity, 96 emphasising the purely analogical relationship between `nature 
necessity' and `grace necessity', the latter being infinitely more necessary and infinitely 
more free. Here we find a characteristic feature of Balthasar's theology: his concern that 
90 Ibid. (Balthasar's italics) The issue is again concerned with whether it is possible to synthesise 
Marechal's philosophy and de Lubac's theology. 
91 Ibid. 357 
92 Ibid. 277ff 
93 cf chapter 4 section B1 and chapter 5 section B below 
94 KB 297 (my italics); cf 357; DB 457 
95 KB 296; 285 
96 Ibid. 296-7; DB 457-8 
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it be fundamentally informed by spirituality (in the 'school of the saints' rather than 
that of rationalistic philosophy). Through prayer it is possible to sense simultaneously 
the eternal predestination to grace (as the very purpose of creation) and the utterly 
unconditional freedom of this election to which there is no claim. 97 Balthasar uses the 
analogy of lovers reflecting on their first meeting as both an extraordinary chance 
occurrence but also written in the stars and predestined by fate. 98 Indeed intersubjective 
analogy is an enduring feature of Balthasar's approach to gratuity. Just as one human 
being can have no claim to another's self-disclosure, in a superabundant sense creatures 
have no claim on God's self-disclosure. But we must take full account of the fact that 
this is only an analogous relation between `natural' and `supernatural claim', "because 
the divine subject stands both much farther, and yet that much nearer to, the creaturely 
subject than any other human `thou' does. "99 
Nevertheless Balthasar still hedges a little here too, conceding a place to the pure 
concept and the consideration of `other possibilities' in expressing the specific gratuity 
of grace and acknowledging a legitimate tension between this approach from below and 
the descending approach of de Lubac. loo However the thrust of his main position seems 
unquestionable: 
From all eternity God has willed one and only one thing: to open up his love to the human race. 
For that he created the world. Thus from God's standpoint it is an utterly idle question whether 
there might have been a world even without this grace. And what has no weight in God's eyes 
should carry no weight with us either. 
101 
Balthasar was handling a highly charged topic. He found himself walking a tight rope, 
the encyclical Humani Generis (1950), which rejected the approach of those who 
"distort the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create 
intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision", 102 appearing 
as he finished his Barth book. Balthasar thus acknowledges that any approach that 
takes such a non posse as its starting point is wrong, and concedes that "too many of 
97 DB 457 
98 Ibid. 452 
99 KB 282 
loo DB 454; KB 300-301 
101 KB 300-301 
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the statements of the group of theologians from Lyons have overstepped the mark too 
far insofar as they have kept the categorical statements about the limits to divine 
possibility". However he also clearly rejects the opposite tendency which, while 
preserving gratuity, goes "too far in discussing the possibilities of the Creator". 103 In as 
much as Balthasar concedes a place to the consideration of other possibilities (on the 
basis of God's omnipotence'04), this offers a negative formulation complementing the 
positive. This is not an exact equivalent expression of "the entire content of the positive 
for it contains no determination beyond the endowments of pure nature", 105 the 
negative formulation being unable to express the gratuity of grace as something belonging 
uniquely to grace and not confused with a general concept of unowedness (because the 
freedom of grace is not exactly the same as other kinds of freedom in creation). Hence as 
the relevant phrase in Humani Generis was only concerned to defend the unowedness of 
grace with reference to the order of creation already in place, (correcting an error in this 
field not setting out a systematic definition of gratuity), just quoting the encyclical does 
not provide a thematic working out of this distinctive character of grace's gratuity. 
G Initial conclusions 
As well as the relation to de Lubac and the emphasis on the concrete paradox in 
Balthasar's work during this period we have also noted a closeness to Rahner as regards 
the distinction between an abstract and concrete concept of nature identified by a 
subtraction process from the concrete, and as regards the structure of models used to 
describe the conceptual relation between a pure nature, its supernatural orientation and 
its receipt of grace. Despite this hovering tendency towards Rahner's development 
Balthasar is not unaware that the direction in which Rahner moves somehow undermines 
de Lubac's fundamental insights, `disregarding' the supernatural orientation which he 
recognised as the innermost core of man, in favour of maintaining a hypothetical pure 
102 Pius XII: Humani Generis (1950) 26 
'03 KB 344; DB 458-9 
104 DB 458-9 
105 Ibid. 458 
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nature (and thus proposing an unworkable compromise between Marechal and de 
Lubac). 
Even this modified discussion of pure nature and subtraction risks trapping de 
Lubac's insights and dragging them into the familiarity of the old system. 106 Whilst 
thinking remains in the shadow of this system (in which after all these thinkers were 
trained) it cannot break free completely. When Balthasar asks rhetorically with 
reference to Rahner whether it is in fact possible and meaningful to ground the meaning 
of all of creation on God's free decision to bestow grace, understanding man's innermost 
essence from this, and still to abstract from this very meaning, we doubtless sense the 
`no' emerging from his argument. Indeed by the time we get to a later section on nature 
and grace in the following chapter in Karl Barth that considers similar approaches to his 
own, 107 the confusion and reservation that we experience elsewhere pales into 
insignificance in the face of unambiguous support for the concrete paradox. Indeed we 
know that this is the dominant direction intended for the book from what he himself 
wrote about it. 108 Yet in the book itself, and even more so in DB, we sense that he does 
not drive this home; he does not have the courage of his convictions to make the point 
unequivocally and discard the rest decisively. If "there is in fact no slice of "pure 
nature" in this world"log then why such fine discussion of its significance? At this level 
of the debate Balthasar remains stuck. The `way out' for him was through the pursuit 
of a completely new approach, that of christology. 
106 Even de Lubac (perhaps as a result of the controversy) tends in subsequent `re-expressions' of his 
thesis to build up a framework which takes away from the radical nature of his main thesis. cf HDL 72 
note 36 
107KB 343-357 We consider this in the following chapter, section A. 
108cf In Retro 63 and letter to de Lubac July 1950 cited in note 4 
109 KB 288 
38 
Chapter 2 
The intra-trinitarian christocentric 
understanding of the relationship 
between nature and grace 
We must now introduce a crucial aspect of Balthasar's thought on this topic: his 
christocentric focus. In this he develops and goes beyond de Lubac, whose critique 
of the extrinsic understanding of the nature-grace relationship was so influential on 
Balthasar. Ultimately de Lubac himself did not consider the nature-supernature 
terminology "particularly felicitous", acknowledging a shift in favour of speaking of 
the "mystery of Christ" and of thinking in more personal categories. ' However it is 
Balthasar who specifically moves away from the abstract conceptuality and gives 
the question an emphatically christological setting. It is in his dialogue with Karl 
Barth in particular that he develops this, but his study of the Fathers is also 
influential, as are similar attempts at a more christocentric focus on the part of a 
number of his contemporaries. Meanwhile the thought of his Polish teacher 
Przywara remains important in his enduring use of the analogy of being, although in 
this respect too we will find Balthasar forging his own distinctive path (even though 
we may find Przywara's influence lingers here more than Balthasar realised. ) 
The fundamental features of this christocentic approach are there in entirety as 
early as Karl Barth, but are to become increasingly dominant and to be expounded in 
more detail in Balthasar's mature work. In this chapter we will therefore conduct 
our exploration of various aspects of this christocentrism by starting with their 
treatment in Karl Barth (and often also in essays collected as Skizzen zur Theologie 
'Atheisme et Sens de L 'homrne (1968) 96,107 cited by Balthasar in The Theology of Henri de Lubac 
(HDL) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1991) 68 
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in 19602), thus showing how they complete and `resolve' the nature-grace 
perspective discussed in the previous chapter. We will then show how this is 
developed in the Theo-drama, often doing no more than pointing ahead to detailed 
treatment in later chapters, but in some cases (notably that of the christological 
analogy of being) providing a detailed analysis, necessary even at this stage if we are 
to go on and explore the range of expression in the Theo-drama in the remaining 
chapters. This chapter is therefore both central and transitional in the thesis: it 
draws attention to the central focus of Balthasar's understanding of the nature grace 
relationship and also bridges our consideration of his earlier and later work. 
A The christocentric perspective on nature and 
grace 
1 Christocentrism 
For Balthasar, to learn from the theology of the saints, as we saw him recommending 
in the previous chapter, is to learn a Christ-centred theology: for them "everything 
seems insipid and meaningless that does not resonate with the name of Jesus Christ 
and is not brought before his light. "3 Amongst various aspects of Barth's thought, it 
is those insights that provide the foundations for a christocentrism that Balthasar 
proposes be taken seriously by Catholic theologians. ' In fact we shall see that the 
main argument in Karl Barth outlined in the previous chapter itself rests on 
christocentric principles. 
The section of Karl Barth entitled `Christocentrism' conveys a whole approach 
to theology identifiable in a variety of Balthasar's Catholic contemporaries-not 
withstanding other differences between them. Here the unity of theology is not built 
into it from outside: Christ is the inner unity of theology. ' The natural order and all 
its laws rests on the incarnation and the history that flows from it between God and 
ZVerbum Caro (Skizzen zur Theologie I) (Johannes Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1960) English translation: 
Explorations in Theology 1: The Word Made Flesh (ET I) (Ignatius Press, San Francisco 1989) 
3 The Theology of Karl Barth (KB) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1992) 297 
4 Ibid. 383 
5 Ibid. 333-334 
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man. ' Creation, history, salvation, judgement are `Christ-centred'. As "the very 
essence of the image of God after whose pattern Adam and creation have been 
formed", he is "`the ultimate meaning of all that has happened in nature and in 
history"" and "especially the `meaning and measure of human existence"'! He is 
the ground and the goal of creation' and we are created through him and for him. In 
his risen and transfigured state he "is the final goal of all of God's action and is the 
image for the ultimate form of man and the world", in whom we have the promise of 
adoptive filiation and of being made holy and spotless. " 
Balthasar sets out to adopt this perspective without simply siding with either 
the `Thomists' or the `Scotists' in the debate about whether or not Christ would 
therefore have come into the world even if there had been no sin. " He understands 
his position to transcend the Thomist-Scotist dichotomy, " maintaining that the 
Incarnation of the Son has been willed from eternity13 but that this predestined 
mission was always seen to include the blood of the Cross. 14 
He also rejects what he understood to be the Engführung, the constriction, of 
Barth's christocentrism. By this he means an exaggerated emphasis, entailing a 
systematic narrowing of everything to the christological starting point, such that 
Christ's priority over creation and sin forces creation "to occupy the Procrustean 
bed of Barth's christological schema. " 15 In contrast Balthasar wishes to protect 
6 Ibid. 383-4 
Ibid. 331 (The first quotation is based on Schmaus: Katholische Dogmatik (4th edition, 1949) II 
290f the second being an actual quotation from the same volume 855. ) 
8 Schmaus: Ibid. 118 cited KB 332 
9 KB 331,353 
10 Schmaus: Katholische 185-186 cited KB 332 
" KB 327; Theo-drama III (Th III) 253 For the `Thomists' the prime motive of the incarnation was 
our redemption from sin, such that without the fall the incarnation would not have taken place, 
whilst for the Scotists it was for the glory of God, as the crown of creation, such that the incarnation 
would have taken place whether we had fallen or not. Balthasar tends to see the Scotist position in 
terms of a hypothetical possibility, thus conflicting with his focus on the concrete. In this sense 
Oakes is not entirely accurate in his attribution of a Scotist leaning to Balthasar (Oakes: Pattern of 
Redemption 220; 226-227). 
12 KB 327-328; Th 111 253 note 71; Mysterium Paschale (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1990) 11-48 
13eg Theo-drama IV (Th IV) 242-3,372; Th 111 257 
14 Th 111 253-254; cf 37; 43 and especially 47-48; Th IV 40; 111516,517; cf chapter 6 section D2 
below 
15 KB 242; cf 127,128; 129,136 Th 111 257 Barth briefly refers to but does not answer the "mild 
rebuke" of christological restriction in Church Dogmatics IV/1767-768. Insteads he retorts that 
Balthasar's rejection of such constriction amounts to an illegitimate emphasis on the human 
response, citing (in polemical tone) Balthasar's works on Therese of Lisieux, Elisabeth of Dijon and 
Reinhold Schneider that followed the Barth book as setting out "representations of the history of 
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nature from being deduced from grace and to uphold the authentic priority of nature 
and reason as the God-given presupposition of the incarnation, of grace, revelation, 
faith, 16 whilst simultaneously maintaining the Son's choice to descend in the 
incarnation as the fundamental presupposition of this nature. " (Thus, despite 
Balthasar's deep attraction to Barth's doctrine of predestination, he defends human 
freedom in the face of Barth's universalist understanding that on the basis of Christ 
being the chosen one of God, every human being, as a human being, has "been chosen 
in God's gracious election, determined from the outset to belong to the Body of 
which Christ is the Head. "") Barth's `narrowing', Balthasar thinks, owes much to 
the adoption of an Augustinian understanding of freedom, that is, measured 
according to freedom's highest, most authentic form lived by grace in the intimacy of 
God's freedom in the concordance of independent self-determination and obedient 
discipleship, to the exclusion of "immanent freedom and its prerequisites". " 
2 Christology and the nature-grace relationship 
It is Balthasar's christocentric perspective on creation that lies at the heart of the 
revival of the patristic and scholastic paradox of human nature discussed in the 
previous chapter. For if we are created in Christ for the new creation, then we are 
indeed oriented to a supernatural destiny from the start (without this Christ-centred 
goal thereby being within our natural range of attainment). The location of created 
nature in relationship with grace right from the very start, is precisely because of its 
christological ground and goal. The approach from above, from the fact that God has 
Jesus Christ" in which the latter "fades into the background", even suggesting a doctrine of "self- 
sanctification. " In his forward to the second edition of Karl Barth (this is the Afterword in the 
English translation KB 391-401) Balthasar places these short works in the context of the rest of his 
work to date and indicates how material in them corresponds to Barth's own theological 
preoccupations. He upholds his concerns about Barth's Engführung whilst responding to criticism 
of the term by drawing attention to its origin in musical theory (the fugue) where it refers to the 
highlighting of one part/voice/instrument. In the Theo-drama (Th 111 253 note 71) Balthasar refers to 
Rudolf Haubst's identification of christological constriction in Karl Barth, H Kung and, in certain 
places, Karl Rahner in Von Sinn der Menschwerdung (Hueber, Munich 1969). On this issue cf also 
John Thompson: "Barth and Balthasar in Ecumenical Dialogue" in Bede McGregor and Thomas 
Norris, ed.: The Beauty of Christ (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1994) 171-178. 
16 KB 362-363 
1' "Revelation does not presuppose creation in such a way that it equates it with the act of revelation. 
In giving ultimate meaning to creation, revelation does not annul creation's own proper and original 
meaning. " KB 242 
18 Barth: Church Dogmatics 6,174 (using Balthasar's numbering), cited KB 127; cf 361-363 
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always intended our nature for supernatural participation is because we have been 
designed and predestined to be the brothers of the Son made man. 2° 
In fact the christocentric perspective provides us with the focal point of our 
discussion of the nature-grace relationship. For it is Christ, to whom our nature is 
ordained and in whom its perfection lies, who is (in Schmaus' words) the 
"foundation and model of the unity of the natural and the supernatural". " 
The synthesis that already subsists in him between divine and human nature is the model for 
all syntheses that Christians have to bridge between the two orders. Christians do not need to 
reconcile Christ and the world to each other, or to mediate between Christ and the world: 
Christ himself is the single mediation and reconciliation. 22 
As Angelo Scola points out, 23 Balthasar had already said this as early as 1948 in his 
essay "Theology and Sanctity". Here he makes clear that in investigating the 
relationship between nature and supernature there is no need to abandon the 
standpoint of faith, to mediate and judge the relationship between God and the 
world, between revelation and reason: "All that is necessary is for him [man] to 
understand "the one mediator between God and man, the man Jesus Christ" (1 Tim 
2: 5)"24 
There is "no mere connecting link between revelation and something else, such as 
human nature, or reason or philosophy", 25 "no vague synthesis of nature and the 
supernaturali2' no abstract speculation about the relation between the two27, "no 
common measure between nature and grace, reason and faith28: "Christ is the one and 
only criterion, given in the concrete, by which we measure the relations between God 
and man, grace and nature, faith and reason", 29 "the one synthesis in which God has 
established his relationship to the world". " The link between nature and 
supernature is in the incarnate Word of the Father, according to the eternal will of 
19 KB 129 For Balthasar's understanding of freedom cf chapter four below. 
20 cf Balthasar: A Theology of History (H) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1994) 70 note 5 
21Schmaus: Katholische 212ff, cited KB 332 
22 KB 332 
23Angelo Scola: Hans Urs von Balthasar A Theological Style (Eerdmans, Michigan 1995) 46 
24 ET I 195 quoted in Scola: Balthasar 46 
25 ET 1 194 
26 Ibid. 177 
27 Ibid. 162 
28 Ibid. 168 
29 Ibid. 162 
30 Ibid. 177 
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God that "human nature and its faculties are given their true centre when in Christ", 
and "in him attain their final truth. "31 
So, as well as entering the mid-century nature-supernature debate, conducted in 
the main on the abstract level, already in the forties and fifties Balthasar clearly 
expresses this characteristic approach, according to which the relationship between 
man's natural seeking of God (an ascending movement out beyond himself), and 
grace, which is God finding us (a descending movement to us), is not to be discussed 
on the abstract plane through speculation on the relation between the natural and 
supernatural, but "is ultimately a matter of Christology. For in Christ, God and 
man, God has opened himself to the world and in this movement of descent has 
determined the course of every mode of ascent of man to him. "32 It is from this 
perspective-that in Christ God's descent embraces man's ascent that we 
comprehend the inclusion of the natural in the supernatural", the relation of nature 
and supernature emphasised by de Lubac in the face of neo-scholastic extrinsicism. 
This strictly Christ-centred focus (which as regards the model of ascent within 
descent owes much to his patristic studies34) is Balthasar's major contribution to the 
formulation of the nature-grace relationship in contemporary theology. His insight, 
as he himself says, is not the presentation of "a new aspect" but "the application of 
the generally accepted Christology to the problem of revelation", an application 
which had "perhaps ... not yet 
been adequately worked out in detail. "35 
The determining factor of all the relationships between natural and supernatural 
is the fact that Christ possesses a human nature but is a divine person. His 
humanity is the expression and instrument of the divine36 and in this way all 
movements of man's nature upwards are brought to true fulfilment in the service of 
revelation, and in Christ, as the synthesis of the opposite movements of the natural 
ascent to God and the supernatural descent of God to man, all created being is able 
31 Ibid. 194-5 
32 Ibid. 162; 177; cf TD IV 343 
33 This is an incorporation and completion, not an invalidation. ET 177 
34 The influence of Maximus is especially significant (who gives it a christological context cf Th IV 
382 and chapter five section DI below). Gregory of Nyssa's and Augustine's development and 
correction of Plotinus are also important (cf Th IV 371-372 and chaper four section Cl below). 
3s ET 147 
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to speak of eternal life. 37 (It is therefore not surprising that Balthasar might be 
attracted to Therese's words, `everything is grace', chosen by Bernanos (the French 
author much favoured by Balthasar) as the closing words of the Diary of a Country 
Priest. 38) 
Thus the synthesis of the hypostatic union takes on central importance in 
understanding our fulfilment in grace. Indeed because the divine nature is necessarily 
transcendent, participation in God's eternal life "can only be explained by taking as 
our starting point the hypostatic union in Christ. "39 Here we see that "the infusion of 
the divine identity does not involve any strain or distortion of the creature's 
potential, for it takes place through God's own condescension and abasement to the 
forms of creaturely non identity. "" Because of his identity with our nature (bringing 
it "into the unity of the God-man in order to redeem it"41) we can have "real 
identification with him742 (which preserves the uniqueness of Christ), a participatory 
identification making the relation of Christ to follower more than mere exemplar. 
Being a follower means being a participator in the mystery of the hypostatic union. " 
Concentration of the nature-supernature relationship in the mediating, reconciling 
relationship between the humanity and divinity of Christ continues to have crucial 
significance for Balthasar; the hypostatic union is the key to the God-world 
relationship for "now, bound up with the world with the indivisible bond of the 
hypostatic union, he [God] will never again be without the world". ' Christ, as God 
living a human life, is the concrete exchange (Konkrete Austausch) which secures the 
integration (einzubergen) of the earthly in the eternal45 and also, in the hypostatic 
36 
Ibid. 162-3; 57 
37 Ibid. 168; 176; 178; Prayer (Ignatius, San Francisco 1986) 203 
38 cf Th IV 374; 422 We will discuss the complex response to this maxim in chapter 5 and 8 below. 
39 ET 1165 
40 Ibid. 179-80 
41 
Ibid. 58; cf Theodrama II (Th II) 409. 
42 ET 59 
43 Ibid. 165 "an inchoate act of presence where he is, developing, when and as he wills, into an 
imitation of him. " 
44 H 70 note 5 
4s TD IV 343 
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union, embraces both the human race as a species and the unique individual 
persons. 46 
Strangely though Balthasar never committed himself to a properly worked out 
understanding of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, simply stating 
that it was "the generally accepted christology"47 that was to be applied to the 
problem of the nature-grace relationship and devoting just a lengthy footnote in the 
Theo-drama to "the appropriate categories for thinking about the unity of the 
person of Christ in the analogy of his natures", a topic about which he "cannot enter 
into a detailed discussion". 48 Whilst elsewhere in the same volume a more 
pneumatologically `mediated' understanding of the relation of divinity and humanity 
in Christ is favoured, 49 a more stark, direct model is sometimes used as regards the 
actions and words of the God-man (his humanity being the instrument of the divine), 
and this role of the Spirit is not even mentioned in his christocentric explication of 
the nature-grace relationship (or in the christological analogy of being to which we 
are about to turn). Bearing in mind the centrality of the hypostatic union in 
Balthasar's christocentric interpretation of our topic this deficiency in his 
christology does appear to be a weak point in his reformulation of the question 
(especially bearing in mind the leaning towards distinction-at the expense of 
union-in Przywara's christological approach"). Nevertheless the focus on the 
human-divine relationship in Christ develops into a striking use of the chalcedonian 
definition (as we shall see later51) and is also expressed distinctively in Balthasar's 
christological analogy of being, our next topic of consideration. 
abcf Th II 210 
a' ET 147 
48 Th 111 228 note 68; cf Scola: Balthasar 79 
49 Th III 184ff 
so cf the following section (B) 
51cf chapter 5 section D1 below 
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B Christological analogy of being 
1 The concrete analogy of being 
A distinctive feature of Balthasar's christocentric treatment of our topic is his 
understanding of Christ as the answer to all our questions on the nature-grace 
relationship, precisely as the analogy of being in the concrete. 
In Balthasar's use of the analogy of being in Karl Barth to elucidate the nature- 
grace relationship we have seen that grace emphasises similarity (participation), but 
precisely by making known the ever greater distance to God. Now this greater 
similarity within ever-greater dissimilarity of grace is achieved concretely, not 
through the rapturous dragging of man from the world to God, but through God's 
descent into the world to the point of being "in the `form of sin"' ("which could not 
be more dissimilar to God"), that is, through the redemptive Kenosis of the 
incarnation. Thus it is in Christ that we see what similarity can mean (adoption) and 
what dissimilarity can mean (going as far as "God's own abandonment of himself'). " 
We see how grace does not eradicate authentic distance (in Gethsemane, cross and 
the holy fear of God that lasts into eternity) yet how it totally irradiates "even the 
most God forsaken realm-where sin took hold and reigned-... chosen as the site of 
God's revelation in Christ. "" Jesus Christ then is the concrete analogy of being. He 
is "the definitive analogy between God and the creature", and not just "in general 
terms": "he took on the form of the concrete analogy between the God of wrath and 
grace and between the creature both condemned and redeemed", the Cross revealing 
what sin is, Easter showing the power of grace. 54 Christ is grace, expressed 
concretely, the Advocate before the Father through whom the believer's inner reality 
is transformed (as he interprets the believer's broken works in the light of grace and 
love, and presents them thus to the Father ). 55 
52 KB 286 
s3 Ibid. 287 
sa Ibid. 376 The interval that he is the measure of thus includes the distance of sin (cf chapter 6 
section C3). 
55 Ibid. 373 
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Przywara's work can be said to point towards an "ultimately christological 
interpretation of the analogy of being", 56 because of the location of the appearance of 
the natural creature-Creator relation "in the supernatural trinitarian One", 57 of nature 
and reason as "exclusively a reason and nature elevated and redeemed in the concrete 
supernatural order"; " for "everything bears without exception, either consciously or 
unconsciously, in varying degrees, the one supernatural God in Christ in the Church' 
as its ultimate form". 59 Logic and ontology are thus judged by a "christological, 
historical and actualist standard". " This is apparent in Przywara's early work but is 
much clearer in the second period. Here he explicitly states that it is in the grace of 
redemption in Christ that being and history, reason and thought (precisely by 
preserving their natural form) have their final form; that "Christianity means: the 
incarnation, redemption on the Cross, incarnation and redemption as Church" and 
Christian philosophy therefore consists in Christian transformation of an 
"`originally sinful philosophy' into a `redeemed philosophy"'. " This is why 
Przywara unrelentingly reduces all aspects to the single focal point of "God in the 
crucified Christ in the crucified Church". 62 All explicit statements concerning the 
relationship between God and man are drawn "into his dialectic of intersecting cross 
beams, where the `crossing' of a positive statement by a negative one imitates the 
true Cross". 63 They then move toward the true statement of faith, alternating 
between an Ignatian `application of the senses' to the divine truth made flesh and the 
ultimate mystery beyond this. However this christological perspective on analogy is 
not the same as an explicit christological analogy of being as we have just seen 
applied to Balthasar's understanding of nature. Balthasar is not simply repeating the 
insights of his master, but has used them in a distinctive way-and one which seems 
to be less exclusively preoccupied with a radical cross-centred dialectic. 
56 Ibid. 328 
57 Przywara: "Reichweite" in Scholastik (1940) 339f cited KB 328 note 10 
58 Ibid. 362 cited KB 329 note 10 
59 Ibid. 527 cited KB 329 note 10 
6" KB 329 
61 Przywara: "philosophy" in Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1949), 1-9 cf KB 255-257 
62 KB 329 
63 Ibid. 
48 
Balthasar develops and crystallises his understanding of the analogy of being 
inherited from Przywara. By the time we get to the Theo-drama he has a more fully 
worked out christological analogy of being at his disposal and the development of, 
indeed divergence from, Przywara's position is more explicitly identifiable. 
Balthasar locates the root of this divergence in Przywara's exaggerated emphasis on 
analogy of being as a law of difference between God and creature' According to 
Balthasar it was the particular version of the text of the Lateran Council's definition 
on which Przywara based his understanding of analogy of being that led him to lay 
such an unnecessarily exaggerated emphasis on this aspect of dierence. 65 Balthasar 
sees the fact that Przywara never produced a christology as an implication of this 
unbalanced interpretation. But christology is for Balthasar the key to the whole 
question. It therefore seems unlikely that Przywara could have developed the 
specific christological analogy of being proposed by Balthasar without subjecting 
his own understanding to substantial revision. Even in his christocentric perspective 
the emphasis is on contradiction and otherness (God in the crucified Christ in the 
crucified Church), because for Przywara the movement of analogy is uniquely made 
known in the Son's adoption of radical difference to God (sin and death) on the 
cross. 66 By positively focusing the central meaning of the analogy of being in 
Christology, in the very being of the person of Christ and all his acts, Balthasar 
develops the insight that he had acquired from Przywara, but in a way that 
Przywara could not have done himself in his increasingly radical emphasis on 
difference. We have gone beyond the christological significance and centre that 
Balthasar attributes to Przywara's position in Karl Barth ("christocentric starting 
point" "ultimately christological interpretation of the analogy of being i67) to Christ, 
64Th 111 220; Medard Kehl in the Introduction to The von Balthasar Reader (T &T Clark, 
Edinburgh 1982) 21. 
65 Th 111 220 However if we compare the version Przywara read ("Inter Creatorem et creaturam non 
potest tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimilitudo notanda"), putting great 
emphasis on the tanta ("however great the similarity-even by supernatural agency-the 
dissimilarity is even greater"), with the version found in the new edition of Denzinger (which omits 
the tanta: "inter creatorem et creaturam non potest similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit 
dissimilitudo notanda. " (DS 806)) it is not really clear why using the former should prompt a greater 
emphasis on difference. 
66Medard Kehl: von Balthasar Reader 21 
67 KB 328 
`0y 
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the Son of God incarnate, as the analogy of being in the concrete, embracing and 
mediating all closeness as well as distance between God and man. In his intra- 
trinitarian perspective distance is for the sake of authentic closeness. 68 
Balthasar does not carry out this development by denying the law of 
insurmountable difference between divine uncreated nature and created nature, the 
"essential abyss" central to Przywara's use of the analogia entis. The union of the 
two natures in Christ is not an exception to this rule, nor an eradication of the 
element of difference. It is the mystery of his person, bridging the abyss between 
created and uncreated without harm to his unity. 69 For his created nature, as well as 
being separated from the Creator by the chasm of creatureliness, is drawn into the 
act by which the Son is begotten from the Father, as the possession of the divine 
person of the Son, 7° who, "measuring the immeasurable realm of the analogia entis as 
he strides though it", has come to dwell as a man among men "identifying himself 
(who is God) with this being (man)". " His person, as the ultimate union of divine 
and created being "must constitute the final proportion [Mass] between the two" 
and it is thus, as the divine Son who becomes man, that he must be the concrete 
analogy of being itself, 72 the measure of the created uncreated relationship. In the 
unity of his divine and human natures he constitutes the proportion of every interval 
between God and man73 and every closeness. " It is thus that he is the concrete 
measure of the human-divine relationship, 75 of nearness and distance from God, 76 of 
the nature-grace relationship. " As the abstract philosophical expression of likeness 
within ultimate difference between divine and created is concretised and made 
theological the whole issue of the apparent `clash' between the analogy of being and 
of faith is now focused on and resolved in him in the unconfused unity of the two 
68 cf eg TD IV 343; Th III 41f 
69 Th 111 220 
70 ET I 176 
" Th 111 227 
72 Th 11 220; 267 
73H70n5 
74 The summit of the creaturely attitude before God, obedience, is found archetypically in him, rooted 
in his mission as eternal son. cf Marc Oullet: "Paradox and/or Supernatural Existential" Communio 
18 1991 274. 
75 Ibid. 273 
76 ET 1 177 
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natures in his one person. It now becomes the norm for every relation between 
divine and created. 
We must be clear that precisely as the final proportion of the created and 
uncreated natures, Christ is not outside the analogy. It applies to "the highest union 
between divine and created being, in the God-man himself'. " The analogia entis 
between God and creature, "albeit in a fundamental and ultimate "greater 
dissimilarity", goes right through the incarnate Son of God. "79 It is important that as 
the new Adam who has taken on a real humanity he stands within the analogy of 
being in which all created reality stands, even though as regards his divine person the 
aspect of similarity is in fact equality, a sharing of a unity of nature with the Father 
in the Holy Spirit. " Analogy is not overstepped in the direction of identity. " By 
virtue of his true divinity we can say that "he transcends the analogy", but "more 
precisely, that he stands on both sides of the analogy, that the analogy goes right 
through the centre of his consciousness". " At the same time though, in recognising 
his relationship to the creature, we must not lose sight of the fact that he actually 
possesses the divine pole of the analogia entis. It is by virtue of this that he can 
undertake the self-emptying of the incarnation in the first place. " 
2 Analogy and participation 
Now if this is the relation of the incarnate Son to the analogy of being, what about 
the status of those who have sonship through participation in him? 
The difficult question will be to explain what the situation is of the man who is made to 
share in the privilege of Jesus' divine Sonship, 84 
a `difficulty' which is precisely the concern of a doctrine of grace. 
According to the fourth Lateran Council the similarity within dissimilarity in the 
creature-Creator relationship is of universal application and so "must extend to the 
" Ibid. 162 
78 Th 111 221; 11 267; H 53ff 
79 Th 111 203 
80 Th 11 406 
" Th 111 222 
82 Th 11 407 Balthasar's italics 
83 Ibid. 267-8 
84 Ibid. 407 
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creature's supernatural elevation, through grace, to divine Sonship". 85 The analogy 
includes supernatural likeness and therefore remains a principle of great significance 
in the life of grace, expressed in that rhythm of `the greatest intimacy united to ever- 
growing reverence"', which, when we consider the anthropology of the Theo- 
drama, " we will see is a new rhythm in Christ henceforward determining all 
anthropology. 
This central Christian understanding of the grace of participation with its abiding 
distinction between God and the creature is of pivotal importance to Balthasar. It is 
crucial for him that in the face of non-Christian understandings of fulfilment and 
post-Christian anthropologies it is upheld in contrast to models of identity and 
confusion, or fantasies on the part of man "that the dimensions opened up to him by 
free grace are his by nature, are postulates of his", such that the distance in the 
analogy is something that he can simply `jump over' and then "settle down in God's 
realm as if it were his own". 88 It is this fallacy that Balthasar seeks to refute whilst 
maintaining that transferral to God's realm is precisely what we are made for and 
that the creature-God relationship is truly a participatory one through the incarnate 
Son. This authentic understanding of participation, as we shall see, is a major 
preoccupation in his treatment of human fulfilment in the Theo-drama. In fact it is 
the distinction between creation and participation that Balthasar ultimately insists 
upon as the distinction between nature and grace. 89 
The christological law of the analogy of being then is absolutely central to theo- 
drama. 9° It is the fact that there is this kind of relationship between creature and 
Creator (a dynamic likeness that never `catches up' with the ever-greater God) that 
makes possible the enduring dramatic quality of their relations. The inalienable 
differentiation of the analogy is the necessary presupposition of genuine encounter, 
exchange, confrontation and co-operation; and the fact that the analogy of likeness 
within unlikeness is conceived of dynamically means the drama never comes to a 
85Th 111221 
86 cf eg Th 11407,260 and chapter 1 section D above. 
87 cf chapter 6 below 
88 Ibid. 407 
89 In Retro 118 
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stand still. This centrality of the analogia entis for theo-dramatic theory is 
fundamentally christological because the drama that the analogy thus bespeaks has 
its "concrete centre" in Christ in the relations between the two natures in the one 
person, as we shall see in more detail in Part II of the thesis. 
C `Intra-trinitarian' christocentrism 
Even in Karl Barth, Balthasar's christological elucidation of the analogy of being is 
grounded intra-trinitarianly. The "similarity of the creature with the ever dissimilar 
God" is elucidated by the fact that the very possibility of the God-creature 
distinction is grounded in the `distance' between Father and Son (in the unity of the 
Holy Spirit). " Thus the distance entailed in the formal concept of nature which we 
discussed in the previous chapter has a theological foundation: 
all creation is grounded in the Logos, more exactly, in Jesus Christ. And the possibility of 
creation being distinct from God derives ultimately from the divine Son's readiness to empty 
himself in service and obedience to his Father. 92 
Whilst then the formal concept of nature is a presupposition for the incarnation, 
on a higher level it "has for its presupposition the Son's willingness to make this 
descent into creation". 93 It is specifically in this sense that Christ is the a priori of 
creation. It is fundamentally this grounding of the possibility of the God-creature 
distance in the intra-trinitarian relation and distance between Father and Son in the 
unity of the Holy Spirit (going all the way to abandonment on the Cross) that 
elucidates the analogy of being, the similarity of the creature with the ever dissimilar 
God. 94 The personal trinitarian life is therefore the goal of our natural substrate (in 
participation) and its ground (as the deepest foundation of natural distance; `the 
condition for its possibility'). And ultimately the dialectic of the life of grace 
expressed by the analogy of being-that is, the stronger the union, the clearer the 
difference-is specifically associated with the mystery of the Holy Spirit, 
anticipating the pneumatological focus we will consider in the Theo-drama. It is in 
90cf eg Th IV 380 
91 KB 286; 292 
92 Ibid. 287 
93 Ibid. "... just as the diver is connected to the diving board, whose purpose and teleology exist only 
so that the diver may leap from it. " 
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the Spirit's impenetrable mystery, Balthasar says, that, according to Paul "we are 
given an ever-increasing share in God's nature as spirit the more we are truly 
identified with our own creaturely nature as spirit. "95 
It is quite striking to find here in Karl Barth this particular insight and expression 
(albeit brief) regarding the intratrinitarian grounding of the God-creature relationship 
so central to Balthasar's mature thought. This particular perspective means that it is 
not simply the hypostatic union, as though an act isolated in time, that is the key to 
the man-God relationship, but the eternal relationship of the Son to the Father in the 
Spirit, in which the hypostatic union is predestined and thus in which our 
brotherhood of the eternal son is also predestined. 
In the Theo-drama Balthasar develops this pattern of thought in his 
understanding of the Son as the ground of creation in his begetting from the Father, 
such that an analogy is exposed between creation and the generation of the Son. 
Here Balthasar, keen to stress creation's locus as emphatically in but other than 
God, 96 develops the christological grounding of creation more and more explicitly in 
its trinitarian context. 97 Whilst the life of the Trinity must not be described as a 
"becoming" (the persons being co-eternal), the creaturely process of becoming can 
present an "image" of the primal life of the Trinity. " The key to understanding the 
existence of relative finite being alongside Absolute being, lies in the imago trinitatis 
quality of creaturely processes, 99 an insight absolutely central to his understanding of 
the world and its processes in the Theo-drama. '°° Difference is part of the Godhead 
(in the opposition of the persons). Thus "the `not' ('the son is not the Father', and 
94 Ibid. 286; 292 
95 Ibid. 292 1 Cor 2: 9-16 
96The creature is found within him (eg Th IV 329) for "there is nothing outside God" (IV 333 with 
reference to II 260ff). In our finitude we must think of ourselves as "others" in our relation to God, 
but as God is "everything", "perfect unity"-such that when we add the world to him we do not have 
any `more"'-finitude "cannot constitute any opposition to him". So rather than being the `other" 
over against finite reality, God is the "non-aliud" the Non-other, as taught by Nicholas Cusanus and 
before him Eckhart (although the latter betrays "an extreme Neoplatonic ontology" V 434) 11 193; cf 
also 230; 287; 428. This is also expressed in terms of the Augustinian "Deus interior intimo meo", 
"more interior to me than I am to myself' (eg 11230,242,421). 
97cf Th 11 287-288 
98 eg Ibid. 261; V 67 
99Th 11 261 
goo Balthasar traces his "trinitarian interpretation of the world's being" (Th V 68) back to high 
scholasticism whilst also engaging with contemporary considerations of the world's "triune 
constitution" (71). 
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so forth)" has "an infinitely positive sense", and mutual `giving away' belongs to the 
Trinity (the `not holding onto' the divine nature' of the Son's kenosis, the Father's 
begetting of the Son and the Spirit's self-giving "to the love of Father and 
Son-which he is"'°'). God does not need the world, but whilst we "must put a 
caesura between the eternal Yes uttered by God's will to himself and his eternal life 
and the Yes which seals the decision to create", "' the freedom in which God 
determines that the world shall exist is, according to its nature, none other than the 
freedom by which he wills eternally to be what he is. 103 So there is an analogical 
relationship between God's yes to himself and his yes to creation. 
The fact that it is specifically in the Son that the world is grounded in God is 
elucidated in the development of an analogy between the world's indebtedness to 
God for its existence and the Son's indebtedness to the Father for his divinity (which 
must owe something to Eckhart's identification of the generation of the Son and the 
creation of the world10'). Balthasar is explicit: 
... there 
is an analogy between the Son's being begotten and the creature's being freely and 
sovereignly created by God. '°5 
For the world can only receive its possibility and reality in the eternal Son, "who 
eternally owes his divine being to the Father's generosity. "'0' As the Father's eternal 
Word, the Son creates the world-but not only instrumentally: `through him', means 
`in him' and `for him' too (Col I: 16); he is "the world's pattern and hence its 
goal". "' The world is thus grounded in the Son "according to its ability". 108 
Balthasar finds the fundamentals of this teaching in high scholasticism, particularly 
Thomas and Bonaventure. 1°9 
'°'Th II 261 
102 Ibid. The kind of relationship we are talking about here may be illuminated by Balthasar's use of 
the same linguistic metaphor to describe the unity and distinction between Jesus' active life and `his 
hour' cf IV 231 ff. 
'03Th 11 261 
104Th V 439; 450; I 551 This position was gradually abandoned by his disciples. cf note 122 below 
'°5Th 111 229 note 68; also II 261f, 286, III 35f, 518; IV 328,330-331, V 81,88 (Adrienne von 
Speyr) 
10 Th II 261; "The world can only be created with the Son's `generation"' IV 326; both generation 
and creation are a form of divine kenosis. IV 323 
107ThII261 
108 Ibid. 262 
109 Th V 61-65; II 262 
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This location in the Son is of course a location in the totality of the Godhead and 
Balthasar suggests we think of the world as the gift of the Father (begetter and 
creator) to the Son, because he wishes to sum up all things in heaven and earth in 
him, as head (Eph I: I). Just as the Son receives the gift of the Godhead, he accepts 
the gift of the world as an opportunity for giving thanks and glory to the Father. 
When he has brought the world to fulfilment, "he will lay the entire Kingdom at his 
feet, so that God (the Father) may be all in all (I Cor 15: 24,28). 1° Meanwhile the 
Spirit is given the world by both and can now implement in and through creation 
what he is eternally, "the reciprocal glorification of Father and Son". "' 
These endeavours on Balthasar's part to understand the God-creature 
relationship in terms of the God-God relationship mean that an interesting analogy is 
established between the God-man `distance' and what Balthasar understands as 
intra-trinitarian `distance', diastase. Literally this means `separation', a strong word, 
used for example in modern Greek, to refer to a married couple who no longer live 
together, who are `separated'. Words like `distance', `separation', `gulf are 
therefore not traditionally applied to the inner life of God in Christian 
theology-indeed John Damascene asserted that God is adiastase. 12 However this 
is not the case in Balthasar's doctrine of the Trinity. Here, without actually 
intending to deny the unity of the Godhead, "' there is a preoccupation with the 
"diastasis of the divine `Persons' in the unity of the divine nature", "' with an 
"absolute, infinite "distance", "' an "eternal separation in God", 116 such that the 
distinctiveness between the persons is so total that it constitutes a "gulf'. "' For 
Balthasar the begetting of the Son is understood as "an incomprehensible and unique 
10 Th II 262 
"'Balthasar maintains that this grounding of creation in God does not involve a `contraction' of God 
to make room for creation: "the `nothing-out-of-which' the world came into being can only be sought 
in infinite freedom itself: that is, in the realm of creatable being opened up by divine omnipotence 
and, at a deeper level, by the Trinitarian "letting-be" of the hypostatic acts. Th II 263f 
"2De Fide Orthodoxa Lib I in Patrologia Graeca vol 94 827,829. I am grateful to Demetrios 
Bathrellos for drawing my attention to this. 
13Th V 81f, 518 (Adrienne von Speyr); 111 333; 11 258; V 94 
14Th 11 288 (TD 11/1 262); Th 111 228 
15Th IV 323 ("absoluten, unendlichen Abstands" TD 111 301); "... absolute distance/distinction... " IV 
333 ("... absoluten Distanz... " TD 1113 10); "distance within the Trinity" (Th IV 380); "... distance 
(Distanz) between God and God" (11 266) 
16Th IV 327 ("Trennung" TD 111304) 
,,,,,... the gulf of the Divine Persons' total distinctiveness... " Th IV 326 
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`separation' of God from himself". "' It is, a kenosis on the Father's part19 in which 
his renunciation of Godhead (not being God for himself alone) gives the Son "equally 
substantial" possession of it (for it is truly given and not just lent), but without the 
Father losing himself"' The Son is thus infinitely other, but, Balthasar maintains, an 
infinite otherness of infinite loving relation which grounds and surpasses both all we 
understand by separation and all we understand by relationship. "' The distance 
between God and man then is grounded in this `distance' (Distanz) between God and 
God. 122 In fact for Balthasar the creature's metaphysical and theological locus in 
God is indeed "the diastasis (Diastase) of the divine `Persons' in the unity of the 
divine nature". "' For if the creature is located in God in the Son, then this is 
grounded in the fact there is a Son as well as the Father, and Spirit as well as a Son 
and Father, that is in the fact there is distinction and opposition in God, the inter- 
penetration of the persons involving each one `letting the others be' (and not holding 
on to the divine nature12'). Balthasar therefore thinks that the genuine distinction of 
God and creature is no longer a problem "because ultimately it is grounded in the real 
difference between the divine hypostases""' Or again: 
"the distance between heaven and earth can only be secondary ("economic") within the primary 
("immanent") distinction between Father and Son in the Spirit; it is to be seen as an expression 
of this latter, all-embracing distinction". 126 
Balthasar maintains this does not mean that the `not' that characterises the 
creature-it is `not' God and cannot exist of itself-is identical with the `not' found 
within the Godhead. However, the latter constitutes the deepest reason why the 
creaturely `not' does not cause the analogy of being between creature and God to 
break down. The infinite distance between the world and God is grounded in the 
118 Th IV 325 ("... eine so unfaßbare und unüberbietbare `Trennung' Gottes von sich selbst... " TD III 
302) 
19 cf Th IV 323 The thinking here is related to that of Bulgakov. 
120 Ibid. 327; 111 518-9 This means that, with F Ulrich, there is a coincidence of poverty and wealth 
in God. This primal kenosis grounds the subsequent kenosis of creation, the establishment of the 
covenant and the redemptive kenosis of the identification of the Logos with the man Jesus. Th IV 
323-333 
121 Th IV 325 
'22cf Th 11 266; IV 380 Here, perhaps in preference to Eckhart's identification of the Son's generation 
and our creation, we see the influence of Ruysbroeck for whom the Father contemplates the otherness 
of the world of creation in the otherness of the eternally begotten Son. V 457-8 
123 Th 11 288 (TD 11/1 262); IV 333 
124 Th 11 261 
125 Ibid. 288 
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other, prototypical distance between God and God"' and the Son is the 
presupposition of any bifurcation (including, as we shall see later the `bad' 
separation of sin and suffering12'). So whilst for Barth the analogy of being breaks 
down because of the fundamental opposition in constitution of `out of itself' nd 
`not out of itself, for Balthasar the analogy is ultimately based on the fact that this 
God-creature opposition is in fact grounded in an opposition internal to God. 
Whilst Balthasar may think this perspective solves problems for the God- 
creature distinction we may find that it makes problems for God. However we will 
postpone any further comment on the introduction of concepts like `distance' into 
the Trinity until we have encountered other aspects of Balthasar's uncovering of the 
ground of intra-mundane characteristics and processes as part of an imago trinitatis 
later on in this thesis. 
As the link between the Son's begetting and creation shows God's eternal 
intention for creation to have a place in God (in the Son), to be `begotten in grace', 
the analogy between creation and begetting is a dynamic one, touching not only our 
origin but also our orientation towards our end. Later we will consider how adoption 
as well as creation is associated with the begetting of the Son. 129 We shall see that 
Balthasar uses personalist models to elucidate the analogy between the primal life of 
the triune God and the origin, destiny and fulfilment of the finite creature, such that 
we learn from the interpersonal constitution of the triune life that the relation of 
finite spiritual creature to the Infinite creator is (amazingly! ) also a personal `I', 
`thou' relationship, and a dynamic one too. 
D Christ as concrete universal 
Finally, we will briefly touch upon a further aspect of Balthasar's christocentrism 
relevant to our topic that we find traces of in Karl Barth and which endures into 
Balthasar's mature work: the christological understanding of the relationship 
between (concrete) particular and universal. 
'26 Th 111 530 
127 Th 11 266 
128 Th IV 325 (TD 111302) 
129 cf chapter 5 below 
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Balthasar's preoccupation with the concrete and historical is centred upon the 
unique, concrete, particularity of Christ. Understanding the Christ event as the 
concretissimum on which the meaning of all else must rest was crucial in Balthasar's 
discussions with Barth, for whom the Catholic analogy of being undermined this 
christocentrism which "interprets all secular and worldly relations and realities in 
terms of God's self interpreting Word, Jesus Christ. ""' Balthasar's exposition of 
Catholic christocentrism is clearly in concord with a recognition of the incarnation 
and the history between God and man that flows from it as "the concretissimum, 
concreteness personified, " from which we must not distance ourselves in abstraction. 
Any authentic abstraction and development of universal concepts is merely relative 
to this. 13' But for Balthasar, precisely as the most concrete reality, the source of all 
meaning, the Christ event is "the fullest and richest of realities", inexhaustive in 
interpretative value and containing "room for the use of universal concepts, 
categories, properties and finally of Being itself. " 112 For it is precisely as 
concretissimum that it is universalissimum. 133 So Balthasar's recognition of Christ as 
the most concrete reality of all, to which all must be referred, is not solely influenced 
by Barth's understanding, (the narrowness of which he considered a `dead end""). 
Rather Balthasar realised that the unique `most concreteness' of the existence of 
Christ makes it the most inclusive reality and it is in this direction that the 
significance of Christ as concretissimum lies: hence its focus as that point at which 
the age old problem of the relation between particular and universal finds its 
answer. 135 
130 KB 30; 37; 55; 383-384 
131 Ibid. 384 
132 Ibid. 
133 Th 11 271 
134cf 
section A above 
135 Philosophical nominalism is an erroneous digression (although Balthasar takes neither a 
straightforward realist or nominalist way forward). Theology, as a true science of singulars that are 
also general and normative, needs a philosophy that protects both the essential and realist aspects; 
that is, it must recognise that "the incarnate Logos is the norm and fulfilment of all authentic logoi 
in nature and history. " KB 336 Balthasar had already set out an understanding of the relation of 
concrete and universal in Christ in an article on the characteristics of Christianity published two years 
before the Barth book. ("Drei merkmale des Christlichen" in Wort und Wahrheit (Wein) 4 1949 401- 
415 reprinted in expanded form in ET 1 161-180, especially pp 170-171); cf also H 92 and Raymond 
Gawronski's exposition in "Jesus Christ Crucified Foundation of the Cosmos" Communio 23 
Summer 1996 339-353. 
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Referring to the Christ-centred observations of Romano Guardini, which are 
clearly of importance in this area of his thought, Balthasar explains 
the historical person of Jesus Christ is himself the essence from which all general and abstract 
categories of the being of the world and of nature have their measure ... 
It is not Christ who is 
in the world, but the world is in Christ. 136 
He quotes at some length from passages in Guardini's Wesen des Christentums, first 
published over twenty years before Karl Barth in 1929, which locate this 
relationship between singular and universal for us in the historical person of Christ: 
Every realm of being contains certain foundational determinants that establish it in its unique 
character and set it off from the rest... These presuppositions or categories are necessarily 
general and universal. But, in our case, it is different. Where elsewhere the general concept 
stands, here there appears a historical person. 137 
As Balthasar himself says some years later, it is Christ's concrete existence that 
provides us with our norm. 13' 
Everything in this world, singular and general, depends upon this uniqueness of 
Christ, which is the manifestation of the uniqueness of God as the One, the 
Unique. "' But through Christ we are called to a participation in this uniqueness. We 
are destined through his uniqueness to a unity in which our creaturely non-identity 
of `I' and `we' is enriched unsurpassably. By grace Christ lets us participate in this 
uniqueness of his that is not of this world, by giving it to the Church, his body, his 
bride. This participation does not jeopardise Christ's own uniqueness nor does it do 
violence to what is specific in the creature, "since God himself in Christ, is "Son of 
Man", one man, that is among all the rest". "' So participation embraces the 
fulfilment of our very particularity (in communion with that of others) in the 
particularity of Christ, given in communion with his body the Church. We will see 
that Balthasar maintains his interest in this crucial reality in the Theo-drama. 
It is in the Theo-drama that we shall find the flowering of a systematic dramatic 
approach to this relation of particular and universal in the uniqueness of Christ 
(especially in the identity of person and mission in Christ from whom the `roles' of 
136 
KB 329 
137 R Guardini: Wesen des Christentums (1929; 1940) 68-9 cited KB 337 
138 "Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics" in Principles of Christian Morality (Ignatius San 
Francisco, 1986) 79,82; cf E Babini: "Jesus Christ, Form and Norm of Man according to Hans Urs 
von Balthasar" Communio 16 1989 448-457 
'39ET 1 171 
140 Ibid. 180 
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the drama are allotted14'). For his uniqueness does not oppose but enhances his 
universal interest, his universality, contained in concentrated form in his mission, so 
manifested in the `shattering' and outpouring of his passion that no spectator 
remains untouched. 142 His personal drama makes a universal claim. The tragic 
dimension of his personal existence illuminates "the significance and change of 
meaning of all intra-mundane tragedyi143 and something of his drama's own catholic 
and concrete universality is communicated to the individual human destiny giving it a 
universal range (as found in the doctrine of the communion of saints). '" Thus the 
plurality of destinies are drawn into a concrete universal point of unity which 
maintains their plurality as a function of this unity, 145 unlike Idealist and Socialist 
claims to universality, where personal drama is lost in its integration into the epic 
"Odyssey of the Spirit". In the communion of saints in Christ each particular 
destiny has a universal (if uncalculable) influence. "' As this incorporation into him 
comes about as a result of his unlimited, representative identification with us 
(including sin), his role as the concretissimum universalissimum not only applies 
when we prescind from the concrete historical modalities of the world's existence, 
but also in the worst of these modalities, that of fallen human nature, when his 
obedience "represents the concrete universal idea of the relationship between heaven 
and earth in the form of crucified love". 147 
E Concluding summary 
In this chapter I have shown how Balthasar's contribution to the mid-century nature 
grace debate is ultimately christocentric and cannot be accurately considered without 
full awareness of this. 148 
141 cf chapter 7 below and also the related question of the logos-logoi, prototype-copy in chapter 5 
section C. 
'42Th 11 32-33 
'a3 Ibid. 49 
'44 Ibid. 50 
145Eph 1: 3-10 and 4: 7-16 
'46 Th 115 1 
'47 Ibid. 271 
148 This appears to have been missed in Stephen Duffy's treatment of Balthasar's contribution to the 
nature-grace debate in The Graced Horizon: Nature and Grace in Modern 
Catholic Thought 
(Liturgical Press, Collegeville 1992) 115-134. 
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Christ is the inner unity of theology, the ground and the goal of creation, the 
immediate implication for the nature-grace relationship being the adoption of de 
Lubac's dialectical understanding of nature (because the christocentric understanding 
of creation means that nature is created for a supernatural end from the start, but, 
because of the utterly transcendent nature of this end, it is beyond our natural 
capacities to achieve it of ourselves). The nature-grace question is a matter of 
christology, for Christ is "the foundation and model of the unity of natural and 
supernatural"149-the relationship between the humanity and divinity of Christ being 
the crucial factor here such that our participation in the divine life is understood in 
terms of our relation to the hypostatic union. As the very union of created and 
uncreated, he is the proportion of the divine-human relation and thus the concrete 
analogy of being. Balthasar is apparently moving away from Przywara's marked 
emphasis on the distance of the cross as the focus of the christological analogia entis 
in favour of the union of creaturely and divine in Christ's personal constitution 
(although there is a lack of specificity about the nature of this union in his 
christology). As the norm for all creaturely relationships, he is the concrete universal 
and he is the measure of all human action. 
The christocentrism is grounded intra-trinitarianly. In Karl Barth the `distance' 
of Father and Son is the theological foundation of the distance entailed in the nature 
concept, whilst the Theo-drama develops the idea that the God-world distinction is 
grounded in the distinction between the persons of the Trinity and depicts creation 
and adoption `taking place with' the eternal begetting of the Son from the Father. In 
the next chapter we will continue our discussion of Balthasar's christocentric 
understanding of the nature-grace relationship by considering its dramatic quality. 
'49KB 332 (Schmaus) 
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Chapter 3 
A christocentric drama 
The path is determined and illuminated by the goal one has in view, and this applies particularly 
to this unique path of salvation history, which only attains its goal as a result of the dialectic 
between, on the one hand, discontinuity and, on the other hand, a fulfilment going beyond all 
expectation (cf Paul in particular) and inner fulfilment (cf Matthew and James). ' 
In his new approach to the nature-grace relationship we have seen that Balthasar wished 
to avoid a "christological constriction"2 that tends to give the order of grace priority over 
the order of creation or place "such one-sided emphasis on God's will to give himself in 
Christ that the human response pales into relative insignificance". 3 We have mentioned 
Barth's position in this context and later in this chapter we will see with what success 
Balthasar develops a corrective of this in his treatment of the two Adams in the Theo- 
drama. However Balthasar also wished to avoid another rather different 
misrepresentation of the nature-grace relationship in which the orientation from nature 
to grace is so natural that grace almost seems to evolve from nature as that which is 
`bound to come', and thus the distinctive character of grace appears to be jeopardised. 
As regards this latter tendency, Balthasar had growing anxieties about the development 
of the fresh approach to theology in the hands of theologians guided by Marechal's 
engagement with idealism. He is concerned that in this `transcendental Thomist' 
approach the grace of Christ is so anticipated in transcendental subjectivity that the 
Christ event is inevitably no more than an explicit unfolding of what was already there 
in the first place. In adopting dramatic categories Balthasar is aware that, as well as 
consolidating a shift from essentialism, they provide a means of expression that 
confronts both of these flawed approaches. 
' "Nine Propositions on Christian Ethics" in Principles of Christian Morality (Ignatius, San Francisco 
1986) 77-78 
2 Th 111 257; cf chapter 2 section A above. 
3 Th 111253 n 71 with reference to R Haubst: Von Sinn der Menschwerdung (Hueber, Munich 1969) 
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A The theo-dramatic perspective 
1 History and the dramatic 
Christ is the centre, the foundation and the completion of history and there is therefore 
only one form of progress, that toward Christ, ' who is the condition of the possibility 
of there being any scene in history' and, as true ground (alpha), is also the conclusion 
(omega)6-but without this christological embrace overcoming genuine historicity. ' 
Being the condition of the possibility of every scene in history means opening an area of 
freedom (within God's freedom) in which man is given the scope to make history 
happen, but as an area belonging to Christ it is shaped according to the structures of his 
earthly existence! In the Theo-drama this is expressed in the idea that as well as being 
one of the actors9 Christ is the acting area, the stage on which the play takes place. '° 
The created order, the whole of history, is ordered so as to be the history of the Son 
incarnate which he fulfils, and yet the actual fulfilment so transcends the promise that 
precedes it as to make it completely impossible to anticipate. Man in history then does 
not naturally `evolve' into his fulfilment by developing into the future, as though 
wholeness is "humanity itself, maturing through generations as it grows out of its own 
fragmentary existence. "" In the face of a smooth, natural progress to completion, a 
natural continuity between fragment and whole, the Christian understanding of 
completion in Christ alone stands out as distinctly dramatic. Grace does not emerge out 
of nature, rather "in the concrete, man and his concrete history, the power of creation 
4cf KB 336 Balthasar wanted to engage with and refute an idealist understanding of history understood in 
terms of universal progress. 
5A Theology of History (H) (Ignatius, San Francisco 1994) 65 
6 Th IV 46,60,66; Balthasar: Man in History (Sheed and Ward, 1968) 116 
7This is disputed by a number of commentators. cf the discussion in section D below and chapter 9 note 
1. For Balthasar's "reciprocal subjection" of history to the Son and the Son to history cf H especially 
51-65. 
8H70f 
9Th 111 21,120-121; 505-535 
'0Ibid. 41,43-6,60-63 
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and the power of grace, must collide". " The category of drama becomes central in 
Balthasar's expression of the Christian message. 
2 Drama 
An interest in the category of event, and even that of drama itself, is already evident 
before the Theo-drama in conjunction with Balthasar's focus on the concrete as 
opposed to the speculative. In Karl Barth he tells us that it is 
a more concrete and positive theology that builds upon the historical fact of revelation and thus 
makes greater use of the categories that apply to events. 13 
He quotes Guardini: 
This is the most fundamental meaning of revelation: that God not only is but acts; not only 
watches over but actively participates; not only fulfils but comes to us. 14 
A citation from FX Arnold actually refers to "the drama of revelation", revelation being 
"essentially event, deed, history, and not merely speech, doctrine, word. " It is on this 
drama that all dogma rests. 15 
This gives a particular perspective to the treatment of man and his fulfilment in 
grace. "Revelation tells us what man is... by recounting the history of what God has 
done and is doing for us and with us to establish his reign in us. "16 Grace is God's 
"involvement". " Man is created to encounter him in the event of revelation18 and "the 
encounter with him in the event of grace renders everything else mere physical 
preparation and propaedeutic to this event". 19 
In the Theo-drama these concerns converge in the definitive choice of drama, as 
offering the categories best suited to the portrayal of God's action. " In the past 
" Man 100 
12 Ibid. 198 (my italics) 
13 KB 258 
14 Guardini: Die Offenbarung, 76 cited in KB 342; in God "being and doing completely coincide. " 
Schmaus: Katholische Dogmatik I 454 cited in KB 342 
15 "Glaubensschwund und Glaubensverkündigung", Die Warte (Luxembourg, October 27,1950) cited in 
KB 340 
16 Schmaus: Katholische Dogmatik II , 
277-278, cited in KB 340 
17 Balthasar: Engagement with God (SPCK, London 1975) 27,36 
18 KB 340, with reference to Guardini 
19 Ibid. 342 
20 cf Th I especially 9-87; Nichols: No bloodless Myth (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 2000) 3-63; Oakes: 
Pattern of Redemption (Continuum, New York 1994) 217f, 221 If, Thomas G Dalzell: The Dramatic 
Encounter of Divine and Human Freedom in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (Peter Lang, Bern 
2000) 113-128; JB Quash: "'Between the Brutally Given and the Brutally, Banally Free': von Balthasar's 
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theology has tended to be conducted in the epic mode which reports events at a narrative 
distance (such that God is `He'), as opposed to the lyrical mode associated with 
spirituality (in which God is 'Thou'). " Drama recognises the need for precise reporting 
but from a position of involvement within the action of the events reported, because it is 
God's action and there is therefore no `external standpoint' from which it can be 
viewed. Drama is thus presented as the solution to the either/or of `epic' theology and 
`lyrical' spirituality. " It is also understood as the mode towards which various trends 
in modem theology are tending but cannot reach, " and is shown to follow on naturally 
from the encounter and perception of revelation of the Aesthetics, " which is not just to 
be looked at, but is an action in which we are involved and to which we can only 
respond through action on our part. Dramatic categories are not imposed on theology: 
revelation is seen itself to be dramatic: "an action involving God and man", " the history 
of an initiative on his part for his world, "a struggle between God and the creature over 
the latter's meaning and salvation. "" Theology is full of dramatic tension: the inward, 
contemplative aspect oriented towards action, and the outward, dialogical aspect always 
questioning and searching, open to the ever fresh and `unexpected' answers of the Spirit 
which generates the genuine pluriform unity of theology. 27 
Balthasar's apprehension of the nature-grace dialectic (which, as we shall see, in the 
Theo-drama is particularly focused on the question of freedom) is central to this 
appreciation of the usefulness of dramatic categories, for it means the natural order has 
an inherent dramatic tension which is adopted and brought to its proper end (through 
transformation) by the supernatural. "There is always a divine-human dramatic 
Theology of Drama in Dialogue with Hegel" Modern Theology 13: 3 July 1997 294-318; G O'Hanlon: 
"Theological Dramatics" in Bede McGregor and Thomas Norris, eds.: The Beauty of Christ (T &T 
Clark, Edinburgh 1994) 92-95; Steffen Lösel: "Murder in the Cathedral Hans Urs von Balthasar's New 
Dramatisation of the Trinity" Pro Ecclesia V no 4 1996 430-431; cf also chapter 7 section Al below. 
21 Th 11 43; 53-57; I 42 
22 Th 11 54-62,532; I 16 For the influence of Hegel cf I 55-6. Hence Balthasar's interest in Calderon's 
dramatisation of theological epic (Thomas). (I 69) 
23Th I 25-50 
24eg Ibid. 15,18 
25Ibid. 130 
26Ibid. 125; 122-3 
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tension": for as God has given freedom to man his creation, man has some kind of 
knowledge of his origin (however obscured) and God is always involved in the world 
(although this is all that is apparent in the `anteroom' of revelation). " Here, hovering on 
the boundary between natural and supernatural, Balthasar locates the central dramatic 
question of role-`who am IT and `what is my part on the world stage? '- to which we 
shall return. 
"Drama is essentially human action, action as a way of imparting meaning to 
existence in its search for self-realisation. "29 It is a presentation of existence, of 
"life-nature embedded in the supernatural", 30 a mirror used in the interests "of self- 
knowledge and the elucidation of Being", but one which, according to Balthasar's 
Christian perspective on existence, must point beyond itself, because existence, by 
virtue of its creatureliness, cannot be perfected essentially but only in supernatural 
grace. 31 The relationship between drama and theology is thus one of nature to grace, for 
in the theatre man attempts a transcendence32 (which he cannot decisively conclude), an 
observation and judgement of his own truth, and in so doing `beckons' the approach of 
revelation about himself, opening a door, parabolically, "to the truth of the real 
revelation. 1133 
In the choice of drama the paradoxical character of spiritual existence (by nature only 
supernaturally fulfilled) can be explored in terms of tragedy. This is evident in the 
situation of finite existence-doomed never to satisfy the `infinite space' within it but 
to be broken off by death34. It also belongs to God's plan of salvation because he takes 
on the tragic situation of man right to the bitter end, 35 and because the free creature's 
27Ibid. 126-128 
28Ibid. 128-129 
29Ibid. 413; 411 
30Ibid. 11,17 
31 Ibid. 86 
32Ibid. 20-21 
33Ibid. 12, cf 20-21 
'a cf eg Th II 38f; 59 On the significance of death cf Th I 369-408; chapter 6 and chapter 9 section B 
below. 
35 eg Th 11 49; 54; 83-84 Regarding the compatibility of tragedy and Christianity cf I 72,74 note 11, 
86 (Przywara), 120-123 (R Schneider), 414,425-435. 
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possibility of rejecting him becomes more serious once this definitive revelation of 
divine love has taken place, leading to a reciprocal escalation of love and hardened hate 
such that the triumph of God's final victory may be tinged with tragedy if part of his 
plan for the world thus fails36. Drama also provides the tools for a trinitarian expression 
of God's immanence and transcendence: as Father he authors the play, in Christ he is 
actor in it, as Spirit he is director of it. 37 That God is thus involved in the history of the 
world, that he risks being affected, is central to this new dramatic mode for theology, 38 
and the fact that we must act too we shall see is central to the dramatic presentation of 
the nature-grace relationship. The audience then are no mere spectators, but are open to 
being touched by the play's `horizon', its "all surrounding framework of meaning", 39 
such that a transcendent insight suddenly breaks forth in the action upon the stage with 
striking personal impact upon the individual. " 
The fundamental foundation to Christian theological dramatic theory is the analogy 
of being. " This ineradicable distinction is the necessary presupposition of genuine 
opposition and interaction, whilst the aspect of likeness based on the imago dei is also 
central. Particularly relevant to our topic is the fact that drama presupposes the 
interaction of two freedoms: infinite freedom and finite freedom made in its image, whilst 
the concrete centre of theo-drama lies in the relationship between these two in Christ 
(this will be our topic in Part II). Central to our concerns in this chapter is the fact that 
the choice of drama means we are dealing with "complications, tensions, catastrophes 
and reconciliations"42 (as we find in our individual lives and our interaction with others), 
with a struggle between God and man and with the unexpected nature of the divine 
response. " Central to the appropriateness of dramatic categories is the fact that tension 
belongs objectively to drama. With its goal-orientation and evaluation of things with 
36 Th V 212 cf V 191-246 esp 201-203 
37 cf Th I 268-305; 111 505-506,514,532-534 
38Th I 31,69,130-131 
39 Nichols: Bloodless 33 
40 On Balthasar's triad of presentation, audience, horizon cf Th I 305-343; III 534-535. 
41Th IV 380 
42 Th 1 17; 413 
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reference to a presupposed order, it "expresses itself in passionate struggle". 4 An 
absolute meaning is presented within something finite, is verified, contested, re-won or 
surpassed, through action and encounter, perhaps suffering and death, the key dramatic 
moments of peripeteia ('turning') and anagnorisis ('discovery') coming amidst a 
kaleidoscope of changes, complications and disentangle: nents. 45 There is no certainty as 
to how things will work out, rather tension between anticipation of the future and 
recapitulation of the past, and a precipitation towards the conclusion that hurtles along 
in "cascading events" yet is likewise "held back by delays, blockages, and the torment of 
excitement sustained". 46 Theo-drama is full of vibrant movement back and forth, 
outpouring and receiving or opposing, distance and closeness, pain and joy. Much is 
made of exchanges, expectation and surprise, recapitulation and reversal, uncertainty and 
discovery, events and decisions with explosive impact. Indeed for Balthasar God 
himself is dramatic, "able to be the "One" the "Other" and the "Unifying ""47, in whom 
there is-not becoming, but `event', `process' (in the sense of procession), " as well as 
distance, 49 expectation, surprises. That the `world play' is dramatic is dependent in the 
first place on the fact that creation images this trinitarian event from which it 
originates. " There is certainly no steady, smoothly unfolding drift towards perfection 
for creation, but a startling drama-with tragic dimensions. 
43cf eg Ibid. 125,127-128 
44E Staiger cited Ibid. 345 
45Th 1345-8; 354-358. 
46Ibid. 348 
47ThIII531 
48Th V 66-94 On the implications for the immutability of God cf 212-246 
49 cf chapter 2 section C 
so Th V 79,89,90,92-93,104,120,126 
51ThIII531 
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B The dramatic relationship between the human and 
the divine 
We have already seen something of the essential significance of the vertical descent of 
revelation for Balthasar in his defence of de Lubac's understanding of gratuity from 
above and in his christocentrism in which God's descent embraces man's ascent without 
nullifying it. 
In the Theo-drama the significance of the vertical is also drawn out in giving the 
totality of meaning to horizontal history. 52 This is the only location of final meaning for 
pre-Christian natural man. Failure to submit to Christianity's unique claim to the 
vertical axis as revelation from above, leaves human "upward" openness53 looking for 
meaning from the horizontal and absolutising what are merely fragments of meaning. 
This emphasis does not mean Balthasar solely employs an approach from above. 54 
Indeed his theo-dramatics starts from `frail human finitude'. The point is that in its 
`unwholeness' and need for full meaning, human finitude should be seen from the 
perspective of the insoluble incompleteness and sinfulness of its concrete situation. 
Then the call of grace and the breaking in of the answer man seeks can be seen as 
descending from the divine initiative without which it is unknown. This is the dramatic 
encounter, the "lightning flash", 55 the collision, " with which Balthasar is concerned, the 
"impact"57 of which unleashes irreversible influences upon world history. " 
1 `Anticipation', supernatural existential and dramatic tension 
It is in the context of this keen awareness of the dramatic quality of revelation and the 
human search for fulfilment that the concern of the mature work about the supernatural 
52 Th IV 71-3; 11 335-426; I 29-30; for critiques of Balthasar's prioritising of the vertical cf chapter 9 
note 1. 
53ThIV72 
54G O'Hanlon's description of Balthasar's "rejection of theology `from below"' in the article "The Legacy 
of Hans Urs von Balthasar" fails to acknowledge this. (Doctrine and Life 41 1991 401) For a more 
carefully considered analysis cf Dalzell: Dramatic 23-4,34-35. 
55Th 11 250; I 229; 344 
56cf Man 198 
57Th 11251 
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existential can be located. We have mentioned already Balthasar's experimental, if 
tentative, use of the supernatural existential in chapter one. Now in the Theo-drama 
Balthasar explicitly rejects usage of the concept in the context of ideas about a universal 
`anticipation' of revelation through the transcendental structures of man (although later 
we will see he never really denies a `triadic' scheme and still himself employs the term 
using his own carefully limited definition of it59) 
In the first place Balthasar, following de Lubac, thinks that man's desire for the 
living God constitutes man's essence and so is entirely natural. There is no need then to 
introduce a supernatural existential to elevate his nature to desire for God as he is in 
himself as this desire belongs to man essentially, even though the fulfilment of this 
desire is out of proportion to his nature and he is entirely dependent on divine 
illumination just to know that this is his essence. " This paradoxical aspect to man's 
nature is prior to talk of any feature that might be called a `supernatural existential' and 
is central to the dramatic character of human finitude. 
Secondly, as well as seeing this use of a supernatural existential as thus unnecessary, 
Balthasar is concerned that the application of an existential that is supernatural in this 
context introduces something supernatural into the nature of man. This creates a 
confusion between what is natural and universally possessed and what is distinctively 
supernatural, issuing in the very real danger that the work of grace is pre-empted in 
human transcendence. Specifically he is concerned about the tendency in some usages of 
the supernatural existential to equate man's supernaturally elevated transcendence with 
an actual experience of grace (which after all can be lost), and to understand it as a 
personal address from the personal God. It is even perceived to provide a formal, non- 
58Ibid. 254 
59 cf chapter 4 section D. For further discussion of this controversial question cf Lucas Lamadrid: 
"Anonymous or Analogous Christians? Rahner and von Balthasar on Naming the Non-Christian" 
Modern Theology 11 July 1995 363-384 (here 369-371); Marc Quellet: "Paradox and/or Supernatural 
Existential" in Communio 18 Summer 1991 259-279; Eamonn Conway: The Anonymous Christian -a 
Relativised Christianity? (Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1993); Dalzell: Dramatic 25-33; G O'Hanlon 
"The Jesuits and Modern Theology - Rahner, von Balthasar and Liberation Theology" Irish Theological 
quarterly 58 1992 25-45. 
Th 111 416; IV 142 cf HDL 70-71 
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objective knowledge of revelation which, on the basis that God wills to reveal himself 
uniquely and definitively in Christ, is understood to have a specifically Christian 
character: that is, an implicit knowledge of the incarnation and the Trinity. b' Balthasar 
finds no support in Scripture62 for the implication of such a universal a priori 
implantation of grace, verbal revelation and salvation history transcendentally in the 
given constitution of man and concludes that there is "an irreconcilable contradiction" in 
this perspective because objective religion will necessarily fail in attempts to objectify 
the a priori, transcendental experience since it cannot be guaranteed by special, a 
posteriori, categorial revelation. " Crucially this kind of transcendental perspective 
obliterates the dramatic tension inherent in the nature of man, who bears the mark of his 
decisive ordering to God in his very creatureliness (as an image by definition in search of 
its prototype) yet is entirely dependent on the free revelation of God to be conscious of 
the direction and nature of the fulfilment he searches for and to have that yearning 
satisfied. ' 
Balthasar sets out his concerns for an authentic expression of the God-creature 
relationship in salvation history in theo-dramatic terms. 65 The Christian solution to the 
problem of the meaning of man and his history should not be anticipated (antizipieren) 
or constructed from man's resources or seen as "`diffusely omnipresent' (by a 
`transcendental' generalising tendency and by talking in terms of a `supernatural 
existentiale"'). 6b This stops due weight being given to the dramatic tension of man's 
61 cf Th 111 410-417; 456-457; IV 75,78,143 He locates these tendencies in some of the writings of 
Karl Rahner, L Heislbetz, and M Schmaus cf Th 111 411-412 especially notes 17-27, his concerns of 
course also being reflected in his famous rejection of Rahner's term `anonymous Christian' cf especially 
The Moment of Christian Witness (Ignatius, San Francisco 1994); also Engagement especially 17-22. (cf 
Eamon Conway: Anonymous and Lamadrid: "Anonymous" ). By the time he wrote his book on de 
Lubac (published 1976) Balthasar is also explicit about de Lubac's rejection of Rahner's supernatural 
existential in the same context. HDL 71 
62 Th 111411,414-415 
63 Ibid. 413-414 
64 cf Ibid. 415-417; For a penetrating and comprehensive analysis of the difference between the dramatic 
and the transcendental perspective cf Marc Oullet: "Paradox and/or Supernatural Existential" Communio 
18 (Summer 1991) 259-279 
65 Th IV 75ff cf I 345-50 
66 Th IV 75 Man has not `always been aware' of redemption, even if only through his own transcendence. 
The divine response is not "something that was `always there'. " 76, cf also 143,150 
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historical situation in the world - continually searching for the answer, but totally 
incapable of constructing it (even in anticipatory fashion) or deducing its point of 
emergence. Balthasar consistently and clearly holds on to the importance of grasping 
"the ultimately hopeless situation of finite existence in the face of a transcendence that 
does not automatically disclose itself', " of being in a situation in which God's free 
triune self-revelation (which is the sole answer of human yearning) is awaited or 
unknown. Man cannot fit together the fragments of meaning he may perceive because 
God in his freedom has reserved to Himself the gift of the synthesis. " Whilst Balthasar 
holds fast then to his focus on the concrete world order made with the one supernatural 
end in view, the fulfilment of that end cannot be deduced from below: man has not even 
an intimation (erahnen) of the solution. " 
It is in the interests of this dramatic tension inherent, in Balthasar's view, to an 
authentic articulation of the dynamics of salvation, that Balthasar insists that before we 
consider the divine response the world of space and time must be allowed to manifest 
itself as it is, in all its finitude, its pathos, and its sinful brokeness'°-free from any 
premature introduction of the divine response. 
Thus in contrast to a description of salvation conveying the cohesion between 
human transcendence towards its divine answer and the giving of that answer (where the 
modulation from transcendence to fulfilment is, if you like, played legato), for Balthasar 
this coming together is less smooth. It embraces a variety of movement amongst the 
characters (towards and away from each other and back again), changes of place and 
direction, confrontation, rejection, conversion. Salvation consists in God's turning to a 
world which is lost, an actual intervention unimagined and previously unknown, coming 
into a world emphatically incapable of working out the answer and led way off the mark 
67 Ibid. 75 
68 Ibid. 77 
69 Ibid. 75 The inadequacy of man's solutions (and hence of the inappropriateness of reading them as 
"valid ciphers of redemption") is finally shown in the face of the actual redemption given by God in 
Christ. Ibid. 78 
70The inability to anticipate fulfilment belongs to creaturely finitude per se but is particularly marked in 
the fallen state. Ibid. 78 
73 
by sin-and yet constituting exactly the answer that is yearned for. Whilst God's 
action in Christ has an inward affect on all human beings by virtue of their solidarity in 
a single human history, the personal commitment to Christ of dying and rising with him 
that characterises Christian discipleship is decisively distinct. " 
The status of a natural intimation and pre-Christian awareness of the Christian 
answer is not entirely negative. Drama itself offers a kind of Vorgriff (Vorverstdndnis); 
so do the insights of inter-subjectivity, as we shall see in the next chapter, but always in 
terms of analogy rather than anticipation, conscious of the maior dissimilitudo. 72 
"Action", Balthasar says as he explores the resources of stage drama, "is the run-up to a 
future that is not predestined, but is indicated in various ways. -), 573 The locus of 
`anticipations' of the Christian solution is the Old Testament `preparation' of the Word 
of God with a view to his incarnation. There is a `pre-Christian twilight', but this (in so 
far as it is light) is for Balthasar a `preliminary' ("Vorlauf'), or rather a reflection 
("Rückstrahl"- literally, `backbeaming') of Christ. Thus any `anticipatory' `light' is 
specifically tied to the light of Christ; it belongs to that one light not yet fully revealed. 
For Balthasar then there is a tension to be maintained between the pre-Christian and the 
Christian which does not ossify into a rigid dialectic of law and Gospel in which all 
those aspects of the old covenant that constitute types of the new are deprived of all 
inner truth, but nor is it so relaxed as to attribute to the old covenant an anticipatory 
share in the new, such that some pre-Christian truth extracted from "the type's external 
husk" could be simply equated with the Christian and post-Christian truth. 74 Any 
understanding then of the Christ event as a crescendo of God's involvement in the world 
is simply dependent on the fact that the incarnation is the single point upon which 
God's saving involvement rests, everything converging on or emerging from it, and is not 
because it is the "unsurpassable highpoint" in a range of saving initiatives. 75 
"cf eg Th I 30f 
72 Ibid. 17-19 (drama); Moment 147 (intersubjectivity) 
73Th 1347 
74 Th IV 207 
75 Ibid. 207-208; 130 
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Now, with both this rejection of an `undramatic' transcendental understanding of 
history and his rejection of Barthian constriction in mind, we can approach Balthasar's 
theo-dramatic treatment of inclusion in Christ according to the reciprocal inter- 
penetration of the principle of Adam and the principle of Christ. 
C Inclusion in Christ 
In accordance with the christocentrism outlined in the previous chapter the Theo-drama 
makes it clear that a full doctrine of man is only possible within christology. Here we 
will consider how the emphasis on `inclusion in Christ"' sheds light on the relation 
between man's nature and end in an understanding of the relationship between the first 
and the second Adam according to which the Christ principle embraces the Adam 
principle. 
The central thought can be found in its essentials in Karl Barth : 
The first Adam is first, and the second Adam is second. But on a deeper level this true and 
lasting priority is grounded in another priority: the first Adam has been mysteriously grounded in 
and has been created in the first place for the sake of the second Adam. And he cannot deny the 
traces in himself of this bond between them. " 
This is developed substantially in the Theo-drama. The fact that man is only really 
understood in the light of Christ, is because "theologically speaking, the first Adam is 
created for the sake of, and with a view to, the second, even if he appears first in 
chronological time (I Cor 15: 45). "78 This twofold pattern is key to his understanding of 
the relationship between nature and grace. For having moved away from a focus on 
abstract concepts like natural and supernatural or nature and grace, Balthasar now 
explores the same under the concrete and more personal categories of man and Christ. 
Chronologically, Adam comes first and Christ comes after him, but theologically in the 
plan of God the Christ principle is the former, the one in, through, for whom and with a 
view to whom Adam is created. There is a very real temporal sequence in history which 
76For Guardini's influence cf KB 330 
" Ibid. 353 
78 Th 11 373-4 
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moves from the beginning towards the end, from Adam to Christ at the fullness of time, 
but Christ embraces the beginning and the end. He is the alpha and omega. 
If we examine this in more detail we find that in the first place "mankind as a whole, 
and each individual within it, represents a biological unity that cannot be designated in 
advance as the unity of Christ. "79 Following Paul's emphasis in I Cor 15: 45ff man is 
initially polarised by the principle of unity that he calls "the first man, Adam" and it is 
only subsequently that this polarisation is reversed by Christ who is the second not the 
first man/Adam. " The implications for the natural-supernatural relation in us are clear. 
The movement in time of first to second Adam is also our movement, from being the 
image of Adam, having all the natural constituents that belong to being 'a human creature, 
to being configured to the image of Christ, made a new creation and heir to the kingdom 
of heaven (I Cor 15.49). 
But this outlook needs to be seen in accordance with another perspective. For, 
although Balthasar maintains that according to this first view it could be possible to call 
Adam the Alpha and Christ the Omega, man's destiny lying in the transition from first 
to second principle, this is in fact rejected by a second view 
equally Pauline and explicitly formulated in the Johannine writings, to the effect that there is "one 
Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist" (I Cor 8: 6); "For in 
him all things were created, in heaven and on earth" (Col 1: 16), so that he is "the first and the last" 
(Rev 1: 17; 2: 8), "Alpha and Omega, the first and the last" (Rev 22: I3). 81 
In this perspective of creation in Christ "the second principle embraces and includes the 
first; the first comes to rest in the second, although, according to the foregoing view, the 
second takes over from the first. "82 
This implies two things as regards the Adam-principle that clearly build upon the 
differentiation of Balthasar's approach from one of developmental continuity between 
man and his wholeness. Firstly the Adam principle, because historically prior, "cannot 
be aware that it is a step on the way to the Christ-principle", although he may have 
some sense of transcending towards something greater and fulfilling and thus a feeling of 
79 Th III 33 
80 Ibid. 33,15 
81 Ibid. 34 
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his own inchoateness. His intuition then is not so much an intuition of his goal and 
completion as of his incompleteness. This is supported by the second implication, that 
is Adam's uncertainty about his origins. He is created and "cannot uncover his own 
foundations; ultimately he is not self-subsisting and cannot be utterly secure in 
himself"" This sense of provisionality cannot be silenced although (on the very real 
basis of his being a spiritual being equipped with power, insight and will as well as 
dependency on the other) he may try to develop his autonomy in the direction of self- 
completion. Such efforts (characteristic of the race of Adam) resist what is in fact 
necessary for completion, that is "being uprooted (according to the first principle) and 
replanted (according to the second)". 84 
These images of uprooting and replanting suggest radical discontinuity between the 
two principles, a discontinuity underlined by the fact that it is characteristic of Adam's 
striving that he resists this movement, striving against the principle of his fulfilment. 
Now this resistance must be characteristic of man as a sinner, for such attempts to take 
root in himself are in fact contrary to the nature of the Adam-principle, because Christ is 
himself its inner principle. The Adam principle was from the very beginning "conceived 
and created as something inchoate and transitional" that can only be fulfilled outside of 
itself in the "other", who is in fact its goal and ground. 85 
However this raises questions regarding whether by `Adam' Balthasar means fallen 
man or natural man, as God created him. Whilst Balthasar is not very specific about 
this, his preoccupation with the concrete situation in which we know man means that he 
is dealing with man in the fallen condition we know. Nevertheless this concrete 
situation still includes the fundamental characteristics with which man was endowed in 
creation, albeit damaged. In other words, the term Adam means both our natural finite 




85 Ibid. 35 
86cf "Ethics" 77; cf also chapter 6 section A2 below 
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could say (as Balthasar does regarding Christ's role as concretissimum) that this scheme 
of Adam and Christ applies both prescinding from the concrete modality of our fallen 
state and in the modality of our fallen condition. However, we will raise this topic again 
in the conclusion to this chapter, because a failure for `Adam' to refer to that `very 
good' form of life created by God in the beginning would greatly reduce the effectiveness 
of this schema as a response, corrective and development of Barth's position. Further 
concerns about the relationship between fallenness and finitude in Balthasar's 
understanding of nature will emerge further into our study. 
So the fact that man is not his own answer but is a puzzle that can only find 
completion in the "other", in God from whom he comes and to whom he is going, is now 
set in the specifically christological framework in which Christ is and always has been 
the beginning and end, both the goal and the ground of the Adam principle. Christ's 
coming in the fulness of time after Adam for Adam's salvation is to do with his place 
before Adam-as the mediator of creation and in his predestination as the one in whom 
we are chosen before the foundation of the world, even in his begetting from the Father, 
as we described in the previous chapter. From the very beginning he is meant as 
Adam's fulfilment. It is in this context that in Parts II and III of the thesis we will 
consider all the various aspects of Balthasar's discussion of the human vocation and its 
fulfilment: freedom, image, idea, person. 
Despite this emphasis on the fundamental orientation of the first principle to the 
second (nature being made for grace), in keeping with what we have just said about the 
dramatic character of Balthasar's perspective, it still holds true that "the second 
principle cannot be envisaged from the first, not even as a postulate that is inconceivable 
and yet indispensable to fulfilment, for through it and the implications are 
overwhelming-we actually `become partakers of the divine nature' (2 Peter I: 4). "87 
This is because what is given through the second principle is beyond the wildest dreams 
of the finite creature-the infinitely gratuitous gift of partaking of the divine nature. 
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This is where the distinction between nature and grace really matters to von Balthasar. 
Even though the Christ principle embraces the Adam, and the latter has always been 
made for the former, there is no direct continuity between nature and grace. The grace of 
fulfilment in Christ opens up a totally new dimension; and the transition from Adam to 
Christ principle is a striking, unanticipated event. 
The distinctive advantage of this perspective is that in it both things are clear: the 
Christ principle embraces but does not swallow up the Adam principle and the Adam 
principle is made for but does not absorb the Christ principle in some kind of 
anticipation. We only know of Christ's Alpha behind the Alpha of Adam (I Peter 1: 20) 
from the outlook of the end. The fact, "eternally present and true in God", that he has 
created all things from before all time with a view to and in Christ "is only in the 
process of coming-to-be in creation. "88 Christ, Balthasar says, is both "determined from 
below by the whole world drama and on the other hand he is not determined by it since 
he alone is `from above' (Jn 8: 23)", "lowered to earth by God's free action" as "the 
capstone of the entire vault of creation built up `from below. "' The sending from above 
embraces the determination from below because "everything he synthesises in himself 
was created in the first place with a view to this synthesis. " From the perspective of 
Adam to Christ principle "he is caused by the world and its history"; and from the 
perspective of the Christ principle embracing the Adam principle "the world and its 
history are caused by him. " Under the first he is the world's Omega; under the second 
its Alpha. The drama of the world takes place between these two. In Christ they are 
identical 89 
This strange "reciprocal causality" which apparently operates in his concrete person 
thus provides us with a concrete and dramatic delineation of what Balthasar was trying 
to say about the nature-grace relationship in Karl Barth. The natural is indeed 
`first'-the presupposition of grace, that which is there to be fulfilled in the grace that 
87 Th 11135 
88 Ibid. 37 
89 Th III 15; IV 29,44,66-67 
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comes after (in the end that is Christ), although, on the other hand, this nature exists for 
the sake of fulfilment in grace. The divine intention that brings it into existence is that it 
be completed in Christ, and so the first is contained within the latter, embraced in the 
one plan of God in Christ. In Balthasar's theology both have to be held together, the 
former within, but not lost in, the utter. Whilst later we may find Balthasar is less clear 
in the significance given the Adam principle, here he goes as far as to say that there is "a 
kind of circumincessio between the first and second Adam, between the order of 
creation and the order of grace and redemption"; the movement being "most definitely 
from the first to the second", but the first not understood as a mere "obsolescent 
`means' leading to the second. " 90 The transition to the Christ principle is not the 
creation of a new human being. In the incarnation it is the nature of the old Adam which 
is taken up (especially on the cross) and thus "through the drama of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus carried over into the state of the new Adam". " It is a more detailed 
understanding of this movement that concerns us in the remaining part of this study. 
D Summary and initial assessment 
In this chapter we have seen that Baithasar's christocentric perspective is a 
dramatic one that seeks to avoid both Barthian constriction on the one hand and any 
kind of transcendental anticipation on the other. Christ is thus the beginning and end of 
history, as it comes from and goes back to God, but without stifling the horizontal 
aspect of historical development which is included in God's will for the world in Christ. 
There is a "reciprocal causality" between the two operating in Christ, such that there is 
a genuine movement from Adam to Christ in which Christ seems to be caused by the 
world and its history, but, from the perspective of eternity, is still in the process of 
coming to be in the world. Christ is the beginning behind the beginning of Adam, since 
before the foundation of the world he is the one in, through and for whom everything is 
90 Th 11139 
91The cross's centrality is based on the fact that "all the aspects and consequences of the old nature " are 
"resolutely adopted and suffered. " Th 111 37; V 506; cf chapter 6 section D2 below. 
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made, thus establishing him as the cause and the goal of the world and its history. There 
is a "circumincessio" between the first and the second Adam, between the orders of 
creation and of grace. 
As we come to the end of Part I of this thesis, we can see that Balthasar has made a 
major contribution to the movement in twentieth-century Catholic theology concerned 
to emphasise a concrete christocentric focus in the wake of the over-conceptualisation of 
neo-scholastic theology. He has thus also contributed to ecumenical dialogue 
particularly through his engagement with Karl Barth. What we have outlined gives some 
indication of how thoroughly and systematically he shows that it is in all Christ is and 
does that creaturely fulfilment is brought about in accordance with God's very plan in 
creation. No aspect goes untouched by this perspective and thus Balthasar shows 
himself to be consistent with his christocentric presuppositions, even if the detail of the 
christology that underpins them could be more thoroughly expounded. By choosing 
dramatic categories in particular he has found the tools that effectively express the 
particular historical Christ-centred perspective he had already delineated, and, as we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, drawn the various insights of his perspective into a 
more orchestrated whole. Moreover the dramatic way forward intends to avoid from 
the start the dangers that Balthasar detects in other alternatives to dry essentialism, as 
well as eschewing the constrictive tendency that he perceived in Barth-despite 
emphatically sharing with him the fundamental presuppositions of his christocentrism. 
The question is whether Balthasar's perspective is able to hold so many divergent 
concerns together. In a theologian so concerned never to soften the paradoxes of 
Christian doctrine and so determined never to create a theological or philosophical 
system, this is difficult to answer definitively. However, we can consider a number of 
points raised by the description so far. 
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1 No `Christological constriction'? 
Having moved away from the bottom up approach of scholastic dualism, in maintaining 
his new approach Balthasar eschews two extremes: the `absorption' of the order of 
grace in the order of creation, and the `swallowing up' of the order of creation in the 
priority of the order of grace and redemption. In the end both tendencies fail to maintain 
an authentic distinction between nature and grace and therefore in theo-dramatic terms 
jeopardise the dramatic quality of the God-man relationship. " How successful is 
Balthasar in maintaining a via media? 
Regarding the first danger, the absorption of grace in the order of creation, Balthasar 
rejects any talk of strict continuity between the two. His accentuation of the union of 
nature and grace in the concrete by no means endorses the identification of creation and 
revelation found in German idealism, but corrects the superficial dualism that followed 
it. 93 He clearly maintains that "to speak of continuity between the orders is in fact 
highly misleading and, sooner or later, involves making grace (even as medicinalis) an 
epiphenomenon of nature". 94 This position, it is true, is perhaps less than clear when he 
likens the relationship between man's nature and its supernatural end to that of seed and 
flower95 (although this comparison does specifically refer to the ordering of nature to its 
end and not to the actual unfolding of that vocation), and in the Theo-drama the use of 
the term circumincessio (usually used to describe the indwelling of the persons of the 
Trinity one with an other) to express the interpenetration of the two orders certainly 
suggests an extraordinary degree of unity between the two, even if not explicitly 
implying continuity. Nevertheless the main position is very much reflected in the theo- 
92 This problem reflects and is illuminated by the perhaps more familiar question of `christology from 
above' and/or `from below'. Just as the `below approach' in christology, which seems suited to 
communicate with contemporary man, is in danger of deducing christology from anthropology and in 
the last analysis dissolving christology into anthropology, the below approach from nature to grace 
starting with the structures of human consciousness and the conditions for the possibility of the 
incarnation is in danger of dissolving grace into nature. Yet it is not possible to approach either 
Christology or the nature-grace relationship from above without some recourse to anthropological 
categories. (cf Kasper: "The Theological Anthropology of Gaudium et Spes" Communio 23 Spring 1996 
136) 
93 ET I 47 
94 Ibid. 60 
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dramatic rejection of undramatic anticipation of the christological `answer' to the 
question of man's nature. 
Similarly the two Adams model of the Theo-drama also preserves the 
distinctiveness of grace vis-ä-vis the creature made for it because the Adam principle has 
no awareness of the fact that it is "a step on the way to the Christ principle" (despite a 
sense of self-transcendence). " It is only aware of its inchoateness and provisionality. 
Thus, as we have seen, even though made for the Christ principle, the Adam principle 
cannot `absorb' it in some kind of anticipation, for there is no strict continuity between 
the two, rather the first principle needs `uprooting' and `replanting' according to the 
second. 
As creation takes place in Christ, Balthasar does maintain that there is an identifiable 
relatedness of the individual in the world to Christ. But this `natural relation', (found 
specifically, as we shall see in the next chapter, in the incarnational and trinitarian 
implications uncovered in the structure in which the `I' freely grasps itself), avoids the 
notion of "a universal offer to all men of a grace that is formally and materially 
christological", and the implication that this gives "a distinctive inner quality to the 
being and actions of all men". 97 On the contrary Balthasar is unmistakably committed to 
emphasising the distinctiveness of both the incarnation and of the decision to be a 
follower of Christ. The former has the impact of a meteor on human history-"man 
will never again be what he was before Christ"98-and the latter is as radical as 
martyrdom" and therefore also involves the full commitment of man's freedom to say 
yes or no to the grace of Christ. 1°° 
On the other hand, how successfully does Balthasar himself avoid the other extreme, 
a constrictive christocentrism in danger of denying, ignoring or `incapacitating', the state, 
95 Ibid. 178 
96ThII134 
97 Ibid. 457 
98 Ibid. 25 
99 cf Moment. Regarding the contrast with Rahner cf note 59 above and Philip Endean: "Von Balthasar, 
Rahner, and the Commissar" in New Blackfriars 79 Jan 1998 3-3-38- 
100 cf chapter 5 section D3. 
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constitution and capacities of man as created by God in the beginning? Is he at risk of 
overlooking the significance of the first man, Adam, and his history? If man is to be 
understood in Christ, then does he make any sense in himself, independently of the 
incarnation? Is his simple createdness comprehensible? Has the integrity of human- 
nature, its rationality and freedom been jettisoned? 
Just as Balthasar set out to uphold the significance of nature in Karl Barth, now, in 
the more concrete categories of the Theo-drama, he also desires to give full attention to 
man's natural constitution. In fact starting here becomes part of his method. 
Accordingly, the volume `Man in God' precedes that entitled `Persons in Christ', and in 
the next chapter we will see how in this former volume he gives substantial space to 
analysing the significance of man's freedom. Denying man's natural power to transcend 
himself and the world would constitute "a want of gratitude to the Creator". '°' Man and 
his natural capacities have a real and enduring significance: they are what God truly 
began in the order of creation with a view to perfection in the order of Christ's 
redemption; an enduring initial stage established by him without which the final 
perfection is meaningless. There is no recapitulation in Christ without there being an 
`un-recapitulated' creation and without its process of becoming. If God's purpose is to 
unite all created things in Christ (Eph I: 3ff) not only must we see things in the light of 
this destiny, there must also be acknowledgement of and acquaintance with this `all' 
which he synthesises in himself. It is a genuine contributor to this synthesis, as it is 
truly the nature of the first man that becomes his own. 102 Thus, even if the goal of 
fulfilment in the grace of Christ is the first thing intended by the agent (and we have seen 
the importance of keeping this goal in mind in Balthasar's perspective) "in ordine 
executionis we must first posit a natural (non-divine) subject as the possible recipient of 
grace. ), 103 It is therefore not entirely accurate to see Balthasar's approach as one strictly 
101 ET I 161 (It would be "equally lacking in gratitude to the Redeemer and giver of grace not to see in 
grace something wholly new and other, crowning and perfecting man's attempts, precisely because it first 
shatters and overturns them. " 
102 Th III 40 
103 Ibid. 257 
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and exclusively from above. For the natural preliminary stages retain their significance, 
in "the full brilliance of the light of revelation", as they did for Christ himself. 104 
However the significance of Adam and his natural capacities is strictly this: an 
incomplete beginning, not self-contained or sufficient, nor able to reach beyond itself"' 
Because man with his natural searching for God is made for the sake of grace, the former 
is in some way the condition of the latter; but in the Creator's design it cannot be 
understood apart from the latter, "which is its justification and the solution of its 
riddles". "' The incapacity for self-fulfilment does not render man's creaturely 
constitution and capacities insignificant: rather Balthasar interprets this inchoateness 
positively as receptivity, a natural predisposition for grace which constitutes not a 
platonist longing including within it a latent claim, nor a resigned indifference to what is 
to come on the basis of the unforeseeability of the divine plan, but an "active 
readiness... for every possible initiative on the part of God's will without at the same time 
anticipating it. 15107 It is this receptivity, this active readiness that becomes for Balthasar 
the dominating expression of the authentic essence of creatureliness and is one that finds 
fulfilment precisely by being taken up and perfected by Christ. It is in Christ alone that 
we find the synthesis of the opposite movements of nature upwards to God and grace 
downwards to man. This, as we have seen, gives us our new theological starting point, 
starting not from below with the natural ascent and then working up to grace, but nor 
invalidating this natural ascent, rather understanding its incorporation and completion 
within the setting of faith, where reason becomes serviceable. "' The brilliance of 
Balthasar's use of the two Adams model is precisely that he can focus attention on the 
second Adam, Christ, but in so doing in no way obscure the first Adam, because Christ 
has truly adopted the first Adam and so there is no danger of failing to find the first in 
the second. In this way Balthasar shows how his positive inclusion of the order of 
104 cf "Ethics" 77 
105 cf ET 160; cf note 54 above 
106 Ibid. 1 62 
107 Ibid. 60 my italics 
108 Ibid. 177-179 
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creation in its own right is not a footnote to his christocentric perspective, but is part of 
his christocentrism. Creation is Christ-centred not simply because it is ordained for 
perfection in Christ but because he is its ground, creation is in Christ. The christocentric 
perspective on creation is not to do with some prior reality of grace or redemption10' but 
to do with the person and mission of the Son who is the mediator of creation as well as 
the one in whom it is recapitulated. 
However this rehabilitation of the significance of nature in a christocentric 
perspective is dependent upon a positive understanding of the first Adam, not simply 
as a sin-ridden principle in need of redemption, of uprooting and replanting, but also as a 
provisional, initial stage in need of completion. Whilst in a lengthy passage of 
Przywara's concerning the two Adams cited in Karl Barth there is no sense of a positive 
transition, but a sharp dialectic between "original sin in Adam and redemption in 
Christ", ' 'I in his description in the Theo-drama Balthasar is less specific about whether 
the Adam principle refers to pre- or post-fall. "' Adam is thus both that `good' creation 
of God established in (not yet perfected) relation with him from the beginning and that 
same creation in sinful alienation from this original closeness. Balthasar's description 
makes it clear that he is not just referring to a corrupt principle in need of total overhaul, 
but also to an inchoate principle in need of fulfilment, suggesting that christocentrism 
does not mean just the rejection and overturning of the first Adam: if it is to be truly 
Christ-centred, it will involve a recognition of this `made through and for and in the 
image of Christ' initial stage, taken up and fulfilled by the second, who is both Beginning 
and End. 
Nevertheless Balthasar's tendency to avoid treating the initial created state and the 
fallen state of human nature separately does create some confusion between finitude and 
sin as we shall discuss later. Moreover he is not entirely consistent in his 
109 Th III 157 
10 From Przywara's short article in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 1949 1-9 quoted in KB 256 
"'This is because Balthasar does not think in terms of separating the redemptive aspect of Christ's work 
from that of bringing man to a greater fulfilment than that known to the first human beings prior to the 
fall. cf chapter 2 section A above. 
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acknowledgement of the significance of the first Adam. In Theo-drama V he actually 
denies any solidarity between all mortals and the first Adam: such solidarity only comes 
with the death of the second Adam and "the first Adam shrinks to the level of a kind of 
prelude to the second Adam. "12 Similarly we will find the first Adam has little 
significance in his theological anthropology discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
Lastly it is very important to the Theo-drama that the relative significance that 
Balthasar in the main continues to give our natural constitution includes our becoming. 
The fact that we are created in and with a view to Christ is only known to us from the 
perspective of the end and is still coming to be in the order of creation. This process of 
becoming cannot be constricted or overtaken. The predestination of all things is not a 
constrictive determination; indeed there is a sense in which Christ is caused and 
determined by the world and its history as well as being its cause and determination. "' 
This is central to the theo-dramatics because the drama of our salvation is precisely 
this, a drama and not something known with certainty in advance. The paradoxical 
sense that the success of God's design for the world is guaranteed in the Son, but that 
there is no certain anticipation of a "happy ending", is drawn together in the mission of 
the Son, who in the book of Revelation is the Conqueror and King of Kings but is also 
still making war in a robe dripped in blood. '" Both God and man "must be allowed 
scope to act in this way or that. "15 The final perspective of the whole does not mean 
that the actor is compelled to act one way or another. His freedom must not be 
determined in advance. The fact that everything is "in Jesus Christ" does not mean "the 
game has been rigged"16 but rather "gives us, a priori, the greatest opportunity and the 
widest possible framework for the interplay of both forms of freedom", human and 
divine. "' This is Christ's role as stage and as the person from whom all the roles of the 
112Th V 343, cf also 392. This contrasts with the acknowledgement of human solidarity on the basis of 
common origin in Catechism of the Catholic Church 360. 
13 Th III 15; H especially 51-65 
14 Th 111 254; cf also I 20; IV 15ff, 21,40-41,54 
15 Th III 14 
116 Ibid. 18, also 22; IV 11; 1470 (Shakespeare) 
117 Th III 17; cf52 
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characters who are to play on the stage are allotted (to be discussed in part III). It is 
thus that he is the condition of the possibility even of "nasty" free action, like the fall. 
This freedom for creaturely action does not mean that the facts of God's plan can be 
altered-fulfilment is always in Jesus Christ-but it does mean that man can choose to 
follow his own plan of self-completion if he wishes (which in the end means a rejection 
of fulfilment ending in slavery. ) 
Here we have obviously entered the area of freedom and its relationship to 
grace-the focus of the next part of the thesis. 
2 Intra-trinitarian constriction? 
There are aspects of Balthasar's christocentric stage which do not always seem quite as 
open and free as the above description suggests. "8 We must leave a fuller assessment 
until we have set out his description of human freedom and its fulfilment in the next 
chapter. However, in the intra-trinitarian perspective we have already outlined (in 
which the God-creature distance is grounded in the God-God `distance' of Father and 
Son and man is created and also begotten in grace along with the eternal Son19) the 
relation between eternal begetting, creation and adoption appears so closely tied and our 
creation and fulfilment are thus seen so very much within the trinitarian `event', that 
this perspective may seem just as (if not more) constrictive than the other forms of 
constriction I have suggested that he has avoided. This is exacerbated by the extent to 
which his non-scotist eternal predestination of the Son seems to imply that our 
predestined creation and adoption in him is a constrictive predestination of redemption 
from sin-as the redemptive mission is intrinsic to the predestination of the 
incarnation. "' Whilst Balthasar explicitly rejects "any `christological constriction' that 
would ground the reality of creation on some `prior' reality of redemption or grace" and 
118Dalzell also refers to christological constriction in Balthasar, but means a concentration on the activity 
of Christ at the expense of the Spirit. Dramatic 277-285 
19 Th III 35; cf also chapter 5 below. 
120 cf chapter 2 section A above and chapter 6 sections C3 and D2 below. 
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comments on Barth's universalist tendencies accordingly, in his book on the latter he 
quoted amongst the words of his pro-christocentric colleagues these of Josef Bernhart: 
Atonement, Christ's work of reconciliation, is, as it were, the a priori of the created world, the 
sign under which all else is explained. 121 
No correction or modification was made. In his Theology of History he can offer the 
cross as the condition for the possibility of existence and predestination. "' The deeper 
we delve into the relationship between the doctrines of the Trinity and those of 
christology and soteriology in the Theo-drama the more this kind of perspective on 
human predestination in the predestination of the Son appears typical-suggesting a 
christocentrism that is perhaps more of a `system' than an `ethos' after all. As, so far, 
we have only considered the relation between begetting and creation and have yet to 
look specifically at that between begetting and adoption, we can of course only 
introduce these possibilities here. 
121 Berhart: Chaos und Dämonie (Munich: Kösel, 1950) 95 cited by Balthasar 
in KB 356 
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Chapter 4 
The structure of finite freedom 
One can then continue with a Dramatik, since this God enters into alliance with us: How 
does the absolute liberty of God in Jesus Christ confront the relative but true liberty of 
man? ' 
Here we have man, both singular and plural, thrown onto the stage, endowed with 
freedom, condemned to freedom and given grace to exercise it, with the power of 
becoming what he can on the basis of his own nature and constitution and yet unable to 
do this outside the divine freedom but only in it and with it. How sublime and yet how 
needy man is! 2 
A Introduction 
Freedom is of the very essence of love. ' 
Balthasar's determination to avoid an extrinsic understanding of the relationship 
between nature and grace is clear from the findings of the previous two chapters. 
However it has also become apparent that he rejects too what we might call an 
`immanentism' which indeed recognises the innerworking of grace in nature as he does, 
but without fully doing justice to its inbreaking. The character of grace as the unique 
gift coming to man from without of himself, as the `surprise' exceeding all expectation, is 
no longer entirely clear, but it is somehow already `apprehended' in his own self- 
understanding. 
Balthasar's rejection of extrinsicism is final. However, whilst the task of overcoming 
the extrinsicism of a decadent neo-scholasticism is a preoccupation in his earlier 
writings, as Catholic theology takes these concerns on board, we find that by the mid 
nineteen-sixties Balthasar is concerned that the renewed appreciation of the 
' Balthasar: My Work in Retrospect 117 
2 Th 11 195-196 
3ThV99 
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interrelationship of nature and grace, theology and philosophy, Church and world that 
he fought for was now tending towards a failure to focus on the distinctive uniqueness 
of Christian grace. In addressing this concern in Love Alone the Way of Revelation' 
Balthasar recognises that extrinsicism and immanentism are not the only alternatives. ' 
The way he adopts can be called the way of love. For love (whether in personal 
encounter or in appreciation of a work of art)' can never be deduced from or controlled 
by the one experiencing it but requires the complete freedom of the other's self- 
disclosure and also invites response in an interior manner by awakening love within. 
Thus models of love encounter (in the personal or aesthetic sphere) can provide a 
pointer "suggesting a direction in which to look for the specifically Christian", ' that is 
the manifestation of the absolute love of God (as the meaning of our existence) in the 
unexpected form of a fellow mang and his agonising death on the Cross9 and our 
liberation and `love-awakening' in the trinitarian life of love. This kind of approach 
developed initially in relation to his theo-aesthetics, also bears fruit in his description of 
the encounter of free persons in the Theo-drama, the drama of salvation. 
4 Love Alone the Way of Revelation (LA) (Burns and Oates 1968); cf also Engagement with God 
cSPCK, London 1975) 
In the patristic period there was no problem in using cosmology (and anthropology) as a point of 
reference (eg presenting Christianity "as the fulfilment of a fragmented understanding of the universe" as 
well as a conversion that leaves behind any tendency to absolutise these fragments (LA 11)), because the 
inextricable inter-relationship of philosophy and theology, natural and supernatural was taken for granted. 
However from the Renaissance onwards the natural began to be seen as an independent sphere such that 
rather than providing a verification for the truths of Christianity, what had been a cosmological 
background now "absorbed the whole of Christianity into itself' (Leibniz LA 21). This is why the later 
distinction between nature and grace was justified, but it has tended to evolve into contrary extremes such 
as the sharp drawing of the frontiers in neo-scholastic extrinsicism on the one hand or the kind of 
immanentism found in modernism and all forms of `anthropological reduction' where ultimately 
Christianity is reduced "to transcendental presuppositions of a man's self understanding". (LA 43) 
6 In the aesthetic sphere the overpowering experience of startling beauty unveils a phenomenon in its 
uniqueness, as it truly is, and not controlled by, deduced or explained from the person having the 
experience. In the love of personal relations the `I' encounters "the other as the other in all his freedom", 
and the other cannot be dominated or the love of the encounter deduced before hand. (LA 45) 
LA 45; cf also eg Man in History A Theological Study (Sheed and Ward, London 1968) 188-9. 
8 LA 60 
9 eg Ibid. 117 
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1 Freedom and love 
It is in the context of this insight of Love Alone-that love always comes from outside 
because it can only exist between persons, it always involves free self-disclosure, free 
self-giving between the I and the thou-that I want to turn now exclusively to the Theo- 
drama. I will introduce Balthasar's focus on finite freedom in volume II and its relation 
to infinite freedom in which perspective we will find mature expression of the nature- 
grace relationship in man as created by God and as it is to be perfected in him, and also 
enter the realm traditionally considered under the concepts of grace and freedom. In 
understanding the fulfilment of the human vocation as the love of God coming within 
from without, the freedom of the one and the other is important, particularly when we 
consider the communion of love the creature has with God where this relation of 
freedoms abides, however intimate the indwelling. Indeed, increasing participation means 
an increase, not a diminishing in the creature's freedom, so the relationship is guaranteed 
ever-increasing dramatic vitality. 
In 1963 in Love Alone Balthasar wrote "Only a philosophy of freedom and love can 
ever justify our existence. "" We could say that it is such a philosophy of freedom and 
love which he uses later in the Theo-drama. Balthasar himself states that in contrast to 
the first part of the trilogy, The Glory of the Lord, where he was primarily concerned 
`with the manifestation of God's glory and only subsequently with man", " in the Theo- 
drama the interplay of infinite and finite freedom is his topic right from the start. 12 It is 
central to the concerns of the second part of the Trilogy for "everything `good' stands 
and falls with freedom. "13 Indeed freedom is the very presupposition of there being a 
drama at all. " This theo-dramatic preoccupation is the culmination of a focus central to 
his theological project. It corrects the classical exaggeration of the spiritual and universal 
10 Ibid. 115-116 
"ThIV211 
12 Ibid. In the theological aesthetics this "had only been broadened in a third step. " The Glory of the 
Lord A Theological Aesthetics (GL) VI (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1991) 144-211,215-298 
13 In Retro 218 
14 Th 1162,196; 215,216; 271; 335; III 18 
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at the expense of the free human individual, and the dialectical system of materialistic 
development of nature and history evolving between Hegel and Feuerbach-Marx which 
only "pretends to arrive at the free individual". 15 Balthasar is conscious of how his 
focus on freedom in the Theo-drama is a defence of personal drama in the face of what 
is ultimately the annihilation of individuality in the perspective of Hegel. " He is also 
aware that the re-definition of human autonomy from the Enlightenment onwards calls 
for another look at the Christian presentation of the relationship between divine and 
human freedom which has come centre stage. " 
2 Method 
In keeping with the approach discussed in the previous chapter, Balthasar begins his 
theo-dramatic treatment of the man-God relationship by exploring the finite-infinite 
freedom relationship at a general level without specific reference to God's action in 
Christ, but within a framework emphatically conscious of the fact that this is the sole 
key to the meaning of everything else, and that the very structure of created reality 
points towards the need for such a meaning. The discussion of finite freedom in volume 
II to which we now turn is thus set in it in an abstract and ideal form such that, although 
it is increasingly obvious that the freedom in question must be that of man, the creature 
endowed with this finite freedom might just as well be angel as man, as Balthasar himself 
points out. 18 In subsequent chapters we will see how Balthasar then goes on to focus 
specifically on man, the spiritual-corporeal possessor of finite freedom and its concrete 
shape, finally showing how man's recapitulation of the cosmos in himself through his 
transcendence toward the infinite is (only) accomplished en Christoi. 19 Our topic then 
is central to a theory of theo-drama 




cf eg Th 1413,418,578f; 11 42; 423; SRC 19 
" eg Th I 49f 
Th II 335 
19 Ibid. 202. 
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in which the `natural' drama of existence (between the Absolute and the relative) is 
consummated in the `supernatural' drama between the God of Jesus Christ and 
mankind. 20 
Balthasar's approach does present him with some methodological problems. How 
can he write theo-dramatic theology without plunging straight into the action? In volume 
II and III of the Theo-drama he sets out to consider who are the dramatis personae of 
this play. It is in this context that finite and infinite freedom are introduced as 
'characters'. He emphasises a number of times that the role of those involved in the 
drama of salvation history cannot be abstracted from their action in this drama-we 
understand their role from the action itself. " Nevertheless in a five volume series `The 
Action' is the title of the fourth volume! Balthasar is aware of this problem of 
"describing the "characters of the play" before the play is actually in progress"" but 
nevertheless sticks to this ordering of the Theo-drama. He considers it important to 
consider the characters and roles carefully prior to volume four, particularly because of 
the freedom possessed by God and man which cannot be constricted in advance by what 
takes place in the action but must have genuine freedom to decide this way or that. 23 
Whilst the nature of divine and created freedom can only be revealed in their dramatic 
inter-action, it is legitimate "to abstract from the concrete dramatic conditions and 
inquire as to their `nature', that is, the presupposition of there being such a dramatic 
situation in the first place". " These considerations of character and role form the basis 
of a dogmatics, covering as they do the doctrines of God, Christ, man, scripture, 
angelology and so on. Nevertheless this is always with reference to the action. On the 
one hand Balthasar wants to avoid writing a static theology of essences by considering 
the characters from within the dramatic performance of existence; but on the other hand 
he wants to look at the characters before dealing with the dramatic action proper. 
20ThI130 
21 Th 11 11-13; 194,335 
22 Ibid. 11,194, Th III 11 
23 Th III 14 
24 Th 11 196 
95 
B Balthasar's core ontology of finite freedom 
Balthasar prefixes his treatment of freedom in Theo-drama II with some important 
preliminary reflections. We shall do the same. 
1 Existence as gift 
There was nothing in me prior to his gift that could have served as a vessel for it. The 
first of his gifts, laying the foundation for all the others, was what I call my `I,. 25 
All is gift; he who receives the gift is the first gift. 26 
Balthasar maintains that for the conscious free subject there is a natural appreciation of 
the fact of existence as something good, given unmerited and without his contribution, 
that is, as a gift. " This central awareness on the part of finite freedom that its own self 
is a `given' is a recognition of the primal value of being. 28 
This emphasis on being as gift is crucial to Balthasar's philosophy and theology and 
to everything we are about to set forth about finite freedom and its fulfilment. It is 
central to theo-drama because theo-drama is concerned with the good, which is 
understood as loving action which contains real giving "originating in the personal 
freedom of the giver and designed for the personal benefit of the recipient". 29 The 
emphasis on the category of gift gives certain distinctive features to finite being. It is 
fundamentally open and receptive (because its very self-possession is received, not self- 
manufactured) and it is responsive (because this gift has been communicated to it): "... in 
awakening to his own being and freedom, consciousness utters an involuntary, limitless 
25 Fenelon: Lettres sur divers sujets metaphysique et de religion I, c. 4, no I (Ouvres spirituelles I [1810], 
274) cited Th 11 289 
26 Gabriel Marcel: Le Mystere de 1 'etre 11 (1951), 174 cf Th 11 289 
27 Th 11 285-291 (Here he calls upon a wide range of authors including Thomas); II 391; 111458. This 
perspective is effectively conveyed in the German `es gibt' cf Th I 639 n 70. cf Kenneth L Schmitz: The 
Gift: Creation (Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1982). De Lubac made some use of the category 
of gift in describing man's relationship with God cf The Theology of Henri de Lubac 68 note 19. 
28 Th 11 286 This contrasts with the tendency to see reality as "just there", prompting no further questions 
about origin and tending to focus rather on what we can do with what is there. cf also Th 111 460 
29 Th 1 18 
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Yes to the reality it has been given", knowing he has been affirmed, has had the Yes of 
being bestowed on him by someone. 30 
The giveness of finite freedom means that it is indebted for its being and that it has 
some obligation to respond by giving thanks for this gift. " All this also points to the 
fact that finite freedom as gift has some relation to a Giver. " Indeed for Balthasar the 
fact that finite freedom is a gift means that it is in a relationship of an image of the 
Giver. " In particular this is an image of the image of the Father, that is, the Son, whose 
indebtedness for his divinity, as we have seen, has an analogous relation to the world's 
indebtedness for existence. 34 He is infinite freedom "in the mode (`tropos') of readiness, 
receptivity, obedience and hence of appropriate response; that is, he is the Father's 
Word, image and expression. "35 Indeed Balthasar maintains that it is in the mystery of 
the Trinity that self-affirmation as an act of thanksgiving to God can be made. For, in 
keeping with the trinitarian perspective on creation that we discussed in the previous 
chapter, it is here that the `I' learns of the positivity of otherness and learns of its 
goodness to God in the Son, addressed and affirmed personally as a `thou' in being given 
the gift of being in the Son. The creation of finite freedom, like the generation of the 
Son, is a form of divine kenosis. 36 By receiving itself, accepting what God gives, finite 
freedom offers the perfect act of thanksgiving to God. 37 
The gift of finite freedom (like the gift of divinity to the Son in his eternal begetting) 
is emphatically given and not just `lent'38 (and this is central to giving an importance to 
individual personhood. 39) We `possess ourselves' and the reception of this gift of free 
selfhood entails a response-ability for how it is used: self-possession is both a gift and a 
30 Th 11286, cf also 254 
31 eg Th II 313; 290; I 497; cf F Ulrich: "A Dangerous Reflection on the Fundamental Act of the 
Creature" Communio 23 1996 36-46 
32 Th 11 286; 391 
3' Th IV 142 The gift-Giver relationship also draws attention to the distinction between the two. cf V 93 
''' chapter 2 section C above 
35Th 11 267; cf also eg 261; IV 325-326 
36 cf IV 323 
37 Th II 287ff 
38 Ibid. 428; 290 This contrasts with Eckhart's description of the gift of being as borrowed (the creature 
itself being nothing). cf Th V 436f 
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task. 40 The fact that the finite has a part to play in receiving, that it is "active in 
("passive") reception", is what Balthasar calls the Marian principle which is meant to 
characterise the creaturely in its relationship to God. " 
Finally, the receptive nature of finite freedom means that it is "a state open and 
exposed to the influence of heaven"; 42 its receptivity is ongoing and is oriented to the 
supernatural, its ontological indebtedness meaning that it cannot "set off in just any 
direction but must pursue the path of self-realisation, that is, toward absolute 
freedom. "43 So the stage is set for further giving, receiving and responding between 
Giver and Receiver. 
2 Selbst-Sein and openness to all being: an image of the 
Trinity 
So, being itself is a gift. Our second point is that the very structure of the gift of 
existence images the constitution of the divine Giver. 
For Balthasar the existence of finite freedom suggests the existence of infinite 
freedom, for within finite freedom there is "an element of infinity", an `indifference' 
toward finite goods in "the absolute longing for what is always beyond our grasp", 
which would be unbearable without an infinite freedom in and above itself" However 
it is only a trinitarian, incarnational understanding of infinite freedom that really makes 
sense of the structure of finite free existence. 
In my presence to myself I know not only that I exist but also that I am open to all 
being. " Grasp of self in principle discloses all reality, for in the consciousness that I am 
I touch "the furthest possible horizon beyond which, evidently, there can be nothing 
39 This is relativised in Eckhart. Th V 437 
40ThII213 
41ThV441 
42 Moment 89 Man is made to be receptive 
43 Th 11 290 
44 Ibid. 200 
Th IV 142; 1639 (dialogist Rosenzweig) 
45 Ibid. 207-11; 239; cf also 111 272; "Theo-Logic: On the Work as a Whole" Communio Winter 1993 
626 note 1. 
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more. "46 Both the incommunicability of my own being and the unlimited 
communicability of being as such-which is never exhausted by all the existences which 
participate in it are unveiled at the same time. As an `I', as a person, I am not merely 
part of a whole but am aware that an unlimited number of others possess 
(incommunicable) being too. I can distinguish my mode of being and my grasp of 
universal being but I cannot separate them. 
Rooted in the vision of creation taking place in Christ with its clear trinitarian 
location, Balthasar maintains incarnational and trinitarian implications can be uncovered 
in this philosophical structure in which the I grasps itself' (thus providing a natural 
relation to Christ, a path to religious awareness from which the truth can be 
sought-even though these crucial elements are neglected in a fallen notion of freedom48). 
For Balthasar the simultaneous incommunicability and communicability of being 
apparent in the grasp of self suggests that as well as being an image of God in general, 
(communicated) being "is actually an image of the three personal God, in whom the 
incommunicability of the hypostases is one with the unity of "essence " in each of 
them. "49 For in Balthasar's view man is not simply an image of the triune God by 
virtue of being a conscious spirit, which is identical in all conscious subjects (the nature 
shared by them all). The image is also found in the complementarity of distinct 
individual subjects, the God who is three as well as one making finite free being such an 
image of (and thus participation in) his infinite being "that the given unity (all men, as 
spirit, share an identical nature) embraces the miracle of individual unity (on the part of 
each spiritual subject)-)-). 50 "Finite freedom only exists in the interrelationship of human 
beings. i51 It is only in the New Testament understanding that God has internal 
46 Th II 208 
47 Th 1I1 457 
48 Ibid. A post-enlightenment approach, for example, starts exclusively with the autonomy of the subject 
(neglecting the crucial `giveness' from another). 
49 Th 112 10 Balthasar's italics; V 75 
so Th III 340,525f 
51 Th 11203 
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relations, (revealed in Christ's relationship to the Father and the Spirit) that both forms 
of human unity, individual and community, are intelligible. " 
Thomas' understanding of being and its mediation is influential here. 53 In accordance 
with the real distinction (the non-identity between finite essence and existence), whilst 
God alone (the source of being) is being according to his very nature, all finite things 
share in being. Being (which is the likeness of God54-not identical with Him) is the 
procession of existence from God into all beings, that gift of participation by virtue of 
which essences exist. " Being thus "permeates and is at work in all finite being, the most 
unique as well as the most general", 56 and so is communissimum, that in which all 
communicate. Thus, according to this thomistic understanding of being, whilst I do 
indeed possess being I do so by participation in common with all other things. My 
possession of being and everything else 's possession of being go together. I cannot 
make my claim to possession in exclusion of the others. This is why I must be open to 
all being, and must let being be, simultaneous with my grasp of being. This 
interrelationship of particular essence and universal participation in being images the 
relationship of the three distinct persons of the Trinity in their sharing of the unity of 
the divine essence (even though these two participations are also radically different). 
Thus the relationship between particular and universal discussed in Part I, and between 
essence and existence is ultimately an imago trinitatis, s' created being owing its essential 
particularity to the Logos and its sharing in non-finite being to the Father. 58 
52 Ibid. 203-206; cf 201; IV 371 
53 cf Th II 224ff; 239; 111 458 note 6; GL IV 393-412; V 613-627 Balthasar is influenced by Gustav 
Siewerth here cf eg GL IV 403 note 368; 406 note 375, Th 11 224 note 39 and Ouellet: "Paradox and/or 
Supernatural Existential" Communio 18 (Summer 1991) 259 note 1 (who contrasts Balthasar's 
understanding of being with a transcendental Thomist one). 
sa Thomas Aquinas: The Truth III, translated into English by Robert W Schmidt (Henry Regnery, 
Chicago 1954) q 22 a2 ad. 2; Summa contra Gentiles 3.65 (Bums Oates & Washbourne, London 1928) 
ss "The being of things flows out from the Word as from an absolute starting point, and this flow 
terminates in the existence which things have in their own natures. " Summa Theologiae translated into 
English by Thomas Gilby (Blackfriars, Cambridge 1967) la 58 6 reply; Thomas describes "the issuing 
ýemanationem) of the whole of being from the universal cause, which is God. " ST Ia 45 I 
6 Th 11239 
57 Th V 75-76 
58 Ibid. 76, cf also 68 
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If the gift of being images the Giver, is a likeness of the divine goodness as Thomas 
maintains, then "all knowers know God implicitly in every mental act", 59 and have a 
natural orientation towards Him. As this gift of being is necessarily shared the 
relationship between individual possession of being and openness to all other 
participators in being has a particular significance to this `inner path to God'. It means 
that it is trinitarian. 
3 Self-transcendence towards the Good, `letting be' and the 
image of the trinitarian constitution of Absolute Being 
Balthasar takes further the image relation between the coincidence of self-possession and 
openness to all being and the trinitarian constitution of absolute being. Our openness to 
being involves an indifference, which not only refers to our infinite longing for what is 
more, 6° but specifies the deeper disinterestedness of letting being be for the sake of a 
thing's goodness. 6' 
Dependent on absolute freedom for its essence, finite freedom's origin governs its 
goal: the good in itself. It has a fundamental self-transcendence towards the absolute 
good, towards an ultimate state with God (even if it chooses to makes itself the self- 
sufficient good). 62 Balthasar therefore acknowledges that finite freedom in its openness 
to all being can only strive for what it perceives to be good. 63 However, without really 
criticising Thomas, 64 against the apparent `unfreedom' of a finite freedom that must seek 
s9 The Truth. qu 22 a2 ad 1 (cf Th 11391) 
60ThII200 
61 For Being is both true and good by nature (Th II 210), with Thomas, "the image-similitudo-of 
divine goodness" (II 225; GL IV 393; 400ff; cf also Oullet: "Paradox" 259 note 1; for references to 
Thomas cf note 54 above) and as the soul only has its `for itself (which cannot be lost) because of the 
luminous quality [Gelichtetsein] of the totality of being, the `letting be' of all other beings because of 
their freedom is an essential part of the imperishable freedom of the soul. "An existent being is good for 
me because it complements my particularity ... 
I must allow it to maintain its own independent reality, for 
only then can it be regarded as a good. " (11 240) 
62 Th V 300,295,394; I 414ff 
63 Th 11211 
64 Ibid. 226,211 Thomas has his own expression of "indifference" as the "part" (that is, myself with my 
self-possession) loving the whole more than itself, and so, for example, the enjoyment of eternal life is 
being bound in love to God for his own sake. He can say with Augustine (De Doctrina Christiana 1.5) 
"enjoying something means clinging to it by love for its own sake. " ST 2a2ae 27 3 sed contra translated 
into English by RJ Batten (Blackfriars, Cambridge 1975) 
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the good in general, " he wants to play off the Anselmian-Augustinian-Franciscan idea of 
loving the good, `letting it be', for its own sake. 6b This is "indifference", and the 
beginning of surrender and love. 
This brings us to the specific and original detail of Balthasar's understanding of finite 
letting be as an imago Trinitatis. In keeping with what we have already said about the 
kenotic self-renunciation at the heart of the Godhead, 67 from the revelation of the triune 
life of God we see that infinite freedom's self-possession is understood as self-giving or 
self-surrender, as love, 68 and that letting be belongs to the very nature of infinite 
freedom: "the Father lets the Son be consubstantial God, and so forth". 69 This is why 
we have the "`absolutely positive aspect of differentiation' in absolute Being"" 
encountered in chapter two in the grounding of the God-world difference in the inter- 
trinitarian difference. As the divine hypostases proceed from one another they are 
perfectly open to one another, but not interchangeable (as we have seen, there is 
opposition, distance). They are transparent to one another yet have their own 
"impenetrable `personal' mystery" and "constitute the greatest imaginable opposition 
to one another... in order that they can mutually interpenetrate in the most intimate 
manner conceivable. "" The degree to which each knows and interpenetrates the others is 
the degree to which each, in absolute freedom, opens up to the others; and none is 
overwhelmed by being known in this way because each of the hypostases subsists by 
being let-be. 72 
So in the very structure of the `I'-grasp (in which receipt of being requires letting 
other beings be) our imaging of the triune God (in whom the self-possession of the 
divine persons coincides with their mutual self-surrender) is implied. This perspective is 
65 Th 11 225-226 
66 Ibid. 211-212,226 
67 cf chapter 2 section C above 
68 Th 11 256-258 This is in agreement with the identity of `having' and `giving' expounded by Ferdinand 
Ulrich. (cf also 111518) 
69 Th 11 259-, V 93 
70 Th 11 258 (with references to Siewerth) 
" Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 259 
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central to Balthasar's understanding of the God-man relationship in its origins and also 
in its fulfilment, as will be unfolded in greater detail when we go on to consider the 
fulfilment of this `natural' image in the grace of perfect conformity. Then we will find it 
is the incarnation in particular that makes sense of finite freedom's yearning for what 
transcends the confines of the finite. For should finite freedcm cross over to infinite 
freedom in the interests of its fulfilment it would lose its own finite shape and thus its 
very self (as in Buddhism and other forms of non-Christian mysticism). In the next 
chapter we will see that what is required is the unique christological indwelling of 
infinite freedom in finite freedom in which the finite is perfected in the infinite without 
the infinite losing itself in the finite and vice versa. 73 
4 The core ontology of finite freedom 
Characteristic of Balthasar's expression of these trinitarian and incarnational 
implications uncovered in the philosophical structure in which the `I' grasps itself is his 
use of analysis that accords with personalist philosophy. " At this level of expression 
the same two-fold aspect of our grasp of self is identified in the fact that human self- 
awakening is only possible when the self is addressed as a `thou' by some other `I'. 75 
Thus in a recurrent focus on the primal act of spiritual life where the child is awakened 
to awareness of self and of the world by the loving address of a 'thou' 7' Balthasar finds 
three elements in which the same features of self-possession already discussed can be 
identified. Firstly there is the ontological indebtedness, an awareness that being a self is 
inseparable from owing oneself to another, ultimately to infinite freedom. Secondly 
there is the awareness that " where being lays hold of itself, it lays hold of being at its 
deepest and broadest"-not that I exhaust this being, but I must leave room for an 
unlimited number of others. This is an experience of the structure of being as such 
73 Ibid. 201-202 and cf chapter 5 section D below 
74 Balthasar's acknowledgement of personalism is not uncritical. cf LA 36-39; Th I 34-37; chapter 7 
section A below 
75 Th 11 286; 203; 388-389 
76 Th 11 388-91; III 175,457-458; cf also LA 61f, In Retro 114; GL V 616 
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which, as we have already mentioned, is thus seen to contain an "`image' of the 
trinitarian constitution of absolute Being". " Lastly there is the awareness that having 
been thus addressed I am called to respond, am entrusted with a mission. " 
For Balthasar these three points make up the core of an ontology of finite freedom. 
This is in accord both with modern personalism and with Thomas's insight in the real 
distinction between essence and existence, according to which, as we have seen, finite 
created being is not its own existence but receives it (and thus unlike divine 
being-"always perfectly fulfilled, identical with itself'79- has never completely 
realised its essence). The being-in-its-totality (which one must respect simultaneous 
with admittance into one's own being) is in fact a world that must let Being "be" if it is 
to grasp its own being. It only shares in Being8° (the non-identity of the real distinction 
in contrast to the identity that belongs to divine being). 
All that is wanting here then is a background in the form of Augustine's desiderium 
naturale visionis Dei, that vocation to union with God8' which means that man fulfils 
himself beyond himself in a grace not at his disposal82 (the paradoxical understanding of 
nature discussed in chapter one). In this way we see that the Augustinian starting point 
that Balthasar shares with de Lubac, incorporating a Thomist ontology, has been 
developed by Balthasar in such a way that the image of the Trinity is interpreted 
interpersonally, not chiefly in terms of the individual soul, because creatures are created 
in the Son, who is primarily receptive. " There is then a continual mutual awakening and 
indebtedness within creation pointing ultimately to an absolute interpersonal Being from 
whom the constant flow of individual beings come and to whom they return. It is the 
Christian picture of God alone, unveiled in Jesus Christ, that gives us a glimpse of the 
mystery of this eternal reciprocity and interpenetration. However in his very self- 
" Th III 458 
78 cf chapter 7 section A below 
79 ET I 163 
80 Th 111 458 note 6 (cf GL V 613-27) 
81 Th 111 415 
82 Ibid. 416 note 31; II 178; IV 142 
83 Ibid. 459 note 7 
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awareness the individual in the world's relationship to the triune God in Christ is 
identifiable, even though he cannot grasp this meaning but must be grasped by it. Thus 
we apprehend the outline of that movement gratia perfecit natura in this vision of finite 
being and its vocation. "What begins, at the natural, personal level, as our having to 
believe in another's freedom and love", that is in the necessarily inter-subjective self- 
possession, "is perfected at the "supernatural" level, where human freedom... is 
challenged to make an ultimate act of faith in absolute freedom and love. "84 The fact 
that man's finite freedom can only find itself in relationship with other human beings 
who share this freedom is an imago trinitatis and a shadowy image of the fact that he is 
called through grace to realise his freedom in that sharing of (infinite) freedom that takes 
place in the love exchange of the persons of the Trinity. " 
For the fact that a human `I' only wakens to itself by another `I' calling it `thou' is 
just the `worldly' prelude of the awakening and affirmation uncovered by the revelation 
of the interpersonal constitution of the triune life and the discovery that the relation of 
finite spiritual creature to the infinite creator is a dynamic, personal `I'-`thou' 
relationship. In and through the human `I' is manifested the Absolute `I' who from 
eternity has generated an Absolute `Thou' with whom, in Spirit, he is One God. 86 This 
trinitarian process of generation causes the absolute preciousness/holiness of Absolute 
Being "to shine forth in its limitless self-affirmation and freedom. "87 Recalling the 
fundamental link between the primal life of the Trinity and the origin of creation, " it is 
only on the basis of the improbable miracle of the constitution of the triune God89 (the 
self-surrender of the "Father-origin" generates the co-eternal Son and their union causes 
the procession of the Spirit from both) that finite freedom, having been given the gift of 
84 Ibid. 459-460 
85 Th V 302 
86 Th 11 286 
87 Ibid. 287 
88chapter 2 section C above 
89 Th 11287 
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self, can know itself to be addressed as a `thou', designate itself an `I' vis-d-vis the Giver 
and then must go on to address infinite freedom as 'Thou'. " 
Of course finite freedom can only use this extraordinary form of address for the God 
who in himself is no one else's other (the All-embracing one (non-aliud)) because it is 
responding to the `thou' addressed to it "from the inner nature of the Absolute-from 
the divine Trinity". " Without this, finite freedom's attitude could not go beyond, at 
most, an awe-filled worship. It is only when I learn (in the Son) that I am a good to God 
(and thus have being and freedom guaranteed) that I recognise that God is my highest 
good and that I can trust in the gift of self and affirm myself. " If I accept that I am 
addressed as a particular `thou' not to be confused with any other93 then it follows that 
my gratitude will not be addressed to an anonymous `Absolute Good' but to infinite 
freedom as a unique, particular 'Thou'. " Again the use of this extraordinary form of 
address is illuminated by the inner trinitarian life of God who has always expressed 
himself in his eternal Word. 
As an understanding of our relation to God is grounded in an understanding of God 
in relation to himself, that is his triune constitution, we can see that in the trinitarian 
perspective on creation the relationship of the hypostases in the Trinity is the key to 
the relationship between infinite and finite freedom. For Balthasar it clearly frees us 
from both (pantheistic) mysticism and (formalist) ritualism, for the discovery that I am 
affirmed by God as a `thou' in the Son, means our relationship with God does not entail 
`being swallowed up' in his infinitude, but nor are we reduced "to a mere awareness of 
distance between the finite and the infinite", for we have our locus in him. In the next 
chapter we shall consider how this trinitarianly rooted relation is a dynamic one and 
investigate Balthasar's description of the movement towards the conformity of finite 
freedom's "watermark" with what Balthasar calls the "idea" reserved for the finite 
90 Regarding the influence of the dialogist, Ebner cf Th 1641. 
91 Th 11287, cf 421 
92 Ibid. 287 
93 cf Ibid. 302 
94 Ibid. 290 
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`thou' in the infinite `Thou'. First though, in the next section of this chapter, we must 
examine the basic structure of finite freedom in Balthasar's view. 
C Bi-polar structure of finite freedom 
In the light of the two-fold aspect of the `I' grasp and its quality of imago trinitatis, we 
can now unfold the two-fold structure of finite freedom-which also contains a 
reflection of the Trinity. 
Finite freedom includes two poles that interpenetrate each other. The first can be 
described as autexousion (`being-from-within-oneself'), the capacity for self 
determination that belongs to our fundamental self-possession (received in creation in a 
way analogous to the Son's receipt of the autonomy of the divine nature in the mode of 
receptivity95), remembering that self possession, `consent to ourselves', always involves 
(indifferent) openness to all being. 96 The second can be described as self-realisation, 
movement beyond ourselves to the other, making choices as we strive for the good 
(ultimately involving consent to the disclosure of the infinite freedom in which alone we 
can realise ourselves). " So there is both independence/autonomy on the one hand and 
openness, ultimately dependence, on the other. 
The second pole "necessarily arises out of the way our original self-possession is 
constituted and the conditions that make it possiblei" (that is, it coincides with 
openness to the `letting be' of all being) and it cannot be reduced to the first. To carry 
out such a reduction and interpret finite freedom solely in terms of the first pole, would 
be to turn the autexousion (self-determination) into autarkia (total self-sufficiency), " a 
distortion that Balthasar's whole description militates against, but without invalidating 
the significance of the first pole. The quality of disinterestedness in our striving beyond 
95 Th IV 328 For God there is therefore a kenotic aspect. 
97 eg Th 11210-212,215,217,227 
eg Ibid. 211-212,217,228,242 
98 Ibid. 212 
99 cf Ibid.; IV 370 
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ourselves for other goods, is an indication of the irreducibility of the second to the 
first. '°° The tendency since the Enlightenment to understand freedom by starting 
exclusively with the `autonomy' of the `subject' breaks off the "inner path to God" that 
we have seen contained within the structure of our self-possession, "' although this does 
not mean that Balthasar is unhappy to use some post-enlightenment descriptions of 
human autonomy. 10' 
However, undermining the first pole is an equally mistaken position: attempts to 
convince man that his self-subsistence is an illusion to be overcome "can only destroy 
the outer, empirical layers of "I" consciousness, not its inner core. i10' Instead 
Balthasar's study of freedom shows his conviction that freedom involves both poles. 
The first is unequivocally "given"; the second is both "given" [gegeben] and "laid upon 
us" [aufgegeben]" (in keeping with the relation between `gift' and 'task/response' 
mentioned above10'). The "autexousion is posited unrestrictedly as the prime datum", 
but significantly this very datum of finite freedom is itself a gift (gegeben), so, in 
accordance with what we have said about the importance of existence as gift, it cannot 
simply be thought of as a datum in the sense that it is `just there'; on the contrary it is 
received. Nevertheless like any authentic gift it is truly given and not just lent, and is 
therefore a real possession. "' 
A second step demonstrates that having been posited in this way (given) freedom 
must also realise itself. Whilst the first pole then is an intrinsic possession the second 
must also be actualised by `the other'. In this "indissolubly twofold aspect" freedom 
"is the gift of `beginning from oneself (autexousion), yet it always contains the second 
dimension, namely, the obligation to leave room (in the vast expanse of being) for an 
10° Th 11 212; 227-228 
101 Th 111 457 
102As in his understanding that the autexousion contains "an element of absoluteness" (Th II 228), 
coming from Schelling's development of Kant (I 49), whilst particularly attributed to Siewerth's analysis 




105 section B1 above (cf Th 11 213) 
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unimaginable number of others, equally free. ""' Associated with this second dimension 
of openness to other freedom "is the obligation to acknowledge one's indebtedness to 
the source of unconditional freedom. " For finite freedom is unable to uncover its own 
origins or obtain its own goal; it is `given' and must return to its source in order to reach 
its goal1°8 (that is the total liberation which can only be found in unconditional, infinite 
freedom). 
1 Patristic and scholastic influence 
Balthasar supports this analysis with a survey of patristic and scholastic understanding 
of freedom, which retrieves from the various descriptions (and various extremes) and 
makes his own a perspective so inclusive of both poles that "the `either-or' of 
autonomy and heteronomy that haunts the entire Christian tradition is overcome right at 
the outset". "' 
Balthasar describes the patristic central focus on finite freedom and its autonomy, 
without giving the impression that the Church Fathers held a modem view of 
autonomous freedom. Since Genesis and Old Testament passages dependent on it see 
human freedom as given, the Fathers and scholastics did not find it difficult to use the 
exploration of the structure of finite freedom carried out in Greek thought in the service 
of a theologically thought out Christian doctrine of freedom. However, Balthasar 
identifies a gradual recognition of the importance of finite freedom precisely as the 
presupposition of the Biblical, especially, Christian drama between God and man and it 
is in this light that patristic concern with finite freedom should be understood, not in 
the modem sense of focusing on it for its own sake. "' This freedom had to be defended 
106 cf Th 11290,428 
107 Th IV 370 
109 Regarding the neo-platonic influence here cf section Cl below "Gregory of Nyssa". 
109 Th 11224 In his `dramatic resources' Balthasar finds a coincidence of the determination of destiny and 
the servum arbitrium of the reformation on the one hand, and the space for man to choose and to make 
his own contribution on the other, in the dramas and comedias of Calderon. 1 361 ff. Modem dramatists 
on the other hand "like to represent man's freedom as his personal possession, which God cannot touch. " 
1429 
110 Th 11215,216 
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against the contrasting pagan, gnostic and Manichean determinism, hence the 
characteristic holding fast to the autexousion"' as the prime datum-which must go on 
to realise itself within the context of divine freedom. 
Augustine - For Augustine it is his refutation of the Manichees in his early period 
that provides the occasion for his assertion of the liberum arbitrium, just as later it is 
against Pelagius that the second pole is developed. Again such concern with the first 
pole is not independent of the second: the foundations of the later elaboration are 
already evident. "' His is a synthesis1' then that is upset by misinterpretations that 
absolutise partial aspects. "' For him "finite freedom as such is the rational, autonomous 
motion of the soul, in which the "I" possesses itself in freedom"5 and every 
freedom-whether finite or infinite-has liberum arbitrium and it is this first pole, 
"freedom as the soul's own power of making decisions" 116 that he defended against the 
Manichees. He does not start by defining finite freedom as freedom to choose good and 
evil-this is what finite freedom is necessarily equipped with, but the main thrust is 
that finite freedom can only fulfil itself (this is the task, the choice given in finite 
freedom's second pole) in the context of infinite freedom. 17 Here then we encounter a 
characteristic of Augustine's doctrine of freedom already raised in relation to what 
Balthasar called Barth's Augustinian definition of freedom, "8 that is, one that 
understands freedom primarily in terms of its fulfilment in submission to God, a basic 
perspective on freedom with which Balthasar concurs. We noticed in Karl Barth, 
however, how Balthasar accused Barth of adopting a narrow Augustinian model which, 
in the terminology of the Theo-drama, has little or no room for the first pole. Here 
though, we encounter Balthasar's corrective of this in his inclusion of Augustine's 
"' This is not therefore an early pelagianism. Th 11215,217 (eg Irenaeus describes man as "created in 
autonomy (idian exousian) from the beginning... so that he can follow God's counsel (gnome) freely, 
without compulsion". Adv Haer IV, 27,3-4, cited Th 11 216, ) 
112 cf Th 11 222 
13 His synthesis is inspired by and an answer to Plotinus. Ibid. 234 
114 Ibid. (Luther and Jansen. ) cf his note 68 and also 223-224 including note 38. 
"5 Ibid. 231 
16 Ibid. 232 note 64 
117 Ibid. 232 
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recognition of the freedom to choose (as a presupposition defended against the 
Manichees), although Augustine himself is not entirely exonerated from adopting 
extreme modes of expression himself in his battle with Pelagius. 
The Augustinian contribution to the paradox retrieved by de Lubac according to 
which man fulfils himself beyond himself is looked at from a theo-dramatic angle, 
concerned with the interaction of freedoms. For in focusing on finite freedom's sole 
fulfilment in infinite freedom, we go beyond the capacities belonging to finite freedom's 
structure. Whilst indeed it cannot be compelled by anything but itself to choose the path 
of slavery rather than freedom, "' the imparting of infinite freedom is clearly not in the 
power of finite freedom: "by definition infinite freedom is free to impart itself to 
others". This is grace, "the freely given indwelling of infinite freedom in finite 
freedom. "'Z° 
Balthasar's consideration of Augustine's defence of the second pole against 
Pelagius'Z' brings out the role of the Spirit and the primacy of love in this respect. In his 
interpretation of Augustine the Spirit is "essentially freedom, "' but freedom as `gift"23 
or 'grace'... `spiritus gratiae"'. 124 It is only when God's love is poured into our hearts 
by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us125 that the confrontation between the law 
and the man not yet liberated to enjoy the freedom of the children of God is brought into 
flux. In the next chapter we will see how important this perspective is to Balthasar in 
his specifically christological framing of it as the fulfilment of finite freedom in infinite 
freedom and in his own pneumatological emphasis. In Balthasar's view Augustine 
maintains the twofold aspect characteristic of the new relationship between finite and 
118 chapter 2 section Al above. 
119 Augustine: The Trinity IV, 13 in The Fathers of the Church Volume 45, translated into English by 
Stephen McKenna, C. SS. R (The Catholic University of America Press, Inc. 1981) 150-154.; Th 11 232 
120 Th II 232 
121 Th 232-234 Here Balthasar focuses on Augustine's On the Spirit and the Letter 
X22 Th 11 233; see On the Spirit and the Letter 28,52 where Augustine quotes 2 Corinthians 3: 17: 
"Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom", (Philip Schaff, ed.: A Select Library of the Nicene 
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church V Saint Augustine: Anti-Pelagian Writings (WMB 
Eerdmans, Michigan 1978)). 
123 On the Spirit 26 
124 On the Spirit 13,15,20 
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infinite freedom. Finite freedom is no longer a mere counterpart to infinite freedom, it is 
fulfilled in and through infinite freedom (which is freely self-giving love). However this 
happens without finite freedom being absorbed into infinite. "' We have become sons but 
do not cease to be servants; there is both "congruity and at the same time distance". 127 
"Biblically speaking, finite freedom is lit up from within by the glorious radiance that 
comes from infinite freedom" to those who love it. 12' All this happens in a sphere where 
there is a mutual sublimation of command and gift, ultimately a sphere of the simple 
presence of the Holy Spirit. The consent and the achievement of the goal go together . 
129 
Gregory of Nyssa - In Balthasar's exploration of the different approach taken by 
the East his attention is focused on Gregory of Nyssa whose synthesis, like 
Augustine's, is also inspired by Plotinus13° and also arrives at "finite freedom's 
complete dependence on and indebtedness to infinite freedom", 131 although by a different 
root to Augustine's. 132 In Gregory's high understanding of freedom, finite freedom 
(influenced by Plotinus's understanding of the nous) is a pure motion coming from and 
proceeding toward infinite freedom and is the closest possible image of God. 133 It does 
not create itself, but ceaselessly receives itself from it's source, a "spring that wells up 
eternally", "' which can only be infinite freedom. 
125 Rom 5.5 
126 On the Spirit 52 (grace does not make free will void), 59 ("We do not take away free will"). 
127 On the Spirit 28 
128 On the Spirit 31 
'29 Th 11234 
130 Ibid. 231 "These two, above all, expressly on the basis of Plotinus, undertook to transpose the 
philosophical "one and many" model into the living relationship between infinite and finite freedom. " 
For Balthasar's early interest in Plotinus cf Scola: Hans Urs von Balthasar a Theological Style 
(Eerdmans, Michigan 1995) 21 note 11 
131 Th II 235 Everything created is in a condition of slavery (douleia) until saved by the uncreated God 
coming amongst us as a servant. Against Eunomius Bk V4 in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers V 
(Parker, Oxford 1893) 179 
132 Th 1123 5 Augustine begins with Adam's "somehow colourless" "posse non peccare" arriving after sin 
and redemptive grace at "non posse peccare". Gregory begins dialectically with finite freedom's 
"infinite" openness to infinite freedom on the one hand and, on the other, the pathic element in man's 
original nature meaning that when it falls it will come up against the limits of temporality and evil and 
thus, through the resulting suffering, `come to its senses' and be freed form "passionate craving" and 
finally open up to infinite freedom. (cf also 11237) Regarding the influence of Plato and Aristotle cf Th 
11 213-214. 
13Ibid. 234-5 
134 De . Anima et Resurrectione 
in Patrologia Graeca 46 105B 
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As this happens to finite freedom an eternal movement is begun in it. Rather than 
moving away from its source it aims to "realise itself by assimilation to it". 135 Gregory 
states that freedom-which God has made autonomous and like that which has no 
master-"is identity with its own nature and assimilation to it. "136 So, in so far as 
freedom is both poles-the datum of the autexousion and the infinite movement toward 
its origin in infinite freedom-it can only fulfil itself in infinite freedom. In this 
movement of becoming, originating with Plotinus, `baptised' by Gregory and absorbed 
into Balthasar's specifically intra-trinitarian christocentric perspective, finite freedom is 
always distinguished from God in that it comes from him and goes to him who is 
"without motion where all change is concerned". 137 It is a movement written into the 
very nature of finite freedom13' and, as freedom is a free gift of the Eternal and the Good, 
it is characterised by an instinct for what is always better. "In a certain sense", Gregory 
says, the soul "is constantly being created in that it transforms itself, through growth in 
what is good, into what is better. " 139 Whilst for Origen `indifference' constitutes 
freedom of choice, for Gregory the innermost nature of freedom of choice is the 
movement toward self-realisation within infinite freedom. It is thus that finite freedom 
can be the image of infinite freedom. Its innermost nature is revealed in the humanity of 
Christ. "' Platonic and Origenistic "satiation" is no longer possible because ever-greater 
infinite freedom continually expands the finite freedom that moves within it ("satiety 
and yearning mutually heighten each otheri14'). Balthasar concludes that "the element of 
infinity that indwells finite freedom comes from the free gift of infinite freedom: the 
latter not only "frees" finite freedom and gives it room to operate but actually opens 
135 Th II 236 
136 De Anima et Resurrectione in Patrologia Graeca 46 101D 
137 Patrologia Graeca 45 1253B 
138 Movement and change belong to the nature of finite freedom as something created. De Hominis 
Oificio in Patrologia Graeca 44 184 CD 
139 On the Songs of Songs VI in Patrologia Graeca 44 885D 
140 cf Oratio Catechetica XXI in Patrologia Graeca 45 60a 
141 De Beatitudinibus Oratio IV Patrologia Graeca 44 1245B 
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itself to it as the context of its self-fulfilment" in God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, 
(the key insight unavailable to Plotinus). 142 
Thomas - Balthasar thinks that the oriental and occidental streams converge in 
Aquinas. "' As regards freedom as autonomous motion, he defends the self- 
determination of the will in its search through the whole breadth of being for the 
absolute good, God. 144 Human reason, as well as the autonomous motion of the will, is 
seen as causa sui145 in judgement since it evaluates existing things under the aspect of 
being (will's free autonomous motion entailing insight into being in its totality) and can 
evaluate its own judgements (unlike animals). Balthasar is clear that this causa sui 
motus is not the same kind of self positing in Being that God exercises. X46 
And so, as with our analysis of Augustine, we arrive at the Thomistic paradox 
rediscovered by de Lubac. For the causa sui motus means there is "in the will a natural 
longing (desiderium naturale) for complete, exhaustive self-possession, which would 
have to coincide with the "possession" of being as such". 147 Man is quite unable to 
achieve his natural desire. He "strives to fulfil himself in an absolute and yet, although 
he is "causa sui", he is unable to achieve this by his own power or by attaining any 
finite thing or finite good. 14' 
Men themselves are the natural sources of their own activity through mind and will. 
Yet the final happiness prepared for the saints surpasses both our thinking and our 
willing... Such happiness goes beyond our natural reach.. . 
Man's complete happiness, as 
we have found, consists in the vision of the divine essence and this is beyond the natural 
stretch of any creature. '49 
The fact that in the end finite freedom only attains self-fulfilment in a dimension 
beyond its own striving is the further aspect of this paradox. 15° 
142 Th 11238 
143 
Ibid. 238 (239) 
'4' Ibid. 225; cf also though the apparent `unfreedom' regarding the formal object Ibid. 226; section B3 
above 
145 Ibid. 225-226; Truth q 24 aI reply. 
146 Truth q 22 
147 Th 11 225; Summa Contra Gentiles 3 25,3-50 
148 Ibid. 225-226 Balthasar says that for Thomas this paradox is man's dignity. 
149 Summa Theologiae la2ae 5,5 sed contra, responsio translated into English by Thomas Gilby 
(Blackfriars, Cambridge 1969) 
150 Ibid. 226 
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When it comes to the question of the consent of the second pole Balthasar focuses 
on Thomas' understanding of the mediation of being, discussed above, esse grounding 
both self-being and communication with the Absolute. "' He thinks that reference to the 
inseparably twofold nature of the primal act of self-knowledge (that is, that it includes 
the openness to/awareness of all being (beyond particular beings) as well as grasping 
our own being)152 is necessary for understanding how infinite freedom can indwell finite 
enabling it to be genuine, finite freedom. `Letting be' and indifference are therefore 
crucial to the second pole. For Balthasar the second pole of finite freedom, the 
openness to all being153 is "the elevated position of `indifference"''S4 which must be 
realised by going out of ourselves and making choices in relation to and affecting 
everything with which we share existence, which is recognised as good and true. 
This raises a further question about how finite freedom relates to "the other" when 
exercising its openness. 15' If the `I'-pole were absolute it would think of the other good 
and true things that share being as things to be used. 15' But, as we have seen, this pole is 
not absolute: there is no articulation of the first pole without the openness to all being 
which shows "this prime thing (myself) as only one being among others. "157 In Thomas, 
as in the patristic tradition, the autonomous motion of the will involves insight into 
being in its totality and judgement of everything under the aspect of being and of the 
good; 158 and within the horizon of being-in-its-totality also disclosed by the `I' pole 
other beings are seen to constitute poles of their own too. This indifference of the 
second pole, illuminated by the idea of the love of the good for its own sake, brings the 
second pole into full view clearly indicating that striving for the good is not a matter of 
self-interest, the element of interest being removed by "the knowledge of the good as 
15' Th 11 224; cf section B2 above 
152 Ibid. 239; 207-11 
153 Ibid. 211 
54 Ibid. 227-228 
Iss Ibid. 228 
156 Ibid. 239,228,211 
'57 Ibid. 211 
158 Ibid. 225 
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good', "' and the element of indifference taking on a depth in which the one who strives 
for the good "is able to let the Good "be ", whether it be a finite or an infinite Good, 
simply for the sake of its goodness, without trying to gain it for himself ""0 This is the 
way of love. 
2 Towards the relationship of freedom and grace 
Choices have to be made about the exercise of the second pole if its elevated indifference 
is to be realised. Once the idea of `use' for the sake of self enrichment has been 
eliminated along the lines indicated above, we begin to move towards the understanding 
that openness may not be self-fulfilled. This is, of course, key to the concept of grace. 
The alternative to `use' is looking at finite freedom's openness as "the opportunity to 
hand itself over to infinite free Being, to the Being who is the Giver of this free 
openness. "16' This is illuminated by the intersubjective reality that finite freedom 
cannot appropriate or incorporate others into itself: "the freedom of the "other" must 
disclose itself by opening up its own inner area. " Thus what we might call an `analogia 
caritatis' between the relationships of finite freedoms and the relationship between 
finite and infinite freedom (ultimately based on the free self-surrendering and `letting be' 
relations of the triune persons), gives the crucial preliminary insight that "ultimately, a 
relation between finite and infinite freedom must involve self disclosure on the part of 
infinite freedom. " 162 
The idea of self-disclosure on the part of the infinite is also suggested when the 
origin and goal of the soul's self possession is considered. The enigmatic state of finite 
freedom possessing in its autexousion "an element of absoluteness, "' an "infinite 
finitude", but because it is "a given" unable to get back to it origins or therefore to reach 
its destination by pursuing the totality of goods and values in the world, is the boundary 
159 Ibid. 211 
160 Ibid. Balthasar's italics 





where the idea of infinite freedom's self-disclosure arises. " The philosophical 
perspective recognises that the origin of the soul's self-possession, the self-luminosity 
shared, in principle, by all that has being, must be the very ground of being "which we 
cannot `get behind' and which the questioning mind cannot approach, as it were, from 
the outside (because it is part of it). "165 Self-possession, the judging and the striving are 
the transcendental modes16' of all-pervasive Being which indwells the soul. Thus 
spiritual being has the highest form of participation in Being. Philosophy, however, 
cannot fully answer this question of origins. For if I only encounter Being in finite 
beings, we are presented with the question of how nonsubsistent non-finite reality can 
be realised in subsisting finite centres which are spiritual and free by virtue of their 
participation in Being. If philosophy concludes that Being-in-its-totality is 
Subjekthaftigkeit (has the quality of a subject) this coheres with the self-propagation of 
non-finite Being in finite subjects but seems to conflict with its Formalität (formality) 
and its noncenteredness. "The only possibility is that, within Being, a nonparticipative 
subjectivity should disclose itself, coextensive with Being-in-its-totality, possessing 
infinite reason, infinite will and infinite freedom. i167 
In Romans I: 19 Paul assumes that such a revelation has taken place. Thus the finite 
mind is challenged right from the start to see the manifestation of the absolute ground 
(that is, God) in the necessary formal object and so "acknowledge (doxazein) that its 
own freedom is immanent not only in all-encompassing Being but in infinite freedom", 
and that divine freedom and infinite will is immanent in its own finite free being and will 
"as the ultimate ground of its own, given, de facto freedom. "168 Of course the alternative 
decision can be taken to retreat from this immanence, to try to be its own ground. This 
surrender to idolatry, which attempts to satisfy the spirit's infinite capacity for Being 
164 Ibid. 228 
165 Ibid. 240 
166 
Ibid. 228 
167 Ibid. 241 
168 Ibid. 
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with finite substance, will ultimately require the dissolving of the finite spiritual centres 
into non-finite Being. 
But finite freedom cannot and does not need to construct a realm of fulfilment 
through the denial of its finite limits. "' For this space is given in its own structure (it is 
"coconstituent of finite freedom"), not as that within which it can fulfil itself, but as "a 
setting-out toward that which alone-in infinite freedom-can communicate itself as 
positive, infinite freedom", or, to use the scholastic terminology, the desiderium 
naturale `visionis' (thus confirming that desire for God is natural, a constituent of finite 
freedom). Here it is described as the "unfillable realm that lies below freedom of 
choice", "' that wealth of `being open' from which decision must be made, the infinite 
finitude impossible to fulfil by the pursuit of the totality of goods and values in the 
world, "' the elevated indifference from which the Good and True can be desired for their 
own sake. A philosophy of freedom has thus come upon the natural desire for the living 
God, a realm that cannot be filled, except by that which alone can freely "communicate 
itself as positive, infinite freedom. " 172 
These points begin to elucidate how surrender to the initiative of the infinite is not a 
contradiction or alienation of the given self possession of finite freedom. For we are 
aware first of all of the frustrating limits of finite freedom, that finite freedom cannot 
fulfil itself, cannot even go back to its origins nor fill itself with the use of other things. 
Yet the idea of the disclosure of the ground of being allows us to see this very 
limitedness as the point of development where finite freedom goes out toward, opens to, 
has natural desire for the self disclosing initiative of infinite freedom. So, surrender, 
consent to the other, rather than contradicting the autonomy of the first pole is in fact 
the necessary counterpart if real freedom is to be exercised and is to grow. So we see 
that although he is causa sui, man cannot achieve the natural desire for true self 
169 Ibid. 241-242. 
170 Ibid. 242 
"' Ibid. 228 
172 Ibid. 242 
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possession by his own efforts but only in open movement towards and the self 
communication of infinite freedom who has perfect self-possession. "' 
Balthasar thus regains freedom as a Christian concept. Freedom as rational 
spontaneity can be seen as the nature of the creature as long as it is seen with the second 
element, which is integral to finitude. The "either-or" of autonomy and heteronomy is 
replaced by a theonomy which both bestows and fulfils a genuine but nevertheless 
`dependent autonomy' in the freedom of self-surrender. And, as we will see in more 
detail in the next chapter, the key to this perfection of human freedom-unachievable 
from below-is identified as the mediating Spirit of God. 
D Natural desire and the supernatural existential in 
the Theo-drama 
Before we move on there are two further points to cover. Firstly there is the extent to 
which the theo-dramatic reaffirmation of the conviction learnt from de Lubac that natural 
desire is truly natural, apparent in the latter part of this analysis, involves a 
development from the position discussed in chapter one with its slightly ambivalent 
relation to the solution proposed by Karl Rahner. 14 Secondly there is the specific 
relation between the bi-polar structure of freedom, nature and grace and the Trinity. 
In the previous chapter we saw that this recognition of the `naturalness' of natural 
desire was one of Balthasar's reasons for rejecting the concept of the supernatural 
existential, for man's horizon does not need to be elevated to the desire for God as he is 
in himself 75 and this natural desire does not have a supernatural element in it. 16 
Nevertheless we do still find evidence of some kind of `triadic' scheme in the Theo- 
"' Ibid. 331,225-226 
14 In GL this question centres on the relationship Balthasar sets out between a natural religious and a 
theological a priori. cf GL I 155-171; cf Dalzell: Dramatic 30ff; Conway: Anonymous 146-149; La 
Madrid: "Anonymous" 375f; Roland Chia: "Theological Aesthetics or Aesthetic Theology? Some 
Reflections on the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar" Scottish Journal of Theology 49 1996 92-94 
15egThIII416 
76 Th IV 142 
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drama, which concedes a place to what can be called a supernatural existential, albeit 
with a limited but unspecific definition. Whilst Balthasar does not take up and actively 
develop the conceptuality used in "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie", "' when it 
becomes necessary to use detailed terminology and fine distinctions it becomes evident 
that he still countenances a `supernatural modification' of our natural openness to the 
absolute"' distinguishable from both nature and grace. It is 'additional' to our natural 
finitude, 1' "more than a natural `orientation"' (and so more than just natural), and yet it 
is "deeply burned" into the structure of finite freedom, like a characteristic mark that 
abides even when grace is rejected (and is therefore distinguished from grace). Whilst he 
maintains that if we call this additional divine `summoning' (Angerufensein) or 
'invitation"" a supernatural existential (which he does legitimise) we "must not seek to 
unpack its contents further" (in the direction of an experience of grace as mentioned 
above18'), it is clearly a supernatural modification (in the terms of the Theo-drama an 
`element of the divine freedom') persisting even under the condition of the loss of grace - 
a supernatural, natural characteristic! 
It is one thing to say that in the concrete state human nature is in relationship with 
grace de facto from the first moment of creation and quite another to say that 
prescinding from this grace there is a supernatural `marking' of this nature and to 
establish this as concrete nature, as Balthasar seems to here (in the language of the Theo- 
drama: this element of divine freedom being "built into the concrete structure of finite 
freedom"). 
So there still seems to be an ultimate concession to a triadic analysis which sustains 
(indeed its vagueness perhaps even aggravates) the kind of complexity which sits ill with 
the simplicity of the insight Balthasar attributes to de Lubac and leaves an unresolved 
"' in Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 75 (1953) 453-461; cf chapter 1 section E above 
18Th 111411 
179 Th IV 166 
180 This choice of words suggests continuity between the position expressed here in the Theo-drama and 
the early exploration of the supernatural modification where this radical elevation is also referred to as a 
summons (Anruf) in KB 291; cf chapter 1 note 88. 
181 chapter 3 section BI above 
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tension at the heart of his thought on the matter. For, as he himself argues elsewhere in 
the Theo-drama, even apart from his concerns about particular understandings of the 
contents of a supernatural existential, the notion itself is an unnecessary complication of 
the basic features of man's unique constitution and destiny. These can be authentically 
conveyed with due regard for the original position of the fathers, the insights of Thomas 
and official ecclesiastical statements of the post-reformation period when it is simply 
maintained that it is into "man's fundamental creatureliness as a conscious being" that 
the vocation to union with God is implanted, a vocation that he cannot fulfil of himself 
(the Augustinian/Thomist natural desire for the beatific vision). "' There is no need to 
confuse things by attributing something supernatural to this desire to know God as he is 
in himself. 183 As `gift' and `image', dependent on free inter-subjective disclosure to be 
ourselves and upon God's free self-disclosure to receive the absolute truth and goodness 
for which we are made, the paradox of this destiny out of proportion with our nature is 
"an integral part of the primal fact of self-consciousness". "' 
E Finite self-transcendence and the nature-grace 
relationship are an image of the Trinity 
Finally the mysterious balance of the bipolar structure of our freedom with its 
simultaneous self-transcending autonomy and absolute indebtedness (as regards both 
existence and fulfilment) is ultimately elucidated with reference to Balthasar's trinitarian 
perspective, that is his concern to uncover a reflection of the Trinity in finite processes, 
to find their origin in the triune life of God. 
The paradox of human nature re-emphasised by de Lubac that man can only fulfil 
himself beyond himself (explored in the Theo-drama in the arena of infinite and finite 
freedom, divine and human action) is itself identified as an image of the Trinity. The 
self-transcendence of our finite free nature exists as a reflection of the triune constitution 
182 Th III 415 Balthasar's italics. 
183 Th IV 142 
184 Ibid. 
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of God185 in which, for Balthasar, each divine person is himself because of his 
`transcendence' towards the other two, the divine essence being `ever greater' than each 
person. '86 It is then ultimately this trinitarian perspective that explains man's 
fundamental orientation to God. It is this imaging of the self-transcendence internal to 
the Trinity in finite self-transcendence that is the reason why every finite being finds its 
meaning, direction and path "by pointing beyond itself to the unfathomable reality of 
God". "' Again we find the inner life of the Trinity offered to us as an explanation of 
specific features of human nature. 
As it is nature's simultaneous self-transcendence and radical indebtedness for both 
origin (being) and goal (participation in the Godhead) that is an image of the Trinity, the 
nature-grace relationship itself is an imago trinitatis. 188 
The connection made between the interplay of nature and grace and the doctrine of 
the Trinity is highly distinctive. The nature-grace relationship is understood to reflect 
Balthasar's novel identification of `expectation' and `surprise' in the love relationships 
of the persons of the Trinity. "' In the "superabundant vitality" of the life of God, 
whilst each person knows and attains the others completely, there is always `something 
new' in their exuberant love; every expectation finds `a fulfilment that surpasses it'. 190 
In particular, on the basis of the creature being created pre-eminently in the Logos, it 
recalls a description of the Father-Son relationship, almost subordationist in tone: 
... that the 
Father, insofar as he is the Origin, is always greater than the Son; for the Son 
expresses his indebtedness to the Father (by sharing the power to breathe forth the Spirit) 
in that he attains the Father's (power of) so breathing him forth. '9' 
As we shall see later, Balthasar's supreme illustration of the relationship between 
self-transcendent nature and the grace of God in Mary192 draws attention to the primacy 
of grace. In this perspective the world's `philosophical' transcendence has its basis "in 
185 Th V 102-105,75,181 
186 Ibid. 102,104,497 
187 Adrienne von Speyr: Das Licht und die Bilder 17 quoted by Balthasar in Th V 103; cf also 75. 
188 Th V 104 
189 Ibid. 
190 Th V 79,89,90,92-93,104,126 
191 Ibid. 104 
192 cf Ibid. and chapter 5 section D3 below 
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the `theological' final prius of grace over nature's efficient causality. ""' However the 
origin of this weighting as an imago trinitatis is provocative giving some kind of 
sovereign primacy to the Father in relation to the Son and the Spirit 
Again the question is raised as to what extent Balthasar's understanding of the 
Godhead suffers from his attempts to co-ordinate the creature-God relationship 
precisely and in detail as an image of the Trinity, and, perhaps with more relevance to 
our concerns here, to what effect? Is the nature-grace relationship really illuminated by 
this association? What does it tell us? That the interplay of nature and grace has a 
strange and mysterious relationship to the relations of the persons of the Trinity that 
makes God's triunity sound rather different from the way it has traditionally been 
presented? Perhaps it gives us a glimpse of just how intense and intimate a 
circumincessio between nature and grace Balthasar wishes to convey, but, as we have 
found little emphasis on the circumincessio of the Trinity, this seems rather unlikely. In 
fact in the next chapter we will discover a tension between unity and distinction in 
Balthasar's understanding of the nature-grace relationship. 
93 Th V 113 
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Chapter 5 
Finite freedom and the nature-grace 
relationship 
God created the world (nature) to be united with him in Christ (the supernatural order). ' 
The creation-grace articulation, the positing of a non-divine subject that is to participate 
in the divine life, cannot be abandoned. 2 
A Gratuity and the nature-grace distinction 
Our discussion of finite freedom in the previous chapter brought us to the threshold of 
its fulfilment in the infinite freedom of God. In this chapter we explicitly connect this 
picture of freedom with the question of the nature-grace relationship, discuss the related 
topic of the relationship between image and likeness before going on to focus 
specifically on how this finite freedom is fulfilled in infinite freedom. 
The analysis of freedom described in the previous chapter is clearly crucial to 
Balthasar's understanding of the spiritual creature and its relation to God and, not 
surprisingly therefore, comes to be associated with its nature. Indeed freedom as 
rational spontaneity can be understood as the creature's nature as long as it is seen with 
the second dimension of openness and consent, which is integral to finitude. ' Balthasar 
is aware that as the bi-polar structure of finite freedom belongs so much to its nature 
this could be understood to imply "that there is neither reason nor space for any 
distinction between its nature and the realm of the "supernatural", that is what is "of 
grace" in the true sense. "4 The point though is that the end and fulfilment of this 
freedom does not lie within the sphere of its own structure, the unity of his `for- 
himself-whilst-making-room-for-others' does not find complete satisfaction of itself. 
'ThIII482 
2 HDL 69 Here Balthasar is summarising part of de Lubac's argument in Le Mystere du Surnaturel. 
3 Th II 224 
4Th IV )71 
124 
Here we touch the limits of philosophy. In contrast to the closed free infinitude of many 
philosophies, ' in Christianity "absolute freedom freely and sovereignly communicates 
itself to finite freedom; in the incarnation of Christ, it descends to a level below itself, 
making itself available to finite freedom as the latter's source and final goal. "6 This is 
grace, "the reciprocal immanence of finite and infinite freedom", ' which finite freedom is 
made for but cannot achieve for itself 
Thus Balthasar's understanding of the constitution of finite freedom with its 
fundamental orientation beyond itself by no means leaves the gratuitous gift of grace 
obsolete, nor renders unnecessary the distinction between what is possessed by nature 
and the fulfilment received in the self-giving of God. 
The innermost dynamism of finite freedom (which is a real desire, yearning) 
rediscovered by twentieth century Catholic theology and which we saw in the previous 
chapter remains so important in Balthasar's perspective, is not a movement that can "in 
any way force the divine self-disclosure"8 which brings it fulfilment. As in Augustine, 
this yearning is a thirst for God, a plea, not a demand (as in Bainism). Moreover, 
Balthasar's christocentric doctrine of creation indicates the irrelevance of such an idea of 
demand because "right from the outset, God had already decided to reveal and so give 
himself to the creature he had endowed with finite freedom", this being "the real motive 
of his creation from all eternity". 9 If it was God's plan from the beginning then a 
demand from the creature is already too late. If participation in God's inner realm by 
grace is the a priori of creation then "every claim the creature may make on God-as to 
5 In Plotinus, for example, the Spirit, the One's "Other", can only circle round the One whose infinite 
freedom is only in and for itself, so that fulfilment is likewise frustration. "Such motion alone can 
constitute its impulse towards it centre: it cannot coincide with the centre, for then there would be no 
circle; since this may not be, it whirls about it; so only can it indulge its tendence... this very motion is 
its eternal attainment. " The Enneads translated into English by Stephen Mackenna (Faber and Faber, 
London 1956) II, 2,1; cf Th IV 371 
6 Th IV 372; I 16; cf also 111 458 
Th IV 383 
8 Ibid. 372 
9 Ibid.; cf chapter 2 section Al above 
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what he "should" do-is already surpassed by what he has actually done". '° The 
christological articulation of the same eternal divine intention for our participation-all 
things are only created with a view to their being perfected in the Second Adam- does 
not mean that "God owes it to natural man to raise him to the state of grace; God 
"owes" it to himself to be faithful to the order and the consistency of his unitary world 
plan. "" Hence wondering about the possibility of finite freedom in the absence of such a 
decision on God's part is also irrelevant. If we recall the rather involved discussion of 
gratuity `from below' and `from above' in chapter one it now seems clear here that 
speculation about hypothetical situations is not necessary for maintaining the gratuity 
of grace-or the distinction between nature and grace. The `concession' to the relative 
significance of a pure nature concept described in chapter one does not seem to have a 
place here. 
The distinction is between God endowing his creature with freedom and the 
extraordinary privilege of God "freely and sovereignly"" communicating himself to that 
creature-that fulfilling self-disclosure that the creature is impotent to compel. So the 
two endowments are not the same although there cannot be a harsh disjunction between 
them because they are both part of the one plan of God for us. Since that plan has been 
revealed to us we cannot see one without the other, and this is emphasised for us in the 
natural yearning that we have for the fulfilment in communion with God that we cannot 
obtain for ourselves. 
Nevertheless, does this distinction between the self-bestowal of absolute freedom in 
addition to the initial bestowal of finite freedom mean there is need to distinguish one 
endowment as grace, `super', `above' the other, or is it satisfactory simply to say with 
Therese and Bernanos that "everything is grace"13 -after all both are the utterly free 
gifts of God, intrinsically related as origin and goal? Despite his affinity with Therese 
10 Th III 47 Absolute freedom "has always anticipated finite freedom by providing it with scope within 
which it can fulfil itself, namely, "en Christo? '. (111 36) 
" Th 111 257 
12ThIV 372 
13 cf Ibid. 374; 422; cf chapter 2 page 45 above. 
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and Bernanos, to Balthasar's mind a theological distinction has always been important, 
notwithstanding the fact that everything is the free gift of God. Side by side with 
Therese's acclamation comes a technical assertion: 
Nature is what God freely creates, ens ab alio; however much grace it receives, it remains 
eternally nondivine, the receptive subject of God's free bestowal of grace, which enables 
it to participate in the divine goods. ' 
We must "hold fast to the distinction between nature (what distinguishes the 
creature from God) and supernatural vocation and endowment",, " whilst acknowledging 
that the former is made for the latter. 
B The dualism of grace 
1 Grace as gift 
... given man's supernatural vocation to trinitarian love, something of the freedom 
granted him is "laid up" in God, ultimately to be handed over to him, in the exchange of 
love, as the final gift that will bring his freedom to fulfilment. 16 
To further explore Balthasar's determination to uphold this distinction and avoid what 
he refers to as a `monism' of grace, " we shall now look at a short but crucial section in 
Theo-drama II which is (unusually) specifically dedicated to the topic of grace, " 
complementing it with a subsequent passage from the section on anthropology. " We 
have already spoken of finite free being as gift; 2° in the section on grace to which we turn 
now Balthasar describes how this initial gift is only the beginning of a divine giving 
culminating in a further superlative gift in which the Giver gives himself. Thus the 
indebtedness for our very beginning is complemented by an indebtedness for our end 
(that is, the realisation of our yearning), and our natural receptivity is fulfilled in 
receiving the ultimate gift. In the face of philosophies which understand man's 
fulfilment as self-achieved through reaching above himself the use of this `gift' 
terminology emphasises the gratis quality of this fulfilment. " 
14 Ibid. 374 
15 Th III 482 
16 Th V 302 
17 Th IV 374; 11 311 note 41 
18 Th 11312-316 
19 Ibid. 398-402 
20cf chapter 4 section B1 above 
21 cf Engagement with God 25; and with reference to the loss of grace's gift quality in Kant cf Th 1142 1. 
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Firstly Balthasar speaks of the gift of creation (already familiar from our discussion 
of existence as gift in chapter four) in which infinite freedom imparts finite freedom. 
Although this finite freedom exists in itself, is not just defined in relation to infinite 
freedom, and looks to realise itself fully, it is, as we have seen, always a gift, indebted to 
a Giver, in vwºwhom it exercises its autonomy, (such that self-possession and thankfulness 
go hand in hand). 22 Balthasar therefore clearly acknowledges the gratis quality of this 
fundamental gift and the fact that there is already an immanence in the divine if this gift, 
which is a unique image of the divine freedom, is to be used. Indeed this bestowal of 
freedom is itself understood to be a self-manifestation of the presence of the divine 
freedom. From the perspective of finite freedom this gift-quality of finite self- 
determining being is expressed in the `obligation' to give thanks which arises (whether or 
not it is carried out) because its autonomy is owed to infinite freedom. 23 
Now this gift of freedom is not final and therefore finite. It is not settled business 
freeing up infinite freedom so that it can concentrate on something else or itself (Deism), 
rather it is a constant, continuing act. 24 The constitution of rational free subjects on the 
part of divine freedom is just the first word of the message. These subjects are made to 
be receptive to and capable of responding to further words. 25 Although it is true that 
this first word, which gives a share in the act of real being, contains an inexhaustible 
message (because being (esse) is richer than any particular totality of entities), 
nevertheless "this "richer" realm apprehended by the spiritual being does not actually 
fulfil but rather holds out a promise", removing limitations and pointing "in the direction 
of a realm that is limitless. "26 This brings us to the unique aspect of this divine 
communication: the Giver of such a promise "far beyond any gift separate from himself, 
is able actually to give himself. "27 The very characteristic of the continuing gift of 
freedom is that it not only produces the gift but also "proffers itself, the Giver", thus 
22 Th II 313 It is not given in such a way as to be expelled or cut off from its origin. (V 389) 
23ThII313 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 398 
26 Ibid. (Balthasar's italics) 
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offering a home, `right of citizenship' in the infinite realm28-the reciprocal immanence 
of the two freedoms, of gift and Giver. In this understanding of grace God is making 
both an offer of love and of being (not to be confused with some 'thing'). " 
Whilst this divine self-communication is located as part of the ongoing giving of 
freedom, Balthasar maintains that it is more than the constitution of subjects: it iS the 
opening up to them of subsistent being's own free inner life. Indeed he makes the 
distinction by actually referring to the constitution of subjects as natural and the latter 
act as supernatural. " Like the fundamental reception of selfhood, this reception of 
infinite life, of participation in divinity, also images the Son's receptivity vis-a-vis the 
Father from whom he too `receives' Godhead and eternal freedom. 3 ` 
If we turn to the viewpoint of finite freedom, this state of being `in grace' means 
following through the fundamental indebted receptivity of existence in the direction of 
both origin and goal and thus also places the gift of grace and the gift of free existence in 
an organic relationship. Being in grace involves acknowledging that both the existence 
and the fulfilment of finite freedom are dependent on the divine freedom made manifest 
in the bestowing of freedom-without making them any the less genuine possessions of 
finite freedom (both are given, not lent32). Thus thanksgiving comes to be understood as 
characteristic of the appropriate response of freedom (and the rejection of grace means a 
living contradiction: refusing to acknowledge personally the objective indebtedness to 
God for everything). " There is a continuous qualitative escalation in experience 
(corresponding to the qualitative heightening in the ongoing divine giving of freedom), 
such that "finite freedom will continually encounter the gift-character of the divine realm 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 313 
29 Ibid. 315; Engagement 27 (grace as a love) 
30 Th 11398 
'' Ibid. 267 
32 "For what God gives, he gives absolutely and entirely, giving us the right of ownership, though 
everything ultimately comes from him. " Adrienne von Speyr: Johannes vol 1125-126 cited by Balthasar 
in Th V 109; Engagement 25 
33cf Th I1316; Engagement 28 
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in a new and heightened way. "34 This process never comes to a stand still for "the 
divine wellspring is always a free self-giving that renders the recipient more and more 
able to receive more. 
"35 
The distinctiveness of the actual gift of participation in the divine realm itself is still 
marked in this view from the perspective of finite freedom. First of all indebtedness for 
this latter gift is not simply merged with indebtedness for the gift of finite freedom, 
such that the latter gift could necessarily be derived from the primary bestowal of 
freedom. 36 That incredible gift of self-transcending freedom is not in itself sufficient to 
unlock the gates of fulfilment in the infinite: this access can only be freely given it by 
infinite freedom; it is "pure grace". Every act that finite freedom "performs in the 
direction of transcendence can only be performed because the realm of infinite freedom 
has disclosed itself. "37 What is extraordinary and quite unique about this fulfilment in 
the infinite for which the finite free subject is destined is the fact that he is actually 
taken beyond himself' and what he encounters and freely receives is the presence of the 
Giver himself in the gift, that is in him. We receive both the love of God, poured into 
our hearts by the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit himself' (who is "the hypostasis of 
all that is meant by "gift"40) 
This extraordinary relationship in which the divine Giver hands himself over as a 
genuine gift to the creature, whilst maintaining some kind of distinction between the 
created gift and the Infinite Giver (who can never be a `thing owned' by the creature41) is 
34ThII314 
3s Th V 397 
36 « the creature's own freedom was always dependent, for its fulfilment, on absolute freedom. But now 
he is given access by God to the inner sphere of divine life, so that he may live and move in it. This is 
something the creature would never have dreamed of; he would never have postulated it for himself either 
subjectively or objectively. " Th 11 400 
37 Ibid. 314 
38 Ibid. 314,399 
39 "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. " Roms 
5: 5 cf Th 11 230; 233; cf section below D2 below. 
40 Ibid. 287 
41 Grace is not simply an identification of Giver and gift. The description `the presence of the Giver in 
the gift' is carefully chosen, allowing Balthasar to put emphasis on the personal self-giving of God in his 
account of grace (the presence of the Giver) whilst also safeguarding the `createdness' of what is given (a 
gift). Thus it cannot be said to be a case of uncreated and infinite Spirit being imparted directly to the 
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further elucidated by the use of the water image to denote the grace of the Holy Spirit. 
Balthasar quotes Ignatius of Antioch: "in me is a murmuring wellspring; it speaks to me 
interiorly, saying, `Come away to the Father"'. This, Balthasar says "is the voice of the 
Kyrios who is the Spirit and who gives us the living water that wells up to eternal life 
(Jn 4: 14). "42 This recalls a passage from Karl Barth in which Balthasar quotes at length 
from a reflection of Guardini's on this living water. 43 Guardini draws attention to the 
fact that the well-spring of grace which "cannot be compelled by any human power" but 
"is God's pure opening up to us in his sovereign freedom", 44 is given in such a way that 
it springs up from within the finite spiritual creature. The well from which I draw the 
grace that comes from God alone is (miraculously! ) in me, a creature, such that there is 
no contradiction between grace being Christ's and grace being mine, between grace as 
God himself and grace as a created gift. As will become clearer in our description of the 
role of the Spirit later in this chapter, this new, abundant love is within because of the 
theonomy of the Spirit. It is not external precisely because it seizes man in the 
innermost depths of his person; he `has' it because it possesses him. " A genuine 
realisation and expression of indebtedness is thus only possible if finite freedom 
acknowledges both the presence of the Giver in the gift and the fact that the infinite 
realm entered is one given by the Giver to whom it owes everything (and is not simply 
seized through its own self-transcendence}. " 
creature, but the fuller and fuller opening up within the created gift already given of the self-giving of the 
uncreated Giver. Thus despite Balthasar's reservations regarding "the abiding obscurity of the term 
`created grace"' (Th 111 299 note 68) his description basically remains within the boundaries framed by the 
distinction made in Catholic theology between created and uncreated grace, although he is keen to 
emphasise what is given is not `a thing'. (Th II 315) (The description `created' should not of course 
imply a `thing', such as a `quantifiable' substance poured into the `vessel' of the soul. The concern 
behind the distinction is the difference between God and his creatures, such that we do not receive into 
our being God as he is in himself (his divine essence), but communion with God, the life of God in 
relation to us. The language of pouring and `infusion' used with reference to grace is of course entirely 
Scriptural inspired primarily by Romans 5.5 and I Cor 12.13, although there is of course also Jesus' use 
of the image of water with reference to his gift of God's life to us eg John 4: 14. cf also Th 11 315 note 2) 
42 Th 111 454-5; cf V 462 (Ruysbroeck); I 646 
'' KB 345-346 
44Ibid. 
45 LA 108 
46ThII314 
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The distinctiveness of the gift of participation in the divine sphere is further 
underlined by Balthasar's acknowledgement that such a state is not necessarily 
universally experienced by all possessors of finite freedom, but there are different 
'gradations"' towards the perfected instance of "absolute non-resistance to infinite 
freedom" and the fruitful immanence that ensues. 48 There is the person who, wishing to 
surrender totally to God, is `in grace' (Balthasar is specifically referring to sanctifying 
grace here49), although they are unable to carry out this non-resistance absolutely and 
the fruitfulness of their life within infinite freedom is curtailed. Secondly, the person 
who does not actually resist God (because they have not reached the age of reason) can 
also be living in receipt of this self-gift of God ('born of him') by virtue of solidarity 
with the Church through baptism, although whether he remains in this state is 
dependent on the subsequent decisions of his life. Finally there are those who to 
varying degrees reject the presence of the Giver of the gift in them, deny their 
indebtedness, and are therefore not in receipt of sanctifying grace. They do have "God's 
antecedent offer of love" though and are therefore still in a relation to grace, which can 
facilitate a positive response to the offer of divine love (prevenient and actual grace"). 
However they can also harden themselves to such an extent that they hurl "a resounding 
No in the face of love (the `sin against the Holy Spirit'). "" 
This is the closest Balthasar gets to talking about different `categories' of grace in the 
Theo-drama, for as the new intimacy of divine indwelling in God's personal self-giving 
in the creature is a relationship without analogy it is extremely "hard to distinguish the 
different forms of act and attitude that manifest God's grace. "52 In fact these only have 
meaning in relation to the creature's finitude and in particular its sinful resistance, for it 
is the finite that alters its stance vis-ä-vis God (moving closer or further away) not God 
47Thus there is not simply a tidy dividing line between those who `have grace' and those who do not. 
48 Th II 315-316 Mary is this perfected instance as the description on these pages suggests (describing 
this non-resistance in terms of her `Let it be done unto to me according to your word'); cf also eg Th V 
104 and section D3 below. 
49 cf Introduction note 16 above 
so cf Introduction note 16 above 
51Th 11316 
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who changes vis-ä-vis the finite. On this rare occasion when Balthasar does use the 
technical language for different `kinds' of grace we can see that the duality of God's 
giving to finite freedom that we have been describing (an initial share in being and the 
possibility of inner access to the life of absolute being) can be seen as a division between 
prevenient and actual grace on the one hand and sanctifying grace on the other: a division 
within grace-albeit nevertheless a very considerable division including on the negative 
side those who may be on the point of a hardened outright rejection of God's presence. 
Balthasar is quite clear here in his description of the various "defective instances" of 
receiving God's grace that the person who to different degrees rejects the presence of 
infinite grace in him does not have the fullness of the immanence of infinite freedom for 
which he is made, does not have `sanctifying grace', is not adopted in a rebirth from 
God. However he still has grace within him, the grace that goes ahead and offers, makes 
available the fullness that alone fulfils and makes possible a `yes' to it, a presence of 
grace that rests on the fact that God gives something of himself in the very act of 
establishing the rational free subject in being and calls and leads that free creature into a 
more and more intimate giving and receiving. This understanding of the distinction 
between those who are and are not `in a state of grace"' as a distinction within grace 
supports the conclusion gradually emerging that Balthasar's duality is as much a duality 
of grace as a division between nature and grace. 
2 Distinction and continuity: one gift or two? 
This description of the `two-fold' gift of freedom means that, on the one hand, finite 
freedom is always in relation to infinite freedom on the basis of the gift of creation, and 
that there is a continuity in this giving which includes the ultimate gift (God himself), but 
that, on the other, that which is thus offered in this ongoing giving is nevertheless 
qualitatively distinct, as a finite thing separate from the Giver is different from the 
Giver's own personal giving of himself to his creature. This is a description that 
52 Th IV 373 
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emphasises the intimate, dynamic relationship between creation and grace-indeed quite 
radically describing them as one process of divine giving-in keeping with the 
understanding that grace does not annihilate or give us a completely different nature but 
transforms it as a gift that is beyond our expectations (but is not a bombshell). " Yet at 
the same time Balthasar's description stresses the uniqueness of the gift of God's-self. 
Thus over and above the gift of finite free being (which necessarily exists in infinite 
being), grace is described as the presence of the Giver in the gifts (complementing the 
description of grace as the indwelling of infinite in the finite discussed above). " This 
immanence is specifically connected with the Holy Spirit, "the absolute divine gift", 57 
and the person who receives this gift of being and love, having acknowledged 
dependence for such fulfilment, is "someone to whom it has been `granted to have life in 
himself ". 58 
On the one hand then this distinctive relationship of Giver to gift bears much in 
common with the essential relationship between the two, such that the distinction can 
sometimes seem to be one of degree. But on the other hand this ultimate giver-gift 
relationship is unique both in what (or rather who) it gives and in the fact that it is not 
necessary. An extract from the passage we have been considering from the theological 
anthropology of volume II is important here: 
God undertook that first communication of his being, whereby finite, self-aware free 
beings were created, with a view to a `second' act of freedom whereby he would initiate 
them into the mysteries of his own life and freely fulfil the promise latent in the 
infinite act that realises Being. 59 
This clearly indicates how Balthasar continues to maintain both the dynamic link 
between the two forms of God's `self-giving' and their distinction as two distinguishable 
acts of divine freedom. (When this distinction is considered `from below' it is conveyed 
53 This phrase is understood in the sense in which it is normally used to refer to a perseverance in the 
sanctifying grace received in baptism. 
54 cf Th V 380 
55 Th 113 14,315 In Jesus there is no tension between Giver and gift. cf H 52 
56section A above and chapter 4 section CI and 2. 
57 Th 11315,233,287; V 65,381 
58 Th 111 35-36 
59 Th 11 400-401 (my italics) 
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by the fact that participation in being is necessary, the gift of existence non-negotiable, 
whereas `grace', encountering the presence of the Giver in the gift, is not. 60) 
We need to be clear however that the distinction between the two divine acts is not 
necessarily a temporal one. b' Indeed in the section entitled `Grace' that we have been 
looking at in particular, more than in the passage just cited (with its explicit `first' and 
`second' communication and use of temporal phrases with reference to the latter62), 
there is a strong sense of the simultaneity of the gift of freedom and the self-giving of the 
Giver in the gift (however qualitatively distinct and however much one is not derivative 
of the other). Here divine freedom is described as manifesting its presence in the very 
act of bestowing finite freedom, and the characteristic of this bestowal is that it proffers 
the Giver as well as producing the gift. 63 Even though in his explicit reference to `two' 
acts (in the passage quoted immediately above) he is careful to put inverted commas 
around `second', ultimately it is difficult to reconcile the deep, important awareness of 
the simultaneity of giving always ordained by God with the strong, underlying sense of 
a first and second act/gift, implying a double gratuity, ie two gratuitous gifts, two 
`unowednesses'64 and thus two responses. 65 This contrasts with his emphasis on the 
priority of the gracious salvific divine intention which seems to suggest one total gift and 
one gratuity. 66 The emphasis on the unity of gift coheres with his enduring emphasis on 
the de facto unity of nature and grace encountered in Karl Barth and on the 
60 Ibid. 314 
61 Ibid. 401 
62 Ibid. 400-401 (Nevertheless, it is also here that the non-temporal aspect of the distinction is made 
explicit. ) 63 
Ibid. 313 
(A eg the passage from Berulle quoted on Th 11 289 which refers to the fact "that we are doubly indebted 
to God". 
65Our reception/affirmation of the fundamental gift of self is described as the perfect response of 
thanksgiving (Th 11 287 cf chapter four section BI above) and one that is ongoing, "a lifelong task" (II 
290)-is this continuous with the response to `the presence of the Giver in the gift' or should we speak 
of two thanksgivings? 
66 eg "The final cause, since it is the first and all-embracing cause, includes all the articulations of the 
efficient cause... To that extent, any `claim' the creature might make on God (assuming the word has any 
meaning) would always come too late, in view of the total gift already made and the response expected, 
namely, total gratitude. " Th 11401; cf 277 This outlook is consistent with his christocentric doctrine of 
creation in which all things are made to be perfected in Christ. cf IV 372; section A above; chapter 2 
section Al; chapter 3 section C. 
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establishment of man in grace from the first moment of his existence, as well as the 
radical gratuity of divine love apparent in the Theo-drama that simply creates 
everything `for nothing'. " On the other hand the emphasis on distinct gifts bears the 
mark of his enduring interest in paradox and the awareness of the discontinuity between 
the nature of man and his end in grace. However a clear coherence between these two 
different aspects of his thought on the subject is less than transparent. Whilst one can 
argue that it is possible to maintain simultaneously that "everything is gift" ("everything 
is grace") but that not all the gifts are the same, nevertheless the relationship and 
distinction between gifts should still exhibit an identifiable coherence. We shall return to 
this crucial issue when we make our conclusions after we have treated all the various 
aspects of this topic. 
3 Support for dualism of gift from the tradition 
Balthasar locates the decisive struggle between a monism or dualism of grace in the 
Augustine-Pelagius debate, 68 but denies that the origin of a dualism lies here, maintaining 
rather the existence of a clear distinction of the two areas right from the beginning. He 
points to a few patristic sources, for example Tertullian's contrasting of facere (to 
create), which he uses with reference to the substance of the creature, and condere (to 
form, establish), which he uses with reference to grace, " also citing his understanding of 
divine grace as more powerful than nature's freedom which underlies it. '° He mentions 
Cyril of Jerusalem's teaching that we are children of God, not by nature, but by 
adoption, that is by grace" and notes that the "`divinization' so extolled by the Greek 
Fathers is always the result of a grace that is rigorously distinguished from nature, a 
67cfThII260 
68He makes close use of Gisbert Greshake: Gnade der konkreten Freiheit. Eine Untersuchung zur 
Gnadenlehre des Pelagius (Mainz: Grünewald, 1972), although distancing himself from Greshake's main 
thesis. cf Th IV 374 note 20 
69Against Marcion 5 17 in Patrologia Latina 2 514C (English translation in: Alexander Roberts and 
James Donaldson, eds.: Ante Nicene Fathers III (Hendrickson, Massachusetts 1995) 466) 
70 "... the power of divine grace, more potent than nature, exercising its sway over the underlying faculty 
of free will in us. " De Anima 21 in Patrologia Latina 2 727 (A treatise on the Soul 21 in Roberts and 
James Donaldson, eds.: Ante Nicene 202) 
71 3rd Catechesis paragraph 14 in Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers VII (Parker, Oxford 1894) 17 
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grace that elevates us to a `super-natural dignity"'. " We could also mention here the 
traditional distinction between 'datum' and `donum '73 (although of course Balthasar is 
concerned that the datum of creation is itself understood to be a gift) and the patristic 
articulation of image and likeness, which we will consider in the next section of this 
chapter. 
His use of the Augustine-Pelagius debate perhaps comes across as more heartfelt. 
He understands Pelagius' position to be one in which "all forms of grace can be traced 
back to a single form, namely, God's gift of finite freedom and his maintenance of it". 74 
His "whole understanding of grace (in creation and redemption) centres on the primary 
gift of freedom to the creature in the original act of creation" so "specifically Christian 
grace is always given solely in order to re-establish and strengthen man's original 
freedom. " The theology of creation is therefore dominant, and the perspective 
ultimately anthropocentric, rather than christocentric. 75 In Augustine's love-centred 
perspective "freedom, in its full sense, only exists in personal participation in absolute 
love". This presupposes that 
such sharing in the inner fullness of God's love is distinct from the creation and gift of a 
natural, free power to choose. For Augustine, it is this sharing that constitutes grace in 
the full sense, however free and gracious creation itself may have been. 76 
Pelagius therefore fails to recognise this radical newness of the grace of participation 
offered in Christ over and above the grace of creation. Accordingly the influence of 
Christ remains for him at the level of exemplum only, such that there is discipleship and 
imitation but not a mystical inter-penetration or identity, there is exemplum but no 
sacramentum making us inwardly the members of Christ. " Whilst recognising the 
harmony of this twofold work, Augustine clearly distinguishes the fact that Christ's 
death and resurrection gives an example for the outer man ("exterioris exemplum") and 
72 hyper physin axioma (a dignity beyond the natural) Cyril of Alexandria In Joh. I, 9 (PG 73,153) Th 
IV 375 
'' cf HDL 69-70; McGrath: lustitia 101 
74 Th IV 378 
75 Ibid. 376-7 
76 Th IV 378 Balthasar acclaims this insight of Augustine's despite acknowledging that his formulation 
was sometimes one-sided (eg II 232; IV 380) and that later interpretations created further distortions 
(Luther, Jansen). 11234 
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the fact that it works upon the inner man ("interioris hominis sacramentum ", 
"sacramentum interioris resurrectionis"), renewing him inwardly "in order that he may 
dwell in the holy mountain of God who speaks the truth in his heart". 78 Likewise, 
Balthasar maintains that an understanding of ethical approximation to Christ requires 
some connection with the ontic question of the creation-God relation. Whilst Pelagius 
correctly recognises that this dramatic relationship is presupposed by the gift of 
freedom to the creature (which constitutes him as the image of God), Balthasar 
emphasises that this "cannot be more than the precondition for inner participation in 
the essence of God, that is, in the vibrant, divine love-life of the Trinity. "79 
So within the overall context of the primal gift (creation) always being made for the 
gift of the Creator's self-bestowal, Balthasar understands the latter gift as qualitatively 
higher than the former and the former as the precondition of the latter. The gift of the 
ability to choose freely, and the gift of rationality, are integral to the nature of the 
spiritual creature; the grace of the bestowal of absolute freedom is not. We must 
recognise how the gift of "personal participation in absolute love" infinitely surpasses 
any other gift of God and cannot therefore merely be seen as a mere development of the 
primal gift as though subsumed into it, for it is something new and unheard of. But this 
does not deprive the primal gift of significance; it is the necessary precondition of the 
latter gift, "the receptive subject" of grace, enabled by grace to participate in the divine 
goods. 8° Indeed without the gifts integral to the spiritual creature's nature (that is "the 
ability to make free decisions.. just as much as its reason") "it could neither understand 
nor spiritually receive God's self-giving. "" Moreover, the receptive subject retains 
significance in all the categories Balthasar uses because it is there that the fundamental 
" Th IV 377,379 
78 The Trinity IV 3 para 6 in The Fathers of the Church Volume 45, translated into English by Stephen 
McKenna, C. SS. R (The Catholic University of America Press, Inc. 1981) (Patrologia Latina 42 891) 
79 Ibid. 380 
80 Ibid. 374; cf 111341 (The created order is seen as the foundation of the order of the incarnation); 1 125 
(The created world is seen as a presupposition of revelation); LA 102; HDL 69. 
81ThIV374 
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non-divinity, the distinction from God lies, a distinction which is of course so essential 
if at the level of communion with God notions of confusion are, not only denied, but 
ruled out from the start. 82 This avoidance of understanding participatory grace as 
identity (so much an anathema to Balthsasar's perspective under the analogy of being) 
whilst appreciating the extraordinarily intimate nature of the communion to which we 
are destined is also important in the choice of spousal language to describe human 
communion with God. 83 We shall make our final comments about continuity and 
distinction in Balthasar's understanding of the relationship between the gift of creation 
and the gift of grace in the Conclusion. To fully appreciate Balthasar's understanding 
we need to look at his description of the relation between image and likeness and idea 
and prototype, before we go on to consider in more detail how given finite freedom (the 
first gift) finds fulfilment in the self-giving of infinite freedom. 
C Image and likeness; Abbild and Urbild 
I Nature and supernature in the image-likeness relationship 
Having seen the centrality of imago dei to the analogia entis, we also found the gift 
character of existence understood as image, " and encountered it specifically as an imago 
trinitatis in finite freedom. 
According to the bi-polar understanding of finite freedom the first pole, autexousion, 
is posited as the prime datum and then this freedom, having been thus given, has to 
"realise itself, within the overall context of divine freedom. °°85 Balthasar concludes that 
many of the Fathers found this same duality of datum and realisation expressed in 
82 It is nature that is precisely that which is not God ("what distinguishes the creature from God") which 
is to be united with God in Christ (supernatural order). cf Th 111 482 
83 This thus emphasises an intimate union without loss or confusion of the distinct identities, the bond 
being dependent on this distinction. cf Church and World (Herder and Herder, New York 1967) 126ff 
This coheres with the importance of the intersubjective path in Balthasar's perspective, the interpersonal 
community of man-woman being seen as necessary to having a relationship with God. (V 473). 
The use of this primarily christological nuptial imagery ("the mystery of marriage is great only because of 
the relation to Christ and the Church" V 472) to describe the individual's communion with God is not 
dominant in the Theo-drama (although cf Th 11 330): it tends rather to be drawn upon in Marian/ecclesial 
contexts and in the development of the significance of gender. cf the mariology and ecclesiology of Th III 
(especially 283-288 and 339-360) and V 470ff; 505f 
84 Th IV 142; cf chapter 4 section B1 above 
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Genesis's `image and likeness. "' Thus a distinction and a dynamic relation is identified 
between the terms: "the `imago' has been created for the sake of the `similitudo"'; 87 it is 
the presupposition of man's development towards likeness, " the datum whose likeness 
to God must be realised by movement toward Him. 89 Importantly from his patristic 
analysis the possibility emerges of actually 
defining the image of God in man as finite freedom (which is naturally only conceivable 
in a rational nature) and locating it in the essence of this freedom. 90 
It must then act accordingly, choosing to move either towards or away from God (thus 
realising or losing the likeness). In Balthasar's Theo-drama the image comes to be 
identified with finite freedom. 9' 
This patristic understanding of the relationship between image and likeness reveals a 
distinction between an essential constituent of man's nature, which cannot be lost even in 
the sinner (lrenaeus defines it as "body-soul" and as the initially hidden image of the 
Logos), and the gift of the Pneuma (grace), which gives man a true likeness to God and 
which can be lost. 92 
Thus whilst the Fathers do not make a modem technical distinction between nature and 
supernature, to do so is an authentic development in keeping with their analysis, 
according to which image is both an essential constituent of man's nature and in a special 
relationship with God of copy to original (specifically in a copy-original relation to the 
85 Th II 215 
86 Ibid 215, cf especially the excursus 316-334; also V 113f 
87 Th 111 527 
88 Th IV 380; cf 111 525 
89 Th 11 327 
90 Ibid. cf Tertullian: Against Marcion 2 6; 5 5; 94 in Ante Nicene Fathers III (Hendrickson, 
Massachusetts 1995); Henri Crouzel: Origen translated by AS Worral (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1989) 
95-6 
91 Th 111 482-3; IV 380; II 223 (with reference to Bernard of Clairvaux cf Sermons on the Song of Songs 
81,6 in Samuel J Eales, ed.: The Life and Works of St Bernard IV (John Hodges, London 1896)); II 
234-5 (Gregory of Nyssa cf chapter four section CI above); 111 483; (For the association of freedom and 
rationality as the image cf IV 165; 11223 note 37,397,398) 
92 Th 11325, cf 324 
In times past it was said that man was created after the image of God, but it was not 
[actually] shown; for the Word was as yet invisible, after whose image man was created. 
Wherefore also he did easily lose the similitude. When, however, the Word of God 
became flesh, he confirmed both these: for he both showed forth the image truly, since he 
became himself what was his image; and he re-established the similitude after a sure 
manner, by assimilating man to the invisible Father through means of the visible Word. " 
Irenaeus: Against Heresies in The Writings of Irenaeus Volume 11 (translated into English by Alexander 
Roberts and WH Rambaut (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1869) V, 16,2; cf also V, 6,1; Volume I (1868) 
III, 18,1. Balthasar finds this perspective recurring, for instance, in Basil and Maximus, whilst 
Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa see image and likenss as a unity and Origen 
adopts both perspectives. cf II 327-328 
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Son) which is to be deepened and perfected towards faithful likeness. Thus it can be 
rightly understood (in the terminology of later theology) to have both a natural and a 
supernatural element. " 
We must be clear that this is not a crude identification of image with nature and 
likeness with supernature. 94 It is not simply that man is created in the image and must 
move towards likeness. He is created in the image and the likeness of God, but this 
unique characteristic contains both a static element and a dynamic element which can be 
realised or lost, (just as man's nature is created in grace with a supernatural 
destiny-not a `pure nature', somehow `neutral' to God-, and this state can be 
perfected or lost). Thus the analysis of man's image character into natural and 
supernatural does not make the former a "self-subsistent rational nature", unrelated to 
God. On the contrary the relation of image to original is the datum of human 
consciousness: but it is not closed and complete, but is open-to realisation through the 
irradiation of divine light. There is, as it were, the inchoate image of the first Adam with 
both the static essential being and "its active fulfilment through choices in accordance 
with God's will", and an image only fully unveiled in the second Adam, restoring the 
first image and bringing about its self-transcendence to a completely unanticipated 
likeness to God. 95 
Following the patristic recognition that it is in fact Christ who is the true image, " 
Balthasar develops a specifically christological understanding of this. In Christ we are 
brought face to face with the authentic image of God; he is man's normative image97 and 
in him we find the true archetype of every human being98 to which each is to be 
conformed. As the image of infinite freedom within the Godhead, the eternal Son lays 
93 
Ibid. 325 including note 33 
94 cf Ibid. 332 note 56 and 33. 
9s Ibid. 326 
96 following Colossians 1: 15; "The Son is the natural image of the Father" and "man is God's image by 
imitation" John Damascene: De imaginibus or 3,18 and 20 in Patrologia Graeca 94,1340A, D; cf 
Irenaeus in note 92 above; as regards Origen cf Crouzel: Origen 93. 
97Th 11417 
98 Th 111258 
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the foundation in him for the images of finite creatures and provides the infinite 
prototype for the assimilation of finite freedom to infinite freedom. 99 
The ultimate distinction then in the unfolding of the human vocation understood in 
terms of image and likeness is clearly "between the ineradicable nondivinity of the 
creaturely `image' and its vocation to participate in the divine prototype (`likeness')", ` 
a union which we shall see is brought about by the ascent of the image within the 
descent of the prototype who indwells the copy and stamps it once and for all with his 
divine form. '°' So here the significance of the natural non-divine subject, called to share 
in the divine, is seen in terms of the creaturely image which "has been created for the 
sake of the `similitudo', not in order to develop toward it by its own self-perfection or 
through a dialectical process, but to serve as a place where the divine Archetype 
[Urbild] can be implanted. ""' Thus this understanding of the role of the created image, 
of creaturely freedom, as the receptive locus of divine action, again distinguishes natural 
and supernatural but also implies their inter-penetration. For it means that the imago is 
not simply the foundation on which the similitudo is built in an entirely different style, 
"rather it is created man, as the conscious subject he is, who is given his true purpose in 
the divine, triune life. " 03 
2 Idea and prototype 
Another important aspect in the christological constellation of image, likeness, copy and 
archetype, is Balthasar's use of the term `idea'. 
To different degrees and under the analogia entis, creation exhibits images of God. 
However in accordance with the christocentric doctrine of creation, the concrete 
relationship between the worldly copies (Abbilder) and the original model (die Urbilder) 
is only to be found in "the authentic, primal archetype or idea of every human being in 
the incarnate, crucified and risen Son, who as such is the primal idea of God, mediating 
99 Th II 330 
10° Th IV 380 
101 Ibid. 381; 11 330 
102 Th 111527 (my italics) 
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all creation"" and who contains the ideas of all the individual creatures and is "the one 
idea that embraces, facilitates and fulfils everything else". "' Thus the creature's proper 
relationship with God is mediated through the exemplary idea of each individual finite 
freedom contained in Christ, "' who in his incarnation reveals the world's exemplary idea 
in definitive concrete form. 1°7 
The creature's `idea' is his prototype or blueprint (Urbild, Leitidee), freely set 
before him by God'°8 in the Son (the one primal Idea), who is the "unchangeably valid 
blueprint" governing individuals, their destinies and every situation in the world and in 
history. 109 It is a `model' which seems to embrace both universal (what it is to be a 
human being) and particular characteristics (my mission or vocation). It is God's will 
for the individual creature in entirety, and from God's perspective creatures are seen in 
accordance with this idea. "' This idea is infinite because it is nothing other than the will 
of God for the creature. It "lies in infinite Will, that is, it is nothing created but an 
aspect of God himself'. "' 
This conception, like that of image-likeness, is dynamic, there being a progression 
towards a relationship of identity between each finite freedom and the idea held for it in 
God. "' This dynamic relationship again expresses the paradoxical nature of man who 
as he searches cannot find fulfilment in anything worldly because his perfection lies in 
an assimilation to the likeness of God himself, yet he is unable by his own capacities to 
achieve this conformity to his `idea'. Man is thus `a search' by nature'13 including a 
reflection on the `image', which is necessarily a reflection on the personality of the 
103 Ibid. 528 
104 Ibid. 
los Th 11266, cf 261; IV 330 
106 Th 11 302-303, cf also 266; 291 
107 Ibid. 270 
108 Ibid. 397 
109 Ibid. 277; Balthasar's understanding of the relationship between the person and his prototype in the 
Son is influenced by Gustav Siewerth's notion of an `exemplary identity' mediated by the creature- 
Creator analogy. cf Ibid. 270; 21-22 
10 Th 11 302; cf 307 
M Ibid. 304 As with the Areopagite, "the ideas are essentially the `divine acts of will' (theia 
thelemata). " V 392; cf V 450 (Tauler) 
112 eg Th 11 291; 270; For his discussion of the `gap' between idea and reality cf V 385ff 
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prototype himself, (again rendering an elevating supernatural existential unnecessary, 
even though what is implicit in this reflection can only be brought into the clarity of 
consciousness by grace. 14) Our creaturely mode is not destroyed in our assimilation to 
our idea in God, but is transcended, again recalling the axiom that grace does not destroy 
but perfects nature. "' 
There is obviously a relation to the platonic doctrine of the divine ideas, taken up by 
the Fathers (especially Augustine and Maximus) who saw in them "the archetypes of 
things that can be, are being and have been created as they exist in the Spirit of the 
Creator". 116 and also by the Scholastics who concerned themselves with the relationship 
between the archetype and the created reality, alternating between a platonic preference 
for the thing's idea and a Christian recognition of the positivity of created reality. In 
this context Balthasar is quite clear that the latter cannot be understood as something 
that has fallen from the heaven of Ideas down to the earth. "' Nor does he accept the 
rigid opposition between the fullness of the idea and the self-realisation of the creature 
arising from the platonic preference for the divine idea, "' or the tendency of the platonic 
mysticism of the German middle ages to transcend the static archetype that confronts 
the creature in the direction of a "ground" in which all dissimilarity is surpassed. "' 
Instead, he favours the reciprocal movement between, and ultimate identity of, idea and 
real individuality understood christocentrically (by virtue of the creature-Creator union 
in his person) first suggested by Scotus Erigena. He elucidates this specifically with 
reference to his doctrine of the relationship between the world and the Trinity, in which 
everything in the created world shot through with potentiality is found positively in 
God-and that includes my freedom and my `I'. 120 As we have already mentioned, for 
Balthasar the idea is infinite and uncreated. However this is because it is grounded in the 
113 Th IV 142; 111 416-7 
14ThIII417 
15 Th V 400 
116 Ibid. 385 
117 Ibid. 386 
118 Ibid. 385ff; cf I 546-553 
119 Ibid. 387-388 
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will, the freedom of God, the profound abyss of divine freedom. It does not have an 
independent existence in God, independent from his freedom. 12' Thus the idea is infinite 
by virtue of its relation to and in God, specifically in the Son. 'ZZ 
The key to the relationship and distinction between his perspective and that of other 
philosophical models lies not only in the influence of the fathers (especially Maximus' 
logoi-Logos relationship123) and the medievals, but also in his recourse to the nineteenth 
century Tübingen theologian, Staudenmaier, in distinguishing his position from that of 
Schleiermacher, whose christological exemplary prototype is simply one of moral 
example, dominated by a Kantian interpretation of Urbild as nonreal idea. '24 
Whilst acknowledging the influence of Schleiermacher's Einheit on Staudenmaier, 
Balthasar uses Staudenmaier's revitalisation of the patristic regard for image and likeness 
in the context of his own day (that of Hegel, Schelling, Günther and the Tübingen 
school) as a model for his own contemporary presentation. "' For Staudenmaier the 
divine idea is God's eternal design in his knowing and willing, his `thought' of the 
creature. 12' Like Balthasar he is concerned with the correspondence between divine idea 
and created reality and whilst in opposition to Hegel this eternal design and the 
concretely created world are clearly distinguished, they are seen as inseparable. We can 
see his influence on Balthasar in a passage in which Balthasar himself describes 
Staudenmaier's approach (close to Gregory of Nyssa's): 
Just as the idea outlines in advance the entire history of the Son's Incarnation and of his 
Church, it also contains the individual ideas of each qualitatively unique personality, 
which is "a distinctive thought on the part of the divinity", for which each individual 
must strive as he is inspired by the Holy Spirit. 127 
120 Ibid. 388ff 
121 Th 113 97,261; V 391 It coincides with the divine nature because its being is in God. 
122 Th 113308,307 
123 cf eg Th 111 258; V 385 note 1 
124 cf Th 111 71 ff 
125 Th II 33 I f, 306 note 29; 111208. Balthasar lists Staudenmaier, along with Barth and Brunner, as the 
only modern dogmatic theologians to give due attention to the theology of the imago Dei Th 11317. For 
an introduction to the thought of Staudenmaier cf Donald J Dietrich: The Goethezeit and the 
Metamorphosis of Catholic Theology in the Age of Idealism (Peter Lang, Berne, 1979). 
126 Th 11 3 31 
127 Ibid. 
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This takes place within the embracing totality of the Idea into which a man is 
inserted by the Holy Spirit. On the basis of the total Idea, nature and supernatural 
vocation can be seen in complete unity so that through the work of the Spirit the 
process of likening aims toward the "supernatural" image, originally perfect, lying in the 
fullness of Christ. His focus, like Balthasar's, is on the concrete idea of creation in 
Christ and thus the postulate of a purely natural goal is not of any significance in his 
doctrine of the concrete real ideas, as we saw Balthasar maintain is the case in the great 
scholastics. "' It is this concrete idea that provides the "living medium within which 
finite freedom is able to pursue its destiny""' and authentic personhood comes from 
God alone, together with eternal destiny and the strength to achieve it. 
3 The inter-subjective perspective on `idea' 
Balthasar's offering of a contemporary presentation of the idea-Prototype relationship 
using person-centred and dramatic categories is evident in his description of the 
distribution of role and mission, that is personhood, from the christological centre 
(which we describe in detail in chapter seven) and also in his use of I-thou models to set 
out the necessarily inter-subjective nature of self-possession and to show that the `thou' 
conferred by the other is ultimately that conferred by God. Here the idea-Idea relation 
is presented in terms of the fact that the finite freedom willed by God, God has a 
particular will for. Although the `image' of the identity enjoyed by divine freedom and 
divine being, impressed onto finite freedom like a watermark (in virtue of which it can be 
freedom) begins to become visible when finite freedom responds to being addressed as 
`thou' by affirming itself, it is only brought to perfection when it becomes "`thou' in 
God's sight in its fully divine, absolute manner, when it has become identical with the 
`idea' reserved for the finite `thou' within the infinite `Thou', within the eternal Word 
128 cf chapter 1 above 
129 Th 11332 
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and Son". "' It is when the Logos-made-man addresses the individual that he is given 
insight into and access to God's idea for him. "' 
The exemplary prototype of finite freedom "in Christ" is that "place" where we participate 
in his eternal Sonship (Eph 1: 5; Rom 8: 17) as "sons": there each of us is a unique "thou" 
in the eternal "Thou". 132 
From our side the dynamic process means offering thanks in terms of response [Ant- 
Wort], by "progressively incarnating the word of thanks in our lives". "' This is the 
copy's (Abbild] realisation of the definitive model [Vorbild] shown by the infinite 
prototype [Urbild]. It is thus that finite freedom truly participates in infinite freedom. 
Later in this chapter134 we will complete our understanding of the receiving of and 
assimilation to our own idea in terms of our insertion into the process whereby we are 
born of God in relation to the eternal generation of the primal Prototype from the 
Father. 
4 `Idea' and the relationship between particularity and 
communion 
Whilst Balthasar's understanding of idea bears some relationship to Stoic and Platonic 
models as regards form, he gives it a new, distinctively Christian trinitarian content. 
This lies in the identification of the primal Idea with the eternal Son, the absolute `thou' 
of the Father, (and so in the difference that there is in the one God), and in the fact 
(grounded in this difference) that God freely wills the creation of each particular finite 
subject. Thus notions of predetermination are guarded against, `space' for free 
particularity is upheld and entirely new possibilities for understanding participation in 
God and the relationship between different individuals in this participation are opened 
up. 
135 
DO Th 11291 
131 Th V 391 
132 Th 11291 
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In keeping with the idea of Christ as concrete universal, "' the enclosure of all ideas 
in the primal Idea of the Son is not a stifling loss of particularity. The all-embracing 
characteristic of the Idea is precisely a superabundant comprehensiveness that integrates 
particularity without interfering with its freedom. 13' In fact uniqueness is enhanced, "' 
because the Son, with his infinite divine freedom, gives a unique participation in his own 
uniqueness, multiplying inexhaustibly what is once-for-all and unique. Our inter- 
personal difference then, our particularity, is distinguished by the Son's divine, unique 
hypostatic difference (and so intra-mundane difference is again grounded in the 
hypostatic distinctiveness of the Son). Nevertheless the unity of this plurality is 
maintained in the Son: the distinct personal `ideas' being "as facets of the one, total 
Idea"139 and the unity of the divine will being preserved. 
For Balthasar the intensified uniqueness that belongs to assimilation to our idea goes 
hand in hand with intensified communion (with God and one another). 14° Opening-up to 
the Prototype means opening to everything that shares in being. So both particular and 
universal reach unknown heights, the former, now more than an individual, is "the giving 
of a name that is unique in each case"14' (that is, personhood) and the latter "a 
fellowship among these unique individuals" (the communion of the Church, that is 
communio in the Spirit142). This key development of role and person will be our subject 
matter in chapter seven. 
5 Summary conclusion 
Baithasar's use of the patristic model of image and likeness then is another example of a 
retrieval on Balthasar's part which is not uncritical or lacking in original development. 
He has opted for the tradition that distinguishes image and likeness and uses those 
thinkers who have a specifically christological focus. He has used Maximus in a post- 
136 cf chapter 2 section D above 
137 Th 11 278; cf 302 
138 Ibid. 270 
139 Ibid. 302 
140 Ibid. 270f 
141 Ibid. 283 
148 
enlightenment context with the help of Staudenmaier. He rejects a straightforward 
adoption of the patristic treatment of image and likeness because in a contemporary 
context their distinction between nature and supernature is basically inadequate. As well 
as making distinctions between different Church Fathers on this point, it is, as Balthasar 
outlines in Love Alone the Way of Revelation, a broad characteristic basically belonging 
to the whole period. This is simply because the world view of the age in which the 
Fathers wrote did not make the kind of distinction (between philosophy and theology, 
nature and supernature) that has become necessary as world views and understandings 
of the place of theology and philosophy have developed across the ages (even though 
the understandable, but artificial, separation of the two in neo-scholasticism is greatly 
mistaken). "' For Balthasar the way forward is not a return to the patristic models but 
their development today in terms of an authentic understanding of freedom. 
D Freedom and self-surrender: the fulfilment of 
human freedom in divine freedom 
Only in the teaching of Jesus and the post-Easter mediation upon it in the light of the 
Holy Spirit does the womb of the Father's divine freedom open so wide and so deep that 
we begin to suspect what "the fulfilment of finite freedom in infinite freedom" might 
mean. 
Balthasar thinks that the kind of revitalising of the Father's--) and high scholasticism's 
concern for the dynamic aspect of likeness as man's assimilation to the image 
undertaken by Staudenmaier needs to be presented today "in terms of finite freedom's 
nonheteronomy within the absolute character of infinite freedom. "145 This brings us back 
to the bi-polar structure of finite freedom. Now, specifically, we consider how it finds 
fulfilment in a dimension beyond itself, that is in complete dependency on infinite 
freedom to communicate itself, as happens in the incarnation. "' The choice over which 
142 Ibid. 301 
143 cf chapter 4 note 5 above 
144 Th 11 229 
145 Ibid. 333 
146 Th IV 372 
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path to follow to realise its freedom is its own, 147 but the actual imparting of infinite 
freedom necessary for finite freedom's true fulfilment is clearly not in the power of 
finite freedom. As we have seen, the grace of "the freely given indwelling of infinite 
freedom in finite freedom""' in which fulfilment lies can only come as the result of a 
self-disclosure on the part of infinite freedom, an idea not totally alien to finite freedom 
because in its own social interchange the freedom of the other cannot be appropriated 
but "must disclose itself by opening up its own inner area. "149 This situation of being 
created to receive absolute goodness and truth, but completely unable to instigate the 
disclosure of this goal is an expression of that same fundamental paradox of man's 
nature that we have already encountered, that is, of being made for a goal out of 
proportion with his own natural capacities. "' Ultimately then the openness of the 
second pole must become consent, surrender to the divine initiative; and contrary to 
what might have been expected, far from being contradictory to autonomy, to the self- 
determination of the first pole, surrender is in fact necessary to its fulfilment and 
involves no compulsion, no contradiction or alienation of the given self-possession of 
finite freedom. 
1 The mediation of the christological paradox 
However, it is uniquely from God's revelation in Christ that we learn of the 
compatibility of true freedom and self-surrender, of the theonomy we mentioned at the 
end of our analysis of the two poles of finite freedom in the previous chapter. Even in 
the Old Testament covenant relationship of the divine and human freedom heteronomy 
is apparent. 
It is only from the New Testament that we learn of that perfect Epitome in whom finite 
freedom indwells absolute freedom. (For until the New Testament, the impression 
persisted that the Law-and hence the divine Will-was external to created reality. ) The 
infinite, divine Will is given final, concrete form in the unique human figure of Jesus 
Christ15' 
147 Th 11285,223-4,232 
148 Ibid. 232 
149 Ibid. 228 
'50 Th IV 142; 111 417 
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and the problem of the relationship of finite and infinite freedom is uniquely solved in 
the mediation of the christological paradox preserved in the chalcedonian definition. 
Whilst philosophical attempts to conceive of a fulfilment of finite freedom in infinite 
freedom cannot overcome the problem that this must inevitably involve a merging of one 
with the other, finite freedom becoming `lost' in the infinite, even the Old Testament 
Covenant does not fully resolve the issue either. The joining of finite and infinite 
freedom in the old covenant is not a full participation, rather it points towards this 
fulfilment. For the freedom in which the commandments are to be fulfilled perfectly can 
only be realised within infinite freedom itself, that is through the implantation of the 
Spirit in the hearts of the finite covenant partners. This ultimate immediacy is attained 
by the covenant undergoing mediation through what Balthasar refers to as "the 
christological paradox, according to which without confusing the freedoms (asunchutos, 
in the chalcedonian expression), infinite freedom indwells finite freedom, and so the 
finite is perfected in the infinite, without the infinite losing itself in the finite or the finite 
in the infinite. ""' Thus, just as we have seen the nature-grace relationship focused on the 
relationship of human and divine in Christ, now we find crucially (influenced by 
Maximus the Confessor's understanding of divine-human reciprocity153) "the entire 
theo-drama has its centre in the two wills of Christ, the infinite, divine will and the 
finite, human will". 154 This is "the reciprocal immanence of finite and infinite 
'52 Th II 201 Balthasar refers later to the heightened sense of drama: "God no longer deals with man from 
without but-by becoming man-from within man... " IV 60; cf also LA 60,85; Engagement 21,37 
153 This is "a characteristic feature of Maximus' theology" according to Lars Thunberg: Microcosm and 
Mediator The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (CWK Gleerup & Ejnar 
Munksgaard, Lund 1965) 134. Both Thunberg (32f, 134,453,457) and Balthasar focus on the 
following passage from Ambigua 10 in P Sherwood: The Early Ambigua of St Maximus the Confessor 
(Rome, 1955): 
God and man are exemplars (paradeigmata) one of another; God makes himself man for 
man's sake out of love, so far as man, enabled by God through charity, deified himself; 
and man is rapt up by God in mind to the unknowable, so far as man has manifested 
through virtues the God by nature invisible. 
A detailed study of Balthasar's appreciation of the importance of chalcedonian christology for Maximus's 
theology can be found in Cyril O'Regan "Von Balthasar and Thick Retrieval: Post-Chalcedonian 
Symphonic Theology" Gregorianum 77 1996 227-260 esp 240,247,259. 
'54 Th 11201, cf also 63,196; IV 380; V 276,410,412,446,453,466. Hence the importance of the 
heart of Christ cf Th 11124' f. 
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freedom""'; "the encounter and reciprocal inter-penetration that takes place here ... 
is the 
climax of the relationship between infinite and finite", "' the centre of the twofold 
movement of finite to infinite and infinite to finite, of "man's ascent within God's 
correlative descent""' that we described in chapter two. The fulfilment of finite freedom 
in true participation in infinite freedom through the finite copy's realisation of the 
definite model exhibited by the infinite prototype is thus understood christologically. 
The "place" where we participate in the eternal Sonship (Eph 1: 5; Rom 8: 17) is the 
"exemplary prototype (Urbild) of finite freedom "in Christ". "' 
So finite freedom's fulfilment beyond itself is in Christ15' (in whom the infinite 
freedom truly indwells the finite) and theosis is specifically christological, presupposed 
by the incarnation. Indeed "if we take seriously this mystery of God's descent into the 
form of his creature-this was the seminal intuition of the Greek Fathers-the sarkosis 
implies the process of deification theopoiesis", 160 for now the divine prototype [Urbild] 
has indwelt and stamped his divine form upon the copy [Abbild]. This understanding of 
theosis as the implication of the incarnation becomes emphatically clear in Balthasar's 
thought because he goes further than the Fathers in his understanding of "the divine 
penetration of the creaturely", maintaining that "even the sinner's alienation from God 
was taken into the Godhead, into the "economic" distance between Father and Son. i161 
There is then no distance from God which has not been embraced in the incarnational 
and redemptive descent of the Son. Thus the understanding that in Christ God's 
descent embraces the ascent of man (the image) towards the gracious offer of freedom 
and divine life162 is given a new precision and completeness. "In fact" Balthasar says 
"the creature's "ascent to God" has already been taken up into the entirely different, 
155 Th IV 383; Engagement 21 
156 Th 11 202 
157 Th IV 382; cf V 375-6; 
158 Th 11 291 
159 Th III 528 "Man both transcends himself and lives in Christ, or allows Christ to live in him" (Gal 
2: 20) 
160 Th IV 381 
161 Ibid. 
162 ET 1 162,177; Engagement 37; Th 11 202; IV 382-383. 
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liberating "servitude" of eternal freedom by the grace (dedit dona) of the God who first 
descends to the level of the creature. 
"63 
2 The Holy Spirit and the analogia libertatis in the new 
sphere of love 
So we have theosis because of the incarnation but we are initiated into it by the Holy 
Spirit. "' Because of the genuine but unconfused indwelling of infinite freedom in the 
finite in Christ, the finite pole of the covenant can be realised in the infinite, in the grace 
of the Spirit who brings into flux the opposition involved in the external confrontation 
of the old law by being that unique gift of freedom which pours the love of God into our 
hearts. 16' So because of the christological mediation, in the Spirit, we can enter into the 
distinct gift of our freedom's perfection in infinite freedom. Thus "man is led into the 
open realm in which he can love by the love he believes in", " the realm in which 
personal love acts being the realm of the Holy Spirit. "' 
The Spirit both enables the freedom of the finite covenant partners and initiates 
them into the divine life and thus the gracious awakening and sustaining of the finite 
response, freeing from sin, and initiation into participation are specifically associated 
with the Holy Spirit: 
as the love of God poured into the hearts of believers, [he] brings about two things at the 
same time: he liberates finite freedom so that it may embrace its own, ultimate freedom; 
and he does so by initiating it into a participation in infinite freedom. 1" 
This is a liberation from and a liberation for, a liberation from the bondage of sin and a 
liberation for adoptive participation in the life of God169 to which the Spirit gives 
initiation. It is in this relationship with the Spirit that the second pole of finite freedom 
can be called a theonomy, without obscuring or interfering with the first pole. Indeed 
this divine work of liberation and initiation to which man surrenders is far from some 
163 Th IV 382 
164 Regarding this inter-working of Christ and Spirit cf Th 11201,276; 11133 1; LA 58 
165 We put on Christ's love "the love of the new and eternal covenant" which is the end of the Old 
Testament process of education. "Love alone can fulfil the law, being its epitome (Rom 13.10; Gal 5.14) 
Without love, the law is no more than a negative barrier against sin (I Thess1.8f). " LA 104-105 
"ALA84 
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kind of heteronomous control over man's free self-possession, for it translates man from 
being a slave to being a child, a friend, an heir of God. 
A crucial characteristic of this status is the coincidence of obedient submission on 
the one hand, and an exalted freedom on the other-`parrhesia', free mutual openness, a 
share in infinite freedom. "° This union of obedience and freedom (in the Spirit) has as 
its model and ground the Son's perfect free obedience. "' In Balthasar's distinctive 
doctrine of the Trinity this is exercised in the Son's filial relationship in the Godhead, 
but also includes in its economic expression a submission of the incarnate Son to the 
Spirit, involving a kind of `reordering' of the traditional understanding of the procession 
of the divine persons termed a "trinitarian inversion" by Balthasar. 12 The dynamic 
analogy of being is thus also an analogy of freedom in which "the more completely man 
participates in God's freedom, the freer he is"; "' the greater the surrender to the Spirit, 
the greater the liberation. "' This "free mutual openness" ("parrhesia") graciously 
bestowed on us by God "here and now" is thus dynamic, finding "its fulfilment in our 
ultimate state (when God "will be all in all" I Cor 15.28). "15 It is the ultimate state that 
is normative for the reciprocal relationship (and this orientation means hope is 
characteristic of the new life of grace). "' 
As with the tradition since Augustine, the final perfection of our freedom lies in a 
fixed choice of the good, although for Balthasar this is not adequately described by 
Augustine's ideal of `rest' or the scholastic `vision'. The final state of the blessed is not 
restricted to the contemplation of the divinity as of a spectacle, but involves the creative 
169 cf Th IV 367-383 `Freedom Liberated' 
10 Th II 231,229; cf Augustine's `mutual sublimation of command and gift' 11 2333; also V 304 (with 
citations from Adrienne von Speyr). The coincidence of a total commitment of self and an intensifying 
liberation can also be found in Staudenmaier cf Th 11 306 n 29,332 n 55; 111208. 
"' "Nine propositions on Christian Ethics" in Principles of Christian Morality (San Francisco, 1976) 
82; Th 11 267; III 520ff; IV 330; V 248 (Adrienne von Speyr); cf also Mark A McIntosh: Christology 
from Within: Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans Urs von Balthasar (University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1996) 77f. Regarding the Ignatian influence on this understanding of 
freedom cf Dalzell: Dramatic 16,54,80,81,215. 
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exercise of personal freedom. This is in keeping with Balthasar's understanding that the 
most precious feature of our earthly experience as free creatures is our creative activity, 
understood as our inter-personal self-surrender (not just the making of forms out of 
matter). Crucially, the dignity of the person according to which disclosure of self cannot 
be forced or known in advance is preserved in our ultimate state. There is thus the 
perpetual joy and surprise of persons mutually disclosing and letting themselves be 
known, of creative freedom inventing, giving and receiving new and unexpected gifts, "' 
and of a dynamic intimacy with and knowledge of God too, such that "existence in 
God. 
. . will 
be no less full of tension and drama than earthly existence". "' For, reflecting 
the relationship between the unity of the one divine freedom and its possession by each 
of the persons of the Trinity, the participation of creaturely freedom in the divine is an 
assimilation to the divine will and a complete openness to all other creaturely freedoms 
but not an absorption or loss of each distinct creaturely freedom (an "irrevocable gift"). 
Each one can undertake creative acts "within the all-encompassing light of the divine 
will", thus generating the ever new giving and receiving which itself images the aspect of 
`surprise' in the Trinity. 179 
3 Gift and response in the theonomy of the Spirit 
Free love can only be answered with love freely given. "0 
So we see that in the theonomy of the Spirit both poles of finite freedom are brought to 
perfection. Our autonomy is not lost, but liberated, and our free response and 
collaboration have an important part to play-whilst surrender to the divine initiative 
remains paramount. 
176 cf Th V 146,428,469-470 
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As in Paul, "possession of the Spirit always requires man's active collaboration". '8' 
Assimilation to the image of God is through grace and human moral effort. 18' So, in 
keeping with the importance laid on the genuinely two-sided nature of the covenant 
between God and man and the insistence that the play is not 'rigged', "' the relationship 
between divine predestination and human freedom is a dramatic one. Even though 
Christ's sarkosis is understood to imply our theopoesis, and even though 
the transition from the Adam-principle to the Christ-principle exhibits a necessity 
inscribed in the constitution of man's nature... the ratification of this transition is 
entrusted to created freedom. 184 
Whilst the creature is held in (bestowed) being whether he likes it or not (it is in the 
nature of creatureliness and at a deeper level part of God's faithfulness to his intention 
as Creator), he is not automatically in receipt of the fruit of God's continuous act of 
giving which grants participation in God's own divine life. This he is free to accept or 
reject. 
No one becomes a loving child of the heavenly Father against his own will. Man can 
freely choose which freedom he prefers. He can choose the freedom of being his own 
origin, in which case he must pay the price of never being able to find any sufficient 
reason or satisfying goal for this self-manufactured freedom but must content himself 
with the exercise of his autonomy; or he can choose the freedom of continually 
acknowledging his indebtedness, in ever new ways, to absolute freedom-who has 
always anticipated finite freedom by providing it with scope within which it can fulfil 
itself, namely, `en christoi'. 185 
Just as God shows himself to be `absolute love' in the self-giving and letting be of 
his triune constitution, so too he `makes room' for finite freedom in a loving latency that 
appears like withdrawal, but is a loving, hidden accompanying' 86-rather like the way 
the author of a play allows it to develop freely but under his influence. "' 
This unequivocal emphasis on the significance of the finite free response goes hand 
in hand with emphasis on the perfection of the other pole of man's freedom, that is, on 
'g'Th V 426 
182Th 11 333; V 380,387 
183cf chapter 3 section D1 above 
184 Th 111 36; V 494 
185 Th 111 36 On this freedom to say `yes and no' cf 111 38; 11228,314,316 
under the perversion of sin. (IV 330f) 
186 Th 11 271-284 
187 cf Dalzell: Dramatic 119 
Such freedom is left intact 
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his total dependence for fulfrlment, '88 on the importance of complete self-surrender18' and 
openness to receive more if our natural orientation towards `more' is ever to be 
satisfied. 19° (This perfects the indebtedness and receptivity emphasised at the level of 
the very existence of our nature. )"' To make the appropriate response for the gift of 
life, and for the gift of participation in the divine life, is to be available and ready, to be 
receptive, to be obedient192 (just as an actor truly uses his creative freedom in willingly 
serving as a mediator of the author's vision193). As finite freedom fulfils itself beyond 
itself in the sphere of infinite freedom, that actual act of entering this realm "will be 
essentially codetermined by the act-quality of infinite freedom. "194 
There is then a genuine but by no means simplistic co-operation between finite and 
infinite freedom here. It is a very particular interaction and exchange in which "the 
power of pure grace" always comes first, without making the human response any the 
less significant. "' The gift of participation in God's life in which our fulfilment lies, 
Balthasar tells us, "can only be grace, freely granted. " He continues: "Grace, however 
must not only be freely given, it also needs to be freely accepted, " and this is "through a 
certain influence on the recipient by the same grace. "196 As Adrienne von Speyr points 
out, the co-operation is not that of two equal partners. The fact that we can make a 
genuine contribution does not detract from the fact that every thought and action is 
dependent on God and that the Christian is called to surrender himself more and more to 
the influence of grace. 19' The fact that what is received when finite freedom hands itself 
188 eg Th II 178,250,272,284,292,303,313,397 
189 This self-surrender is made "to God's eternal, loving will, which chooses us in Christ. " Th 11 308 
190 Th 11 398; IV 142 
191 cf chapter 4 section B1 above 
192Th 11 267 
193 cf Dalzell: Dramatic 121,126 
194 Th 11 314 (my italics) 
195 Th 111 53 We have already mentioned this "final prius of grace" in our discussion of the nature-grace 
relationship as imago Trinitatis. For an expression of this understanding of the relationship between 
nature and grace as it exists in prayer cf Adrienne von Speyr: The World of Prayer (Ignatius Press, San 
Francisco, 1985) 273-298. 
196 Th 111 35; I 363 
197cf World of Prayer 274-298 It is not that God `takes us over', or `hypnotises' us. Rather "the fact that 
God is near to us makes us freer, and what we do together with God is done better and more 
productively. There is a kind of communion and collaboration that expands man's horizon and 
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over to find its fulfilment in God is so uniquely enabling (rather than deterministically 
binding) and is thus appreciated as a wonderful gift (rather than a confining burden) 
means "when man acknowledges his indebtedness, no alienating compulsion is involved: 
there wells up within him spontaneously, a sense of privilege in handing himself over to 
his origin. ""' Freedom is a gift called to be genuinely and increasingly active and alive in 
itself; but this vitality truly possessed within owes everything to a Giver upon whose 
free, loving decision to give `life in abundance' everything depends. He "has been 
`granted to have life in himself ""-and hence the fact that thanksgiving is central to 
the act of response. 
The grace-freedom relationship is thus a dynamic, thriving, changing one, engaging us 
in the life-long task of expressing gratitude for the gift of self by making our whole 
existence into a response of thanksgiving. 20' We give ourselves in response to God's 
offering of himself to us. "' This authentic receptivity to the gift of freedom and its 
perfection in our receipt of the life of God himself means a rich co-productivity in the 
free creature. For God's revelation not only exhibits his love, but makes it understood, 
and invites and empowers its imitation and reproduction within the human heart. 202 The 
gift of grace implies a task. 2°3 
In its higher potency, grace endows the one who receives it with a special receptivity: 
he is enabled to conceive, to be a womb; he is enabled to bring to maturity the fruit he 204 
has been given.... 
Such conception and birth fulfils our fundamental creaturely receptivity. And so the 
`task' (Aufgabe) inherent in the initial gift (Gabe) of freedom can become the responsive 
freedom... God does not overpower man; he does not oppress man in his role as the "Absolute". He helps 
man toward his freedom. Man can invite him and ask him to fashion the good in him. " (274) In so 
doing man must recognise the ongoing need to surrender himself and everything he thinks of as his own 
and let God thus mould him by his grace. (It is evident throughout this section in the World of Prayer 
that von Speyr's understanding of this surrender in prayer can be quite radical (involving for example 
being led "willy-nilly by God" 284)) This relationship between human and divine action is central to 
theo-drama: "It is God who acts, on man, for man and then together with man; the involvement of man 
in the divine action is part of God's action". Th I 18 
198 Th III 36 
199 
Ibid. 
200Th 11 290 
201Th V 383 
202 Th 111 518 
203Th 11314 
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thanksgiving of a mission (discussed in detail in chapter seven), a free obedience which 
makes a unique contribution to the theo-drama, a co-operation with the saving will of 
God that Balthasar calls "the grace of co-atonement". 205 It can include suffering, 
transformed by the crucified Christ into something fruitful, "co-redemptive". 206 This 
total giving of our lives may then entail personal tragedy, but a `tragedy under grace'. 207 
Two further points need to be made here. Firstly there is the fact that Mary is the 
unique model of this fruitfulness of the relationship of grace and freedom, 208 and in this 
marian model we see the formal description of the relationship of finite and infinite 
freedom `in action' in the scenes of the theo-drama. In Mary we see perfect reciprocity 
between heaven and earth, God and man, nature and grace, in an intensifying mutual 
receptivity. This runs from earth to heaven (that is, from her reception (conception) of 
the Son which expands to fulfilment in her assumption into heaven), and from heaven to 
earth (that is, from the Son's reception of her into heaven, which has as its high point 
the Son's conception by her). "' Thus there is "an eternal circuit between God and man, 
heaven and earth, spiritual world and material world", "' in which, nevertheless, "grace 
has the primacy, the grace of the immaculate conception, giving nature-albeit a nature 
created from the outset with a view to receiving this gift the grace to receive grace in its 
fullness. ""' As we have seen, Balthasar understands this exemplary instance of the 
relationship between nature and grace as an image of the relations of the persons of the 
Trinity one to one another. 212 In particular it images the Son in his relation to the Father, 
204 Ibid. 184; "fruitfulness" Ibid. 315 
205 h 1115-3 5 
206Th V 501, cf also 479-481; 1647 
207"Tragedy under grace is what is experienced by the man who wants to do the truth and is brought 
down because truth cannot be done in this world; graceless tragedy is the lot of the man who does not 
want the truth. " R Schneider cited Th I 120 
208 Th V 466 (with reference to Ambrose). We have already mentioned the marian dimension to our 
natural creaturely receptivity (chapter 4 section B I) and alluded to her as the perfect model of receptivity 
to grace (note 48 above). Regarding the necessity of the feminine mediatorial profile cf section F below. 
209Th V 104 (Adrienne von Speyr) 
210 Ibid.; cf Gardner, Moss: "Something like Time; something like the Sexes" in Gardner, Moss, Quash, 
Ward: Balthasar at the End of Modernity (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1999) 133 
211 Th V 105 
212 chapter 4 section E above 
159 
who is not only the archetype of receptivity, "' but also of response, carrying out his 
mission in perfect and generous obedience to the Father, "' accepting and returning the 
world to the Father as a means of thanksgiving, 215 
making a fitting response to the Father's total gift of himself by freely and thankfully allowing 
himself to be poured forth by the Father. 216 
As we will see later"' Balthasar develops the idea that Mary's exceptional receptivity 
not only gives a supreme illustration of how the nature-grace relationship can be, but is 
also a receptivity exercised by her, "the highest product of nature", 218 for all of us. In 
this context we look not just at the annunciation and assumption but at another `scene' 
of the play: the passion and cross, where Mary utters a representative yes to God on 
behalf of those who refuse to respond. Mary's role as model of receptivity and 
response, of the authentic interrelationship of freedom with grace, is also very important 
to Balthasar's theology of gender, his understanding of woman as response/answer, the 
spousal/nuptial dimension of communio and the Church's relationship to Christ as 
bride,... as well as the understanding of the relationship between the Marian profile of 
the Church and the Petrine institutional profile-topics which go well beyond the scope 
of this present work. 
The second point to be made is that the relationship between gift and response, 
grace and freedom, outlined here is central to-indeed Balthasar claims actually 
constitutes-the action of the Theo-drama. In the transition from the understanding of 
grace belonging to the aesthetics to that of the theodramatics he points to the intimate 
relationship between grace and gratitude. 22° The delight in the objective gracefulness of 
a form becomes with the Greeks the self-attesting favour of the gods, so powerfully 
213cf chapter 4 section B1 above 
214cf Th 11 267 and notes 171,172 above 
2`5Ibid. 262 
216Th IV 329-330,324 
217 chapter 6 section E4 below 
218 Th V 104 
219cf Th III Part III B especially 283-292 ("Woman's Answer") and 339-360 ("The Answer of the 
Church"); on the spousal dimension cf end section B3 above; cf also discussion of the man-woman and 
Christ-Church relationship in chapter 6 section B2 and E2 below (especially Th 11 413-414 but also 365- 
382). 
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attested that the receiver is compelled to respond, to meet it, to give thanks. For 
Balthasar the full significance of charis lies in the interplay of both meanings, and in the 
Theo-drama the enrapturing experience of the revelation of God of the aesthetics 
demands a life-changing response that opens up the action of theo-drama, carrying 
through the ethical implications contained within the aesthetics. "' This response, this 
decision for or against the revelation of the Word made flesh is "the drama", 222 and the 
tension immanent in human nature between the necessary character of the transition 
from Adam to Christ principle, and the fact that it can only be ratified freely, is a 
tension constituting "the entire action of the theo-drama". 223 "If ultimately everything 
comes from God, if only heaven is active and earth is merely passive, there can never be 
a drama. Without this presupposition all Christology would dissolve in 
Monophysitism, and the doctrine of grace would dissolve in extreme 
Predestinationism. "224 The free acceptance or refusal to co-operate with grace has a 
dynamic effect on the drama. We need to join in performing the good that God has done 
for us so as to embody it in the world. 225 Man shapes the stage through the measure of 
his receptivity "which enables him in an earthly way to receive heavenly things and give 
birth to them, and through the measure of his freedom to keep the kingdom of heaven 
away from the earth or, conversely, to cause it to come nearer", 226 an alternative whose 
confrontation becomes more and not less intense as the play goes on. 227 As we have just 
seen, our individual freedom is even to contribute to the eternal drama of heaven itself 
where we will exercise genuine creativity within the divine will, 228 and, notwithstanding 
the asymmetrical nature of the grace-freedom relationship, Balthasar suggests that our 
220Th 11 23-24 
ZZ' Ibid. 30-31 
2221bid. 26,260 
223 Th III 36; Whilst Christ died for all, the justification of each sinner requires the individual's 
conversion and consent: "Who could possibly penetrate to this hidden, dramatic wrestling of God and the 
sinner? " (V 494) 
224 Th II 184 
225 Th I 20,645 (co-actors with God) 
226 Th II 188; 111 37-38 
227 Th 111 37-38 
228Th V 486; cf section D2 above 
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response may actually affect God. 229 Nevertheless we will have to weigh this emphasis 
on the drama between God and man against the emphasis on the drama of the inner life 
of the Trinity in which it is contained. 
E Participation in the Trinity 
1 The indwelling of the Trinity - participation in the divine 
processions 
We have seen that Balthasar adopts and modifies the patristic use of transition from 
image to likeness for understanding the fulfilment of the human vocation, focusing on 
freedom as a defining characteristic of the image and understanding its fulfilment as 
similitudo in a participation in "the absolute character of infinite freedom" which is 
clearly supernatural but non-heteronomous. 
In the first place this fulfilment is through participation in Jesus' existence, living in 
him or allowing him to live in us, but this is an indwelling "which entails the indwelling 
of the "We" of the Trinity also. "230 Balthasar maintains that trying to make further 
distinctions about the particular divine Person involved in indwelling betrays a blindness 
to the mutual indwelling circumincessio of the divine Persons within the Trinity itself. "' 
Our participation is a "trans-psychological reciprocal indwelling" which is different 
from but based on the reciprocal indwelling of the persons of the Trinity. "' (Indeed the 
fact that we have participation in the divinity without confusion is grounded in the fact 
that the triune persons enjoy the highest of unions without confusion. 233) Moreover our 
participation is actually located within the internal life of the Trinity as a gift that the 
229On this question of God's immutability cf Dalzell: Dramatic 204-211; "The Enrichment of God in 
Balthasar's Trinitarian Eschatology" Irish Theological Quarterly 66 2001 3-18; Gerard O'Hanlon: 
"Theological Dramatics" in Bede McGregor and Thomas Norris, eds.: The Beauty of Christ (T &T 
Clark, Edinburgh 1994) 99; The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990). 
230 Th 111 528 
23' Ibid.; V 148,336,384,426f, 431 (John of the Cross), 518 In fact we have found little evidence of 
Trinitarian circumincession in the Theo-drama, finding the term used rather with reference to the 
relationship between the first and second Adam. 
232 Th V 493 
233ET1177 
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divine persons make to each other23' and, crucially, is specifically a participation in the 
inner relationships of the Trinity, that is in the divine processions. 235 This gives a 
distinct vibrancy to the concept of reciprocal indwelling, defining it more in terms of a 
creative relationship than simple abiding presence. Indeed Balthasar considers it 
insufficient 
to portray the life of grace in terms of a special `presence' and `indwelling' of the Person 
of the Son and the Spirit (sent by the Father) in the souls of the recipients of grace; the 
purpose of this indwelling is to enable men to participate in the relations between the 
Divine Persons 
and, in Balthasar's doctrine of the Trinity "relations are precisely what these Persons 
are, wholly and entirely. ""' This emphatically intra-trinitarian perspective on the 
reciprocal indwelling is developed in Balthasar's taking up of the theme of `being born of 
God'). 
F Living in the Trinity: being `born of God' and the eternal 
begetting of the Son 
To be endowed with grace essentially means being accepted as sons in the eternal Son 
(Rom 8: 15-17). 237 
The receipt of sanctifying grace and the co-operative action between God and man 
which puts man in living possession of his `idea', the immanence of infinite freedom 
(that is, the Spirit as Giver) in finite freedom (the gift), and participation in the triune 
life of God are described by Balthasar in terms of the grace of being begotten or born of 
God. 238 
As our "idea" is just one aspect of the total Idea which in the Son (destined to be 
incarnate) is infinite, Balthasar maintains that it must come into being at the point of the 
Father's self-declaration in generating the Son239-a description that recalls and develops 
the identification of the God-creature and the Father-Son relationship discussed in 
234 Th V 507; 521 
235 Ibid. 425,428,463,466,467 
236 Ibid. 428 
237 Ibid. 433 (Here Balthasar is speaking specifically of the scriptural basis for the Medieval Rhenish- 
Flemish teaching on `being born of God'. ) 
238 Th II 302-31 1 especially 308ff; V 425-470 
239 Th 11 308; V 390 
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chapter two. From the perspective of finite freedom this `birth' is the complete self- 
surrender to the eternal, loving will of God to choose us in Christ that we have been 
describing in this chapter. From God's vantage point it is the mystery of "being born of 
God" understood as the adoption of the creature into the process whereby the Son comes 
forth from the Father, a begetting in grace with the eternal Son24° through which, in the 
Spirit, the creature becomes a son and heir with Christ, "' sharing in his sonship. 242 
Balthasar again gives this the form of an imago trinitatis: the child adopted in Christ now 
shares with him the gift of the Spirit and sends the Spirit back to the Father in the form 
of a Yes in Christ, such that the Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the child, can be 
said to be "their mutuality, their 'we""'. 243 Just as we saw earlier it is only on the basis 
of the Father's generation of the Son and their united procession of the Spirit that finite 
freedom can know itself to be addressed as a `thou', so too it is only from the Father 
surrendering the Son that the creature can be addressed as adoptive son. 244 
This birth within/into the eternal relations of the persons of the Trinity becomes 
operative for the individual believer in the incarnation, the begetting of the Son in man, in 
the womb of Mary and then in the Church. It acquires concrete form in baptism- 
confirmation when "Christ (the Church) draws believers into the mystery of being born 
of God"' This represents the first utterance of the Word and breathing of the Spirit 
`before the foundation of the world', in which the world order is prefigured in the 
infinite Idea and a particular place reserved for believers in Christ. In his faithful 
discipleship the believer then `gives birth' to Christ in the world. Balthasar's 
understanding of `participation in the divine processions' is thus a "participation of the 
creature, through grace, in the Father's trinitarian generative power", through the 
mediation of Son and Spirit (to whom the Father communicates all that is his), and 
240Th II 308; III 35,258,527; V 433 
241 Th 11308 
242Th IV 242-243 
243Th 111 36 note 1, cf 527; V 432 (According to John of the Cross the breathing of the Holy Sprit by 
Father and Son becomes a breathing on the part of the soul. ) 
244Th 111 254 
245 Th 11308 
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through the mediation of the feminine principle of the Church/Mary/the Soul given 
creaturely, receptive participation in the Father's primal fruitfulness. "' 
This understanding is derived from Scripture, particularly the Johannine writings, 247 
and from Patristic reflection on it, 248 where `being born of God' is the birth of the Word 
by the eternal Father's heart and the implanting of this same Word in the hearts of 
believers (through the mediation of the church). Mary's reception of the Word is the 
model of this. Throughout, this mediation of the feminine principle of Mary/Church 
conceiving and giving birth is evident, such that the union of the individual soul with 
God and his/her giving birth to God and Christ is always in the ecclesiological context. 
Balthasar considers this feminine principle to be essential. The process of the divine 
birth moves in the direction of both the Church as "the totality of the Logos coming-to- 
be in the world", 249 and the individual in baptism and his or her `baptism-life', that is, a 
life bearing witness to this baptism lived according to the pattern of Christ. 
While Mary gives birth to the Church's Head, the Church (in the font) gives birth to the 
Head's members who, incorporated in him, are "mystically" the Logos himself. These 
members however, together form the Church-and the more perfect the individual 
members are, the more perfectly they realise the Church's nature-and they themselves, 
for their part, give birth to Christ. 250 
Looked at from below man appears to allow himself "to be refashioned and assimilated 
to Christ (Rom 8: 29; Phil 3.21)", and from above the Word allows himself to "take 
shape in the totality of his Body (the Church) and in her individual member (the 
believer). 15251 It is Cyril of Alexandria's understanding of this mystical ecclesiological 
copying of Christ's birth from Mary that includes the full trinitarian content thus 
making it "centre stage"252 for Balthasar. Cyril draws attention to the perfecting work of 
246 Th V 468-9 
247eg Jn 1: 13; 3: 3,5-8 Although the basic principle is also Pauline: that "to be endowed with grace 
essentially means being accepted as Sons in the eternal Son (Rom 8: 15-17). " (Th V 433) cf V 426ff ; III 
229 note 68,258. 
248 Th 11 308-9; V 462-469 making close use of H Rahner's "Die Gottgeburt. die Lehre der Kirchenvater 
von der Geburt Christi in den Herzen der Glaubigen" in Zeitschrift fur Katholische Theologie 59 (1935). 
333-418, reprinted with slight changes in Symbole der Kirche, die Ekklesiologie der Vater (Salzbutg: 
Otto Muller, 1964), 11-87. 
249 Th 11 309 
250 Th V 464 
251 Th 11 309; V 464-466 Here Balthasar refers to Irenaeus, Hippolytus, Origen and Methodius. 
252 Th V 467 
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the Spirit in us (corresponding to his overshadowing of the Virgin in the incarnation) 
such that 
Christ is formed in us, because the Holy Spirit causes us to share in the divine process 
of formation... the stamp (charakter) of God the Father's nature [Heb 1: 3 that is, the 
Son] is impressed in our souls, the Holy Spirit sanctifying and conforming us to 
Christ. "' 
We can see how this would strike a chord with Balthasar's understanding of the life of 
grace as a participation in the divine processions. 
Balthasar thinks the theological wealth in this patristic reflection is lacking in later 
development. "' However the explicit association of the Son's begetting and our `birth 
from God' owes much to this development as the theme passes from Origen to 
Maximus and from there to Scotus Erigena and then on to Meister Eckhart and the 
Rhenish-Flemish mystics. Balthasar acknowledges that it is from Eckhart in particular 
that being `born of God' means being "drawn into the Son's `coming forth' from the 
Father", "' whereas in John the relationship is between our birth from God and the Son's 
birth "of God" in the incarnation (Jn I: 13), which is thus established as the archetype 
of all divine birth256. Alongside this undoubted influence and the substantial attention 
Balthasar gives Eckhart in his treatment of the topic in the last volume of the Theo- 
drama, 257 Balthasar is critical of Eckhart's failure to re-evaluate neoplatonic influences in 
the light of his Christianity, such as his "trend toward absolute unicity" which sees all 
multiplicity in a negative light looking `above' the Trinity for the transcendent Ground 
of all things. 25' He draws attention in particular to his overlooking of the Marian 
principle (an omission not untypical of the medieval period) characterised in Eckhart by 
the understanding of creatures themselves as nothing259 (in contrast to the real (Marian) 
253 Commentary on Isaiah IV, or. 2 Patrologia Graeca 70 936BC 
254 Th V 428 
255Th 111 229 note 68 The influence of Eckhart on Balthasar's connection of the begetting of the Son and 
our creation (described in chapter 2 section C above) is also to be noted. For an interesting discussion of 
the ambivalent relationship with the medieval mystic cf Cyril O'Regan: "Balthasar and Eckhart: 
Theological Principles and Catholicity" The Thomist April 1996 vol. 60 2 203-239. 
256 Th V 426-7 
257 Ibid. 434-444 Of the various approaches described the treatment of Eckhart is the lengthiest. 
258 Ibid. 437,443; 1 551-558 
259 Ibid. 436f 
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receptivity of creaturely being described above 26. ). Consequently, the individual person 
is relativised and a genuine analogy of being collapses, leading to a confusion between 
creature and God. 26' Balthasar favours the modifications of Eckhart's followers with 
their more concrete christological approach, especially that of Ruysbroeck. 262 
Balthasar is concerned to keep the idea biblical and save it from "a Neoplatonic 
undertow". 263 He rules out any understanding in which the Logos's birth in the Church 
meant some kind of growth or becoming in the world, 264 and he rejects seeing the Son as 
God's single, primal Idea with creaturely being as just a variety of participations in it. 
Thus also, crucially for us, he disallows the idea that the "In-sich-Sein (natural self- 
being) of beings at the natural level merges with participation in Christ through grace". 265 
This rejection is obviously very important for finalising his position on the relation 
between nature and grace, on the `duality' of grace we have described in this chapter. 
Here he is clearly saying we cannot merge our natural self-being and our adoptive 
participation, and he explicitly denies that being created and being born of God are one 
single process. 266 
However this distinction is not always so clear in his intra-trinitarian description. 
No doubt one of the most striking things about encountering this association of our 
rebirth by grace with an adoption into the eternal generation of the Son is the fact that 
we have already discussed a similar association of our creation with the generation of the 
Son in chapter two. 26' There we found that the grounding of the fact that there is a 
world at all in the fact that there is a Son as well as the Father focuses on the eternal 
generative love of the Father bringing forth the Son as the origin of the world and in such 
a way that undoubtedly draws an analogy between creation and begetting. So it seems 
260 cf chapter 4 section BI above 
261 cf esp Th V 441; 463; 11 306-7 
262 Th V 457-458 
263Th 11311 
264 Rather, the realm of becoming is thus made to correspond more and more to God's Being, to be 
drawn into the first and all-embracing Idea and become the expression of it. Th II 311 
265Th II 311 Whilst there is inclination in this direction in Scotus Erigena and Eckhart, Balthasar 
maintains they did distinguish between nature and grace in this respect. cf Th 11311 note 41 and V 439 
266Th 1I 311; 
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then that both our creation and our adoption `happen with'26S the eternal generation of 
the Son. Both gifts are united in having as their condition of possibility the primal 
divine self-bestowal of the eternal generation of the Son (which `spills over' into the 
kenosis of incarnation and redemption269) and, as it were, `contains' both the divine self- 
giving of creation and of `re-creation' in grace, such that both can be associated with the 
eternal begetting of the Son as we have described. Balthasar can talk about both 
analogies together27° and can even see the whole sweep of the Father's kenotic self-giving 
in the Son as so closely tied with our creation and adoption that he can actually say that 
our adoption as sons is something "the Father gives (automatically (selbstverständlich), 
as it were) when surrendering his only Son for our sake". "' However he never fully 
clarifies the relationship between all these associated events (the Father's begetting and 
surrendering of the Son and our creation and participation). We are therefore left with 
the fact that both creation and adoption are clearly identified with the eternal begetting 
(a powerful expression of continuity/simultaneity between creation and participation) 
but in their unfolding in the worldly sphere they are denied the continuity of one 
process (thus clearly separating the two `events'). Indeed here Balthasar seems to want 
to draw a sharp distinction between the basic `created' relation to Christ as the "first 
born of all creation" in, through and for whom all things are created according to their 
natures, and the kind of participatory relationship that exists under his headship in the 
Church, as his body. "' He goes so far as to say of the latter that the "church does not 
belong on the side of created beings", belonging "in a different way to the `First-born', 
the `Image of the invisible God"', as "the organism in whom he imprints himself upon 
267chapter 2 section C above 
268eg "Mit-Zeugung" TD II, 2 32 (Th 111 35) 
269cf chapter 6 section D2 below 
270TD II, 2 32 (Th 111 35): "Ein Moment der Warumlosigkeit besteht sowohl in der Erschaffung wie in 
der Mit-Zeugung mit dem ewigen Sohn... " (the English translation "... man is created and begotten 
together with the eternal Son" could be understood to imply a stronger association). In Th III 229 note 
68 the analogy between begetting and creation is presented as a bridge to our rebirth (and indeed to the 
kenosis of the Son becoming a creature). 
Z"Th 111 254 (TD II, 2 233) This is an example of the possible intra-trinitarian christological constriction 
we mentioned in chapter two and will raise again in our conclusions. 
272Th 113 11 Balthasar bases his description here on Col 1: 15-18. 
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the universe, fashioning it after his own pattern, as `the fullness' of him who, as 
Ephesians 1.23 says, fills all in all. " There is a relationship of potentiality between the 
plurality of created beings and the pluriform unity of Christ, but he states that the 
Church ("the fullness filled by the fullness of Christ") "stands in clear contrast to the 
created universe", 273 a contrast which is not easy to reconcile with the implications of his 
christocentric perspective on creation. 274 
The difficulty here is no doubt partly because of the uniqueness of the perspective 
adopted where we have the mysterious combination of everything seeming to be 
contained in the Father's generation of the Son but also `becoming operative' and `made 
concrete' in separate events in time (incarnation in Mary/Church; 
Baptism/Confirmation). In other words we have the difficulty of a description that 
`cross-sections' both time and eternity, giving us the view of things as they are ('laid 
up') in the Being of God and as they come to be in the becoming of time and are thus 
brought into correspondence more and more with the Being of God. 275 Nevertheless 
there is still an issue for a theology trying to describe these `events' as to whether a 
highly synthetic approach is taken or whether weight is given to the fact that these 
things happen at different points in time. Balthasar is clearly aware of these 
possibilities but does not seem to attribute much significance to the question of which 
approach is taken. In a footnote he acknowledges that "the individual aspects can be 
considered in relative isolation from one another" and cites Maximus' twofold birth from 
God in which initially we are potentially (dynamei) given the entire grace of being 
children of God and then given the grace actually (Kat'energeian) such that our entire 
will is refashioned by the Spirit and directed towards God. However in the main body 
of the text he refers us to the synthetic patristic view, and indeed seems particularly 
struck by the comprehensive nature of the patristic notion embracing in one view the 
273 Ibid. 
274If creation is for Christ and this orientation culminates in our union with him as members of his body, 
the Church, how can creation and Church be placed in this kind of opposition? On Balthasar's 
christocentric doctrine of creation cf chapter two section A; chapter three section C and p 124 above. 
275cf Th 11311 
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doctrines of the Trinity, christology, ecclesiology, grace, the sacraments and Christian 
life, both baptism and the electio of Ignatius Loyola. "' 
The problem of systematically depicting worldly events as imaging vividly 
portrayed eternal `events' in the being of God is one that we have already come up 
against and it will crop up again. And it is not only clarity about continuity and 
distinction in the nature-grace relationship which is affected. The association of 
adoption and eternal begetting discussed here only adds to the accumulating concerns 
about how Balthasar's very specific association of creaturely processes with the Son- 
Father relationship in the Spirit affects his doctrine of God. 27 Whilst in itself this is not 
our topic it is a very important implication (perhaps the most important implication) of 
Balthasar's treatment of it and so we shall return to this question in the concluding 
chapters. 
276Ibid. 309 
277 eg chapter 2 section C; chapter 4 section E above 
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PART III 
FROM `MAN IN GOD' TO 
`PERSONS IN CHRIST' 
171 
Chapter 6 
Nature-grace and anthropology 
A Introduction 
I Meta-anthropology 0 
Balthasar's understanding of the history of thought delineates a move away from a 
cosmological perspective in favour of an anthropological one. For Balthasar this gives 
anthropology a fresh significance for the theology of his day, even though he is highly 
critical of the anthropocentrism which he believes much theology has fallen into in its 
concern to engage with the situation of modem man. ' He is clear nevertheless that we 
do have to engage with contemporary, not ancient or medieval understanding of the 
world, (although this may include the retrieval of past insights lost in the contemporary 
outlook). Love Alone (and before that Science Religion and Christianity) is exemplary of 
the basic direction. It plots a progress from a cosmological perspective on the nature- 
supernature relationship to an anthropological one, finally settling upon love as the way 
into the question, with intersubjectivity as an initial pointer (as we mentioned at the 
beginning of chapter four). The approach is what he called a `meta-anthropology'. For 
Balthasar, in today's situation, the relation with the rest of the universe is now 
contained in anthropology (as philosophy). Meta physics has been replaced by meta- 
anthropology: 
`He is keenly aware of the dangers in the waning of cosmological significance in favour of 
anthropocentrism (cf Science, Religion and Christianity (Burns and Oates, London 1958) and his 
rejection of anthropological reduction in the theology of revelation in Love Alone the Way of Revelation 
(Burns and Oates 1968)). His criticism is particularly clear in The Moment of Christian Witness in his 
delineation of "the theses of the philosophical system" and the ensuing anthropocentrism which 
culminates in the anthropologising of christology (61-113). 
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Let us say above all that the traditional term `metaphysics' signified the act of transcending 
physics, which for the Greeks signified the totality of the cosmos, of which man was a part. 
For us, physics is something else: the science of the material world. For us, the cosmos 
perfects itself in man, who at the same time sums up the world and surpasses it. Thus our 
philosophy will be essentially a meta-anthropology, presupposing not only the cosmological 
sciences but also the anthropological sciences, and surpassing them toward the question of the 
being and essence of man. 2 
This approach, described here in 1988 a few weeks before his death, thus embraces 
and transcends both the cosmological as well as the anthropological sciences. The 
starting point and `spring board' for our investigations is man. Indeed here in this short 
summary of the essence of his work we begin with a "reflection on the situation of 
man". But as a meta-anthropology, this anthropic starting point leads directly to the 
question of being. Reflection on man as limited being, open to the unlimited leads 
immediately to the reassertion of the -`real-'distinction'. The question of essence and 
esse, of the division of finite and infinite at the heart of classical metaphysical enquiry, 
is presented precisely as a question of the human situation. And so Balthasar's central 
project of the one, beautiful, good and true, the transcendental attributes of being 
discussed most comprehensively in his Trilogy, is thus a meta-anthropological one. It 
starts with man's essential intersubjectivity (as we have seen in the previous two 
chapters). The primal inter-personal encounter of mother and child reveals that being is 
one, good, true and beautiful and, under the analogy of being, that it is in an analogical 
relationship with the divine transcendentals. Balthasar's meta-anthropological approach 
is therefore an attempt "to construct a philosophy and a theology starting from an 
analogy not of an abstract Being, but of Being as it is encountered concretely in its 
attributes (not categorical, but transcendental). "3 So, the question of being, of essence 
and existence which Balthasar considers to be lost in the `system' of much 
contemporary thought, ' does remain central. However it is presented concretely, not 
abstractly, from the specifically anthropocentric perspective of modern thought, 
2 My Work In Retrospect (Ignatius, San Francisco 1993) 114 
3 Ibid. 114-115 
4 cf eg Moment 61-76 esp 68 
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including much of its preoccupations (eg dialogue), although these are reassessed by 
Balthasar. 
2 Theo-dramatic meta-anthropology 
Balthasar's dramatic resources place man first and foremost as the content of the play! 
Whilst there can have been little doubt that the finite freedom under consideration in 
part II of this thesis was that belonging to human nature, the discussion of freedom in 
chapter four at least was basically ideal and abstract in form, securing the finite-infinite 
freedom relationship as the formal datum of theoJdrama. b Balthasar sees this discussion 
(in which, as we mentioned before, the possessor of finite freedom could in the main just 
as well have been an angel') as a prologue to a concrete consideration of the specific 
creature endowed with this freedom, that is, man. A whole section in Theo-drama II is 
dedicated to this. ' In this chapter then we will consider this treatment of man, moving 
from there to the question of personhood, which we focus on in the next chapter and 
conclude our analysis of Balthasar's treatment of our topic with a consideration of 
whether we can `hope that all men will be saved'. 
Once we ask `what is man', once he appears in all his concreteness, our range 
extends beyond that of dramatic presupposition: the drama "becomes suddenly and 
abruptly real. "' Thus in addressing the concrete question of the specific creature 
endowed with the freedom we have been considering, in asking what is the nature of the 
human creature, our consideration, Balthasar contends, is to be dramatic not essentialist. 
We can only ask about man's essence, about what kind of being he is, about what is 
"essential and (relatively) unchanging in all man's acts and states" from within his 
dramatic performance of existence. "There is no other anthropology but the dramatic. "" 
5 Th 1 256 
6Th 11 335 
cf chapter 4 section A2 above 
8 Th 11 11 C 335-429 
9 Th 11 335 
10 Ibid. 
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One of the first questions raised by this approach is how one goes about considering 
man from the dramatic performance of his existence. We can be clear that for Balthasar 
this means considering man from within the ongoing action-but at what point from 
within the ongoing action? It would appear that Balthasar proceeds from the action 
currently being played out by man, his realistic existence as we know it. From the 
theological perspective this means focusing on the third `state' of human nature, the 
natura reparata, and therefore investigating all the acts or states of mankind (the status 
naturae integrae, naturae lapsae and last status naturae glorificatae) on the basis of the 
third, the natura reparata, which is currently being played by mankind. This is 
obviously a crucial decision of determining significance for his anthropology. It is in 
keeping with his christological focus on understanding the nature of man, that it is from 
Christ we understand what man is. Nevertheless it is a decision which could open him 
to attack on two sides: from those concerned that his christocentric approach overlooks 
the significance of the natura integra, of man as created by God, for our understanding 
of human nature, and from those concerned that he (and indeed Catholic theology in 
general) does not take seriously enough the effect of the status naturae lapsae. However 
Balthasar does not want simply to think of these states of nature (which he has renamed 
`acts' in accordance with the dramatic turn in terminology) "as a purely temporal 
succession of different, mutually exclusive states, for the natura reparata that roughly 
designates our place in the theo-drama coincides to a large extent with the natura lapsa 
yet is able to participate proleptically (spe, non re) in the ultimate state. "" So in 
focusing on our current act, Balthasar by no means excludes the relevance of the others 
for how we understand what man is. On the contrary by focusing on the natura 
reparata Balthasar is also de facto drawing upon the lapsa and glorificata for his 
understanding of man, because reparata is a transitional or rather `transfigurational' 
state in which fallen man is `repaired' and transformed into the glorified image of the 
Son. 
" Th 11 3-")5--')36; cf 111298 
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Strangely though, in this `collection' of states within the one current state the natura 
integra is not mentioned. Does the condition in which God created us in the beginning 
not after all have some implication for our understanding of who man is? Does it have 
no bearing on our current state? What has happened to the relative significance of the 
first Adam? Is there no significant continuity between the first and the second creation 
after all? The omission of this state from those that have some bearing on our current act 
may be accidental, after all an understanding of the status reparata and glorificata would 
normally involve a recognition that the reparation involves restoration to the original 
state as well as giving an even greater gift of participation which comes to fruition in the 
final state. Perhaps therefore the significance of the Integra is implicit. But it is not 
made explicit, which is at the least disappointing, particularly with a view to concerns 
about the significance of nature raised by his perspective from early in his career (in his 
alignment with de Lubac's position) and by the influence of Barthian christocentrism 
(which has little interest in the significance of the first Adam). We have seen that he can 
in principle offer a potentially great corrective to this 'constriction', " but the omission 
here of the state in which we were created cannot help but make us feel that the insight 
of this corrective, that is the necessary and abiding significance of nature precisely in an 
authentic christocentric perspective, has somehow been undermined. The possible 
inconsistency in the significance given to the Adam principle, raised in the conclusion to 
chapter three, would seem to support this. 
Balthasar continues to pursue the kind of method outlined in previous chapters, 
exploring from below the anthropological state of affairs without specific reference in 
the first instance to the Christian solution which he proposes as the sole `answer'. The 
main difference though between the methodology in the previous chapter and in this is 
that now we do not prescind from the drama: we are in the middle of it. Nevertheless a 
clear theological delineation of the scene we find ourselves in is postponed, as initially 
we consider the state of affairs without the light shed on it by Christian revelation. 
12 chapter 3 section C and D above 
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3 Paradox and riddle 
Proceeding on the basis of man's realistic existence as we know it, it is evident that he is 
in a condition of alienation and of peculiar contradiction. There is an awareness of 
having `fallen away' from his origin. As regards our personal freedom, now that we 
consider it under the condition of our concrete experience, we note that it only operates 
within the rules of a universal spiritual nature, that it is bound to a subtle organic and 
mechanical system dependent on a given external world, and that it is bound by the 
overwhelming power of its own instincts. " This too suggests that this condition is only 
one `scene', pointing back to an origin and forward to a destination-even if it cannot be 
(re)constructed. 
The aspect of contradiction is evident from man's very situation in the cosmos, 
simultaneously rooted in it (physical and sensory nature) and reaching above it 
(intellectual and spiritual)-not simply as the heightening of the sensory and instinctual 
level but also contrary to it, even to the point of mutual destruction (eg the strong 
versus the good). " Man is a paradox, unlike anything else in nature. He cannot be 
defined by anything outside of himself: "the material aspect of the world does not even 
hint at the direction man ought to take if he is to realise himself". " Because of his 
relation (as finite freedom) to infinite freedom, he is superior to all the finitude of the 
world, yet he cannot grasp "infinite freedom as a means of self-perfection within the 
terms of the world; for this would conflict with the concept of freedom". " So man must 
define himself. But as he is not in a position to step outside the dramatic action to 
consider the part he is playing, and as it is impossible to piece together from the 
contradictory state of our current brokeness the original totality that we were or the 
"(Romans 7) Th II 336-7 
14 Ibid. 337-338 
'5 Ibid. 341 
16 Ibid. 341 
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ultimate one that we are meant to be, " we find that (without his essential relatedness to 
the mystery of Christ) man is an insoluble riddle. '8 
B `Nature' in anthropology 
Having established man's condition as a `puzzle' unable to construct his own answer, 
we can now look in more detail at what exactly Balthasar understands as "essential and 
(relatively) unchanging in all man's acts and states", " the "constant attributes"'° that tell 
us about the essence (nature) of man (that is ultimately only fully comprehensible in the 
light of grace). Then we will consider `what happens' to these constants when the 
specifically Christian illumination is shed on them. In other words we are looking in 
detail at his understanding of what nature is and what the nature-grace relationship is, in 
the context of anthropology. 
Developing a recurrent interest in threefold schemes of polarity to describe the 
human condition, " in the Theo-drama Balthasar settles on Erich Przywara's designation 
of the polarities of spirit-body, man-woman, individual-community as the three 
dimensions of man's constant attributes making up his essence or nature" (thus 
providing an interesting indication of the abiding significance of Przywara for 
Balthasar's work). Although these are the fundamental features of his nature, " in 
themselves they do not resolve but deepen his riddle. They mean his existence includes 
'either-ors'. 24 "In all three dimensions man seems to be built according to a polarity, 
obliged to engage in reciprocity, always seeking complementarity and peace in the other 
" Ibid. 342 cf chapter -3 section 
B above 
18 Ibid. 345 
19 Ibid. 335 
20 Ibid. 355 
21 In The Christian State of Life (Ignatius, San Francisco 1983) it was the feeling of shame, the 
awareness of death and the necessity of distinguishing between good and evil that seem to be identified 
with the three foundation stones of our spiritual being. (85) In Karl Barth the interpersonal relationships 
of I-thou and man-woman are cited (along with culture) as examples of that particular, relatively self- 
subsistent sphere of meaning within creation that adequately upholds the relative significance of nature 
(KB 300). In Man in History it was Fesard's man-woman, Jew-pagan, servant-master schema (306-330; 
cf Scola ibid. 97 note 22)-no doubt influenced by Barth's extensive use of this model in the Church 
Dogmatics. 
22ThII355 
23 Th 111 283 
24 Th 11411 
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pole".. " For this reason he is pointed beyond the polar structure, crossing the boundary, 
and "defined most exactly by that boundary with which death brutally confronts him, in 
all three areas, without taking account of his threefold transcendence. "Z6 
1 First polarity: body/spirit 
In this natural anthropology there is "a twofold and contrary rhythm", integral to 
nature, in which the body rises to spirit, and the spirit descends into the body. 27 
Man is unique in being material and more than material, in the fact that for him 
"bodily things are communicated spiritually and spiritual things bodily. "28 On the one 
hand, the two poles of the bodily and spiritual can be seen to embrace each other only in 
a unity, man being spirit as the summit of a series of forms ascending from matter. 
However, on the other hand, there is also a tension, evident in the contrary pull of the 
two poles, " and thus an ambiguity, in which anthropology is forced to recognise that 
what appears to be a "natural polarity is also an unnatural dichotomy". " This can be 
seen as a sign of dignity: "man ascends, leaving behind and transcending what is below 
him: he is the crown of creation and ruler of the world, and this transcendence of his 
... coincides with a 
direct relationship to the divine: man comes from the divine and has 
been instituted by it. "31 But on the other hand "realistically speaking-the greatness 
cannot deny its inner `torn-ness', its "misere", where "spirit" and "flesh" are "at war" 
with one another, resulting in man being made "captive" (Rom 7: 23)11.32 This tension is 
not a dualism between matter and spirit, " for man is a unity who "originates from below 
and from above and extends both upward and downward", but a tension which, "to be 
25 Ibid. 355 
26 Ibid. (my italics); Th I 378 
27 Ibid. 411 
28 Ibid. 366,419 
29 Ibid. 355-358 
30 Ibid. 358 
31 
Ibid. 358-9 
32 Ibid. 359 
33 Ibid. 359 Balthasar offers systems like Gnostic ism-Manichaeism and those of Klages and Scheler as 
examples of this. Bearing in mind the body-spirit tension described, Balthasar is well aware of the 
temptation such an approach exerts. 
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precise, must pass right through spirit's centre", a paradox expressed in the "age-old 
description of man as a "boundary", "methorion". 34 
From this two alternatives develop. There is the positive understanding of man as 
the mediator between the lower and upper world, " and that he can make a kind of 
natural synthesis between the two, or there is the negative understanding that, because 
he is in the middle position, man cannot gain a precise knowledge of either nature, that 
the two are completely contrary to each other and he can only choose to relate to one or 
other of them. 36 In his middle position man has to make choices between the `above' 
and the `below', and ultimately this refers to the choice between God and the world, or 
between good and evil, although this should not be interpreted as a pure spiritualisation 
(which amounts to the hubris of wanting to be like God). Whilst "the fundamental 
demand must be for an upward movement... if the spirit is to be genuinely `above', it 
must come `down' into flesh: only thus can it bring the flesh with it, up into a true 
spiritualisation. "37 It is together with its physiological infrastructure that the soul has to 
choose the higher value. 38 
The last barrier we encounter in our consideration of this essential feature of human 
nature-as in all three anthropological tensions-is the "ultimate riddle" of death. 39 
Whatever his status as regards mortality or immortality may once have been, it is clear 
that somewhere along the line the decision has been made for immortality. In this 
current concrete condition how is he to choose immortality? What is the point of trying 
to fashion something "immortal" out of mortal matter? Yet Balthasar asserts "this is 
man's situation". " And so consideration of our nature's body-spirit polarity leaves 
man an `open question'. He has no answer without Christ. 
34 
Ibid. 359 
35 Ibid. 359-361 
36 Ibid. 360 
37 Ibid. 363 
38 Ibid. 362 
39 Ibid. 364 
40 Ibid. 
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2 Second polarity: man/woman 
The tensions uncovered in the body-spirit polarity recur in a deeper form in the second 
of the essential anthropological dimensions "human nature's sexual differentiation into 
man and woman". " This "fundamental feature of human nature"42 immediately brings 
the third tension of individual and community into play, the former standing "as a 
paradigm of that community dimension which characterises man's entire nature. , 43 
There is not room here to carry out an in-depth investigation of Balthasar's distinctive 
understanding of the two genders and the creation narratives. I only intend to bring out 
the main points relevant to our current concerns. 
Right from the start we are aware of the distinction and unity in this polarity. The 
male is totally male, down to every cell, and in empirical experience and ego- 
consciousness. In the same way the female is totally female. Yet at the same time both 
share an identical human nature, but this never protrudes "neutrally, beyond the sexual 
difference". 44 Thus in the completed creation the human being is a "dual unity". 45 As a 
human being man is always in communion with woman, but never reaches her and so 
also woman with man. 46 
So in the pre-Christian understanding what is natural is caught between two poles 
and ultimately cannot be defined. On the one hand, human sexuality is embedded in the 
cosmic-divine relation which is both the projection and affirmation of the human sexual 
dimension, and, on the other hand, the authentic theion is understood to be the spiritual 
dimension, and this spiritual dimension is then taken out of the sexual at the inner- 
worldly level, making it vulnerable to ascetic suppression in favour of the spiritual or 
depreciation as inferior or demonic. 47 
41 Ibid. 365; III 283 
42 Th 111 283 
43 Th II 365 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 366 
47 Ibid. 382 
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Balthasar maintains that the metaphysics of all cultures attempts to explain the 
male-female polarity as a fundamental rhythm of existence in the world. This is 
generally in terms of a heaven-earth relationship (heaven as fructifying and animating, 
earth as responsive), with the human sexual dimension frequently projected into the 
realm of the gods which is then copied and re-enacted by man (although Balthasar also 
mentions its inclusion in the all-embracing form of polarity implied by the Yang and the 
Yin). But the problem is that it is not possible to adduce a metaphysical polarity that 
adequately explains the difference of the sexes in mankind. Either there is a one-sided 
distortion (for example male is equated with spirit and female with matter) and 
subsequent inequality, or the explanation remains vague and undefined (in the Yang and 
Yin no primary significance is attached to the sexes). In the heaven-earth model this 
vagueness is inevitable because the relationship between cosmos and theion is itself 
"unavoidably fluid. "48 If, on the one hand, there is one-sided emphasis on the theion as 
the prototype of the sexual dimension we move in the direction of the fantastic vision of 
sexuality in the divine realm as the model of this dimension. But if, on the other hand, 
the cosmic is the prototype of the sexual we lose sight of man's transcendence as he 
becomes no more than a special instance, locked within the cosmos. 
Genesis provides a phenomenology of the sexual49 operating at the level of man's 
creatureliness. The sexual differentiation emphasises creaturely contingence, one sex 
dependent on the other, neither able to be the whole human being on his or her own5° 
and every human being who comes into being owing his existence to a sexual process. 
This biblical perspective confirms the enigmatic status belonging to man now familiar to 
4$ Ibid. 368 
49 Ibid. 368-369 note 56 In keeping with his comments on the relation of the first and second Adam 
described in chapter 3 above, whilst citing Barth's chapter in CD 111/2 285-324 as a good example of a 
phenomenology of the sexual viewed initially from the perspective of creatureliness, Balthasar thinks that 
here (as in his treatment of image and likeness) Barth "succumbs to the temptation to pass over rapidly to 
the New Testament fulfilment (Eph 5)". 
50 Ibid. 369 Sexual intercourse cannot be seen as an absolute union and the suspension of this 
contingence. In the second account the same point is evident in the fact that it is not good for the man to 
be alone and indeed he bears the woman within him but is unable to give her to himself. Thus there can 
never be an idea of a sexually undifferentiated or androgynous human being content within himself. Ibid. 
370,373 
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us from analysis of the body-spirit polarity: he is both similar to and distinct from the 
rest of the creaturely order and similar to and different from God. Human beings are 
created in the image of God and there is therefore a similarity with him seen in his 
Biblical revelation in terms of Fatherhood and Motherhood and the nuptial relationship 
with Israel, but there is also dissimilarity at the level of their creation as male and female, 
their sexuality being part of the sexuality of all created things. " And so again we arrive 
at the conclusion that human nature cannot be understood from itself. Whilst "purely 
worldly beings reproduce their entire nature in new members of the species"52 will man 
and woman bring forth images of God? For Balthasar it is rather that the natural 
operation of the human generative power extends into the divine creative power "which 
opens up and makes itself available in the creation of man. "53 Thus Eve's recognition 
regarding her first born "I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord" (Gen 4: 1), 
indicating that the human child is a personal gift of God, not just a gift of nature . 
The dual unity of the human being seen in this second polarity requires the 
archetypal image of Christ/Church to "radiate the fullness of light onto the creaturely 
copy. "54 For these central features of man are made to be perfected in Christ, for as we 
have seen "the first Adam is created for the sake of and with a view to, the Second. "55 
As sexual generation (as the fathers understood it) cannot be separated from the 
context of death56 and death is always connected with falleness, 57 the essential man- 
woman relationship (as found before the fall) does not appear to include sexual relations, 
although what kind of non-sexual erotic man-woman relationship there may have been 
remains an open question. " Again this unresolved element points to the fact "the centre 
of what is human cannot be constructed out of itself. Man acts out of his role between 
51 Ibid. 369-370 Here Balthasar follows Przywara's understanding rather than Barth's identification of 
image and likeness with the reciprocity of man and woman CD III/I, 288-329. cf Th 111 286 
52 Ibid. 370 
53 Ibid. 372 
54 Ibid. 373 
ss Ibid. 373-374 
56 Ibid. 374-381 
57 Ibid. 374,381 
58 Ibid. 381 
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earth and heaven, and in heaven there is not marriage (Mt 22: 30): there the Marriage of 
the Lamb is celebrated. "59 
3 Third polarity: individual-community 
bo All men are present in each. 
Here we again find ourselves in the arena of the `one and the many' encountered in 
chapter four's exploration of the coincidence of self-possession and openness to being 
as an image of the Trinity and in the relationship between concrete and universal in 
chapter two. 
Each human being is a perfect member of the species "embodying the whole concept 
of what it is to be human. "61 Part of this concept is that everyone embodies it as an 
individual, excluding all others. As free, self-aware beings "each one in himself is 
something that excludes all participation by others. Thus the concept embraces an 
aspect that is common to all men and simultaneously exclusive to all men. " The aspect 
of incommunicability 
is the precondition or reverse side of all spiritual communication. Not only does it require the 
reciprocal knowledge and recognition of the other as "other" but also the freedom to detach 
oneself from the totality of the world (and hence from the community) and encounter the latter 
creatively, out of the uniqueness of one's own self. 62 
Thus "beings existing for themselves simultaneously exist for one another". Each 
"human self-awareness enters the dance at a particular time", but not by its own 
volition. " It "can only be wakened to free self-awareness by some other free self- 
awareness", as we saw in the inter-subjective models of the previous chapters. Here 
Balthasar is mainly concerned with the element of shared humanity (rather than with 
openness to being-in its-totality). In the cogito/sum there is the self disclosure of the 
radiance of reality as such which frees man to move towards it. There is also the 
experience of the identity of being-for-me and being-in itself, and, as it is an awakened 
gift-identity, there is the obligation "to respond in gratitude to an absolute identity of 
59 Ibid. 382 




spirit and being. "' Then there is also the call to shared humanity, for "free self- 
awareness experiences itself as an `I' only when it knows that it is addressed and treated 
as a `thou' ... that 
is, when it realises that it is admitted into the appropriate 
community. " And so it becomes apparent "that, a priori, the cogitolsum includes shared 
humanity". This elucidates the paradox of the exclusivity of "for-itself' simultaneously 
including what is excluded in the individual subject as well as logically in the "concept 
of species". "Precisely because being-in-its-totality has disclosed itself to him, and he 
has experienced the gift-quality of his own nature hence his relativity, his `response- 
character' (E Brunner) and so the limitation of his nature, the individual subject realises 
that he is "for-himself-with-others". 65 This essential relationship of the human 
community to individual human self-possession gives shared humanity an essential 
place in Balthasar's `natural path to God' through reflection on the gift of the free self. 66 
For the likeness of the gift of being to the divine goodness upon which this implicit 
knowledge of God is founded, has been shown to be a gift the possession of which 
necessarily involves other human beings. 
So Balthasar argues that both "shared humanity [Mitmenschlichkeit] and non- 
mediate presence before God [Gottunmittelbarkeit] are inseparable in every individual. "67 
The non-mediate is mediated through the medium of shared humanity. "The theion is 
open to view, implicitly given to every human being who attains human self- 
awareness"68-but only in a veiled way because this accessibility consists in 
participation in being-in-its-totality which can only be had in the cosmos of inanimate, 
animate and thinking beings. "However, both as individuals and as a community, human 
beings incline to equate the theion that reveals itself in being-in-its-totality with the 
universe of beings, the cosmos". 69 And thus the problem of death emerges again and we 
63 
Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 389 
65 Ibid. 389-90 
66 cf Th 11285,391; 111 457; cf chapter 4 section B2 above 
67 Th II 391 




can see why so often the spirit has been viewed "as the essential determinate of the 
human being", " and both body and community as of relative insignificance; or the 
individual has been understood to have no eternal existence but will dissolve into the 
elements of the universe. 
C The inbreaking of the biblio-Christian doctrine of 
creation and the heightening of `natural' (pre- 
Christian) tensions 
Whilst outside the biblical realm there is potentially at least a perception of the `non- 
absoluteness' and the fragility of the finite in contrast with the truth and the repose of 
the Absolute which supports all else, there is no understanding of the world's 
createdness by infinite freedom. " The Biblical and Christian understanding cuts through 
this problematic understanding of relationship of theion and cosmos when it proclaims, 
uniquely, the sovereign freedom of God in his creation of the entire world (heaven and 
earth) out of nothing. "Both cosmos and man are now on the same side: they are 
creatures vis-a-vis the God who creates them". All the "similarities" between God on 
the one hand and man and world on the other are cut through by this axis" without 
making God remote and absent from the world and man. 73 Rather his transcendence is 
such that it gives a new angle on immanence; it is the absolute transcendence of the 
Creator who is close to and immanent in his creation. 74 
So now man is face to face with his Creator. Indeed now we talk not simply in 
general terms of finite freedom on the one hand and infinite on the other but of "created 
and uncreated freedom". 75 The doctrine of creation out of nothing makes the God-world 
relationship more precisely the creature-Creator relationship and teaches important 
features about these partners vis-ä-vis one another. 76 It shows that the world is not an 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 253 
72 Ibid. 395 
73 Ibid. 395-6 
74 Ibid. 396 
75 Ibid. 397 
76 Ibid. 396-7 
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illusory appearance or a quasi-necessary emanation" and it points to God's absolute 
freedom, aseity, self sufficiency and thus shows that there is no compulsion on him to 
conceive a world, a `non-ego', in order to conceive himself, or to create a world to prove 
his omnipotence and that he is love. 78 Thus the shift from natural finitude to Christian 
creatureliness "involves a total revaluation". 79 It is from this perspective that the 
creature's origin can be seen to be in this amazing freedom as we have discussed, " and 
not in a divine idea independent from God's freedom. " It is for this reason that "the 
"image of God" in the creature consists decisively in its autexousion, in the created 
mirroring of uncreated freedom". 82 Meanwhile the criteria for using or not using this 
nature is found in the act in which man is given to himself: it is by looking toward 
infinite freedom that finite freedom sees how its finitude, its natural state, is to be 
fulfilled. " 
This opening up of the profound abysses of uncreated and created freedom in the 
biblical revelation only reveals further mysteries, showing that "the true nature of the 
idea of man, as seen by God", in fact stretches the `natural' dramatic tensions in human 
nature to breaking point. 84 This is a `supernatural heightening' of the various tensions in 
which, we have seen, man is stretched, an Uberspannung that is at the same time the 
answer to all these tensions. Balthasar considers this heightening under three aspects. 
1 From `out of nothing' to the grace of communion with the 
Absolute 
Firstly there is the new revolutionary perspective on man's origin and goal. We have 
already seen the dramatic impact of his creation from nothing, but there is also the 
" Ibid. 253 
78 Ibid. 397 
79 Ibid. 254 
80 Ibid. 397 It "has no ground under its feet but "stands above itself' (Augustine) in the sole Will of 
infinite freedom" (254); cf also 290,314; cf chapter 2 section C and chapter 3 above. 
81 Th II 397 Rather, as we have seen, the idea is grounded in God's freedom, being God's will for the 
creature that he has willed to exist; the creature's blueprint freely put before him. cf chapter 5 section C 
above 
82 Th II 397 
83 Ibid.; cf 250,284,272,292,303,313 
84 Ibid. 398 
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impact of his creation for infinity, of his supernatural goal. This means that his finitude 
is now stretched from nothingness to infinity. Christian revelation shows what no one 
could ever have dreamt of nor any religion or philosophy come up with: that he is 
created from nothing yet called to make his home in the divine. He "realises something 
entirely new"-and here we recall the passage we cited in chapter five: 
God undertook that first communication of his being, whereby finite, self-aware, free beings were 
created, with a view to a "second" act of freedom whereby he would initiate them into the 
mysteries of his own life and freely fulfil the promise latent in the infinite act that realises 
Being. 81 
The initial description of the unfolding of this orientation in the direction of grace is 
already familiar from our discussion of the dualism of gift in the previous chapter. This 
gift of creation, extraordinary though it is, is just the beginning. Beyond the 
participation in being belonging to all entities, spiritual beings have in principle access to 
absolute Being's self-disclosure, that opening up of subsistent Being's own free inner 
life in which the Giver of being gives his very self, an act which we have seen Balthasar 
refers to as supernatural (in distinction from the `natural' constitution of subjects. ) 
Again there is no marked discontinuity between the first word of creation out of 
nothing and the further work of elevation to participation in the divine life which then 
continues in a deepening initiation into this participation. (The self communication of 
God to the creature gives him the first experience of the "glory" of absolute freedom 
which deepens as they are further initiated into the divine nature through God's 
"Word". ) Nevertheless, this supernatural fulfilment does not follow on necessarily; " it 
is an if" an offer, not a must, a free act on the part of God, requiring a response on the 
part of the creature. There is no claim to it. 88 Balthasar again offers us the analogy of the 
free self-disclosure of one human subject to another in which there is also no claim on or 
right to the knowledge disclosed. Nevertheless, even this cannot compare with God 
85 Ibid. 400 
86 Th II 398. 
87 Ibid. 399; 398 ("in principle") 
88 Ibid. 400 "At the very moment when God freely discloses himself to him and utters his inner work, 
man the creature-discerning his own nothingness-knows how 
little claim he has to such initiation. " 
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offering participation in his life which is "`fundamentally foreign' and an inaccessible 
mystery". 89 
Now crucially this grace of God's self-communication is presented as communion 
with Him. His self-gift to us is both communication and communing, a fact emphasised 
by Balthasar's `play' on the verb mitteilen (and the noun Mitteilung). This normally 
means communicate, but Balthasar also draws attention to the literal meaning, `share 
with', by separating the prefix from the rest of the word ("mit-teilen", "Mit-teilung"): 
hence (we suppose) the English translation's use of the two words communicate and 
commune. 90 Thus God "opens up his own absolute being, communicating it and 
enabling us to commune with it [mit-teilt]" and "he enables the created spirit to grasp 
(auffassen) this communication, this communing (Mit-teilung), as what it is and what it 
intends, namely, participation in the Absolute", " (that is, in Jesus and in the Spirit92). 
When God speaks, he opens up his Wesen. The communication is both verbal 
("addressing the mind, explicatory") and ontological (substantial). From the perspective 
of the divine this means "the Absolute bends down towards the creature, but it only 
reaches the creaturely level, substantially, by lifting the latter up, beyond itself and its 
entire natural substance, to its level, giving it access and citizenship in the sphere of the 
Absolute", 93 this movement thus offering the answer to the paradox of man, that he can 
only fulfil himself beyond himself. From the perspective of the creature it means that as 
one destined to share in the divine nature he will be called to it recognisably, and is 
naturally constituted with the ability to hear and respond. 
This heightening of tension also needs to be understood in the context of the analogy 
of being. On the difference between the pre-Christian creaturely tension and that 
belonging to the Christian heightening Balthasar does not reject the idea that it is simply 
the case that the former "prevalently natural relation has now become emphatically free 
89 Ibid. 399 
90 Ibid. 399/ TD II/I 366 
91 Th 11 399 
92 Th III 131 
93 Th 11399,41 1 
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and personal". 94 Both views maintain the positive side of the analogy of being "that is, 
that the being [Sein] of the primal origins and the being [Sein] of the effects are to some 
degree comparable. " However Balthasar wishes to make more of the difference between 
the two perspectives. Turning to the negative side of the analogy (that is, the "greater 
dissimilarity") he draws attention to the fact that this gains a unique force in the biblical 
and Christian perspective because all the similarities the creature puts forward are seen 
in the light of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and therefore ultimately rest upon an 
"irreducible opposition", that is, the "out-of-itself' of the Creator over against the "out- 
of-some-other", the "out of nothing" of the creature. For Balthasar thinks, as we have 
seen elsewhere, it is very important in the Christian and especially the post-Christian 
world view95 to remember this aspect of the biblio-Christian understanding precisely 
when the Christian understanding of likeness transcends the wildest dreams of pre- 
Christian thought, including as it does "participation in the divine nature" and "being 
born of God". Indeed the elevation beyond the creaturely nature to one transcending it 
absolutely, brings the enormous gulf between them to the awareness of the creature. 
Confronted with the abyss of divine freedom he experiences his radical creatureliness for 
the first time, aware that this freedom has drawn his being from the abyss of 
nothingness, that, as we have seen from the Greek fathers, the only "substance" from 
which the creature can trace his origin is the divine will (freedom), and there is no 
security or definition for him outside God's free purpose. The elevation into kinship 
with God happens at the level of being and consciousness, but is never a substantial 
divinization. 96 It is a paradoxical state of simultaneous nearness and distance. (Indeed as 
we have seen from the beginning, " Balthasar thinks the one enhances the other: "the 
more the creature is found worthy of intimacy with God, the more deeply he becomes 
94 Ibid. 401 
95 There is a loss of natural reserve in the face of the theion, a weakening or extinguishing of the natural 
awareness of the analogia entis in post-Christian Titanism, that is the Promethian rejection of the `new 
God' (Zeus or Christ) and man's seizing of this divinity for himself, understanding himself to be equal 
with God. cf Th II 420ff Balthasar refers us to his detailed treatment in the first volume of Apokalypse 
der Deutschen Seele (A Pustet, Salzburg 1937). 
96 Th 11401 
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aware of God's uniqueness and incomparability, without his reverence turning into an 
inhibiting fear which would refuse the proffered intimacy". 98) 
The mystery of the (Christological) analogia entis "henceforward determines all 
anthropology". 
99 The distance (taken for granted by pre-christian man) cannot be 
jumped over by man; the closeness, the opening up of the divine realm is only possible 
by grace-it cannot be opened by nature. 
2 The intensification of individuality and community: grace as 
personhood 
When this free self-communication of God takes place and man is addressed by God's 
word and given a share in his nature a second aspect of heightening takes place: the new 
quality of unique personhood is bestowed. This is a uniquely Christian category. It was 
unknown in the pre-Christian era and is sacrificed in all forms of post- Christian 
`Titanism'. '°° "The person only shines forth in the individual where the absolute 
Unique God bestows an equally unique name on him", "' "person" being the "new 
name" given by God in the Book of Revelation. "' This new name indicates entry into a 
"supernatural" and direct relationship with God and the consequent receipt of personal 
call and complementary endowment. This bestowal is by no means at the expense of 
the community. The community is involved in and indeed built up by the unique 
endowment, the personal mission of the individual, "' as we will see in the next chapter. 
This unusual reservation of the concept of person "for the supernatural uniqueness 
of the man who has been called into a relationship of intimacy with God", " obviously 
raises a number of questions, not least who is a person. Despite the narrow definition 
of the term Balthasar claims that all human beings can share in it to some degree. He is 
97 cf chapter 1 section D and chapter 2 section B2 above 
98 Th 11 401-2 
99 Ibid. 407 
100 Ibid. 423 cf note 95 above 
101 Ibid. 402 It is "unique because it is chosen by God". Balthasar quotes Rev 2 17 and refers to the new 
names of Is 62: 2; 65: 15; 60: 14; 62: 4; Gen 17: 5; 32: 28ff; Hos 2: 3; Jn 1: 42; cf also Th 11 254. For the 
clear influence of dialogist, Rosenzwieg, cf 1639,645. 
102 Th 111 208 
103 cf Th 11404,415 
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not withdrawing his earlier affirmation of the hypercosmic nature of every man: all are 
spiritual subjects. The question is whether these spiritual subjects are to be called 
persons or whether this is to be reserved to the man called through grace. Whilst 
Balthasar concedes the possibility of the former he stipulates in this case a distinction 
between two forms or `grades' of personhood. Again mission (which we will see is 
intrinsically connected to person) is not understood by Balthasar in an "elitist" sense, 
but it is a possibility for anyone prepared "to break out of his egoistic narrowness and 
do the good for its own sake". "' This perspective simply fits with the understanding of 
a range of differing `grace-relations' described in chapter five. Nevertheless this does not 
stop Balthasar leaning toward the `supernatural' understanding of person as we shall see 
when, in the next chapter, we consider in greater detail this concept of personhood so 
crucial to Balthasar's understanding of our intra-trinitarian christocentric fulfilment in 
grace as described in the Theo-drama. 
3 The intensification of intimacy and the intensification of the 
distance of sin 
Finally the new supernatural heightening of anthropological tension illuminates sin: "the 
new immediacy and intimacy between the called person and the personal divine life 
gives a new quality to every turning aside, every refusal". "' 
There is not room in this thesis to offer a full discussion of the treatment of sin in 
the Theo-drama. Suffice to say that whilst on the one hand sin and evil are treated with 
the utmost seriousness, in specific treatment of this topic little attention is given to the 
historical dimension of sin and the fall and there is some confusion between descriptions 
of the essential characteristics belonging to man and those arising from his sinful 
condition. '°' 
1 04 Th II 402 
pos Th III 529 
106 Th 11 404 
1°7When we proceed "on the basis of man's realistic existence, as we know it" (the "current act" which 
includes aspects of all the others) it is difficult to clearly identify the fallen and sinful tensions in 
particular from amongst the various natural tensions our finitude manifests (Th 11 336). 
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This is partly because of Balthasar's understanding of a progressive unveiling of sin 
such that it is only in the biblio-Christian context that sin really comes into play, '°8 and 
both participation in divine holiness and the shadow of sin intensify in the law of the 
reciprocal escalation of love and evil. 10' Ultimately, though, the fact that sin is `located' 
in the Trinity overshadows quests for the root of sin in the historical stages of human 
freedom. As the world is to be located within the diastasis of the persons of the 
trinity"' so too is its sinful alienation. "The creature's No resounds at the `place' of 
distinction within the Godhead" between the Father and the Son. "' The Father's kenotic 
begetting implies such an extraordinary distance, a separation internal to God that it 
"includes and grounds every other separation-be it never so dark and bitter" 112 
-including the distance of sin. 
As well as being the ground of the God-world relationship, the loving Father-Son 
relationship undergirds and renders possible the godlessness of the world, even the 
existence of hell. "3 In as much as the primal divine kenosis is a surrender of the 
Godhead to the Son it "manifests a (divine) God-lessness (of love, of course). "' 14 "As a 
result of creation" this 
most positive Godless-ness on God's part has produced [ergeben] a negative godlessness... Man's 
refusal was possible because of the trinitarian "recklessness" of divine love, which, in its self- 
giving, observed no limits and had no regard for itself. In this, it showed both its power and its 
powerlessness and fundamental vulnerability (the two are inseparable). 15 
Here then sin is identified as the fruit of God's kenosis rather than the fruit of man's 
decision and in the light of this ultimate trinitarian ground the moment of human 
historical responsibility pales into insignificance. It also means that sin and death (and 
108 Th 11 404-5; IV 167 
109 Th I 30; 11 405; IV 56,166-168,338. The "vast abysses" thus opened up in the God-man relationship 
produce "the dimensions and intensities of theo-drama. " 11 405 
10 cf chapter 2 section C above 
." Th IV 333-4 
112 Ibid. 325; cf also V 101 and 479-481 regarding the influence of Przywara. 
"' Th IV 325 
14 Ibid. 324 
115 Ibid. 329 
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thus we will see below, the cross too) is always `part of the picture': God's plan has 
always known of it and even took account of it in the act of creation. 1' 
However this location of the creature's sin and its resolution in a trinitarian context 
is in danger of overshadowing the significance of the historical and temporal and reducing 
the seriousness of sin. The creature's no is located within the Son's all-embracing yes; 
"It is the lie, which only exists by courtesy of the truth and has already been overtaken 
by it. For the Son in his kenotic mission follows truth to the end. Thus "The creature 's 
No is merely a twisted knot within the Son's pouring forth; it is left behind by the current 
of love. ""' In such descriptions it is difficult to see what significance the human 
response of `yes' or `no' can really have. We will return to this question. "8 
D Christological grounding of the heightening 
In keeping with the christocentric perspective already outlined, this new supernatural 
heightening can only be understood with reference to Christ. Under the heightening 
anthropology seems to slide between nothingness and infinity. But in the God-man, 
Jesus Christ, a new foothold as it were is gained, "a concrete system of co-ordinates". "' 
1 Jesus as the concrete living of Uberspannung 
The first point about this christological foothold is that it does not mean the obliteration 
of tension. Instead it confirms that the supernatural Uberspannung in man "does not 
inhumanly tear his existence apart. Jesus Christ proves that existence in this tension is 
liveable, that it is in fact "the solution to the riddle of the `Old Adam' and brings release 
from his torment. ""' Thus Jesus reveals true humanity. As we discussed in chapter 
two, this is expressed above all by the fact that he does not stand outside the analogy of 
being, but is the concrete analogy of being, such that this analogy is the `rule' for all 
further anthropology, including participation in the life of God. 
"6 Th 11148 
117 Th IV 330 (my italics) 
118 cf chapter 7 section B and chapter 9 section A below. 
19 Th 11 406 
120 Ibid. 406 
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2 Christological representation and the doctrine of 
redemption 
The second point is that Christ embraces every tension and every distance. This is 
central to Balthasar's soteriology. Whilst, unfortunately, we do not have space to 
include a full treatment of his doctrine of redemption which lies at the centre of the theo- 
dramatic action, "' we can briefly set out the central themes relevant to our concerns. 
Christ's embrace of all tension and distance constitutes the soteriological 
representation (which has its anthropological point of departure in the intrinsic 
significance of the `we' in the human `I') that `changes' the individuals who make up the 
community, through a Word of forgiveness that takes on the judgement, the dying and 
the death that has proved the ultimate riddle for man in his threefold polarity. "' 
Radically, for Balthasar this representative identification with human nature knows no 
limits and includes sin, 123 going as far as a descent into hell understood as a real solidarity 
with dead sinners in the lonely silence of the tomb. 124 By identifying himself with all 
that is anti-God he infiltrates the chaotic world of sin, so that, as the Father's forgiving 
Word, he can cut it from man and let it go back to nothingness. Thus it is in God's 
incarnation "down to the lowest depths and the furthest bounds" that man is raised up, 
transfigured and permeated by the Spirit. "' It is in the resurrection that the Father 
shows this judged man to be his forgiving Word through whom the sinner is liberated, 
forgiven and enabled to share in the divine life, making the resurrection the new centre of 
anthropology. "' 
Central too, to the `mechanics' of our redemption is the fact that the exchange of life 
and death made possible by this radical understanding of representation is specifically 
located within the relations of the persons of the Trinity. This not only means that all 
12IThIII50 
122 Th 11 407-409 
123 Th 111241,248; IV 241,334-336,339. In this respect he does not think the Fathers went far enough. 
IV 245,250-254 
124 Mysterium Paschale (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1990) 148-188 
125 Th 11 412 Regarding dramatic resources for this theo-dramatic action cf `death on behalf of someone 
else' and `the unmaking of Kings' ("descending 
into the deepest dungeons of the world" I 400) in I 392- 
408. 
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the persons of the Trinity are dramatically involved in the drama of the cross, as we find 
distinctively in Balthasar's theology of the cross and his understanding of the dying 
Christ's `God-forsakeness'127 (for grace comes at a price), but also that the whole 
redemptive plan is primarily understood in terms of the eternal relations of the 
Trinity. "' 
As the world and its sinful rebellion is located in the diastasis of the persons of the 
Trinity it is precisely at this locus that its sinful alienation has to be solved. "' God's 
commitment to redemption through the cross is eternal, "' `consequent' upon his 
creative will (which stands from eternity13'), because this redemption is the guarantee of 
the goodness and the success of creation; 132 it is what it takes to care for the vineyard of 
God's creation. 113 As the cross (like sin and death) thus has a significance before the 
foundation of the world, it is not only the incarnation of the Son that is predestined but 
also the suffering of his redemptive mission134 and the gift of grace and redemption 
through the cross are connected intrinsically in Balthasar's christocentrism. 135 If the 
`place' at which the creature's no resounds is precisely the `place' of distinction within 
the Godhead, the Son does not need to change place when he represents the alienated 
world but does so on the basis of his very topos, that is his absolute distinction from the 
Father within the Trinity. '36 
This `intrinsicality' of the cross in the divine plan is primarily to do with 
Balthasar's picture of God, his understanding of the triune relations, such that we could 
say the redemption of the cross is not so much because of sin, as it is because of who 
the Trinity is. For Balthasar it is the cross above all else that tells us who the Trinity is, 
126 Th 11 408-9 
127 cf Th 1429; 111216,522,530; IV 35,327-8,333,335-7 (cf note 10), 349,356,363 
128 Th IV 333 
129 Ibid. 
'30 Th 111 514; IV 360 
13' Th IV 330 
132 Th 111254,514; cf IV 330 
133 Th III 516f 
134 cf Th 111 47; IV 40; chapter 2 section AI above 
"s cf eg Th III 14,39,493; Mysterium Paschale 12f 
136 Th IV 333-334 
196 
and, as we feel our way back from cross to Trinity, we see that the crucifixion is strictly 
grounded in the immanent Trinity in the radical, absolute personal self-surrender that 
constitutes Balthasar's vision of the Godhead. The conditions for Jesus' abandonment 
lie "in the absolute distance/distinction between the Hypostasis who surrenders the 
Godhead and the Hypostasis who receives it. "137 It is this primal kenosis that is the 
condition for the possibility of both sin and its solution, the cross. The Son's 
redemptive kenosis only exists because of this `prior' intra-trinitarian kenosis of which 
it is the economic representation. 
The `distance' between God and God on the basis of the primal kenotic begetting 
not only grounds the distance of sin it also goes beyond it, so that the absolute loving 
distance of Father and Son in the union of the Spirit, (represented economically in the 
anguished separation of the cross), always overtakes the distance of sin. Thus the drama 
of redemption at the heart of the theo-dramatic action is above all else a drama of the 
inner life of the Trinity, the "primal drama". "' The world (as we have seen) is created 
with the Son's generation, is his and has him as its goal and whatever way he is handed 
over to the world "is an integral part of his `co-original' thanksgiving for the world", '39 
and even if the world rejects him, the world is still his and has him as its goal. It is thus 
that the creature's no is located in and already overtaken by the Son's all-embracing yes, 
a blip in the surging current of love140-although Balthasar maintains that Christ's 
representation does not interfere with our freedom. 14' 
3 Communio sanctorum 
Finally, building upon the unique relation between `I' and `we' in Christ that makes his 
representation pro nobis possible, the final christological aspect concerns the 
137 Ibid. 333 
138 Ibid. 326 
139 Ibid. (This is identified with his eternal Yes to the gift of consubstantial divinity. ) 
140 cf Ibid. 329-330 This conclusion is perhaps the final implication of a systematic understanding of the 
creature as being found "within the distinction between the hypostases". (IV 333) 
141 Indeed, in the law of reciprocal escalation, far from "the all encompassing action of the "Lamb as 
though it had been slain" stifling all possible resistance, the degree of rejection increases, as for the first 
time man resists being embraced by the mystery of the cross. Ibid. 11 
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communion (Eucharistic and Sanctorum) that is thus made possible. This dispels the 
tragic side of individuation in bodiliness, 142 instigating a union which involves body as 
well as mind in pneumatic rather than biological medium, a `deprivatisation' which 
establishes the sharing and working for one another of the communion of saints. The 
communio sanctorum is always mediated by sacramental communion143 and Balthasar 
also speaks of an analogy (deriving from Origen) between the distribution and 
availability of Christ in the Eucharist and the openness and permeability that is possible 
among the members of the communion of saints. " In this way "we are ourselves by 
simultaneously making ourselves a dwelling place for others", "' a gift of self made in 
response to God's self-gift to us. 
Whilst we do not intend to examine the sacramental element further, here we 
encounter a crucial aspect of the new life of grace that will be developed below in our 
consideration of personhood. The new relationship with God is also a new relationship 
with other persons: communion is horizontal as well as vertical, a `supernatural' 
communion clearly fulfilling the essential relationship between my `I' and other `I's (I- 
thou/I-we) that we explored in Part II and above in the relationship between individual 
and community (section B3). In this way grace as communio imitates the fellowship, 
the communio of the persons of the Trinity. 146 
E The new christological rhythm 
These "christological new departures" so heighten anthropological tension that they 
explode the proportions of the human being, whilst also fulfilling the fragmentary aspect 
of the pre-christian tensions. Pre-christian `moderation' is replaced by the Christian 
attitudes of gratitude, humility, hope, boldness as "man discerns dimensions in himself 
142 Th II 409 
143 Th V 483 
144 Ibid. 373-4,382-3 
145 Ibid. 382 
146 Ibid. 483 
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which, if he did not know that he could fulfil himself in God, he would despair of 
fathoming. ""' 
To understand how this is the case we need to consider what specifically the person 
and work of Christ do to the scheme of polarity that has been used to describe the 
nature of man. The Word of God in Jesus Christ cannot be understood to avoid 
somehow this threefold rhythm, since he becomes man in a fully bodily sense and man 
exists precisely in this rhythm. What happens is that he enters the human sphere at one 
pole of every either/or "in order, from that vantage point, to go on to fulfil the other 
pole" 148 and thus establish a new rhythm. Let us see how this works with reference to 
each of the three pairs of tensions. 
1 First tension 
The twofold rhythm in which the body rises to spirit and spirit into the body "is not 
destroyed but overlaid by a primacy of the descent" of the divine into the flesh and thus 
descent is understood to be primary in the whole incarnational movement. 14' This 
incarnational descent goes right down to the obedience of death on the cross, with its 
ultimately ecclesial implications as a Eucharistic enfleshment. In this way the natural 
rootedness of the spirit in flesh such that the flesh is permeated by spirit and lifted up 
in the sphere of the spirit, is fulfilled "in the new supernatural rhythm in which God 
becomes incarnate right down to the lowest depths and out to the farthest bounds" 
where "the physical is `divinised', permeated with God's Pneuma, transfigured and 
`transferred' (Col I: 13) into the kingdom of the Son, and hence of God""' through con- 
crucifixion with the love of Christ. (This of course coheres with other descriptions of 
our ascent being overtaken by the descending event of Agape and brought to a fulfilment 
beyond our own upward drive. ) 
147Th 11410 
'48 Ibid. 411 
'49 Ibid. 412 
150 Ibid. 
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2 Second tension 
Christ's overcoming of death is explored in the context of the second tension. Here we 
saw the intimate relationship between procreating love and death. Now a love that is 
purely personal and free descends into this generative chain and undergoes a death that 
is also personal and free, so that the death (tainted by guilt) entailed by being a member 
of the species is robbed of its sting and victory (I Cor 15: 55). This new process then is 
not subject to the worldly cycle but encompasses and transcends it, not as something 
sexless but as suprasexual. 
The reciprocal fruitfulness of man and woman is surpassed by the ultimate priority of the 
"Second Adam", who, in suprasexual fruitfulness, brings a "companion", the Church, into 
being. 151 
This companion is brought forth from his death on the cross, like the rib from Adam in 
the deep sleep-not in an unconscious passivity, but "in the consciously affirmed love- 
death of the Agape" from which comes the Eucharistic fruitfulness. In this new man- 
woman rhythm of Christ and Church, as the Church is his creation, taken from his own 
substance, the relative priority of man over woman is an absolute one of Christ over the 
Church. Yet this is an `over-fulfilment' of the first creation "for in the mind of God the 
incarnate Word has never existed without his Church (Eph I: 4-6). i152 This `new' 
relationship is a completely human one; it is a new rhythm in which human beings can 
share, such that human fruitfulness need not only be understood in terms of sexual man- 
woman fruitfulness but can also involve a celibate fruitfulness. This is a stepping out of 
the cycle of generation (Mk 10: 29) "to enter the unique, supra-temporal, sexual 
relationship between the New Adam and his "spouse" (Rev 21: 9)" in which God's 
Agape "becomes the all-inclusive total meaning of life". 153 
3 Third tension 
Thirdly the relationship between individual and community is transcended in the 
direction of the communio sanctorum as we have already described. This happens 
15' Ibid. 413 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 414 
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through the transformation of the individual into a person, called and sent forth, with a 
dramatic effect on the nature of the community, all the members of which are enriched 
by his new unique quality (charism)154 and thus the universality indwelling the individual 
is expressed. Like the communion of each individual finite freedom with infinite 
freedom, this "reciprocal openness of the redeemed" by no means involves the loss of 
individual distinctiveness. Rather this mutual openness and availability is "on the basis 
of the unfathomable distinctiveness of each", for it is the mutual exchange of unique gifts 
which enriches the community. "' 
Thus in this rhythm we see confirmed the affirmation of the heightened natural 
tension. There is a simultaneous intensification of both poles: the more unique and 
`personalised' the individual, the closer-knit the community. This is not an 
understanding of communion based on a `spiritualisation' of relationships, as was 
suggested by the scholastics. "' It is based on the enfleshment of the Logos and the 
ongoing communication of the members in the bodily organism of the Church through 
the Eucharist, and on the fact that this enfleshment is an expression of his surrendering 
of divine uniqueness "to enter into the `form of a servant' of the mere individual, for the 
benefit of the `many"'. It is possible then to share not only in his uniqueness but "also 
in the unique surrender of his uniqueness `for many"'. ' 57 The Christian rhythm of 
individual and community in this reciprocity of personal uniqueness and surrendering of 
personal uniqueness "becomes a concrete metaphor of trinitarian life with God, 
inscribed in the very structures of the creaturely tension between individual and 
species. " 
158 
The person's self-surrender to the community can so personalise the latter that it is no longer an 
extrapersonal principle of unity beside and above the unity of persons but is integrated out of 
these surrendered unities, just as God's unity of9nature is not something in addition to the 
interplay of relations between the divine Persons. 
154 I Cor 12; Ephesians 4: 4-16 




159 Ibid. 416 
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But of course this too remains under the analogy of being: however great the similarity 
between creature and God in the new rhythm of the Christian order the greater 
dissimilarity is not abolished, consisting as it does "in the fact that the created persons 
remain individual substances, each of which is an image and likeness of the Absolute 
Substance. "60 
4 Marian representation 
We should add here that, in keeping with what we said about the essential feminine 
mediatorial role at the end of the previous chapter, the crucial `link' between 
christological representation and this communion with God and others in him is a 
Marian representation. Developing the traditional understanding of Mary's `yes' to 
God at the annunciation as "uttered `in the name of the whole human race"',, "' Balthasar 
depicts her role at the foot of the cross in terms of a second `representative' yes for 
those who refuse to respond. 162 Mary's openness makes her the only one able to 
receive the Eucharistic distribution of the Son as he is shattered on the cross. It is like a 
second conception in which she is both the bride of the son (their union, beginning in the 
experience of darkness and desolation, rending the curtain that separated God and the 
earth), and in which she is also the womb of the Church, where the seed of God is now 
"eucharistically multiplied-thousands-fold""' and "`the new man' is conceived and 
born". 164 As we have seen in section D2 above, those who refuse to respond are 
"undergirded and sustained" by the Word's representative death ("`for sinners' and on 
their behalf'), but for a full understanding of salvation we also need to recognise the 
significance of Mary/Ecclesia's response for them, "as a source, representing them and 
answering for them, in her darkness, at the cross". "' The representative death requires a 
'6o Ibid. 
161 Th IV 360 
'62Ibid. 358-361; cf Th V 345 
163 Ibid. 358; The Eucharist is the definitive `Word become flesh' in the Virgin Mother, Mary-Ecclesia. 
(Ibid. 361) 
164 Ibid. 359; "... in the second creation the Virgin is empowered to a new motherhood... she is to bring 
forth redeemed creation's answer... " Ibid. 360 
165 Th IV 361 
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response and this too is representative, the response of Mary/Church for us and on our 
behalf. 
Here we see the `extremes' of both human freedom and divine grace in action. The 
interplay of the powerlessness and poverty of total self-giving and the omnipotence of 
divine grace bring about a supreme fruitfulness. 
At the Cross, Mary's Yes consents to her being totally stripped of power (Mary can do 
nothing to help her Son) ... 
God, from the lonely heights of his almighty power, can 
take the `nothingness' of unfruitful virginity (to which, in the Old Covenant, the odour 
of shame was attached) and make of it the fruitful motherhood of the Virgin with a 
fruitfulness that extends to the whole world. 166 
This universally extensive fruitfulness is the distribution of the Son through the 
Eucharist through which he thus definitively becomes flesh in Mary/Ecclesia-making 
her response "more fruitful than all the attempts on the part of the sinful world to 
fructify itself-attempts that are doomed to sterility. ""' Such a response is thus the 
living enactment of what was said about the contrast between the `dead end' of autarkia 
and an autexousion fulfilled through consent; it is the living example of the active 
productivity granted `passive' receptivity. It is this many-levelled fruitful consent of 
Mary's (to the divine birth and life-giving death) that makes her "a mediatrix of the 
graces of the Trinity""' and gives the feminine principle of Mary/church/soul such a 
central role in the rebirth of grace discussed at the end of chapter five, it being through 
Mary that Christ comes into the world; through the Church that individuals are 
baptised; through the faithful lives of such disciples that Christ is made known in every 
age. 
F Concluding comments 
So, in addition to the characteristics of the finite spirit formally speaking, discussed in 
chapters four and five under the topic of finite freedom, in this chapter we have 
described those specific to the concrete human creature, analysed in terms of the three 
tensions of matter-spirit, man-woman, individual-community. In the first of these 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
168Th V 467; cf 441 
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tensions we have that which does immediately distinguish the human from the angel: the 
body-soul tension, thus in fact completing what we might expect to find in a `definition' 
of human nature: spirit, body, freedom, rationality, self-reflective possession and inter- 
subjective relationship-although there is no sense in which Balthasar explicitly 
connects these various aspects of his description. Meanwhile the second two tensions, 
man-woman and individual-community, cohere with the dimension of relationship and 
communion which we have already seen to be important in Balthasar's perspective on 
our nature. However this complementarity is by no means explicitly drawn out. Such a 
`collation' of the descriptions in Section B of volume II of the Theo-drama (the `formal' 
treatment on freedom) and section C (the 'concrete': man) in order to give us an 
integrated description of human nature comes from the reader's own analysis and 
overview. There is not a strong sense of continuity between the description in section B 
and that in section C. They seem to offer very different models for analysing our 
nature, despite purporting not to talk about two different things, but in two different 
ways (formal and concrete), the latter additionally being specific to a particular finite 
spiritual creature, although it is the same creature which provides the point of reference 
in the former. Whilst intersubjectivity and christocentricity remain centre stage in 
Section C, freedom is not so dominant. 
It is confusing to find the central defining characteristic of man, that is his relation of 
body and soul, matter and spirit, clearly distinguishing him from the rest of creation, 
presented as just one central feature among three, the other two obviously different from 
the rest of creation in degree rather than kind. Very little constructive theological 
attention is given the soul, the spiritual nature of man, or the significance of the 
difference between matter and spirit and the singular situation of man as a union of the 
two. Moreover, there is no attempt specifically to connect this central feature of man's 
nature to the imago dei (discussed in the excursus immediately preceding the 
anthropological section Q. 
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We have already seen how for Balthasar the unique and profound situation of man in 
relation to natural and supernatural is understood in terms of paradox or dialectic. Here 
in the Theo-drama's anthropology there is a marked preoccupation with tension. 
Certainly it is true that the initial picture presented is that of a natural anthropology, 
which, without revelation of its only resolution in Christ, is an enigmatic set of puzzles 
precisely because it is Christ alone who reveals man to himself. Even allowing for this 
however, such emphasis on tension in describing the essential characteristics of man is 
problematic. 
Firstly, even if it is a philosophical anthropology that uncovers such tensions, they 
are all the same proposed by Balthasar (via Przywara) as the fundamental features of 
human existence and directly associated with essence or nature. That our nature (created 
"very good" by God) should be so characterised by tension is problematic in itself, but 
it is the first tension that is particularly contentious: characterising the matter spirit 
relation as one of tension is at odds with the repeatedly affirmed doctrine of the unity of 
matter and spirit in man. 169 Secondly, still heeding the assertions that this is a natural 
anthropology, and Balthasar's acknowledgement of the unity of our nature in the face of 
gnostic dualism, "' the emphasis on tension (even conflict) inevitably suggests that our 
nature is not only incomplete without the revelation of Christ but in some sense divided. 
Again, this manifests a confusion of the essential characteristics of our nature and of the 
same nature under the condition of sin. 
Finally even `beyond' the natural pre-Christian perspective in the christological 
resolution, tension remains paramount. Indeed it is intensified, stretched further: an 
`extension' that is confirmed in Christ and results in the extreme and uttermost 
stretching apart of the Son from the Father on the cross. We shall return to this 
question of tension in the conclusion. 
169 This does not imply a confusion of matter and spirit in man, rather a dichotomism (material body and 
spiritual soul) entailing an intrinsic attachment of the two parts forming the unity of one nature. cf 
Fourth Lateran Council 1215 D 800; Council of Vienne (1311-1312) D 902; Vatican ID 3002; Vatican H 
Gaudium et Spes 14; Catechism of the Catholic Church 364,365. 
170 cf section BI above 
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Chapter 7 
Nature-grace and personhood 
For Balthasar, the freedom of human beings is the freedom of the actor who takes upon himself a 
role in a drama. ' 
Who can show me the role in which I can really be myself? ' 
A Persons in Christ 
Our survey of Balthasar's theo-dramatic presentation of nature and grace has moved 
from looking at `man in God' (the title of volume II) to unveiling `persons in Christ' 
(title of volume III)-the `destination' of the theological anthropology analysed in the 
previous chapter. We need to complete our understanding of this tracing of fulfilment 
with a closer look at what is meant by being a person in Christ. 
1 From role to mission 
The question of person and role, of "who am I? " and "what is the task that justifies, 
fulfils, forms my existence (individually and socially)? ", 3 is fundamental to Balthasar, 
more so in the end than the question of nature and the human body-soul constitution. 4 It 
is a question posed in the Prolegomena, first in terms of the `world theatre' metaphor 
(which is found in ancient thought, climaxes in Christian drama and is lost in idealist and 
post-idealist theatre); and then in terms of modem concern with the question `who am 
I? ', as Balthasar marks out the transition from role to mission. His analysis locates 
role/person as a `borderline concept' in the nature-supernature dialectic although it only 
finds definitive answer in Christian revelation. ' 
The world theatre metaphor is significant in so far as it understands roles to be 
apportioned and judged by a divine dramatist/director, recognises some kind of distance 
'FC Bauerschmidt: "Theo-drama and Political Theology" Communio 25 1998 540 
2 Th 147 
3 Balthasar: "Another 10 years - 1975" in The Analogy of Beauty (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1986) 226 
° Th 148 If, 493; E Babini "Jesus Christ, Form and Norm of Man according to Hans Urs von Balthasar" 
Communio 16 1989 449 
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between I and role (whilst being aware that it is a synthesis with a certain kind of 
identity at the heart of it), and perceives "the social involvement of each role with all the 
others". 6 Although sometimes the bearing of role upon person can be no more than that 
of slipping in and out of costume, in the Christian period, far from leaving the `I' 
untouched, role "is what gives people their fundamental uniqueness", ' a mission, 
personalising them for life in the world, everything depending on the way the role is 
played. The `I's responsibility in acting out the role can be understood as a genuine 
counterpart to the Divine. Ultimately, Balthasar finds reflection on the metaphor's 
content (the underlying metaphysical implications and the individual elements) more 
theologically fruitful than its direct application. 
Balthasar divides philosophical reflection on the subject into two approaches. 
Firstly there are those that understand role as the acceptance of limitation' (such as in 
stoicism and the various attempts of psychology and sociology to bring man to accept 
what he is, with its limitations). Secondly there are those that understand role as 
alienation' (such as the neoplatonic path to uniqueness in the uniquely One through the 
loss of individual selfhood, or the idealist loss of the individual as person in the 
favouring of the ideal over the empirical `I' and the relentless orientation towards the 
perfect integration of the individual into the totality of the spirit). He concludes that 
ultimately both approaches fail to answer the question `who am I' because the `I' is 
surrendered to an all embracing life/essence, and a necessary connection between the 
particular `I' and life/essence is not adequately delineated. Finally he considers attempts 
to mediate between the two. '° There is the pre-Christian near East's conception of the 
king who represents the deity to the people and the people before the god, but leaves 
other members of the nation indeterminate. There is the Italic understanding of the 
`genius' which glimpses the "goal of providing a basis for the individuality of each 
5 cf Th 146-48,129-257,354ff, 481-648; "On the Concept of Person" Communio 13 1986 18-26 
6 Th I 253 
7 
Ibid. 165 
8 Ibid. 493-544 
9 Ibid. 545-589 
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human being" but cannot reach it, being diffuse and ambivalent, neither fully identified 
with the human I nor set over against it as another `I". There is George Simmel's post- 
christian, post-idealist striving for a new expression of individuality in terms of "the 
individual law", the essential ideal image of the conscious spirit "predicated of it as its 
very own, sprung from its very self, " an `ought' that everyone carries within him-yet 
lacking the interpersonal dimension. Lastly there is the `dialogue principle' pioneered 
by Ebner, Buber, Marcel and Rosenzweig in which awareness of my `I' comes through 
discovery of the `thou'. This brings us to the threshold of the answer to the question 
`who am I', for it points to the fact that a positive answer can only come from the 
vertical axis of revelation when the `I' is addressed by God as `thou', and, in particular, 
it comes as a summoning, calling and being sent, that is, as mission. This means the 
arbitrariness of `role' as the draping of a colourless `I' in whatever trappings are at hand 
could be left behind, in favour of "an `I' that was irreplaceable as such"" and could be 
enabled to adopt a genuinely dramatic role in the real play of life. To this perspective, 
so influential on his own formulation, Balthasar brings the crucial specifically Christian 
content of christology and trinitarian doctrine: "only in Jesus Christ does it become clear 
how profoundly this definitive `I'-name signifies vocation, mission. 1112 
2 The christological concept 
In Balthasar's Christology there is identity of person and mission in Christ, an absolute 
and completely unique coincidence of role and person. 13 The point of identity is his 
mission from God (missio), which is identical with the Person in God and as God 
(processio)", 14 for his mission as he-who-is-sent is not given him subsequently a 
posteriori but he must spontaneously have declared his readiness "before the foundation 
1° Ibid. 591-643 
" Ibid. 645 
12 Ibid. 645 Balthasar acknowledges the influence of Guardini, Mounier, Marcel and de Rougement here. 
cf "On the Concept of Person" 25 
13 Th 111231,533 
14 Th 111 533; 1646 (Aquinas); V 80 (Adrienne von Speyr) 
208 
of the world". " Jesus Christ is "someone who never was, and never could have been, 
anyone other than the One sent [der je schon Gesendete]". " In this identity the duality 
between `being' and `seeming', person and role that runs throughout the structure of 
man, is overcome. " It is in him that mission and personhood take on some kind of 
identity for us. This is the relationship between the incarnate Word and human nature 
as a whole. " And it is the gift of the Spirit to us, who mediates between the two 
aspects of the duality brought together in the non-heteronomous obedience of the Son's 
humanity, that "can close the tragic breach between person and role in mission" 19 
enabling us to fulfil our freedom in carrying out the unique mission to which we are 
called. 
The Spirit has always borne witness to the unique and peerless Son of the Father, 
but "the Son... can impart the Spirit to the players in such a way that they too, in an 
analogous way can be seen to be unique", 20 giving each individual a personal 
commission, a task to do and the freedom to do it. So it is the bestowal of this mission 
that makes us persons. 
It is when God addresses a conscious subject, tells him who he is and what he means to the 
eternal God of truth and shows him the purpose of his existence-that is, imparts a distinctive 
and divinely authorised mission- that we can say of a conscious subject that he is a person. 
21 
This "happened, archetypally in the case of Jesus Christ, when he was given his eternal 
'definition'-'You are my beloved Son"'; but we, who cannot have an exact identity 
between `I' and mission as it exists in Jesus (for this in Balthasar's Christology is "the 
irrefutable expression of his divinity"22) have a personalising mission by being given a 
share in the universal mission of Christ. 23 "This personal commission... is actually 
15 Th III 516 
16 Ibid. 150 
17 Th I 646 
'8ThIII231 
19ThI646 
20 Th 1115 1; I 641 (Ebner), 646-7 
21 Th 111207,263; V 392-393,413; This is glimpsed in theological dialogism. I 628 
22 Th 111 207 
23 Ibid. 248-249; V 414 
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constitutive of the person as such"24 because it is what God always intended for him in 
Christ, what he specifically and nobody else is meant to be. 25 
So person is a Christological concept. We "can claim to be persons only in virtue of 
a relationship with him and in dependence on him.. . this participation 
is what makes 
conscious subjects into persons in the Christian sense. "26 And this grace of 
incorporation into Christ upon which our personhood rests comes about as a result of 
his redemptive, representative identification with us described in the previous chapter. 27 
As we enter into "the sphere of life and action created by the extension of the universal 
mission of Jesus", that is, we respond `yes' to `being in' Christ (en Christoi), we stop 
living for ourselves and gain personality through being in him, 28 for the new life of grace 
involves an `unselving' by being drawn into the life and death of Christ and being filled 
by him. 29 Our `nature', understood as the freedom to make our own decisions and 
actions, is thus perfected by the grace of participation in the divine freedom through our 
incorporation into Christ, into the Eucharistic offering he makes in the Spirit to the 
Father. 3° Theo-drama, therefore, does not end with the Christ event, rather "a new 
dramatic dimension comes into being". " Christ in his role/mission reveals the Father, 
and now we as Christians `play' Christ. We are a dramatic mode of his presence as he 
continues to work in his body the Church. 32 
3 Grace as action for communio 
He who drinks from the well becomes in turn a wellspring. 
33 
For Balthasar grace always implies mission. " The personal and personalising mission 
received in Christ is the particular grace of one's vocation or mission. " It is a God-given 
24 Th III 51 
25 Ibid. 533 
26 Ibid. 207,489; IV 406; I 641-2 (Ebner) 
27 cf Th 111241,248 
28 Ibid. 245-248 
29 Th V 333-334 This is in the Pauline sense of Galations 2: 20; 6: 14; Eph 2: 6; and Rom 6: 4; 6: 6; 
14: 7-8. In purgatory there is a destruction of my `I' to be returned to me as a new `I' in God. Th V 364 
It is here that the "definitive recasting of the `I' is carried out. " V 391 
30 Th IV 406 
31ThI118 
32 Ibid. 118,53 
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task in the world, " "an aspect of the grace of the God who is concerned for and involved 
in the world". " It therefore implies "the social dimension of service on behalf of 
others", 38 a `de-privatisation' making "ecclesial room for othersi39-for personal 
identity in Christ always involves the community of those who are in Christ. The Spirit 
who gives unique identity/mission is likewise the "socialising `between "', and the 
individual is sent to a stage inhabited by an ensemble of fellow actors into which he is 
inserted. 40 Believers thus share in Christ's pro nobis and their theological personhood 
coincides with their role and influence in the community on behalf of others. 41 On the 
basis of his pro nobis, Christ opens up "an area of Christian mission" in which 
individuals "can be given a share in his salvific work and suffering for the world". 42 The 
communion of saints, which we have already encountered as the supernatural 
christological fulfilment of the relationship between individual and community, is this 
`de-privatisation' in Christ constituted through the pneumatological communication of 
something of Christ's own personal concrete universality to the individual. " This 
"signals an unimaginable expansion, in the order of creation, of the individual's sphere of 
influence"44 in which there "is in principle no limit to the possible influence of one 
member upon another within the spiritual community of goods, both in space and 
time. "45 The individual drama of the person in Christ "may extend to the whole 
universe, depending on how far it is prepared to co-operate in being inserted into the 
33ThV398 
'a Th 111349,528; Engagement 38-9 
35 To be precise, there is a distinction between vocation and mission, "the latter is inchoately present in 
the former as its goal... but there are intermediary stages. " (Mark 3.14f; Acts 9: 15f) Th 11 267 
36 Th 11 402 
37ThII1528 
38 Th 111 267 
39 Ibid. 527,271 ff; II 50 A number of commentators criticise Balthasar's failure to develop this 
emphasis in the direction of a social theology. cf chapter 9 note 1 below 
ao Th I 647 (my italics) 
41ThIV406 
42 Th 111 241 
43 Th 1150; 111 349 This is in contrast to Hegel who only recognises the Spirit's universalising. I 588 
as Th IV 407 
45 Ibid. 413 
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normative drama of Christ's life, death and resurrection. "46 Thus living in the grace of 
Christ, that communion to which our nature tends, is not only a vertical exchange 
between us and God, but a horizontal exchange with our fellow human beings, "my 
being-in-grace (which is being-in-love) involving being allotted and possessing a charism, 
personal to me, for the sake of the community... having an influence that is ultimately 
universal. "47 This universal range of action, "the opening up of ever new and 
unimaginable realms of freedom and dramatic plot", is held together in Christ as the most 
universal because the most concrete. 48 The coincidence of universality and particularity 
in every mission means that the interaction of missions generates "a genuine and 
unlimited richness of dramatic tensions, conflicts and collisions. "49 In this conception 
the significance of `who' over `what' (nature) is again apparent: 
The one addressed by God does not love the other person as someone who "shares the same 
nature" (like the stoic and the Spinozist) but as someone who is likewise addressed by God in 
`what is most individual to him'. S° 
So we see the centrality of the mission of personhood to the fulfilment of the aspect 
of response written into the gift of existence and heightened in view of the gift of God's 
self-communication. It is thus central to our `co-acting' with God in the theo-drama. As 
we saw in chapter five the gift of grace and the response go together. This is central to 
the Theo-drama, constituting the transition from aesthetics to drama that takes the form 
of election, in which someone is called to a particular task: 
When a person is struck by something truly significant, he is not simply placed in a universal 
perspective from which he can survey the totality: an arrow pierces his heart, at his most 
personal level. The issue is one that concerns him. "You must change your life", you must 
henceforth live in response to this unique and genuine revelation.... Being touched in this way is 
election... . no-one 
is enraptured without returning from his encounter, with a personal 
mission... God only shows himself to someone, only enraptures him, in order to commission 
51 him. 
46 Th 11 50,51; V 178 This can mean a sharing in his suffering, as Balthasar witnessed in a particular 
way in the case of Adrienne von Speyr's `paschal' suffering. cf eg 
111 241 note 43; also the reference to 
`co-atonement' in chapter 5 section D3. 
47 Th IV 419-420. Dalzell thus underestimates the significance of horizontal communio (Dramatic 19, 
263-277). 
48 Th 11 271 
49 Th I 68 
so Ibid. 638 (citing Rosenzweig) 
5'ThII30-31 
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This experience enables decision to be made regarding the commission. For election is 
not so much God's eternal gracious choice as "the effect of this call on the freedom of 
the person called". " The key characteristic of this response is again availability, found 
archetypically in the Son. The genuinely Christian mark that Christ's dying imprints on 
human life is not so much in the direction of the ecstasy of love as in staying close to 
him, taking our cross daily and accepting whatever he gives. 53 And as the drama of 
response is ongoing, the yes or no of co-operation and availability or resistance and 
opposition contributes to the action of the theo-drama as the intensity of love and hate 
escalates towards the end. 
In this understanding of the grace of personal mission we find the same complex 
relationship of toing and froing between divine and human action, in which the work of 
the Holy Spirit is always prior, as we saw in our description of the response to the gift 
of grace in chapter five. The Holy Spirit gives both a task ("a concrete plan of the 
future") and the freedom to do it ("the inner free spontaneity to carry out, recall and 
follow this plan"54). We are thus enabled to act in Christ's acting area. So it is not as 
though we are like immature children made to trace a path already marked out: we can 
realise ourselves by freely choosing to follow the personal path absolute freedom has 
indeed "prepared" for each one of us, but prepared for us to follow freely. " It is thus 
that a full understanding of human freedom as the choice of the good, a choice of the true 
meaning and fulfilment that constitutes the deepest desire of the heart, is realised in the 
grace of mission. " 
52 Th III 266 In Christology from Within: Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1996) Mark A McIntosh points out the Ignatian 
influence on Balthasar's understanding of mission. "The yearning neo-platonic heart, seeking assimilation 
to its divine ideal, is `Ignatianised' to become the obedient apostolic servant, abandoning self to the 
divine mission... what was a kind of necessary and inevitable process of ascent becomes... a free and 
historical activity of choosing. " (43); cf also Dalzell: Dramatic 215. 
53ThV338 
54ThIII52 
ss Ibid. 52,44 (Grace is enabling) As regards the intuition of the world-stage metaphor in this respect cf 
12 53. 
56 cf McIntosh: Christology 124 
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4 The natural-supernatural distinction in the conscious 
subject-person relationship 
By giving mission such significance for our destiny in Christ, Balthasar emphasises that 
this vocation is not simply some kind of accidental extra, but true identity, "the very 
core of our personal being", 57 with which we receive our "own, inalienable, personal 
name", 58 (that is, the "new name" of Rev 2: 17, as we saw above59). It is the `idea' he 
has and has always had for us which we described in chapter five. However this does 
not mean that the personalising mission is derived from the individual concerned; it can 
only come from God in Christ: "election, vocation and mission are always pure grace". 60 
Hence we see emerging the same nature-grace dynamic. There is a distinction but also a 
dynamic relationship between individual and person. An individual of the human race, 
is translated to unique personhood; 6' a conscious subject becomes a person62; `man in 
God' (volume II) becomes `persons in Christ' (volume III) and so on. This is clearly a 
movement of natural to supernatural, in which, as Balthasar says, the man "who was 
hitherto an individual of the species at the natural level, is now entering a "supernatural" 
and direct relationship with God and so receives a personal call and corresponding 
endowmenti63 and the concept of person is therefore reserved for "the supernatural 
uniqueness of the man who has been called into a relationship of intimacy with God". 64 
It is "the grace of selfhood in God"65 which does not obliterate the natural level of 
individual but perfects it by giving it its unique identity (for example, in the case of the 
apostle Paul, when Christ lays hold of his existence his conscious subject is left intact 
57 Th IV 406 
58 Th 111 51,155; 11402 
59 Th 11 402; 111 208 
60 Th 111 269 
61 Th 112 10 Relevant too is the distinction between individual and person in "On the concept of person" 
especially 18-19, where the former is "primarily concerned with the identity of human nature" and the 
latter refers to "the uniqueness, the incomparability and therefore irreplaceability of the individual", 
although the former potentially contains something of the latter; likewise Larry S Chapp: "Who is the 
Church" The Personalistic categories of Balthasar's ecclesiology" Communio 23 1996 322-338 here 326f. 
62 eg Th 11415; 111207,263,349 
63 Th 11 402 
64 Ibid.; "In Christ it has been made possible for a conscious subject to rise above his natural level to that 
of the ("supernatural") person. " II1208 
65 Th III 19 
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but Balthasar says he "has also expropriated him in order to personalise him"66). This 
bestowal of the uniqueness for which we are made cannot be anticipated, but is 
something new and unexpected" (for example, nobody expected Saul to be Paul; John 
the Baptist's name was a surprise and intervention by God). 
It emerges that this personhood is in fact something that "comes from "the beginning 
of God's creation" (Rev 3: 14)68 and yet is lived out in time. In contrast to Christ, there 
is no identity between our eternal election and our temporal vocation and mission. 69 It 
has to be grown into. " Its significance will abide into eternity. " As it refers to the 
supernatural uniqueness of the human vocation, that is a man's call into intimacy with 
God, and since all have this calling, "every human being can share this distinction to 
some degree". 72 The greater the participation in the mission of Christ the greater the 
subject's personal definition and the more universal his mission. " There is a mysterious 
tension between the fact that there is a process, we become persons, it is something new 
that happens, and the fact that we have been chosen and predestined for this mission in 
Christ before the foundation of the world. 74 Personalising mission is offered, and if lived 
out election can be fulfilled, yet in doing so what we become is what in God's sight we 
always are and always have been. 75 Sin intensifies this tension on account of fallen 
nature's resistance to "being and becoming something it cannot be in purely egoistic, 
self-regarding terms but only with the `communion of saints"'. " 
66 Ibid. 247 
67 Ibid. 263-264,267; V 145 
69ThI1I208 
69 Ibid. 263 
70 cf Ibid. 267 
71 ThV413ff 
72 Th 11402 
73 Th 111 207 
74 Ibid. 157 Eph 1: 4f 
75 Ibid. 270 
76 Ibid. 
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5 The importance of grace as personhood/mission 
Building on what we have already said about Balthasar's concept of `idea', " one of the 
achievements of Balthasar's intriguing understanding of personal mission is the way it 
relates what one might call the `universal' and the `particular' aspects of the new life 
of grace. The concept of personhood appears to embrace both the adoptive filiation 
through which we share in the `family life' of God that is common to all who have been 
made a new creation and the particular characteristics meant for each specific child for 
the sake of all the children, the unique particularity of the living of this new life in 
different people, the charism of their vocation. Becoming a child of God is 
simultaneously the giving of specific grace. Here it becomes particularly clear how the 
grace of communion with God not only does not jeopardise our own particularity, but 
enhances it. 78 
Secondly, whilst sometimes the Theo-drama seems to produce an abundance of 
different categories and models that are difficult to synthesise, in this concept of person 
we begin to get a glimpse of how all these hang together. The centre around which all 
the forces of one's nature are drawn into a clear and definite pattern is the identity of 
person and mission in Christ from which human conscious subjects are allotted 
personalising missions, " and it is in this that Christ's archetypal quality in relation to us 
lies. We also find that the personal model is built on the imago-similitudo understanding 
used by the Fathers, for the translation of conscious subject to person positively 
"presupposes that the created spirit, man, can be an image (imago) of God" and 
negatively "implies that he is deficient and needs to be perfected and given a 
"likeness"(similitudo)" which "can only be imparted by God in Christ. "" Man's 
correspondence to his archetype in Christ is indeed correspondence to the role, the 
" cf chapter 5 section C 
78 "God `does not put us into a uniform of love. He lets his own love, out of which he has created every 
man, be reflected in the particular way in which each person loves. ' `Thus the unity bestowed by the 
Lord not only preserves all that is personal, it actually promotes it where hitherto it was hard to 
recognise. "' Th V 108 citing Adrienne von Speyr: Katholische Briefe 11 170 and 1227 
79 Th 111 258 
80 Ibid. 208 
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mission given in Christ. Finally, the mission we have through Christ and in the Spirit to 
which we must correspond must be the fulfilment of the aufgegeben of finite freedom's 
second pole, for it is the ultimate task given along with freedom that can only be realised 
through christological mediation between finite and infinite freedom and in the liberating 
love of the Spirit of boundless freedom. 
B Dare we hope "that all men will be saved"? 
"Pardon's the word to all"? 81 
As we draw to the close of our analysis of Balthasar's description of our finite free 
nature and its fulfilment in the christological grace of personal participation in the 
Trinity, the one question that remains is whether the redemptive kenosis of the Word is 
to such depths, his death (and the complementary Marian response) so representative 
that in the end our consent is rendered no more than nominal. If this were the case the 
universality of grace would be such as to contradict the specificity that Balthasar 
appears to defend and to undermine the abiding significance he gives the freedom of 
choice in the process of adoption. " The whole controversy as to whether Balthasar 
`believed in hell' issues from this question. " 
1 The universality and the particularity of grace 
Without entering a debate which is a thesis topic in its own right, " there does appear to 
be a tension between Balthasar's inclusive emphasis and his emphasis on the 
particularity of grace, the specificity of being a Christian; between his emphasis on 
81 Shakespeare: Cymbeline, V, 5 quoted by Balthasar Th 1470,475 
82 cf especially chapter 5 above 
83 John Paul II: Crossing the Threshold of Hope (Jonathan Cape, London 1994) 185; Balthasar: Dare We 
Hope "that All Men be Saved" with A Short Discourse on Hell (Ignatius, San Francisco 1987); Roch 
Kereszty: "Response to Professor Scola" Communio 18 (Summer 1991) 227-236; John R Sachs: "Current 
Eschatology: Universal Salvation and the Problem of Hell" Theological Studies 52 1991 227-254; Jan 
Ambaum: "An Empty Hell? The Restoration of All Things? Balthasar's Concept of Hope for Salvation" 
Communio 18 Spring 1991 35-52; Dalzell: Dramatic 153-5 
84cf Eamonn Conway: The Anonymous Christian -a Relativised Christianity? An Evaluation of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar's Criticisms of Karl Rahner's Theory of the Anonymous Christian (Peter Lang, 
Frankfurt am Main 1993) 
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human freedom and his detailed picture of the embrace of the trinitarian drama that 
enfolds everything else. We have seen that because creation takes place in Christ, every 
individual in the world has a relation to him, but the incarnational and trinitarian 
implications in the structure in which the I freely grasps itself do not involve a universal 
offer of grace that is formally and materially christological. SS The universalist tendency 
issues from his trinitarian kenotic theology in which the Son appears to be the guarantee 
of a `happy ending'. 86 There is no distance between man and God so bad that it is not 
already `covered' by the kenotic distance of Father and Son. 87 Sin is just "a twisted 
knot within the Son's pouring forth; it is left behind by the current of love", 88 and 
adoption, it is suggested, is given automatically with the surrendering of the Son, 89 such 
that the trinitarian drama of kenosis seems to overtake the exercise of our freedom. Yet 
on the other side of this tension there is the emphasis on the significance of our free 
`yes' or `no'. There is the insistence that inclusion in the Son does not mean the play 
has been rigged, 90 and the understanding that God takes our freedom seriously to the 
point of a `loving latency' out of respect for our freedom. 9' There is also the stress on 
the particularity of grace and the choice of being a Christian which issued in the 
polemical critique of the concept of the anonymous Christian in The Moment of 
Christian Witness. Here the emphasis on the decision for or against Christ typical of the 
Theo-drama is presented as an Ernstfall (crisis-situation/moment), the choice in favour 
entailing martyrdom, whether that is the literal martyrdom of Ignatius of Antioch or the 
complete surrender of life in the service of the Lord in the case of Ignatius Loyola. 92 
There is a definite, decisive and unique character to the grace of being born of God, of 
receiving the presence of the Giver in the gift, that is not universally possessed, yet all 
85 Th III 457 
86Ibid. 254; cf chapter 3 section D2 and chapter 4 section C3, D2 above 
g'cf chapter 4 section C3, D2 above; "However wide the dramatic acting area may become, we can have 
confidence that no abyss is deeper than God. " Th 111 531 
88Th IV 330 
89Th 111254 
90cf section A3 above; chapter 3 section Dl; chapter 5 section D3 
91Th 11 276; cf chapter 5 section D3 above 
92Moment 139-141, but passim 
218 
are made for and are in some kind of relationship to this state. 93 This tension is also 
evident in Balthasar's attraction to Barth's doctrine of predestination yet his concerns 
about its tendency towards a doctrine of universal salvation in which the freedom of 
man created by God is not taken seriously enough. 94 
2 Towards hell as a gift of grace 
Balthasar is clearly unhappy with traditional treatments of the human-divine freedom 
relationship as regards the question of ultimate damnation or salvation. (Here the 
possibility of eternal damnation on the basis of the creature's genuine freedom is naively 
juxtaposed with the possibility of repentance through the `irresistible grace' of absolute 
freedom, without any reflection on what this means for the concept of God-as well as 
being out of touch with modern re-evaluations of human freedom and the origin of evil 
and its relationship to God95). In Theo-drama V, having presented the arguments for 
universal salvation in a highly sympathetic way (for "men's freedom is not infinite 
`they are free within the greater freedom of God"'96), and having pointed out on the 
other hand that "universal salvation seems to empty God's involvement in the world of 
every last trace of tragedy"97 as well as failing to do justice to the sinner's refusal and the 
mysterium iniquitatis, 98 Balthasar seems to settle for a hope for the salvation of all, the 
outcome of the final act apparently uncertain on both sides. 99 Nevertheless the reader 
may well sense that he is much more inclined toward the former, for this is where the 
creative thinking lies-and the abundance of quotes from Adrienne von Speyr, whose 
pivotal significance for his theology is made most explicit in the final volume of the 
Theo-drama. He does in fact clarify his position a little further, but emphasises that 
this is very hypothetical. 
93cf Th II 315 
94cf chapter 2 section A1 above; Th V 270,285; 494 
9s Th I 48-50 
96Th V 284 citing Adrienne von Speyr: Johannes II 121; cf Dare 15 
97Th V 269 
98lbid. 285 He is specifically referring to the reciprocal intensification of love and hate mentioned in 
chapter 6 section C3 above. In Dare the rejection of apokatastasis is clear. 
99 Th V 290 This is in keeping with the position set out in Dare. 
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The thinking here is very much to do with the relationship between finite and 
infinite freedom and the fact that the grace-freedom relationship is not symmetrical, as 
we have seen. '°° For whilst Balthasar clearly acknowledges the possible reality of hell 
once a person persists in the contradiction of choosing himself as the absolute good, he 
sees "internal limitations and difficulties involved in the idea that man has absolute 
power and freedom to turn his back totally on God". '°' "While infinite freedom will 
respect the decisions of finite freedom, it will not allow itself to be compelled, or 
restricted in its own freedom, by the latter. ""' As our essence rests in the Word we are 
by nature ("prior to the realm of choice and to the sphere of our vacillation and 
irresolution") "involved in a dialogue with Godi103 and the `curve of our life' is enclosed 
within the curve of the Word made man. Even if we try to exclude ourselves in order to 
be our own private hell, we are effectively determined by the Trinity's desire to 
reconcile the world. 104 
This view point is thus of course also determined by Balthasar's theology of 
redemption. Our judge is also our saviour who will "take every available path to bring 
back the person whose sins he has borne even if this person rejects him. ""' The Son's 
cross has space "for the (infernal) experience of sinners abandoned by God. "106 His 
God-forsakeness'°' is for the sake of the damned. Whilst the devil wants sin but not the 
fruit of sin, Christ takes the sins and their fruits upon himself. The Son is prepared to 
walk to the very end the path leading away from God and thus he stands in the way of 
'00 cf chapter 5 section D3 above 
101Th V 304 
102Ibid. 295 
103 Adrienne von Speyr: Johannes I 31 cited by Balthasar Th V 302 
104 «th Christ, the life of the Trinity is bent on reconciling the world to God. In this perspective, 
therefore, if a man tries to exclude himself from it in order to be his own private hell, he is still embraced 
by the curve of Christ's being. To that extent he is still determined by its essence and meaning, which 
aims to communicate to the world the freedom of the absolute good. " Th V 303-304; "Whatever paths 
the particular may follow, they will be within God's total Idea: for in the Son's Cross God has enfolded 
and undergirded the most extreme courses the creature can take. " 11 278; cf also V 342 
'°5Th V 299; Christ's death for us so undergirds all other deaths that there is an unavoidable objective 
relation of unequal reciprocity between his death for us and the death of sinners, such that even if a man 
dies turned away from God he is still dying "unto Him". V 341 
106Ibid. 308 
107cf chapter 6 section D2 above 
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the man who thinks he has gone out of God's reach-the Son is still in front of him and 
he must go towards him. Thus, without doing violence to his freedom, the hardened 
sinner's apparent inaccessibility is opened up by this appearance of God in the 
loneliness of one even further down the road of abandonment than himself (and there for 
his sake). "' The cross thus "opens up a path whereby men get beyond their own 
refusal". "' In this view it is sin, "the unusable residue separated by the cross from the 
sinner" that is in hell, not the sinner (making hell a gift of grace). "' So whilst it does 
seem to be the case that an individual is free to reject God's love, it does not seem 
possible for this situation to abide into eternity. In the end God's infinite love wins 
over every human heart through the presence of the crucified brother who has descended 
even lower than the most isolated and forsaken sinner, "abolishing the limits of those 
who limit themselves. ""' On this basis it would seem to be the case that Balthasar's 
thought cannot really admit of a definitive free refusal of God's love12 even though this 
never entails the compulsion of finite freedom but a warming, opening up and winning 
over. 13 However this description in Volume V has to be squared with the comments in 
Volume IV that "a sinner might so identify himself with his No to God that Trinitarian 
love would be unable to loosen the resultant snarl" and the plain assertion that 
"Scripture prohibits us from saying that this deliberate No is impossible. ""' Our 
conclusion can only therefore be that we are left with an unresolved tension. 
Indeed, in typical Balthasarian style, the hope for universal salvation is not meant to 
completely annihilate the New Testament tension between judgement in the style of the 
Old covenant and the fact that Christ's death has reconciled the whole world. 115 Such 
108Th V 311-313 (cf Mysterium Paschale 167f); Balthasar's dramatic resources point to the lowest role's 
centrality to the action. I 257 
109Ibid. 509 
110 Ibid. 314; Mysterium Paschale 174 
"' Th V 314; cf Ibid. 313 
112 cf Roch Kereszty: "Response" 228; "... the love of God in Christ... is stronger than any resistance it 
encounters" (describing the history of a motif in Christian eschatology confirming Balthasar's own 
Perspective). Dare 97 cf also 177,208 
'3 Edith Stein talks of "outwitting". Dare 221 
14Th IV 350 
15ThV316 
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tension is essential to the dramatic quality of theology. "' So this is not the easy hope of 
a straightforward doctrine of apokatastasis, but a hope for the salvation of all based on a 
brave and absolute trust in God's mercy that involves the sacrifice of total consecration 
to God on behalf of others. "' It is a hope "not without a certain fear", a hope dearly 
bought, for it 
can only cling blindly to the miracle that has already taken place in the cross of Christ; 
it takes the entire courage of Christian hope for a man to apply this to himself, to trust 
that, by the power of this miracle, what is damnable in him has been separated from 
him and thrown out with unusable residue that is incinerated outside the gates of the 
Holy City. "8 
The last word goes to Shakespeare, Balthasar's love of Measure for Measure 
illuminating his own position: 
Shakespeare... works toward a single final scene that occupies the whole of the fifth act: everyone 
is brought to judgement, and no one knows how it will end. The prospect of a happy issue is 
concealed from moment to moment, the scales of justice are handled gravely, and only then can 
the sentence be uttered: "I find an apt remission in myself" (V, I). 19 
116 Th I 126,128,470,478 (Shakespeare) 
"'eg in the case of Therese cf Th V 320-321 
"8Th V 321 
19 Th I 470 He compares this with "Pardon's the word to all" (Cymbeline, V, 5) (which he quotes again 
475), and talks of Shakespeare allowing mercy and justice to persist (for he "does not abandon the order 







The nature-grace relationship in the 
Theo-drama 
As kingfishers catch fire, dragonflies draw flame; 
As tumbled over rim in roundy wells 
Stones ring; like each tucked string tells, each hung bell's 
Bow swung finds tongue to fling out broad its name; 
Each mortal thing does one thing and the same: 
Deals out that being indoors each one dwells; 
Selves - goes itself, myself it speaks and spells, 
Crying What I dö is me: for that I came. 
I say more: the just man justices; 
Keeps grace: that keeps all his goings graces; 
Acts in God's eye what in God's eye he is - 
Christ - for Christ plays in ten thousand places, 
Lovely in limbs, and lovely in eyes not his 
To the Father through the features of men's faces. ' 
A Introduction 
We have explored in some detail Balthasar's `re-presentation' of the nature-grace 
relationship according to an intra-trinitarian christocentric perspective and in dramatic 
categories. We now want to draw some conclusions as to what this expression means 
for the nature-grace relationship, what happens to the content of the nature concept and 
the grace concept. 
The first thing we have to acknowledge of course is that `concepts' are not as centre 
stage as they were, precisely because they are not `dramatic' enough. Focusing on 
concepts is an essentialist approach, and Balthasar has opted for a dramatic one. 
Nevertheless, Balthasar is quite clear that this focus on the person in the world in all his 
relationships is by no means in conflict with a focus on ontology. Personal and 
ontological categories go together. ' This is a concrete focus on being in which 
Hopkins: untitled sonnet in WH Gardner, ed.: Gerard Manley Hopkins Poems and Prose (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth 1963) 51 (no 34) 
2cfThII314 
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metaphysics has not disappeared but, is now 'meta-anthropology', ' a transcendental 
argument from man, working on inter-subjective `freedom-focused' principles and in 
which, above all else, all realities are strictly envisaged in terms of their relation to Jesus 
Christ, who, as the concrete universal, `takes over' as it were the place that conceptual 
measures may have had previously. Ways of talking about and categorising ontological, 
essential ('of essence'), existential and personal realities are all referred back to his 
person, and thus we get less of `nature' and `grace' and more of first and second Adam, 
`alpha and omega'. We have often then in our discussion been dealing with the contents 
of `nature' and `grace' for Balthasar even where he is not explicitly using this 
terminology. 
This is not to say that we have not encountered concepts like nature, grace, 
supernature and so on. They have as it were `support roles'. They crop up when 
discussion becomes specific and there is a particular need for theological and 
philosophical precision. It is as though we are reading a theology in transition, one 
dominated by a fresh way of presenting the truths of salvation but which still needs to 
fall back on the perennial terminology to make itself clear. 
B Nature 
I Introduction 
As we come to summarise the portrayal of the natural that we have encountered, let us 
first recall what we said in the introduction concerning the different but closely related 
meanings of the term nature. We saw how it referred both specifically to the precise 
`whatness' of a thing (its essence, that which makes it the sort of thing it is, an intrinsic 
source of activity) and also more broadly to `all that is', (that is, in a Christian context, 
all creation), as well as noting its particular theological usage in the combination, `nature 
and grace'. 
3 cf chapter 6 section AI above 
225 
We have seen the relevance of the `essence' meaning to an expression of the 
immanence and transcendence of grace. As nature is intrinsic to an entity, it is 
distinguished from grace which is transcendent and by definition not inherent. 
(Although grace is not merely external: for it works from within and in this sense can be 
called immanent. ) In Balthasar in particular we struck upon the peculiarity of human 
nature as having a fulfilment beyond its natural abilities to achieve. We therefore 
considered the relation of the essence of the human creature to a vocation transcending 
that essence whilst being that essence's very own finality and fulfilment (the 
understanding of nature as paradox). 
The second meaning ('totality') also had some relevance vis-a-vis the relation of the 
first and the second creation and the `natural order' to the `supernatural'. This meaning 
plays some part in Balthasar's discussion of nature and grace within the framework of 
Christ as alpha and omega (chapter three), as he increasingly adopts a creation-grace 
perspective. It is also relevant to his defence of Augustine over Pelagius (chapter five), 
based as it is upon recognition of the incarnation as bringing a new salvific fullness and 
not just the reaffirmation and strengthening of the first creation's gift of freedom. 
2 Development from the earlier work 
At the time of the mid-century nature-grace debate, we noted that Balthasar, inspired by 
de Lubac, adopts the focus on the one (supernatural) end of man and his paradoxical 
character as a creature directed beyond himself, understanding the nature concept more 
dialectically, as two-sided (Doppelsinnigkeit), and calling for a greater awareness of the 
analogical relation of the philosophical and theological use of the term. He focuses upon 
nature in the concrete where there is a de facto unity between creaturely essence and the 
free gift of grace from the first moment of man's creation and-as this is not a necessary 
unity-he simultaneously maintains the material distinguishability and distinction of the 
two orders. Nevertheless we uncovered a tension between this dominant concrete 
perspective and his intricate discussion of an abstract or formal concept of nature. 
226 
The function of the concept is clearer. It upholds the qualitative distinctiveness of 
the two orders and prevents both the `naturalisation' of grace or the `loss' of nature in 
the radiance of grace. ' This balance is expressed in later work by his avoidance of what 
we referred to as the `absorption' of grace in the order of creation and the `absorption' 
of creation in the order of grace. ' Any strict continuity between the two orders, or 
tendency to make grace an epiphenomenon of nature, or any christological restriction of 
creation is eventually confronted by the requirements of a theo-dramatic method, teased 
out in the `reciprocal causality' of the two Adams and even upheld in his consideration 
of the relationship of the individual in the world to Christ. In the latter case he employs 
his distinctive understanding of human self-possession as an imago trinitatis with 
incarnational implications (rather than suggesting a formally and materially christological 
universal offer of grace). ' Meanwhile the understanding of nature as presupposed 
subject of grace set out in Karl Barth' is of enduring significance in his mature work 
where nature as the eternally nondivine ens ab alio is conceived as "the receptive 
subject" of the gift of grace, ' receptivity being central to his understanding of the nature 
of the finite free creature. Nevertheless, as we have seen, he is far less concerned with 
the formal concept in the Theo-drama, focusing rather on what is referred to as concrete 
nature in Karl Barth. This is now expressed simply in terms of (spiritual) creaturehood, 
the conscious, free subject, and is formally considered in terms of finite freedom, with a 
concrete presentation unfolding in the sections on anthropology. 
The attention he gives the abstract concept as abstraction or remainder in the earlier 
work is not developed in later work-although the (limited) place he gives a concept of 
nature per se is effectively as an abstract presupposition, in as much as the "receptive 
subject" can still be understood as `the minimum' that must be there for grace to be 
received. However we have seen that his flirtation with a triadic `compromise' along the 
4 eg KB 281,287 
5 cf chapter 3 section D1 above 
6 Th 111 452 
KB chapters 13-15,17 especially 281,285,292 
8 Th IV 374; cf chapter 5 above 
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lines of suggestions made by Rahner is not clearly and fully resolved in the Theo-drama. 
Whilst he does not develop the notion of supernatural existential which he uses in the 
article "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie"9 (and raises serious concerns regarding 
its use by other theologians") when detailed analysis is called for he still describes a 
`supernatural modification' of our natural openness to the absolute" which is 
'additional' to our natural finitude, yet so "deeply burned" into the structure of finite 
freedom that it remains even under the rejection of grace. 12 At the end of chapter four 
we concluded that this supernatural, natural characteristic complicated if not 
contradicted his otherwise straightforward understanding of natural desire as natural, and 
of the vocation to God as planted in the fundamental creatureliness of the conscious 
subject. It is, after all, the fact that natural desire for this vision is of the very essence of 
man that constitutes the paradox of his nature: unable to bring about this exalted end in 
which direction he transcends himself. 
In the Theo-drama this natural paradox (prior to any supernatural element) comes to 
be expressed in the characteristic language of free inter-subjective self-disclosure through 
an analogia caritatis between man's dependence on the free self-disclosure of his fellow 
human beings to be himself, and his dependence-as a creature made to be receptive to 
absolute truth and goodness-on the `unpostulatable' free self-disclosure of God. 13 We 
have also seen this paradox identified with man's fundamental constitution as the image 
and likeness of the personal God for whom he is made. 14 The `search' that he is by 
nature includes reflection on this image and thus on the personality of the prototype 
himself, thus again rendering an elevating supernatural existential unnecessary, even 
though only the "light of grace can lift what is implicit in this reflection into the clarity 
9 Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie 75 (1953), 453-461 
'o cf chapter 3 section B1 above. 
IThII411 
12Th IV 166 
13 Ibid. 142 
14 Ibid.; 111 416-7 
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of consciousness. "" The paradox of nature is of course central to the dramatic tension 
of the Theo-drama. For the very fact that it is strictly prior to any supernatural 
element (even though nature is made for the grace of the incarnation and its only solution 
lies there), not only uncovers the natural dramatic tension of human existence, but also 
draws attention to the supremely dramatic `un-anticipatable' gift-character of the action 
of God in Christ. " This `clean cut' tension is emphasised in the Theo-drama (in 
contrast to the relationship between the a priori transcendental experience of salvation 
history and the historical Christ event in the uses of the transcendental existential 
Balthasar rejects). Nevertheless how this tension is affected by his `supernatural 
summoning', additional, but not accidental to man's nature, remains unclear. 
Moreover, as the emphasis falls more and more heavily on the concrete tension 
between the creature and the historical Christ event, how exactly the tension between 
natural and supernatural in the original constitution of the creature from the first 
moments of creation relates to this becomes unclear. The tendency is either to treat this 
matter separately (and rarely), " or, if we were to look for a key relating the two, we 
might find it in Balthasar's consideration of different states of relatedness to the Christ 
event, '$ in which case the original created relationship to grace would be one of these. 
However in his consideration of different states of relatedness Balthasar is concerned 
with current states, that is how people in the world in the era following the redemption 
are related to Christ, rather than the traditional `states of nature' of which the integral 
state of the original creation is one. 
Of course at the foundation of these different degrees of relatedness is the 
fundamental relatedness of our self-possession (in its coincidence with openness to all 
being) as an imago trinitatis with incamational implications19-and this of course applies 
to all the `states of nature' including the original one. However, as this is a non- 
15 Th 111 417; "The paradox is an integral part of the primal fact of self-consciousness insofar as the latter 
recognises itself to a be a gift , and 
hence an `image'. " IV 142 
16 Th I 128f; cf chapter 3 above. 
" eg Th IV 374; Th 11 400-401 
18 cf eg Th 111 417; 11 315-6 
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accidental relation, whereas as the original union of nature and grace can be (and is! ) lost, 
treatment of this fundamental relatedness does not in itself help us connect the tension 
between fundamental essence and grace in their non-necessary union in the first creation 
with the concrete tension between this first creation and the second (fulfilling and 
healing) one in Christ. In the distinctly theo-dramatic discussion the tension seems 
inevitably to be in terms of the interplay between first and second creation-for it is the 
intensifying encounter between God's love revelation in Christ and our response (the 
subject of the Theo-drama) that constitutes this action-rather than the relationship 
between essence and grace in their non-necessary union as established by God in the 
beginning. 
In the Theo-drama then Balthasar rejects the supernatural existential as an 
explanation of man's natural orientation to the contemplation of God and as an 
anticipation of the strictly supernatural, but when he talks of `getting behind the 
theorem' this is to recapture the natural paradox of the creaturely constitution not to 
reject the notion of supernatural existential outright. This natural paradox does not 
straightforwardly eliminate the validity of some kind of supernatural existential: it is 
simply logically prior to it. 2° Balthasar shows that when it comes to it he still will not 
relate the natural orientation that constitutes man's essence and its fulfilment in grace 
without introducing some kind of supernatural modification as a `third' element, and he 
remains ambivalent as to whether we specifically call this a supernatural existential or 
not. 
3 Formal treatment in the Theo-drama 
The second part of Balthasar's trilogy, to which we devoted special attention in Part II 
of our thesis, is a `dramatik' because the God who appears and is contemplated in his 
glory in The Glory of the Lord, enters into alliance with us (in Christ) and his absolute 
freedom confronts the relative but genuine freedom of man. Here then we found a 
19 Th 111 457; cf chapter 4 section B2,3,4 
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distinctive understanding of nature, in accord with this theo-dramatic perspective. 
Description of the finite spiritual creature focuses on freedom in a rich, synthetic 
understanding, which is aware of freedom both as the intrinsic faculty to choose this or 
that and as the ('Augustinian') choice of the good in surrender to God. We understood 
this focus on freedom as an essential characteristic of Balthasar's theological `project', 
providing a corrective to both classical and post-enlightenment diminishment of the free 
individual. 
This primary focus on freedom in spiritual creaturehood provides some contrast to 
the classical dominance of rationality and to the more recent transcendental Thomist 
focus on the structure of knowing in the self-aware subject as the point of departure. Z' 
In Balthasar's perspective the subject's presence to itself is important, but, as we have 
seen, this is never in isolation from an essential relational recognition of the other, and is 
immediately associated with the geben and auf-geben of the freedom belonging to the 
conscious subject. The responsive recognition of the other necessary to the fundamental 
20 "This paradox is prior to all talk of the `supernatural existentiale. "' Th IV 142 Balthasar also talks of 
"the logical priority of the natural paradox over any `supernatural existentiale"'. IV 143 
21 This divergence could be seen as part of a debate suggested by theologians such as Gerald McCool and 
Walter Kasper between contemporary Thomism (transcendental) and an alternative approach in 
contemporary Catholic theology linked with a revival of interest in nineteenth century Tübingen 
theologians (Mohler, Drey, Kuhn and Staudenmaier), whose response to enlightenment thinking is 
distinguishable from both the extremes of rationalism and traditionalism condemned at Vatican I and the 
`restorationism' of neo-scholasticism that wished to reinforce dependence upon the prevailing scholastic 
synthesis of philosophy and theology in the face of secular intellectual developments viewed entirely 
negatively. (Gerald McCool: Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century The Quest for a Unitary 
Method Seabury Press, New York 1977, especially 3-7; 241,263f; Kasper Glaube und Geschichte 
(Grünewald, Mainz 1970) 9-32; An Introduction to Christian Faith (Burns & Oates, London 1980) 10- 
11; Cyril O'Regan associates aspects of Balthasar's understanding of tradition with a Tübingen model 
"Balthasar: Between Tübingen and Postmodernity" Modern Theology 14 July 1998 325-353). The 
Tübingen theologians preferred to develop their own synthesis of philosophy and theology in the wake of 
and in critical engagement with the intellectual developments that shook the period. Thus, unlike both 
transcendental and neo-scholastic Thomism, their thought is not `driven' by a particular interpretation and 
application of Thomas (who himself gave rationality considerable dominance in his definitions of human 
nature). Nor is it so preoccupied with a mind-centred anthropology and the Thomistic theory of 
knowledge. 
For Balthasar, as we saw in chapter 5 section C2, the work of Staudenmaier is particularly important, an 
influence directly relevant to Balthasar's focus on freedom. The rehabilitation of Stuadenmaier he 
proposes is precisely in terms of the immanence of finite freedom and infinite freedom (cf Th II 333) and 
the emphasis on freedom in Balthasar's engagement with Hegel has affinities with Staudenmaier's 
defence of freedom in the face of his concerns regarding the impersonal logical necessity of the Hegelian 
system. (cf Th 11 3-32; J Dietrich The Goethezeit and the Metamorphosis of Catholic Theology in the Age 
of Idealism (Peter Lang, Berne, 1979) especially 
161; 170f) 
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possession of freedom is ultimately a relation to God, who gives this possession as free 
gift, (and who offers fulfilment of this freedom in the giving of himself (the Giver) in the 
gift (grace)). Such an understanding of nature is oriented towards love. The possession 
of my own free being is dependent upon the letting be of all other being, on loving it for 
its own sake, and it is directed toward the act of thanksgiving for the gift of being. In 
this way finite free being images and finds fulfilment in the love of infinite, free, triune 
being. 
It is not the case that the question of rationality/reason has no place in this theo- 
dramatic focus on freedom. In fact, at the outset, Balthasar claims that everything he 
says about freedom is "indivisibly intellectual and volitive", eschewing any "one-sided 
attribution of freedom" to either rationality or pure will. 22 He implies that one cannot be 
envisaged without the other, " but in a way that could suggest the former is rather taken 
for granted, " an impression supported by the fact that the rational element receives no 
specific treatment in the Theo-drama, whilst nature seems to be understood in terms of 
man's freedom "to make his own decisions and actions. "" The preference for freedom 
is perhaps most emphatic in the discussion of the imago dei with the suggestion that 
this is located specifically in human freedom. 26 
Care must be taken not to read too much into this emphasis on freedom. It is after 
all to be expected in the theo-dramatic part of Balthasar's trilogy, which, addressing the 
transcendental of the good, is an ethics, concerned with the human person as a being who 
acts, while it is the theo-aesthetics (addressing the beautiful) which is concerned with 
him as a being who perceives, and the theo-logic (addressing the true) which is concerned 
22 Th 112 1 Of, cf also 223 note 37 
23He maintains the interdependence of understanding and will, the 
former necessary for anything to be 
affirmed, but the latter necessary to stimulate this understanding. 
(Th 112 10) He also refers to Thomas' 
relation of human judgement to free will (225), to the 
fact that the understanding of form as expression 
presupposes both freedom and intel-lectus (understood as 
insight) (25) and to Augustine's understanding 
of freedom as "the rational, autonomous motion of the soul, 
in which the `I' possesses itself in freedom. " 
(231) 
24 "The spiritual creature's ability to make free decisions 
is an integral part of its nature just as much as 
its reason. " Th IV 374 
25 Th IV 406 
26 cf chapter 5 section C1 above 
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with him as a being who thinks, speaks and formulates. 27 Moreover, we have seen that 
aspects of Balthasar's theology of redemption and his doctrine of the Trinity can appear 
to call the significance of this freedom into question (we will return to this in the next 
chapter). Nevertheless, the prominence of freedom is a distinctive and interesting 
characteristic. Freedom is specifically identified with the fundamental openness to 
being, 28 as an `inalienable core' that goes with our presence to ourselves, " and the axiom 
`grace perfects nature' is expressed in terms of human freedom's perfection through 
participation in divine freedom. 3° Moreover, the very fact that Balthasar chooses to 
develop a theo-dramatics at the heart of his magnum opus only serves to underline the 
significance of freedom, which is the very presupposition of the dramatic situation with 
which he is concerned and is central not only theologically, but also in his very 
philosophical point of departure and his project of contemporary philosophical 
engagement. 
4 Concrete treatment 
Alongside the formal treatment of the spiritual creature with its focus on freedom, in 
chapter six we also considered Balthasar's analysis of the characteristics specific to the 
concrete human creature. This was described in terms of the three tensions of matter- 
spirit, man-woman, individual-community, thus distinguishing the human from the angel 
and, when viewed alongside the formal treatment, offering a full picture of the 
characteristics of human nature (even though we found the continuity between the 
formal and concrete treatment less than transparent). We also concluded that Balthasar's 
treatment of the body-soul relation is less than adequate - presenting it as just one 
central characteristic among three, not specifically linking it to the imago dei (which 
27 Balthasar: "Theo-logic: On the Work as a Whole" Communio Winter 1993 631 It is here, for example, 
that Balthasar speaks of intelligence as that which denotes a privileged place in the created world. 
Meanwhile in the summary of his thought in his "Retrospective 1988" the fundamental openness of 
human being to the infinite is simply described as the openness of human reason to the unlimited (my 
italics). In Retro 112,114. 
28 Th 11211 ("... daß die endliche Freiheit als Offenheit zu allem seienden... " TD II, 1 190) (It is thus both 
volitional and rational because being itself is both good and true. ) 
29 Th 11 210 
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tends to be linked with freedom or specified as an imago trinitatis) and emphasising 
tension more than a union. 
In part, the confusion in the concrete treatment of the essence of the human being 
serves to emphasise how the focus of the concrete perspective is Christ, who is the 
concrete norm of all things. In the Theo-drama we have observed Balthasar develop the 
understanding that we only comprehend what is human with reference to Christ, and the 
suggestion that we only have personal identity in him, with all the intriguing 
implications for the concept of personhood mentioned in chapter seven. 
Nevertheless, this does not entirely explain away the problems associated with this 
concrete treatment. We will leave our final comments on the predominance of tension in 
particular to the next chapter, but will reflect here a little further on his concrete focus. 
The quotation from Hopkins at the head of this chapter vividly captures a 
conviction of the importance of concrete individuality in knowing what a thing is-albeit 
in an idiosyncratic and noticeably Scotist way. A basic orientation towards the concrete 
particular is characteristic of the tendency in mid to late twentieth century Catholic 
theology to move away from an emphasis on universal natures to focus on the concrete 
person. Of course, Balthasar's focus on the concrete, influenced by both Przywara's 
focus on "das Konkretische"31 and de Lubac's emphasis on the concrete as opposed to 
the possible/abstract, also needs to be seen in the context of and as contributing towards 
this general trend. Without calling into question this basic `re-orientation' or engaging in 
a detailed analysis of the thorny, age-old problem of the relation between concrete and 
universal, we do want to raise some concerns about certain features of Balthasar's shift 
in emphasis. 
In the summary of Balthasar's theology and philosophy of nature outlined in this 
chapter, we have already drawn attention to a lack of cohesion in presentation (for 
example between formal and concrete perspectives), in the concept itself (because of his 
30 Th IV 406 
31 cf chapter 9 section B2 below 
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preoccupation with tension and paradox and his own vulnerability to christocentric 
constriction, not withstanding his fundamental corrective of Barth in this respect), and 
sometimes in the very nature of the `concreteness' adopted (the non essentialist, theo- 
dramatic focus on freedom being by his own admission a formal treatment that could 
refer to man or angel). 
Our concern is what happens to the universal concept and its content in Balthasar's 
shift to the concrete. Is the concept that concerns us, that of nature, really left any 
role? 32 Whatever may be the strengths and weaknesses of instances we might cite of 
possible strategies to relate universal and particular in the Theo-drama (such as his 
discussion of `idea' and of Christ as concrete universal-we will return to these below), 
the significance of a concept of nature is less than clear. We have seen the term `nature' 
all but disappear in the constructive thought of the Theo-drama (having just a `support 
role'). The more concrete `creation' and `creature' crop up far more frequently and the 
who (person) question is favoured over the `what' (nature) one. The fact that the 
subject of Theo-drama II section B (which amounts to a formal treatment of our nature) 
could refer as much to angels as to men is an indication of the lack of specificity in his 
treatment of universal natures. 
It could perhaps be argued that ditching universals is precisely the desired purpose 
of a shift from essentialism. However if it is acknowledged that what sort of a thing 
something is remains significant, that what its nature is, what characteristics belong to it, 
are important, then universals still matter. The fact that we recognise that it is the 
individual that first and most strikes us, does not mean that the sort of thing it is has no 
part in expressing that thing's `selfhood'. 
32 The concerns set out here can be related to those of critics perturbed by a `supernaturalising' of nature 
(cf Fergus Kerr in the Forward to Gardner, Moss, Quash, Ward: Balthasar at the end of Modernity (T & 
T Clark, Edinburgh 1999) 12-13; Noel 0' Donaghue: "A Theology of Beauty" in John Riches, ed.: The 
Analogy of Beauty The Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1986) 4-6), in as 
much as we express reservations about Balthasar's failure to give serious treatment to the natura integra 
of the first Adam and to make clear the enduring validity of philosophical concepts in the face of Christ's 
role as concrete universal. However we do not share the view that the rethinking of the nature-grace 
relationship of the nouvelle theologie in itself amounts to a supernaturalism, and we acknowledge 
Balthasar's attempts to avoid a constrictive christocentrism. 
2335 
The concept of nature is important in the creation-grace relationship because it 
precisely maintains the necessary antithesis between the two poles. However much we 
understand nature to be orientated towards, embraced by, even "impregnated" with the 
supernatural" (such that we cannot abstract it in its pure state), grace is not part of 
nature, and indeed nature is still nature should grace be lost (albeit impoverished and 
deformed). Nature is by definition, not `super' nature, not grace, however involved 
with grace it is in the concrete and however much it is always in some kind of relation to 
grace. For, fundamentally, this distinction of natural and supernatural is to do with the 
real distinction between us and God and the fact that our nature is not necessary to God 
and God is not a necessary element of our nature (grace therefore being not necessary to 
nature, and thus distinct from it, because we are not God). Although Balthasar 
acknowledges the nature concept's role in maintaining the distinction34 this does not 
encourage him to make more use of the concept. 
The word creation cannot be as effectively employed in this way in order to 
maintain the distinction. In the first place this is because, if we follow Balthasar's 
perspective, creation is this concrete forever involved with grace and thus is not 
effectively used to represent that which is not grace. We do not first have an `ungraced' 
creation brought into existence by a Creator who then grants it grace. The act of creation 
establishes man (at the summit of creation) in a relation of grace (which can be lost). 
The distinction between grace and what is not essentially graced is a logical and not a 
chronological one and it cannot be adequately expressed by talking of `creation' and 
`grace' if we understand the act of creation to involve an establishment in relationship to 
grace simultaneous with the bestowal of existence. Moreover, Catholic theology has 
generally recognised that the gift of grace is itself created, seen perhaps most obviously 
in the case of the hypostatic union but also understood to be true of sanctifying grace. 
To use `that which is created' as an antithesis to grace is therefore laden with confusion. 
33 "Theo-logic: On the Work as a Whole" 628 
34 eg Th 111 482; In Retro 118 
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Perhaps most importantly, in our discussion of the relationship between nature and 
grace, nature understood as essence has been central in conveying the 
relationship/distinction between intrinsic, essential characteristics, behaviour and 
becoming and the `entrance' within of grace from `without' (in the sense that it is not a 
necessary characteristic). Here it is clear that the more concrete term `creature' or 
`creation' cannot be treated as synonymous with the more abstract term `nature'. 
Whilst nature refers more precisely to the necessary essence of a being, its intrinsic 
characteristics (thus the contrast with the non-essential characteristic of grace), 
`creation' simply refers to what is created, `creature' to some thing created. The nature 
concept is thus invaluable in describing that unique interplay between human nature and 
the grace for which it was made, but which is not possessed as an inherent characteristic 
by virtue of creation. " 
Moreover, the nature concept is able to specify the particular sort of created entity 
made to receive the grace of personal participation in the life of God. When applied to 
different kinds of created reality, `nature' precisely identifies and `links' the members of 
each kind and differentiates them from those of all other kinds in a way that the words 
`creation', `creature' obviously can never do, signifying as they do a fundamental 
characteristic shared by all creation, that is the fact of being created. In a christocentric 
perspective which focuses the meaning of grace on the incarnation the significance ought 
to be all the clearer, for in the incarnation it is not any created thing that is 
hypostatically united to the Son, but specifically human nature. Here we see the climax 
of the importance of the precision of the concept, for it is this adoption of our nature 
that makes salvation and therefore the communion of grace possible. 
35 This focus on humanity as the only part of the material creation called to personal communion with 
God remains valid when we recognise the perfection of the whole creation in relationship with God, 
mediated through the human creature, who unites both material and spiritual worlds. cf Catechism of the 
Catholic Church 355,364 
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5 The nature concept's intrinsic orientation to grace and the 
imago trinitatis 
The status of the nature concept in Balthasar's thought is further complicated by its 
intrinsic orientation to participation in the life of God, for this means that nature is far 
less tidy a concept than it was for the static essentialism of the neo-scholastic 
perspective. Relative to its perfection in grace, nature is intrinsically oriented to `be 
more' so is not straightforwardly intelligible in itself. Distinctively, this dynamism is 
understood as an imago trinitatis, as we saw at the end of chapter four. We have seen 
the importance of our final `divine definition' in Balthasar's discussion of person and 
role in the Theo-drama, which focuses on our identity and function (mission) in God's 
eyes, God alone knowing and giving us our true name. The dynamic `being more' that 
characterises our nature (received into the `ever more' of God's infinity through the 
correspondence of infinite and finite in Jesus Christ) is an unlimited openness to Being. 
It means man "cannot be fully made into an object" or be interpreted "according to a 
consistent idea", 36 but, as the image of God (who cannot be defined by a finite formula), 
only the revelation of the original can disclose his unity. There is no static, final 
definition of things because of the relation of image to divine prototype. For if 
everything is a particular imago dei "this image of God in things points beyond itself to 
the primal image" and thus can only attain definite form in the infinity of God to which 
it has a dynamic, but dependent relationship. " Each `idea' is self-transcendent towards 
the Father as ground, because of its location by way of essence in the Logos (who is 
always with Father and Spirit), and because of the association of the Logos' generation 
with creation. " As the imago dei is specifically an imago trinitatis and in Balthasar's 
Trinity each divine person is himself because of his `transcendence' towards the other 
two (the divine essence being `ever greater' than each person), worldly self- 
transcendence exists as a reflection of this triune constitution (as we saw at the end of 
chapter four). This is why every finite being finds its meaning, direction and path "by 
36 Science, Religion and Christianity (SRC) (Burns and Oates, London 1958) 90 
37 Th V 101 with reference to Adrienne von Speyr: Objective Mystik 9 
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pointing beyond itself to the unfathomable reality of God". 39 However, again here we 
have found that the search for the `trinitarian mystery' behind a feature of worldly 
reality has led to provocative statements regarding the inner life of God, that is, to the 
identification of relationships of movement and development among the persons of the 
Trinity. Notwithstanding all the gentle clarifications of the difference between 
trinitarian and worldly `becoming' and `event', 40 again one cannot help wondering 
whether the explicit and detailed search for the `primal trinitarian mystery' behind 
worldly process41 has in fact introduced an image of the finite world into the Trinity 
rather than uncovering an image of the Trinity in the world. 
Concern about the `disappearance' of nature in Balthasar's theo-dramatics does not 
amount to a plea for the straightforward reinstatement of a static essentialism. If we are 
open to a christocentric perspective on creation this involves recognising that our nature 
can only be known fully in Christ and that a frank acknowledgement of our divinely 
established self-transcendence in the direction of the one supernatural end for which we 
are made means that what we are is still in a process of unfolding. Nevertheless, 
theological anthropology and a satisfactory re-working of the relationship between 
singular and universal need to be able to work with an objective, coherent nature 
concept. Balthasar is not unaware that even though our open orientation towards our 
prototype makes a tidy, consistent idea impossible, there are nevertheless objective 
features to our nature (a `perennial humanity"'). However his description of this is less 
than clear and satisfactory. We have no unified, coherent sense of our `whatness', but a 
scattered collection of characteristics which does not focus on the differentiation of 
different `sorts' of things (for example, angel/man; creature/man). 
In Balthasar's doctrine of `ideas' and his understanding of personhood the universal 
has significance, although (in contrast to the Platonist mysticism of the German Middle 
38 Th V 75 
39 Adrienne von Speyr: Das Licht und die Bilder 92-93 quoted by Balthasar in Th V 103; cf also 75 
40 eg Th V 67 
41 Ibid. 68 
42 SRC 12 
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Ages43) the emphasis is on the particular (real and ideal). What each individual is (meant 
to be) according to the divine will is incorporated in the understanding of what a thing is 
(whilst there is a simultaneous intensification of unique individuality and communion 
with everything that shares in being. ) We have seen this is arrived at by consideration of 
the prototype and that the whole question of the relation of concrete to universal is 
grounded in Christ as concrete universal. ' Without entering into a full assessment of the 
effectiveness of this resolution of the problem of relating concrete and universal, we can 
see again the insightful application of christology to the problems of philosophy and 
theology such that Christ (as universale because all things are created through him and 
for him, made concretissimum in the incarnation) is clearly established as the measure 
and norm of all things, in relation to which all our concepts are imperfect. Nevertheless 
there does seem to be a danger that Balthasar's unswerving focus on the christocentric 
answer tends to leave our concepts out in the cold; what exactly it means for 
philosophical concepts, what objective validity they have in the face of this 
christological fullness is not clearly worked through in these pages. Without a clear 
philosophical insight for understanding the interrelation of concrete and universal in the 
identity of what a thing is, a turn to the concrete risks becoming one-sided-which is 
precisely what must be avoided if a turn to the singular is not to become nominalist or 
subjectivist. Moreover, there is also a danger that, rather than Christ, as 
concretissimum, being so universal that there is room for every valid concept (as we 
were assured in Karl Barth"), in fact all ideas do not so much find room within Christ as 
concrete universal as become continually reduced to the dazzling prototype. 
6 Process meets paradox 
Finally although a dynamic concept of nature is clearly important for von Balthasar, and 
finality, what we are meant to be, is central in his understanding of our `whatness', he 
43 For this approach tended to see in the idea what is common to the species. Th V 388 
as Like all finite reality, the relationship of species and individual has a trinitarian constitution, according 
to which it is understood as a remote reflection of the simultaneous identity of each divine person with 
the divine essence and the distinction of each person from the other two. Th V 103; 67f 
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nevertheless keeps running a noticeable `line' through the process of becoming that links 
our nature and its end. This is partly due to his employment of the double-sided 
concept of nature which understandably thus protects grace from being considered a 
`right' of nature just because it is necessary to our full development. More than this, 
though, we have seen that it tends to divide the becoming of our self-transcendent 
nature into separate `moments', breaking up what might otherwise be a more organic 
vision of our growth to fulfilment. One wonders whether Balthasar has really taken his 
recognition of the centrality of our finality as the fullness of what we are for 
understanding what we are to its full implications, partly, no doubt, because this could 
have sounded so very like a resurrection of Bainism, but partly too because of his 
preoccupation with paradox, dialectic and tension. Without this the central insight 
might be developed in a much clearer and natural way (without for example needing to 
have recourse to the supernatural existential. ) This is our concern in the next half of this 
chapter where, turning our attention to making conclusions about his treatment of grace, 
we suggest that the most effective and authentic aspects of Balthasar's perspective on 
nature and grace are hampered from developing to their final conclusion by an 
unnecessary, anxious preoccupation with this `line', this tension or paradox between 
what we possess by nature and what we are naturally meant to receive and to be (which 
comes by grace alone). 
45 cf chapter 2 section D above 
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C Grace 
Communio, however, is the primal mystery, namely that God, out of his freely 
bestowed love, allows that which is not God to participate in all the treasures of his 
love; and this comes about in a reciprocity which, in Christian revelation, has again to 
be grounded in God (in the Trinity), yet without abolishing the creatureliness of the 
creature. 46 
If we now draw together our examination of grace in Balthasar's earlier work and in the 
Theo-drama, what conclusions can we make? 
1 Development from the earlier work 
In chapter one we found Balthasar proposing in his mid-century work that we define 
grace not so much in terms of nature (as `what is not nature'), but as it is revealed in its 
own inner essence, and hence from the perspective of faith. The understanding of grace 
that ensues is one in which participation is emphasised. It has ontic and noetic 
dimensions; it has the quality of a personal relationship and of an event. The element of 
varying degrees of closeness and moving away (under the dynamic analogy of being) is 
discussed in more detail in the Theo-drama, quite specifically in the short section 
devoted to grace in Theo-drama II47 and more generally with reference to the `inner 
path' to God in finite free being created in Christ48 and as regards the connected 
christological understanding of personhood (to which all have some kind of possession). 
The dramatic `space' in grace for greater and lesser closeness and distance is elucidated 
by the persistence of drama in the arena of grace. 49 
The firm conviction expressed in the earlier work that emphatic recognition of the 
union of nature and grace in the concrete creation in no way permits derivation of grace 
from creation (against Baius) and that the gratuitous giving of God in the act of creation 
and the actual grace of his supernatural disclosure must be distinguished (against 
Pelagius) is exemplified in his later defence of Augustine over Pelagius in Theo-drama IV 
and is developed in his exposition of grace in the Theo-drama as a whole. However his 
46Th II 127 
47 Ibid. 312-316 
48 Chapter 4 section B above 
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move towards the consistently and explicitly christological framing of the question and 
the adoption of a theo-dramatic perspective considerably affect his expression of this, as 
well as his specific descriptions of grace. 
2 The theo-dramatic, intra-trinitarian perspective 
The emerging christocentric treatment in Karl Barth becomes in the mature work more 
exclusively Christ-centred. We encounter a thoroughgoing application of the early 
christological insight that Christ is the sole measure of the nature-grace relationship and 
the concrete analogy of being. This includes an apparent disassociation from 
Pryzwara's emphasis on radical difference in the analogy of being in favour of focusing 
upon the relationship of the human and divine in Christ as the key to the theodramatic 
interpretation of grace (although we have found that radical difference does remain 
central for Balthasar, s° and that he himself gives little attention to the distinctive nature 
of the union of the two orders in Christ-the very relationship that is proposed as the 
measure of the nature-grace relationship. ) Crucially the relation of christology to 
trinitarian doctrine is far more explicit and thoroughly developed, such that ultimately 
the whole question finds its definitive location in the relation of the persons of the 
Trinity. 
The grace of participation is emphatically a communio-in relation to Christ (by 
whom and in whom such a sharing in the life of God is possible) but also now more 
specifically in relation to the Spirit who brings us into this state of theosis. It is thus an 
indwelling of the Trinity, as well as a new relation in God to all other persons reborn in 
grace. That this latter horizontal-ecclesial dimension is essential is emphasised in the 
description of the new life of grace as personalising mission, inserted into and thus 
authentically imaging the kind of sharing in the divine life that belongs to the persons of 
the Trinity. A central feature of the theo-dramatic perspective is that the grace of 
communion is understood in terms of freedom: "the freely given indwelling of infinite 
49cf chapter 5 section D2,3 above 
50 We will return to this issue in the next chapter. 
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freedom in finite freedom"51, or more specifically "the reciprocal immanence of finite and 
infinite freedom", 52 "finite freedom's non-heteronomy within the absolute character of 
infinite freedom". 53 In that other central feature of theo-dramatic description, the 
phraseology of `gift', we find this immanence expressed as `the presence of the Giver 
(God) in the gift (finite free being)'. " 
This depiction of grace in terms of the mutual indwelling of the two freedoms has to 
be elucidated christologically because it is in the very person of Christ, in the 
relationship of humanity and divinity in the incarnation, that this "reciprocal 
interpenetration" of finite and infinite actually takes place-the relationship between his 
human and his divine will thus constituting the climax of the relationship between finite 
and infinite freedom and the heart of the Theo-drama (in accordance with Maximus the 
Confessor's understanding of this christological mediation as "man's ascent within 
God's correlative descent in Christ. "55) The pneumatological description of grace is 
theodramatic too, attention being drawn to Augustine's understanding that the Spirit is 
freedom, understood as gift, grace, 56 with Balthasar's portrayal of Christian freedom in 
terms of theonomy specifically elucidated with reference to the person and work of the 
Spirit. 
In that other distinctive feature of the theo-dramatic presentation of grace, 
Balthasar's understanding of personhood as the grace of self-hood in God, the 
christological and pneumatological aspects are also clearly delineated. We are persons in 
Christ (supernatural) and it is the Spirit who inserts us into the `idea' held for us in 
Christ, allocates to us the personhood that is to be ours in him and communicates divine 
grace and divine mission, operating in the area between us and God. 57 It is especially 
51ThII232 
52 Th IV 383 
53 Th 11 333 
54cf chapter 5 above and especially Th 11 314 
ss Th IV 382; cf chapter 5 section Dl above 
56The association of grace and the Spirit is particularly marked in Balthasar's description of grace as "the 
presence of the Giver in the gift", because for Balthasar the Spirit is "God's perfect gift character" and 
"the absolute divine gift" Th 11 315; 11 287; V 65; cf chapter five above. 
57 Th 111486,510 
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this understanding of the effect of our communion with God in Christ through the Holy 
Spirit that emphasises the horizontal implications of our new status in relation to God, 
our share in Christ's mission facilitating a participation in his pro nobis in the form of a 
vocation in the service of others. The communion that makes us persons in Christ 
always works in the direction of the communion of saints and shows the importance of 
`grace in action'. 
This christocentric and pneumocentric perspective is of course strongly intra- 
trinitarian. We have seen (in chapter five) that the Spirit-initiated participation in 
Christ/Christ in us is a tri personal indwelling. More specifically, we could say we are 
being christo-pneumatologically drawn into a relationship with the Father, " and for 
Balthasar in the Theo-drama the ultimate description of grace as participation is as a 
participation in the triune processions. We have seen that our relationship to God is 
understood through close reference to the relationship of God to Himself, that is, his 
triunity. Just as our creation, our nature, the operation of our freedom and so on are 
again and again referred back to the drama, that is the inter-personal relationships of the 
immanent Trinity, so too Balthasar explores how the offer of grace is related to `events' 
within the Trinity. Our rebirth in grace ("being born of God") is presented as an 
adoption into the Son's begetting from the Father into which we are drawn by Christ 
through his `begetting' in us, that is through his incarnation in the virgin and then in the 
Church. 
So in the Theo-drama the offer of grace continues to embrace ontic, noetic and 
personal dimensions. As we saw in chapter five (section B), it is an offer of being (a 
substantial participation in the divine nature59), but not as some "thing"; 60 and it is an 
offer of love, 6' God's personal self-giving, elucidated by the pneumatological focus (the 
Holy Spirit being the gift of God's own love to us") and the christocentric focus 
58 cf Th 111 454-5 
59 Th 11399 
60 Ibid. 315 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 230,233,287; V65 
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(because in the divine self-revelation in Christ God's very being coincides with his 
"being gift" and his "being love". 63) This description, like `the presence of the Giver in 
the gift', emphasises the immediate, personal dimension without going beyond the 
bounds of the concerns enshrined in the distinction between created and uncreated grace, 
Christ being the very synthesis of created and uncreated. (All the same Balthasar's 
slightly ambivalent employment of the basically Eckhartian understanding of "being 
born of God" raises questions regarding the distinction between created and uncreated, 
that is, between the eternal sonship of the Logos and the adoptive sonship of the 
divinized creature. We shall return to this. ) 
This description of grace as the self-offering of divine being as gift and love is very 
important in the Theo-drama where there is a natural emphasis on understanding grace 
in terms of the love of the Good, (rather than, say, the glory of the Beautiful). The 
dominant theme of the Theo-drama (the immanent involvement of the transcendent God 
in the world) is presented in terms of the revelation and communication of God as love' 
in such a way that it is understood and the recipients are enabled to reproduce it within 
themselves65 (as we saw with the work of the Spirit and discussed in our description of 
the human response to grace with its mariological model in chapter five. ) As in Karl 
Barth Balthasar's recognition of the ontological aspect does not ignore the noetic and 
therefore the verbal and aural aspects. In the Theo-drama the self-communication of the 
Absolute is both ontological and verbal (addressing the mind, explicatory). " 
Balthasar's teaching on grace is gathered together in Mary, who exemplifies the 
responsive receptivity (active in its passive receiving) that for Baithasar characterises 
creaturehood both as regards existence itself" and the fulfilment of that existence in the 
gift of grace. 68 Mary is given a key role in making this fulfilment possible, in her 
reception of Christ in the incarnation and in her representative response at the foot of 
63ThII315 
64 cf Th II 314-S and 230; cf 111514,518,520; IV 420 (Being-in-grace is the same as being-in-love. ) 
65ThIII518 
66 Th 11 399 cf chapter 6 section Cl above 
67 chapter 4 section B1 above 
e 
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the cross. 69 She is the living example of the dynamics of this fulfilment, of the 
relationship between grace and freedom, providing a model for the active fruitfulness of 
finite surrender to divine grace, of the conception and birth that characterises the life of 
the Christian" and the role of the Church. " In this light it becomes difficult to defend 
Noel Dermot O'Donoghue's conclusion that Balthasar's mariology betrays signs of "the 
kind of theology in which man is passively receptive and does not in any real sense 
work out his own salvation",, " although we could not concur with Ward's proposition 
of the opposite extreme that "the mediating role of the Spirit is taken over by 
Mary"73-on the basis of what we have said about the Spirit and grace and the clear 
identification of Mary with creaturely receptivity and the Spirit with divine gift. 
D Continuity and distinction in the nature-grace 
relationship 
Finally we need to make the assessment central to our topic, that is, what does 
Balthasar's description of grace mean for the relation between that fundamental giving 
which constitutes our very existence as creatures and this `special' giving in which the 
Giver himself is received? What place is there for a distinction between `nature and 
grace'? 
As we have seen, the theo-dramatic presentation of grace maintains the same basic 
assertion of the non-derivability of grace from `nature' (now generally expressed as 
creatureliness or finitude) and of a distinction between creation on the one hand, and 
"the actual grace of God's supernatural self-disclosure" and the divine adoption74 on the 
other (even though creation itself is unowed, is made for Christ, and the creature is 
always in some kind of relation to grace). We found de Lubac's Augustinian/Thomist 
68 chapter 5 note 48 and section D3 above 
69 chapter 6 section E4 
70 chapter 5 section D3 
" chapter 5 section F 
72 Noel O'Donaghue: "A theology of Beauty" 3; cf F Kerr in the Foreword to Gardner, Moss, Quash, 
Ward: Balthasar at the end of Modernity 10 
73 Ward: "Kenosis: Death, Discourse and Resurrection" Ibid. 51 
74 KB 379 This grace is a second and higher work "that should not be explained in terms of the first level 
but from its own intrinsic character. " KB 296 
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paradox expressed in terms of freedom as an inherent dramatic tension: finite freedom is 
self-transcendent movement but cannot force the disclosure of infinite freedom in which 
its fulfilment lies. 75 It strives for fulfilment in an absolute, but despite being `causa sui' 
cannot achieve this by its own power or through possession of anything finite76 but 
only in and through divine freedom"-- imaging the trinitarian `dialectic' of expectation 
and surprise and the `going-out' self-giving and indebted receiving amongst the persons 
of the Trinity in which the Father has ultimate priority as "the Origin". " 
In chapter three we discussed the christocentric presentation of the same 
fundamental tension, where we found the Adam principle fundamentally oriented 
towards the Christ principle (indeed this movement exhibiting "a necessity inscribed in 
the constitution of man's naturei79), but there being no easy transition between the two, 
the former requiring `uprooting' and `replanting' according to the latter (and the 
transition requiring the ratification of created freedom). Alongside Balthasar's 
determination to avoid the kind of continuity between the two that could be interpreted 
as either an `absorption' of grace into nature or of nature into grace we were aware of a 
predilection for descriptions that distinctively favour an exceptionally intimate bond 
between the two (circumincessio) or an emphatically intrinsic orientation of one to the 
other (the relationship of seed to plant). 
Gradually a tension between continuity and distinction emerged in our study-with 
the emphasis in the end resting upon the latter. " In chapter five we found that, 
strangely, the firm defence of a `dualism' of grace is developed in apparent contradiction 
of Therese. In this dualistic conception of gift we found an unresolved tension between 
emphasis on continuity in divine giving (beginning with the imparting of freedom, itself 
gratuitous, and culminating with the gratuitous imparting of the Giver of that freedom in 
75 cf eg Th 11232,237 This articulates grace's gratuity. 
76 Th 11 225-6; cf also 228,242,272,313-314 
" eg Th 11 397 and 272,250,284,292,303 
78 Th V 104; cf chapter -3) section 
E above 
79Th 111 36 
80 Dalzell settles for a certain continuity within greater discontinuity. Dramatic 29-30,50 
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the gift), and an emphasis on distinction between the two as two separate 
communications or gifts" (with a similar tension in the corresponding human receiving). 
The interest in the `view from eternity' leans on the side of a far less markedly 
dualistic conception, for here there is just the one gift, that of the world given from 
Father to Son and then, in its state of fulfilment, from Son to Father in the Spirit. " 
There is the one `big idea': that the created world should find its end in God. There is 
simply one all-embracing plan: "God created the world (nature) to be united with him in 
Christ (supernatural order). "83 
However, the specifically intra-trinitarian perspective reveals the same tension. 
Both the gifts of creation and adoptive participation are united in having as their 
condition of possibility the primal divine self-bestowal of the eternal generation of the 
Son which, as it were, (in Balthasar's more `Eckhartian' moments) `contains' both the 
self-giving of creation and of `re-creation' in grace, such that Balthasar can talk about 
being "created and begotten together with the eternal Son" and even imply an 
identification of all three `events'; yet in their unfolding in the worldly sphere he refuses 
them the continuity of one process. 84 Meanwhile, Balthasar's depiction of nature's 
transcendence and its relationship to grace as an image of the Trinity conveys some 
sense of continuity between nature and grace, giving nature a very real self- 
transcendence towards its fulfilment and emphasising the circumincession between the 
two, but also clearly distinguishing the two in the radical dependence upon grace for 
fulfilment based somehow (as an image) in the difference between the Father and the Son 
in the Spirit. Moreover, there again appears to be a distinction between the dependence 
"Similarly is there just the one divine affirmation of the creature, the one `yes', the one address as 
`thou'? (cf 11 287; 111 496; chapter 4 section B4) Does this address belong with the basic constitution of 
the subject or does it come later and thus to what extent does the `yes' conferring the dignity of person 
belong universally to all subjects and to what extent is it `laid up' awaiting our assimilation to it by 
ce? gra Zcf chapter 2 section C above 
83 Th 111 482; "the total gift already made" 11 401 
84 Th 11 3311 The relationship between idea and reality articulates the same nature-grace tension. cf Th V 
389-391,458 
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of our nature as regards origin and as regards fulfilment. There are two indebtednesses: 
for the gift of transcendence85 and for the gift of the fulfilment of that transcendence. 86 
The depiction of grace in terms of the mutual indwelling of freedoms that has so 
dominated our discussion of a theo-dramatic presentation of the nature-grace 
relationship brings us to the nub of the problem of continuity and distinction in the 
creation-grace relationship. How can an (emphatic) distinction be maintained when, in a 
theology keenly aware of the participation of all things in beings' and the location of all 
creation in God, 88 grace itself is understood in terms of participation and indwelling? 
How exactly are we to distinguish participation in being and the participation that 
belongs to grace? In particular, how is human participation in being, which (as a 
spiritual as well as material participation) always has some relation to grace, to be 
distinguished from the actual gift of theosis? If, for example the fundamental 
participation in being by which we exist is to be described as "participation in the real 
being of God"89 where does that leave the promise of grace understood as "participation 
in the divine nature"? " The theo-dramatic focus on freedom highlights this difficulty, 
drawing attention to both the essential relationship of finite freedom to infinite freedom, 
as well as to the (non-necessary) graced relationship, in such a way that whilst grace as 
such is described in terms of the reciprocal indwelling of infinite freedom in finite 
freedom9' it is in fact clear from Balthasar's description that finite freedom is always 
within infinite freedom, which is immanent to it whilst being infinitely transcendent to 
it. 92 
Whilst Balthasar is aware of the impression of continuity conveyed in his analysis 
of freedom and its fulfilment, " he clearly wishes to maintain a definite `dividing line' in 
85 Th V 103 
86 
Ibid. 104 
87cf chapter 1 section D above and chapter 4 section B2 
88cf chapter 2 section C above 
89 GL IV 404 
90 cf eg Th 11398-399,311; cf IV 373 
9' cf page 242 above 
92eg Th II 241f, IV 373; cf chapter 5 section B above 
93 eg Th IV 371 
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the unfolding of finite freedom's vocation to perfect participation in the infinite. At the 
heart of this decision to lean heavily in the direction of distinction within a perspective 
that has a sensibility for continuity is his sense for a qualitative distinctiveness of divine 
initiative, a unique identity belonging to the divine self-bestowal in grace that is 
qualitatively distinct from the divine act of creation, however much the two events are 
understood to coincide in time. Hence the pattern of two `kinds' or features of divine 
action that has emerged: God endows his creature with freedom and God freely 
communicates himself to that creature. This is the dualism of grace. Both endowments 
are the free gift of God, but the second cannot be derived from the first. It is an 
additional gift (and in this strict sense `accidental'/modal94) of which the first is the 
precondition, and has its own uniquely superlative quality, or `higher' content-even 
though the former gift of freedom involves some kind of self-imparting on the part of 
God as well as the latter. The central point is the non-negotiable non-divinity of the 
(logically) prior, receptive gift (that is, finite, free being) as distinct from the gift of 
divine grace, which is divine, a personal sharing in what is God's: divine, infinite and 
eternal. However, to maintain this, is it really necessary to insist on seeing the 
establishment of nature in existence and the bestowal of grace as `two separate elements' 
("... müssen beide Momente klar unterschieden werden... ")? " And how can this kind of 
dualistic emphasis finally cohere with Balthasar's strong awareness of God's one plan 
from the beginning to give himself to the creature he established in his image and 
likeness? 96 
Balthasar's dualism of gift does offer an answer to the problem of distinguishing 
between the participation in being that belongs to the existence of an entity and that 
participation that defines the meaning of grace. It is the difference between being filled 
94By nature we are forever in receipt of our existence whether we like it or not but we are only in a state 
of grace 
by God giving and us accepting the gift of himself in the gift of finite freedom and us choosing 
to accept that our goal (as well as origin) lies here. 
9s Th IV 375 (TD 111349) my italics; cf the reference to `two moments' in his description of de Lubac's 
Le Mystere du surnaturel. HDL 72 
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with being (to a degree in accordance with the nature of the entity) on the one hand, and 
being given access to the inner life of absolute being on the other. 97 However for the 
spiritual creatures for whom the latter is possible and for whom, according to Balthasar, 
this form of participation is their only end, can we really say that the relationship 
between the two is not one process--that our inviolable participation in being, as 
creatures made uniquely in his image and likeness and ordained to an end in him, and the 
personal participation in the inner life of God which fulfils this nature and end are not 
established in a relationship of organic continuity (however qualitatively distinct the 
two may be)? If not, have we really banished an extrinsic understanding of the 
relationship between nature and grace? If the one was always made for the other in the 
mind of God then surely they go together and should not be separated in our 
perspective either. 
Balthasar is obviously engaged in a fine balancing act and this can make definitive 
interpretation difficult and frustrating. However it would not be untypical of his 
thought that he should be perfectly happy with such a tension. Indeed his cautious 
attitude to the topic98 may demand a delicate balancing act. Nevertheless it is possible 
to suggest that here we are trying to reconcile the ultimately incompatible: a 
ressourcement retrieval of (patristic) recognition of the unity of nature and grace and a 
(basically neo-scholastic) distinction of nature and grace powerfully interpreted through 
a dialectic heavily influenced by nineteenth century German philosophical 
preoccupations. It is almost as though the coincidence of the two approaches prevents 
the coherent flowering of one or the other. Is it possible that without the latter 
preoccupation with dialectic, Balthasar might have been able to opt more simply for a 
more unitive understanding of the creation-grace relationship? Perhaps what he calls 
96 eg Th 111 47,482; "the total gift" 11401,277; Therese's `everything is grace' cf chapter 1 page 45 
above; chapter 2 section C; chapter 5 pages 124-125. Regarding the possible conflict between his 
christocentrism and an emphatic double gratuity cf chapter 5 pages 134 and 167. 
97 11398, IV 373 
98cf Introduction section B above 
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the paradox of our nature (that our end transcends our natural powers) might not have 
been emphasised quite so much as a paradox, but have simply been seen as a distinctive 
feature of our nature, and the fact that the end to which we are oriented so transcends 
our natural capacities and is so dependent on grace for its attainment would not have 
meant we cannot describe our movement by grace towards that end as an organic 
process. 
Taking more interest in the imago dei as spirit (rather than always systematically 
translating it into a specifically imago trinitatis), and not seeing our matter-spirit 
constitution as just one fundamental human characteristic among three others, might also 
have facilitated a final settling for a more unitive treatment. For, as creatures who are 
spiritual as well as material, our end can only be in God who is Spirit. " The very fact 
that we are thus created in his image (are spiritual) immediately indicates our end is in 
him (who is Spirit) and that by nature the participation in being that gives us existence is 
at once ordered to a spiritual participation in the self-disclosure of the inner life of 
absolute being in whose image we are made. Our very nature thus so spells out our end 
and meaning that it would seem strange and highly contrived to divide up these aspects 
of spiritual-corporeal participation into separate gifts. In this case differentiation in 
participation is less to do with the difference between our establishment in existence and 
our establishment in grace and more to do with the difference between the participation 
of spiritual creatures in being and that of the non-spiritual creation, that is the difference 
in creation between those beings who can (spiritual) and cannot (purely material) 
experience this kind of personal participation in the divine bestowal of being. "' 
99 This is specifically in Christ, God the Son incarnate, (the image of the invisible God) who shares our 
spirit-body nature. For what follows I am much indebted to Edward Holloway: Perspectives in 
Philosophy I (Faith-Keyway 1994) especially 74-91. 
100 Afterall as Balthasar himself is of course aware, the heightened apex of the gift of being, the second 
act or communication of being, ie access to the self-disclosure of absolute 
being, is a possibility for 
spiritual beings. (cf eg Th 11 400 "The realised entities are 
filled with as much being as they can contain, 
but in being thus filled, insofar as they are spiritual, they also have access in principle to a self-disclosure 
on the part of absolute Being. ") 
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It is not so much the case then that the human creature straddles two different 
orders, natural and supernatural, "' but that his fundamental existence and his vocation 
and perfection lie in the one supernatural order of the love of God which both creates a 
unique contingent being in the very divine image and likeness and (entirely in keeping 
with such a nature) brings it to fulfilment through the (christo--pneumatological) 
perfection of this unique relation to the divine. Of course the perfection of this creature 
is not the same as its creation, and there is change-growth or deterioration-and thus 
differentiation in the same sense as there is between a seedling and a fully grown shrub 
(or a seedling and a withered plant), but it is certainly not a separate, additional gift, 
rather its authentic flowering. 102 As spiritual-material creatures made in the image of 
God our relationship to the supernatural is natural (hence the sense in which our 
situation can authentically be called paradoxical-without placing unnecessary emphasis 
on contradiction). Indeed this relationship can be described as unequivocally 
substantial-without in any sense implying that there is a `just demand' for grace, but 
simply because God made us, uniquely, in his image and his likeness therefore at once 
ordaining us to an end in him in whose image we are made. To maintain that anything 
else could satisfy such a creature is absurd (as Balthasar recognised), but to fail to 
acknowledge this as one gratuitous gift suggests a blindness to the real implications of 
there being just one end for us, an end appropriate to the corporeal-spiritual nature God 
created-however undoubtedly exalted and privileged an end that be-and therefore an 
end in a relation of continuity with our nature. 
We do not need to carve this relationship/process up into different acts of giving in 
order to maintain the distinction between natural and supernatural. Indeed this latter 
distinction is a far more fundamental one than can be upheld by dividing our nature and 
end, for it lies in the real distinction between God and creature and in the non-necessity 
of the creature in its nature to God (which is therefore unable to determine him) and the 
101cf chapter 1 section B above 
102Hence a division between nature and accidental is inappropriate in this respect. 
254 
non-necessity of God to the creature's being in his nature as such, (in the sense that he 
is not an element of our created substance), and can be rejected even though he is the 
`perfecting principle' of our nature. 
It is in this sense alone that grace can be considered `modal' or `accidental' (as 
Balthasar described it in Karl Barth). For whilst the orientation to the supernatural, the 
relationship to grace, is substantial and we cannot define our nature without reference to 
this vertical relationship, grace is not substantial, the supernatural is not the natural, 
because God is never part of our nature and because grace, being in communion with 
God, can be lost. We can uphold both this and the continuity of relationship between 
our nature and the supernatural; our nature is in a relationship to the supernatural as an 
imperfect thing is to its perfection, even though that perfection can be rejected. 
The confusion over the bond and the distinction between nature and grace that we 
have identified in Balthasar's various descriptions and in his lingering over the idea of 
two divine communications suggests that he never quite leaves the neo-scholastic 
perspective behind. Nor after the mid-century condemnation of de Lubac is this 
surprising. However, looking over his shoulder to the old school of thought (however 
unconsciously) is unlikely to facilitate a creative retrieval of the patristic perspective re- 
emerging at the time of the nouvelle theologie. It is as though he is not entirely able to 
break out of the former world view and when it comes to specifics we are left with the 
`two orders', loitering in the territory of double gratuity. 
It could of course be argued that this is necessary in order to maintain continuity 
with theological tradition and in particular to take on board Church teaching against 
Baius and Jansen and that of Humani Generis. But is adherence to the neo-scholastic 
way of looking at the question necessary to do this-especially if it itself breaks with 
earlier theological tradition, as the de Lubac thesis he first took up suggests? Indeed 
perhaps a true retrieval of Patristic thought is only possible if the old system is 
straightforwardly rejected. Such a rejection could not of course be understood as 
synonymous with an adherence to Bainism-as though there were just the two 
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alternatives. To maintain that there is just the one end for man and that there is for him 
just the one gift-that is, to maintain that for us as spiritual-material creatures made in 
the image of God, participation in being (non-accidental) and participation in grace 
(which can be lost) is one process-does not amount to Baius's position, not because 
grace is still seen as a secondary gratuitous gift (as in the end it seems it is for Balthasar), 
but because this one end, and indeed the entire plan of God from the beginning for this 
creation, is entirely (entire-ly) gratuitous, the work of divine love. Balthasar, as we have 
seen, fails to indicate clearly and with full conviction that recognition of the one divinely 
ordained end means one divinely ordained gift, one unified work of divine love-and this 
without any danger of grace therefore being seen as derivative of nature and a Pelagian or 
Baian position adopted. For there are no `just claims' on God, either supernatural or 
natural. Neither our creation or our fulfilment are `necessary' to God, rather both are 
the free work of God's love who, in the same order of free love, brings to the 
appropriate perfection those beings he has created. If we are willed to be through love 
then our natural ordination to the supernatural can only be through love, but through the 
same love that willed us to be, the love which seeks to bring to natural perfection all that 
it has made. 
Finally, in as much as Balthasar does take up the new approach and make a radical 
break from the neo-scholastic perspective this does not amount to a `supernaturalising' 
of nature. 10' In this approach it is not that grace is so emphasised that there is no room 
for nature (as might be said of the tendency towards Barthian constriction) or that 
because nature is always related to grace there is nothing truly natural anymore. The 
issue is what we mean by nature and whether Christian theology can ever seriously think 
of nature as a sphere in isolation from or independent of grace, or whether it needs 
honestly to confront and think through the fact that our peculiar nature does not fit the 
Aristotelian pattern where every created nature has its own natural end. As a uniquely 
103 cf note 32 above; also Roland Chia: "Theological Aesthetics or Aesthetic Theology Some Reflections 
on the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar" Scottish Journal of Theology 49 1996 93-95 
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material-spiritual nature made in the image of God for intimate sharing in his own divine 
life, it is uniquely defined beyond and above itself, and so is always in some kind of 
relation to the supernatural-without compromising its 'naturalness'. 
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Chapter 9 
The nature-grace relationship and 
the doctrine of the Trinity: some 
questions for von Balthasar's 
theology 
In our discussion of the nature-grace relationship in the Theo-drama we have been 
increasingly aware of the significance of the intra-trinitarian drama for the drama 
between God and man in which human freedom realises (or loses) itself in participation 
in the triune freedom of God. In this final part of our Conclusion we reflect on some 
important implications of this relationship as viewed by Balthasar, firstly as regards the 
significance of human freedom and secondly as regards the significance of paradox and 
tension and its relationship to God. 
A Human freedom and the Trinity 
Our conclusions regarding nature in the previous chapter drew attention to the emphasis 
on human freedom in the Theo-drama. However we have also been aware that it is 
difficult at times to see how this coheres with some of the more `extreme' aspects of the 
intra-trinitarian perspective in which the drama set in motion by human freedom does 
seem insignificant or `swallowed up' in the intra-trinitarian 'action. ' As we saw in 
'This is related to concerns about the significance of human history and socio-political action in 
Balthasar's understanding of `our play within the play of the Trinity'. cf the critique of Steffen Lösel: 
"Unapocalyptic Theology: History and Eschatology in Balthasar's Theo-drama" Modern Theology 17 
2001 201-225; the moderate critique of Gerry O'Hanlon: "May Christians Hope for a Better World? " 
Irish Theological Quarterly 54 1988 175-189; "Theological Dramatics" in Bede McGregor and Thomas 
Norris, eds.: The Beauty of Christ Introduction to the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (T &T 
Clark, Edinburgh 1994) 101-111; also Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt: "Theo-drama and Political 
Theology" Communio 25 1998 532-552. For Thomas G Dalzell (who offers a more positive 
understanding of Balthasar's view of history) 
it is the focus on the inter-personal rather than the social, 
on the freedom of the individual, and on the analogy of proportionality 
(resulting from a concentration on 
the activity of Christ rather than the Spirit) which restricts engagement with social theology. Dramatic 
19,58,227f, 246-285,291f (The trinitarian conception actually allows for a genuine `giving' from the 
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chapters two and five, the relation between the eternal begetting of the Son, and our 
creation and adoption is so closely tied that at times it inevitably appears constrictive 
(for example Balthasar is able to say that it is as if adoption is given automatically with 
the surrendering of the Son2). The possibility of the creature proffering a definitive and 
final no to being begotten in grace seems particularly remote. It is difficult to see how 
Balthasar's understanding of the predestination of the Son can avoid being seen as 
deterministic; indeed being the goal and ground of the world drama, Balthasar tells us, is 
coextensive with determining (bestimmen) its entire course. ' This problem is only 
exacerbated by the location, not only of the God-man relation, but also of sin and the 
cross within the trinitarian relations, such that sin can be described as a mere knot in the 
love of Father and Sono, there being no distance greater than the trinitarian separation of 
God from himself most fully revealed in the forsakeness of the cross. ' 
As well as being much concerned with the reality of finite freedom, Balthasar's is a 
theology very much preoccupied with seeing things as they are `laid up'6 in God, from 
the divine perspective which beholds things as they are meant to be. ' Looked at from 
this point of view everything does appear to be decided in advance and the decisions and 
actions of finite freedom seem completely overtaken by those of infinite freedom, that is 
world to God. cf 204-211; also "The Enrichment of God in Balthasar's Trinitarian Eschatology" Irish 
Theological Quarterly 66 2001 3-18) 
2ThIII254 
3 Th 11 268 (TD 11/1 246) 
4 Th IV 330; cf chapter 6 section C3 above 
5 cf chapter 6 section D2 and chapter 7 section B above; cf Th IV 325,323; III 53 1. "The Son is 
eternally begotten by the Father: within the infinite divine nature, in other words, one Person is "let be" 
in absolute Otherness; what deep abysses are here! God has always plumbed them, but once a finite 
world of creatures has been opened up, these depths must be traversed stepwise as forms of alienation. 
Nonetheless these steps can only be taken as part of a journey already (and always) accomplished in the 
infinite Trinity. And when the particular mystery of the Son's incarnation takes place, he traverses-as 
man and together with all sufferers and on their behalf-the realms of forsakeness that, as God, he has 
already (and has always) traversed. " (Th V 502) Similarly the "idea" of creation (including the cross) 
made realisable by the divine begetting "has already been overtaken and surpassed by the divine life and 
as such is incorporated into the absolute gratuitousness of trinitarian freedom and vitality. " (509) This 
"has always been realised" aspect is central to Balthasar's perspective. (508) 
6 On use of this expression (derived from Adrienne von Speyr, as pointed out by Nichols: No Bloodless 
Myth 215) cf Th V 257ff, 302,328. 
cf Th V 389; cf passage from John of Ruysbroeck 390-391 Regarding Baithasar's use of a trinitarian 
and christological eschatology looking at things from God's perspective cf 506. Interestingly it is 
Eckhart who he describes as speaking "from the perspective of eternity". (444) 
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the interaction of Father, Son and Spirit. Often though, it is the tension between these 
two concerns (that is, the seriousness with which human freedom, its actions and its 
becoming should be treated and the preoccupation with the creation and consummation 
of the world as beheld and possessed by God) that seems to fascinate Balthasar. The 
defence of finite freedom in the face of christological constriction described at the end of 
chapter three did not resolve this tension but dwelt on the paradox of maintaining at one 
and the same time that the Son is the guarantor of the success of God's plan for the 
world but that there is no sure anticipation of `happy ending'. In the descriptions of 
our birth from God in the begetting of the Son and our assimilation to our idea in Him, 
we found the mysterious coincidence and distinction between creation and adoption, 
between our idea (as we are in God's eyes) and the free process in which, through our 
co-operation with God's grace, we come to be conformed to that idea ("the gap between 
idea and reality"'). Then, in our brief discussion of universal salvation at the end of 
chapter seven, we found a similar preoccupation with the tension between the reality of 
human free action and thus the possibility of tragedy in the world plan on the one hand, 
and the all embracing love of the absolute will of the triune God on the other, such that 
the end seemed an open question. The tension is part of the entrancing problem of how 
we are "to conceive finite being-time-space being-located in the embrace of the 
absolute", avoiding both pantheistic absorption and a mere juxtaposition of the two. ' 
Again it comes under an imago trinitatis in which everything `shot through' with 
potentiality is found positively in God. '° The `finite side' of the tension is thus taken 
seriously as the divinely created image of God-but it is only an image, and an image of 
an ever-greater God to whom it is ordered. 
However, even allowing for Balthasar's preference for tension, " and taking into account 
the asymmetry of grace, it remains the case that it is not always possible to square the 
8 Th V 387 
9 Ibid. 385 
10 Ibid. 389 
11 cf section B below 
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paradoxical openness for finite freedom to act this way or that within the ever-greater 
infinitude of the divine freedom with some of Balthasar's more extreme assertions about 
the place of the drama of the world within the drama that he traces in the inner life of 
God. If the God-world distance is so located within the distance between the divine 
hypostases that there is no distance `bigger' than this primal separation, a definite 
rejection of God is of limited significance, for it is always overtaken by the Father-Son 
distance/relationship within which it is contained. Finite freedom can choose itself as its 
absolute good as much as it likes, but this is of little ultimate impact, for it cannot 
`escape' its location in this triune relationship nor the determination of the absolute 
sovereign will of God to reconcile the world to himself" Balthasar's emphatic 
exposition of the genuine ability of finite freedom to choose for or against intimacy with 
God as its good and its goal needs to face up honestly to the fact that according to his 
trinitarian perspective it is impossible to go further away from God than he is already 
from himself in his inter-hypostatic `distance'. In as much as Balthasar upholds the 
latter position we are dealing here with the incompatible, not merely the paradoxical. 
B Paradox 
1 The centrality of tension 
Balthasar's preference for duality in the nature-grace relationship has raised the question 
of the influence of dialectic/paradox in Balthasar's work. This first cropped up in 
chapter one where we found that the unique `double-sided' situation of man in relation 
to natural and supernatural is described specifically as paradox or dialectic. The 
question arose again in the analysis of the anthropological section of Theo-drama II in 
chapter six. Here we saw that whatever allowances are made for the setting of his 
threefold anthropological tensions in a natural pre-Christian framework, their influence 
remains problematic whether it be because this `description' is still considered to 
contain the fundamental features of man, and/or because it introduces contradiction and 
12 cf Th V 303-304; chapter 7 section B above 
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non-coherence into nature, or because tension (now `hypertension') remains central to 
the Christian resolution itself. We were particularly concerned about the first tension of 
matter and spirit rendering man not a unity of matter and spirit but rather a tension 
between the two orders, only resolved in Christ in the extreme and uttermost stretching 
apart of the Son from the Father on the Cross-a problematic tension itself to which we 
will return to below. 
We have seen the centrality of tension to theo-drama. " More fundamentally, for 
Balthasar tension lies at the heart of being in the `real distinction' between essence and 
existence. These two poles-and those involved in the other bi-polar tensions: 
individual and universal, obedience and freedom, self realization of finite freedom 
through handing over to infinite freedom-can only be understood by means of one 
another in strict analysis. " For Balthasar the fact that there are such polarities "gives 
finite Being its consistency, its vitality, and its dignity which lifts it above the level of 
what is merely factual and makes it the object of an insatiable interest, indeed of a 
reverent, amazed admiration" in the ongoing paradox of ever greater disclosure within 
ever greater mystery and concealment. " Whilst this insight clearly sets forth the 
uncontainable and inexhaustible wonder of being, the emphasis on tension and oscillation 
tends to mean that this openness and determination to avoid tidy, closed systems is 
vulnerable to becoming a kind of `systematic uncertainty', in which the mysterious 
profundity of contingent being is such that, in Balthasar's own words, it "makes it 
impossible to arrive at a definitive solution to a problem. " 16 
'' Th I 125-6; chapter 3 section A2 and BI above; chapter 5 page 159; cf the reciprocal escalation of love 
and hate chapter 6 section C3. 
14 Balthasar: "Theo-logic: On the Work as a Whole" Communio Winter 1993 625 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. (my italics) 
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2 The influence of Przywara 
The pervasive significance of tension, paradox and polarity in Balthasar's work owes 
much to the early and enduring influence of Erich Pryzwara. " The polish philosopher's 
characteristic use of polarity and contradiction (Widerspruch), tension (Spannung) and 
oscillation (Schwingung) `zwischen' opposing poles is related to his methodological 
commitment to the concrete situation in the world, the `sachlichkeit, '$ and also to his 
appreciation for "das Konkretische", 19 which involves giving due attention to the 
puzzling divisions and tensions experienced in the world. 20 The latter also demands 
attentive listening to actual contemporaneous reflection on the reality of being in the 
world, where Przywara encountered a preoccupation with polarity and dialectic in 
different cultural and philosophical schools of thought (such as the polarity of the 
romantics, the dialectic of Kant, of Hegel, of Neitzsche, of Kierkegaard and then that of 
the Protestant `dialectical' theologians of the early twentieth century, all already familiar 
to Balthasar from his doctoral dissertation on eschatological problems in modern 
German Literature). " Bringing the Catholic theological tradition and philosophia 
17 cf chapter 1 section D above. The few works providing a thorough treatment in English are: J Zeitz 
SJ: Spirituality and Analogia Entis according to Erich Przywara SJ (Z) (University Press of America 
1982); AC Bouquet: "A German Catholic Philosophy of Religion" in Theology Vol 29 1934 327-38; 
Neils C Nielsen, Jr: "Przywara's Philosophy of the Analogia Entis" in The Review of Metaphysics Vol 5, 
No 4, June 1952 599-620; Walter Marshall Horton: Contemporary Continental Theology: An 
Interpretation for Anglo-Saxons (SCM London, 1938) 65-84,105,178. cf also Medard Kehl's 
Introduction in The von Balthasar Reader (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1982) 17-21. For Balthasar's own 
summary see his "Erich Przywara" in HJ Schultz: Tendenzen der Theologie im 20 Jahrhundert: Eine 
Geschichte Portrats (EP) 354-359 (Kreuz-Verlag/Walter-Verlag, Stuttgart 1966). 
''This is objectivity or factuality-rather than speculation- `allowing the facts to speak' historically, 
and existentially. 
19This refers to the fact of being in the world, seen, for example, in his anthropological perspective and 
his preoccupation with a creaturely metaphysics. Z 23-26: "Our metaphysics is, according to its formal 
object `creaturely' for it deals with the web of tensions between consciousness and being. " Przywara: 
Analogia Entis 19, cited by Z 126. 
20 eg the `tensions' of body/spirit; man/woman; being/consciousness; ontic/noetic; a priori/a posteriori; 
philosophy/theology. 
2' Geschichte des Eschatologischen Problems in der Modernen Deutschen Literatur (Dissertation, 
Zurich, 1930) completed before his encounter with Przywara. cf P Henrici SJ: "The Philosophy of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar" in DL Schindler, ed.: Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
His Life and his Work (Ignatius, San 
Francisco 1991) 149. This included an outline of the development of philosophy from the middle ages 
to the modern era and a detailed comparative treatment of 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and was finally 
reworked into the three-volume Apokalypse 
der Deutschen Seele. Studien zu einer Lehre von letzen 
Haltungen, with chapters on a variety of idealist thinkers as well as on Kierkegaard, Scheler, Heidegger 
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perennis to his engagement with modem thinkers, Przywara's extensive analysis of the 
history of thought investigates a whole range of contrasting positions" rejecting the 
exclusive pursuit of one particular pole, rather encouraging emphasis on the mutuality of 
the poles-but without suggesting an annihilation of the difference between them. 
Hence the abiding focus on difference, an understanding of unity which embraces an 
oscillation between different poles and proposes a central principle of difference-unity, 
of unity in tension. 
Having initially conveyed this central rhythm of unity in tension by a notion of 
polarity, " his endeavours culminated in the establishment of the analogy of being as "die 
abschließende Formel"2' and the immanent synthesis of Christianity. " In a `multi- 
leveled' analogical interrelation of opposites the horizontal, intra-mundane metaphysical 
`tensions' open up to the `supra-worldly' God-creature analogy, coming `in' from 
`above'26. Here a thinking is revealed which is neither purely ontic nor noetic in starting 
point, neither strictly a priori nor a posteriori, neither simply philosophical nor 
theological, " but a synthesis between opposing approaches, which is an eternal open- 
ended movement (ewige, offenlassende Bewegung). ` Being is not accessible just as 
pure logic29, nor on the other hand as pure contradiction which annihilates logic, " rather 
and Barth. Of course Balthasar's direct engagement with the latter theologian a few years later 
consolidated the influence of his dialectical approach on Balthasar's thought. 
22eg from the mild juxtaposition of Augustine and Thomas to the radical opposition of rationalist and 
fideist; pantheist and theopanist. eg in Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie (1926) cf Bouquet's 
summary in "German" 327-348; also Marshall Horton: "Contemporary" 69-70,73-83 
23 Originating in romantic writers this was developed by Przywara (through contact with other thinkers 
such as Guardini and Newman) (Z 127f) to describe the Augustinian `God in and above us', a living 
unity in tension of divine transcendence and immanence which he established as the "Polaritätsgrund'. 
EP 355; Z 14-15. 
24 EP 356 
25 cf eg Z 119-120 
26 cf Medard Kehl's Introduction in The von Balthasar Reader 20; Z 129,138-155, especially diagram 
on 151 and then the final `levels' of analogy 154-5. 
27 Z 135; 139-149 
28 EP 356 
29This would be the metaphysics of pure identity and the pure stability of Parmenides. It only expresses 
the principle of non-contradiction as identity (what 
is, is), making the principle of non-contradiction a 
thing rather than the basic (minimum) ground of thought. Z 153; EP 356 
30This is the flux of Heraclitus. It dissolves the basic ground (the `minimum' mentioned in preceding 
footnote) necessary to the principle of non-contradiction. Z 153; EP 356 
264 
analogy is the "relationship between identity and contradiction", ` the most fundamental 
of the forms of thinking. " It is the "middle in motion" that Aristotle found between the 
autonomous opposing poles of Heraclitus and Parmenides, which consists in the 
oscillating rhythms between a dynamism beyond (transcending immanence) and a 
receiving from above (immanent transcendence). " In and above this metaphysical 
creaturely analogy comes (from above) the analogy between God and creature, and the 
decisive analogy between the intra-creaturely oscillation and this movement between 
creature and Creator is neither pantheism, nor theopanism, but the Augustinian dynamic 
movement towards God (".. our hearts are restless until they rest in you") and the 
attitude of receptivity in the face of the unattainable. " Crucially he does not want to 
`overview' ("überblicken") the analogy of being, but to recognise `the ever-greater God' 
who, out of every failing attempt of finite thinking on the absolute, shines out all the 
more intangibly. Im Grundbegriff analogia entis means that it is in the essence of the 
creaturely `is'-which is in a state of becoming-to be an `is not' aswell, standing as 
`nothing' in the face of the `Creator out of Nothing'. " It is the crucifixion of the Logos 
that is the key to the analogy of being (as we mentioned in Chapter two36), all `literal' 
concepts being broken and driven into pairs in submission to Christ and, through the 
"flashing contradiction of his cross and resurrection, point to the unfathomable depths 
of God. "37 
31 Z 153 
32 Ibid. 152-3; 158 
33 Z 154 (Analogia Entis 114,121); EP 356 "Only analogy is capable of respecting both extremes (logic 
and dialectics). Logic deals with the immediacy of physical laws. Dialectics is a continual shifting 
between opposites. But analogy alone maintains a measure `equilibrium'... " Analogia Entis 112 cited by 
Z 154. 
34 EP 356 
35 "Im Grundbegriff: das inner geschöpfliche `ist (gilt)' ist sosehr innerlich (im Wesen des `Werdens') ein 
`ist im nicht' ..., 
daß es zwischen-gott-geschöpflich sich als `Nichts' zum `Schöpfer aus dem Nichts' 
verhalt. " cited in EP 357 This 
reminds us of Balthasar's description of our finitude as stretching from 
nothingness to infinity. (cf chapter 4 section 
Cl above; Th II 400f) However it is also not 
unreminiscent of Eckhart's understanding that the creature 
is nothing, which Balthasar rejects. For the 
German mystic being is borrowed, not received as 
its own, and this means there is not a genuine analogy 
of being. cf Th V 436f; 441 
36 section B1 
37 EP 357 
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Przywara's apparent preference for analogy over dialectic and his relation of 
dialectic to analogy is clearly very important for assessing Balthasar's proneness to 
using the language of polar tension. It tends to confirm the possibility that for him 
tension and dialectic are always tension in relation, a way of describing the mystery of 
unity which does not override authentic distinction that runs throughout Catholic 
understanding of the God-world relation and (if Przywara is correct in his analysis) can 
be found throughout the history of thought. His use of paradox and polarity is 
intrinsically related to his use of the analogy of being. 
However, the question is whether Przywara's subordination of dialectic to analogy 
is always clear and decisive. In as much as Przywara's and Balthasar's use of `tension 
terminology' does articulate the basic synthesis of difference in unity that belongs to 
philosophical and Christian reality, it finds a home in the Catholic tradition, even though 
the particular distinctiveness of the synthesis would remain open to discussion. " 
Indeed, it could be recognised to draw attention to the richness of being (which-amidst 
our unified experience of it-confronts us with irreducibly polar characteristics resistant 
to simple reduction into one-sided formulas (for example, flux/static; a priori/a 
posteriori). It could also be understood to offer a clear and profound articulation of the 
relationship of finite being to God's infinite being (God as `Wholly Other' who is `Non- 
Other39) and an articulation of the characteristics peculiar to the `new being' of the 
Christian life in particular (for example the coincidence of freedom-obedience, awe- 
intimacy, poverty-wealth), as well as the unique characteristics of the relationship 
between human nature and its end in grace. 4° Such use of paradox remains significant 
because the Christian synthesis cannot be authentically conveyed if the difference 
between the `opposites' in each `daring integration"' is eliminated (hence the 
significance of the nuptial image of communio42). Such a systematisation43 would risk 
38 cf chapter 1 note 56 
39 eg Th II 193; cf chapter 2 note 96 
40 The fulfilment for which it is made transcends its nature. 
41ThII127 
42 cf chapter 5 note 83 
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neglecting the revelation of the mystery of the love and power of God, "who is able to 
unite things which man regards as incapable of union". ' The continuing use of paradox 
is a ceaseless reminder that what is brought together in the Christian synthesis 
transcends ordinary human conception/speculation of what it is possible to unite (whilst 
simultaneously satisfying the deepest human yearnings). It is therefore also a witness 
to the distinctive power of grace, to the `ever greater' character of revelation. 
Nevertheless the emphasis on difference is noticeable and open to question. A unity 
which does not annihilate difference, a mutuality-which must presuppose enduring 
difference in order for their to be relation at all-is not problematic. However the 
constant reference to tension, oscillation, paradox, opposition can appear to weigh rather 
considerably in favour of contradiction and flux, or at least suggest an over- 
preoccupation with the opposition of the poles. Whilst it is clear in most cases that 
tension is being used in its literal sense of something stretched, pulled in two opposing 
directions, the emphasis on opposition and the cocktail of terminology designating some 
kind of polarity makes it difficult to eschew the shadow of other meanings (tension 
meaning strain or hostility-particularly in view of our main theo-dramatic context 
where dramatic tension does involve conflict and confrontation; oscillation suggesting 
instability, uncertainty, fluctuation and vacillation as well as simply swinging from one 
side to another; paradox meaning something that is self-contradictory as well as 
something seemingly contradictory). Although this ambiguity is not entirely absent 
from the German (where the same variety of word meanings apply), some of the 
particular terminological meanings have a precision which makes it easier to locate the 
intended meaning securely. Interestingly Schwingung (normally translated as 
oscillation) can also refer to an `arched course' such as the extension (Schwingung-sich 
ziehen) of a bridge across a river, connecting with and illuminating Balthasar's usage of 
43 Balthasar refers to the tendency of human speculation "to bring contraries together under one heading" 




Spannung in the christocentric anthropology discussed in chapter six above. More 
significantly, Widerspruch has a philosophical usage that specifically refers to the 
contrast between two phenomena or processes that simultaneously necessitate and 
exclude each other, for example, form and content, essence and phenomenon, capital and 
work. Whilst this certainly exemplifies the need for the English-speaking reader to `get 
under the skin' of a distinctly German heritage and world-view, an association of 
Przywara's usage with this particular philosophical application hardly relieves the 
anxiety that rather much is being made of the necessity of opposition, seeing as this 
Germanic usage is readily associated with philosophical positions in which a necessary 
conflict does lie at the heart of things. 
3 Beyond Przywara? 
As we have already mentioned, Balthasar himself was in fact concerned about what he 
understood to be an unbalanced emphasis on difference in Przywara's understanding of 
analogy, seeking to correct this in his own work. As well as drawing attention to the 
different readings of Lateran IV, ` Balthasar also uncovers a tendency towards the 
Heraclitean pole on Przywara's part in the works following Analogia Entis (which 
Balthasar calls a watershed). There is an attachment to the radicality of creaturely 
difference and the aspect of nothingness. Balthasar rejects this, as we saw in his own 
development of a christological analogy of being, focusing his accolades on the thought 
of Analogia Entis as "das Pharmakon für die Philosophie und Theologie unserer Zeit". 46 
These extremes on Przywara's part temper Balthasar's overall assessment of his Polish 
mentor, such that his awareness of the abiding significance of Przywara-that he is an 
incomparable teacher whose insights every thinking person should think through, but 
then they have to go on alone47-are rather reminiscent of Barth's comments on the 
45 cf chapter 2 note 65 
46 EP 357 Balthasar's italics 
47 Ibid. 359 
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influence that the great protestant dialectician, Kierkergaard, had on him. 48 However it 
remains to be seen whether the later emphasis on the Widerspruchsrhythmus is really so 
very divergent from the main position that Balthasar draws from Przywara. Surely the 
obsession with nothingness was already `simmering' in the thrilling radicality of the 
creaturely `Nothing' in the "als `Nichts' zum `Schöpfer aus dem Nichts"' that we cited 
above and which Przywara, quoted by Balthasar himself, says expresses the very 
"Grundbegriff' of analogia entis? And the oscillation inherent in his conception of 
analogy, that toing and froing between transcending immanence and immanent 
transcendence49 was always rather close to the "either-or of continual shifting between 
opposites" which he says defines dialectics, " and closer to the Heraclitean perpetual 
movement than to the Parmenidian rest. 
Perhaps such dialectical terminology and method of discussion is simply less 
familiar to the Anglo-Saxon audience-although this may no longer be quite so much the 
case if H Slaatte was right in claiming (in 1968) that paradox has become used more 
widely and taken more seriously than ever before in the history of thought. 51 However a 
greater awareness of the background to this terminology only tends to support 
suggestions that dialectic has an intrinsic, weighted significance in Przywara's synthesis. 
Certainly, Marshall Horton (writing in the 1930s) was not slow to make the connection 
with the dialectical method of modern German philosophy, understanding Przywara's 
originality in his adaptation of the ancient topic of analogy and essence and existence to 
this new approach. 52 Bouquet writes of "the strong Hegelian background" to 
Przywara's Religionsphilosophie Katholischer Theologie, citing the use of terminology 
from the Logic and the understanding of process as dialectical. The use of oscillation (as 
48 consider him a teacher into whose school every theologian must go once. Woe to him who has 
missed it! So long as he does not remain in or return to 
it! " Karl Barth: "A Thank you and a Bow. 
Kierkegaard's Reveille" in Canadian Journal of Theology XI n1 Jan 1965 3-7 here 6, a translation of 
Barth's address at Copenhagen in 1963 at his reception of the 
Sonning Prize for outstanding development 
to European Culture by the University and City of Copenhagen. Barth also questioned the idea of giving 
predominance to Kierkegaard's "contrasts, contradictions and precipices" 
(5). 
9 cf eg Z 154-5 
50 AE 112 cited by Z 154 
S' The Pertinence of the Paradox (Humanities Press, New York 1968) 1 
269 
`driving' (cause) the different modes of thought) and Spannung (as holding together 
polar opposites) are specifically associated with this same Hegelian background, " 
although this is considered to be a methodological association, and (even at this 
methodological level) dialectic is (seen to be) ultimately subordinated to analogy. This 
recognition of an indisputable link with dialectical thinking but at the service of analogy 
seems to me to give us an important perspective, suggesting that we are not so much 
dealing with a balanced weder Logos.. . weder 
dialectic, but a definite opting for dialectic, 
within and ordered to analogy. Even if dialectic only makes a take over bid in the later 
work (after Analogia Entis) it clearly has a position of significance right from the start: 
there is never an equal weighting of identity and contradiction. 
So if there is a tendency for Przywara's formulation to lead to an exaggeration of 
dissimilarity it is not so easy to pin down where this tendency begins and ends and it is 
difficult to envisage how Balthasar could avoid entirely an emphasis so bound to the 
main thesis. The necessary `greater dissimilarity' that rightly belongs to the essentially 
unequal and asymmetric `analogy of being' between God and creature seems to be 
replicated in an overemphasis on dissimilarity in all conceptual analysis of reality-as if 
an inevitable consequence of using analogy as the rule of all metaphysics. 
That Balthasar's adoption of Przywara's analogy does not entirely avoid an over 
preponderance of tension and difference in reality itself, is perhaps suggested by his 
favourable attitude towards Przywara's understanding that all concepts must be broken 
into contrasting pairs (by passing through the contradiction of the cross/resurrection 
dialectic) if they are to provide theological service, implying a significantly negative 
attitude to our finite concepts per se, as though their incompleteness and need of 
redemption leaves them completely flawed in themselves. 
54 This sense is reinforced by 
the tendency to associate contradiction with finitude as much as with sin that we 
52 Marshall Horton: "Contemporary" 73 
53 Bouquet: "German" 329 
sa B 357 Balthasar's description of the crucified Logos as the one who puts to shame "all the `logical' 
ways of man" ( "Fides Christi" in ET 
11 74) also brings Przywara to mind. 
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discussed in chapter six. Moreover it is in the anthropology of Theo-drama 11-the 
topic in which Przywara's contribution survives Balthasar's critique to be chosen as the 
main models- that we find exaggerated attention to contradiction in the very synthesis 
that Balthasar systematically brings to Przywara's analogia entis: that of the person of 
Christ. In him the natural human tensions (spannung) find their answer, not in being 
resolved, but in an Überspannung in him, a hyper or heightened tension which he 
shows not to be destructive but livable. It is interesting that earlier, in his book on Karl 
Barth, the same word Überspannung is used to refer to an exaggerated perspective in 
Barth's christology. 56 But here in the tensions of the Theo-drama Balthasar makes 
exaggeration his own. 
The persisting preoccupation with dialectic within the preference for analogy gives it 
a kind of universal significance for all areas of theological description, without proper 
differentiation. We have already mentioned the ambiguity inherent in a number of the 
characteristic terms employed by Przywara and absorbed into Balthasar's expression 
too. The slippery nature of the meaning conveyed by such terminology is illustrated by 
Balthasar's own usage of the term Widerspruch when writing of the very "Grundklang' 
of Przywara's position. In the same sentence a negative usage of Widerspruch 
describing creaturely opposition to God ("... mit der verzweifelt sich wehrenden, 
widersprechenden Kreatur, deren Widerspruch und Widerstand... ")57 comes right on the 
heels of a positive usage describing the authentic difference between God and the world 
as "Einheit Gottes mit der Welt im Widerspruch". There is no allusion to the different 
kinds of opposition being placed together in this summary, albeit understood that the 
latter embraces the former, which is overcome in the cross of God himself, making 
possible the nuptial union between God and creature. Where traditionally theology has 
tended to use words like contradiction and opposition of sin, here the words embrace a 
more fundamental, intrinsic characteristic of intra-mundane and God-world relations. In 
ss cf Th 11 355; cf chapter 6 section B above 
56 KB 242, (KBD 253). 
57 EP 358 
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the use of tension and dialectic made by these writers there is a general failure to account 
clearly for the difference between tensions inherent in being/reality and those resulting 
from sin. Not only does tying down Balthasar's treatment of sin in the Theo-drama 
involve isolating it from its sometimes confused relation to the contradictions of natural 
finitude, we have seen how sin itself, the no, the contradiction is in fact intrinsic to 
Balthasar's picture of things. It is not to be isolated from the divine plan, indeed it 
belongs so very much to it that Balthasar can even say that God took account of it in the 
very act of creation. 
Similarly we have also seen how thoroughly being is pervaded by its very opposite, 
extinction58-indeed to the extent that the generation of life (and the sexual faculty that 
makes it possible) is understood through its relation to death. 59 There is a natural 
orientation to termination imaging the `good' death of the letting be of the Trinity, an 
imaging which can mean self-surrender to annihilation, " this centrality of death in life 
and the understanding of its relationship to self-surrender not being unrelated to 
Heidegger's. 6' Death is life's tragic destiny, Christ's life being supremely a "life for 
death", 62 such that the "form of his dying. . . 
is the form and rationale of his living", 63 a 
dying undergirding all other deaths, "the abyss of tragedy beyond all tragedy". ' Indeed, 
if we recall the discussion of the development from Przywara's cross-centred analogy to 
Balthasar's christological analogia entis, 65 in the end it can hardly be said that 
Balthasar's christocentrism has completely left behind the emphasis on contradiction 
and difference issuing from Przywara's focus on the cross as the central revelation of 
analogy in the Son's adoption of radical difference to God. For as we saw in chapter six, 
58cf the significance of death in the threefold anthropological polarity in chapter 6 section B; cf also 
section C3; also Th I 369-408 especially 377f: "life is `saturated with death' (Tennessee Williams). " 
59 cf chapter 6 section B2 above 
60 Man in History 220; Th V 101 
61 Th V 323f 
62 Man. 222; R Gawronski observes that it is in his suffering flesh that Christ is most flesh, that his 
concrete form is heightened to concretissimum, for suffering is the heart of the reality of the world. "Jesus 
Christ Crucified Foundation of the Cosmos" Communio 23 summer 1996 345,349. 
63 Th V 324 Regarding the relationship between active and passive death cf Th 1370,384,392 
64 ET 166; Th 1429 
65 cf chapter 2 above. 
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in the Theo-drama it is the forsakeness of the cross that is the supreme revelation of 
relationship, for it is the revelation of the relationship between Father and Song (in 
which all other relationships are contained) and of all nearness to and distance from God. 
Extreme paradox lies at the heart of it, the abandonment verging on contradiction where 
"what is `experienced' is the opposite of what the facts indicate" and it is just as 
possible to say that the forsakeness was the opposite of hell as to say it was hell. 67 
C "Eternal separation in God9968 What is Balthasar 
doing to the Trinity? 
These last points remind us that in the end the dialectic of Przywara is not the final 
influence in Balthasar's understanding of unity in distinction, but rather a more 
fundamental difference and separation: that within God himself 69 This is developed in 
Balthasar's rich, speculative theology of the Trinity, going back as far as Wahrheit 
(1946), 7° in an understanding that there is paradox in the Trinity, a trinitarian 'diastase' 
which is the condition of the possibility of any contradiction at all, such that all 
intramundane contradiction is grounded trinitarianly. 
As our topic is not Balthasar's doctrine of God we do not intend to set out a 
detailed critique of his doctrine of the Trinity, but having studied his understanding of 
the nature-grace relationship we put forward as one of our main concerns regarding his 
whole understanding of the God-world relationship the extraordinary implications it has 
for his doctrine of God. Ultimate sense is made of the world, its inherent tensions, its 
relationship to God (not least the nature-grace relationship) with reference to tensions 
and separations in the Godhead. Meanwhile, whilst the divine persons are thus 
stretched apart, the bond between the second person of the Trinity and the created 
66 Rowan Williams points out that this is close to a Lutheran position. `Afterword' to Gardner, Moss, 
9uash, Ward: Balthasar at the end of Modernity (T &T Clark, Edinburgh 1999) 178 
6 Th IV 336 
68 Ibid. 327 
69 Although this may have initially been influenced by Przywara's understanding that God is the ground 
of polarity and that there is no distance greater than the inner-divine distance. cf Th V 479-481 
70cf Th 11258 
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world is elaborated. It appears that to explain worldly contradiction (including that of 
sin) Balthasar has introduced it into God (and so no wonder there is confusion between 
`natural' tension and the tensions belonging to sin). Worldly contradiction is thus made 
an imago trinitatis (whereas in fact one could argue he has thus constructed a doctrine of 
the Trinity which is made in imago mundi with its distances, tensions and 
contradictions). Similarly the core features of creaturely existence are elucidated by 
locating them prototypically (in a special divine version) in the eternal Son, but when 
we talk of the Son's receptivity and obedience can we be sure that Balthasar has not 
made the Son in the image of a creature rather than the other way round? 
Strangely Balthasar does not present his trinitarian innovations as revolutionary. 
They are unobtrusive, subtle, and are conveyed in a style more akin to mystical 
contemplation than provocative thesis. They come across as a perspective that 
radically deepens rather than overturns traditional understanding. But what Balthasar is 
doing with the doctrine of the Trinity is undoubtedly revolutionary. For in addition to 
rejecting separation of the discussion of De Deo Uno and De Deo Trino, and giving his 
doctrine of the Trinity a number of distinctive features (including eternal happening, " 
`eternal time' and 'space', 72 prayer 7' requeSt'74 permission '75 consideration '76 the 
virtues") we have found that Balthasar is actually asserting that in the God who "is 
one"78 there is distance, `gaps'. Notwithstanding Balthasar's qualifications that this is a 
unique kind of distance, " transcended in the Godhead as the `gift' the three persons 
"This is the interpersonal toing and froing of the triune life identified with eternal being/essence in God. 
Th V 66f 
72 ('letting be') Ibid. 91-95 
73 Ibid. 96 
74 Ibid. 88 
75 Ibid. 87 
76 Ibid. 89 
" Ibid. 97 
78 Dt 6,4; Mk 12 29,32; cf also 1 Cor 8,4; Roms 3,29-30; Eph 4,6 
79It is "incomprehensible and unique"; an infinite otherness of infinite loving relation which grounds and 
surpasses both all we understand by separation and all we understand 
by relationship. (Th IV 325) There 
is the greatest imaginable opposition for the sake the most intimate mutual 
interpenetration. (II 258) See 
also chapter 2 note 113 above. 
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have in common,, " and a distance not in opposition to the closeness of the 
circumincessio, 8' it is still diastase, "eternally confirmed and maintained". 82 Balthasar 
has specifically chosen to introduce this term which has no history of trinitarian 
application and to support it with explicit reference to separation, " a "gulf"' an 
"absolute, infinite 'distance""' in God. Emphasis on the distinctiveness of the divine 
persons is thus taken to such an extreme that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
square it with their ontological unity, and the paradox of the one in three verges on 
contradiction. 
There is an extraordinary absence of debate on Balthasar's part over what is 
manifestly a radical thesis, sitting uncomfortably with (if not contraverting) the 
Christian tradition of `credo in unum Deum'86 and indeed directly opposing patristic 
teaching that there is no diastase in God. 87 This failure on the part of the theologian of 
patristic retrieval to engage fully with the tradition at this point-even if 
critically-stands in contrast to the way he treats his innovations with regard to 
Christ's adoption of sinful human nature, where he is explicit about the way he builds 
on and goes beyond the teaching of the Fathers. 88 And we cannot doubt that Balthasar 
was completely aware of the full force of the term diastase. In an early theological 
essay he laments and argues for an end to the diastase that, negatively, divided theology 
and spirituality. " What he then considered detrimental to the unity of two spheres of 
80Th III 333 
81 Th V 94 Whilst acknowledging Balthasar's divergence from the tradition here in as much as Thomas 
ruled out the use of the terms separation and division, Dalzell finds Balthasar's rejection of tritheism and 
his assertion of the oneness of the divine freedom adequate defence against the accusation that he 
compromises the unity of the Godhead. Dramatic 164f, 186f, 193. 
82Th IV 333 
83 Ibid. 327 
84 Ibid. 326 
85 Ibid. 323 
86 The Nicene-Constantinople Symbol of Faith (cf also Toledo Symbol 675; Lateran Symbol 1215; 
Profession of Faith of Pius IV 1564; Profession of Faith of Paul VI 1968); Catechism of the Catholic 
Church 199-202,222,228. 
87See chapter 2 section C above 
88See chapter 6 section D2 above 
89 "Theologie und Spiritualität" in Gregorianum 50 1969 571-586 collected in Einfaltungen Auf Wegen 
christlicher Einigung (Kösel-Verlag 
München 1969) (English translation: Convergences to the Sources of 
Christian Mystery (Ignatius, San Francisco 1984) translated by EA Nelson) 
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human activity is now considered unproblematic to the unique unity of the One God. 
Whilst account must be taken of Balthasar's programme of combining metaphysics and 
metaphor in God-talk, the employment of diastasis by no means slips tidily into the 
category of image (as might be said of the use of `prayer' or `surprise'), being delineated 
in terms of analogy, as we have seen. 
There is a similar failure to acknowledge fully the controversial nature of the 
subsequent teaching, resting on diastase, that this `holy separation' and `opposition' of 
the divine persons grounds sinful opposition, such that the God of love is likewise the 
ground of sin, suffering, the cross and hell, all of which are therefore given a place 
intrinsic to the divine plan, taken account of in creation, and indeed before. Not only 
does this stretch paradox (and God) to the point of incoherence, it has enormous 
implications for the kind of God we are talking about-a loving God who includes 
suffering in his eternal plan? It raises questions about his immutability and 
impassibility, " and about the ultimate origin of evil. Do Balthasar's efforts to engage 
with modem understandings of freedom, evil and God, in which "it is God who bears 
the contradiction (including hell) in himself', " end up resembling them rather too 
closely? Balthasar is happier to discuss other, related, controversial features of his 
doctrine of the Trinity, such as limitation, event/'happening' and `development' in 
God. 92 
Finally, if we are concerned about how the doctrine of God comes out of Balthasar's 
theology of the God-world relationship, then it is our understanding of the person of the 
Son that is most in jeopardy. We saw in Part I how it was a strictly christological 
doctrine of creation that made possible a new christocentic perspective on the 
90 See Th 11 280; IV 327-8 Here it does seem that in order to guarantee drama in God, there needs to be a 
potential in him to suffer ("there is something 
in God that can develop into suffering"), which is only 
fulfilled in the context of the creation of the world. cf Th V 13,506-520 esp. 512ff A detailed study can 
be found in G O'Hanlon: The Immutability of God in the Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990). 
91 Th I 48-9; cf 66 (Hegel's idea of the tragedy played 
in the absolute); 520 (Jung's "projection onto God 
of a polarity structure that is typical of the creature". 
); Dalzell: "The Enrichment of God" 4 (Moltmann's 
"Hegelian assimilation of the process of the world to the 
inner history of God"). 
92See eg Th V66ff, 71 
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relationship between nature and grace. However the nature of the increasingly intense 
and consistent association of the Son with creation found in the Theo-drama-as 
divinity in tropos of receptivity and obedience, " as the world's idea in whose eternal 
receipt of Godhead (begetting) creation's receipt of existence and its divinization is 
contained94-when combined with his emphatic separation from the Father can leave us 
feeling less than sure which is the greater: the distance between creation and the divine 
Son (who is God) or the distance between the Son and the Father. 95 The Father-Son 
distinction and the Infinite freedom/finite freedom distinction are not sufficiently 
distinguished. In the many associations of the Son and creation this latter fundamental 
distinction between the Father-Son distinction and the creature-God distinction is rarely 
mentioned and does not form part of the unfolding description and emphasis. It is not 
the case that Balthasar is `promoting' creation to the same status as the Logos. He is 
explicit in asserting the non-divinity of creation96 (although there are places where his 
trinitarian location of creation leaves his expression more ambiguous than it could be97), 
and the share that finite beings have of the divine Sonship is clearly adoptive and never 
93Th 11 267; 261 (chapter 4 section BI above) This is emphatic: "the Son... cannot be and possess the 
absolute nature of God except in the mode of receptivity. " (IV 325-326); cf also "Nine propositions on 
Christian Ethics" in Principles of Christian Morality (San Francisco, 1976) 82; Th 11 267; III 520ff; IV 
330; V 248 (chapter 5 section D2 above). 
94See chapter 2 section C; chapter 5 section C and F above. Balthasar uses the same language of `given 
not just lent' of the gifts of freedom and grace (Th 11 428; 290; V 109; Engagement 25) and the Son's 
`gift' of divinity (Th IV 325). Also compare the Son's receipt of the Spirit in his relation to the Father 
(V 104) and a human being's receipt of the Spirit in his birth from God (III 36 note 1). 
9s Indeed whilst God is `non-other' vis-ä-vis us, there is infinite otherness between Father and Son. (See 
chapter 2 section C above) 
96This emphasis is evident throughout his work because of the centrality of the analogy of being. We 
therefore just give a couple of examples: "we are creatures and not the eternal Logos. " Th 111 229 note 68 
"Between the divine and created natures there is an essential abyss. It cannot be circumvented. " 111 220 
97When talking about the creature receiving itself he says "here the gift of God separates itself from God 
as the fruit separates itself from the tree" (Th 11 288), as though the 
human creature-God relationship was 
the same kind of organic emanation as there is between a plant and 
its produce. But "the idea that the 
world and man have developed out of God "is precisely the "perversion" of 
Christianity that he wants to 
reject (II 420), although he is not unaware of 
how easily Christian formulation can be thus distorted 
("Given the Christian assertion that man in Christ "is born of God", why should he not be ultimately of 
divine nature himself? "). Whether he is aware that 
his own expression might lend itself to this kind of 
interpretation is another matter. Tellingly his reflection on how the nothingness out of which the world 
is made is located in infinite freedom itself winds up with the position of 
Scotus Erigena whose 
identification of this `nothingness' and God himself yielded pantheistic conclusions (which of course 
Baithasar does not adopt, but neither is he here explicit in his rejection of them. ) (11 265-266) 
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causes the analogy of being to break down. 98 However it is less easy to defend him 
against some kind of subordinationism, perhaps of an Arian hue, 99 however inadvertent. 
We have already seen how his outworking of the idea that the nature-grace relationship 
specifically images the relationship of the divine persons suggests an inequality between 
the Father and the Son. '°° If it is the case, as we tentatively suggest, that as a result of 
trying to provide a detailed account of worldly characteristics and processes as an image 
of the Trinity these same features are projected onto God (in a mysterious, paradoxical 
form-where for example distance can mean a superlative form of closeness), then it is 
the Son, as the image after whom creation is made, who is the greatest casualty. He 
above all is the receptacle of all the creaturely characteristics-receptivity, 
responsiveness, obedience, gender differentiation and so on-so that distinguishing his 
attitude towards the Father from the creaturely attitude becomes extremely difficult. As 
Balthasar himself puts it in the context of the finite-infinite freedom relationship: 
The crux is that it is extremely hard to see how the Son, who "receives" Godhead, and 
hence eternal freedom, from the Father (and so seems to be closely related to the 
creature), can nonetheless possess this infinite freedom in the same sovereign manner 
(albeit in the mode of obedience ) as the Father. 
Is 
`having-life-in himself' sufficient to distinguish the Son from the creature if, on the 
other hand, like the creature, he does not seem to possess this interior freedom `of 
himself ? 10' 
Balthasar goes on to uphold the Son-creature distinction in this context on the basis that 
the Son's self-reception from the Father is the receipt of "the originless, self-possessing 
God, that is, the fullness of being". "' Such possession of the `form of God' ("in very 
truth") is the necessary presupposition of his incarnational kenosis (otherwise his 
adoption of the form of a servant would not be a self-emptying but like the creature's 
98eg Th 11 241-242 
99 He specifically denies an Arian interpretation of `happening' 
in the Trinity, ie happening understood as 
a coming to be of something that once was not 
(Th V 67,497; II 261). However our concern is an 
unintentional conflation of the Father-son and 
God-world distinction. Interestingly it is to Eckhart, 
whose exact influence on Balthasar is often so 
hard to pin down, that he attributes (and rejects) a teaching 
in which the Son and the world have moved too close together. 
(V 442) 
'°°See chapter 4 section E above 
101Th 11 267 
102Ibid. 267-268 
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who simply "comes into being in this state"). "' However this distinction is complicated 
by the fact that the Son's self-emptying and adoption of the sinful human state has a 
primal place in the inner life of the Trinity and belongs to his person (which is identical 
with his mission) from eternity. 10' Moreover such a clarification of the creature-son 
distinction does not of course account for the radical distance between the Father and 
the Son; but nor, however, does it ameliorate the emphasis on the Son's indebtedness 
and obedience as his very tropos, his identity. Is such a relationship to the Father 
compatible with possession of the very form of God and his infinite freedom? (or to put 
it in the terms of the passage quoted above: can there be an `obedient-sovereign' 
possession of infinite freedom? ) Finally, when we recall that elsewhere Balthasar uses 
the same scriptural phrase he here applies to the Son-"to have life in himself'-to 
describe creaturely receipt of grace10' the distinction between the Son's receipt of the 
fullness of divine being and the creature's receipt of divine being (in the grace of 
participation) does not seem quite so clear. 
We have suggested the possibility that at least part of the motivation for the Father- 
Son diastase is to explain the diastase between the world and God. 106 In the end, are the 
two diastases really different? "' Or is this strange distinction in God which is never 
fully explained really just the God-world distinction, so important to Balthasar, 
introduced into God, in an effort to establish its ground? After all, if John Damascene is 
right and there is no God-God diastase, then this is the only diastase available. Some 
kind of conflation of the two diastases-God-world, Father-Son-would certainly be 
consistent with our concerns that descriptions of the second person of the 
Trinity seem 
to bring him onto our side of the God-creature divide. Of course one of the main 
'o3Ibid. 268 
104See chapter 6 section D2 above 
'°5 h 111 35-36; (see chapter 5 section B2 above) 
106 "Without this personal distance in the circumincessio of the Persons it would 
be impossible to 
understand either the creature's distance 
from God or the Son's economic distance from the Father". (Tb 
V 98 cf also 94; II 261) Similarly the fact that there are 
in the Trinity in a `supra-essential' way such 
things as process, distance, surprise-all those things 
known in the creaturely sphere permeated with 
potentiality, facilitates understanding 
how creatures can be embedded in God so as to attain perfection 
without losing their creaturely nature. cf 
V 394 
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difficulties with identifying such a confusion between the God-God and the God-world 
distinction in Balthasar is that it would fly in the face of the law of the analogy of being 
so important to him, and Balthasar is well aware that the "temptation to equate the 
distance between God and the creature with the `distance' found within the Trinity" is 
soundly quashed by the Fourth Lateran Council's definition. "' But what of the 
temptation to equate the God-God distinction with the God-world distance? That is 
more the problem for Balthasar. Fully answering these questions belongs to another 
study, but they emerge as critical implications of Balthasar's treatment of our topic. 
107Balthasar of course denies they are the same (Th 11 266). But can we clearly 
distinguish the two? 
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